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Dedication
First, this is dedicated to my family who has 
been patient and supportive throughout the 
overall journey during the development of 
this book and also of my overall research 
path. Second, this is dedicated to the many 
colleagues I’ve worked with over the years. 
While this is a job that provides the finances 
for us to survive, I absolutely love the topic 
and working through the challenges of 
clarifying an implementation of the concepts 
and working with a wide range of colleagues 
from all over the world.
This book is also dedicated in remembrance 
of several key scholar mentors:
Ed Mather (1937–2010)
My first opportunity to return to academia 
was when in 2003, he asked me to develop an 
online graduate course for the Master of 
Science in Food Safety Program. Along the 
way, he helped me see the opportunity in 
academia and navigate through Michigan 
State University. His encouragement and 
guidance were critical to me, getting through 
my Ph.D. and providing a realistic 
perspective on what I could expect from my 
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appointments. He served as one of my Ph.D. 
committee members and my first supervisor 
in the MSU Master of Science in Food Safety 
Program. Previously, he was chair of the 
Department of Large Animal Clinical 
Sciences, associate dean for Research and 
Graduate Studies, director of the National 
Food Safety and Toxicology Center, and 
director of the Master of Science in Food 
Safety Program.
Don DeKieffer (1946–2011)
After meeting at an Anti-counterfeiting 
Conference, he was an early mentor that 
provided tremendous insight into the very 
first prevention strategies. A key point was 
“don’t start with trying to stop all 
counterfeiting, get them to stop knocking you 
off!” His wide range of Washington 
experiences were especially insightful and 
valuable including having served on the 
professional staff of the US Senate 
Republican Policy Committee, as general 
counsel to the Office of the US Trade 
Representative, and then as a founding 
partner of deKieffer & Horgan law firm. In 
parallel, he led the EDDI, Inc., working on 
databases relating to counterfeiters and 
diverters.
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Foreword
This book deals with a crucial matter regarding food. The problem of food fraud, 
unfortunately, has been with us as long as the history of food trade. The oldest 
recorded food laws attempt to deter it. In Babylon, you might be thrown into the 
Euphrates with a millstone around your neck for the adulteration of flour. In the 
fourth century BC, the Greek Theophrastus reported on the use of food adulterants 
for economic reasons in Enquiry into Plants. Pliny the Elder in Natural History 
provides evidence of widespread adulteration, such as bread adulterated with chalk 
to make it whiter and pepper adulterated with juniper berries in economic fraud.
John Spink brings an important perspective to this field. Food lawyers tend to 
look at food fraud from a legal liability viewpoint. Yet, reputational damage can far 
exceed the penalties in the laws. Food safety experts tend to approach the topic as 
health and safety risks. Yet, the clever fraudsters seek economic advantage and may 
present to health risk. Food scientists see the challenges in standards, detection, and 
testing. Yet, there can be adulterated food that contains no adulterant. Criminologists 
see motive and opportunity. Yet, the nature of supply chains can muddle such analy-
sis. To deal with these seeming contradictions, John Spink brings a multidisciplinary 
approach to the topic.
The problem of food fraud is global in nature. Food fraud concerns public health 
but goes beyond to economic loss and harm to consumer confidence in individual 
companies and also loss of confidence in the integrity of the food supply. This has 
been with us since the beginning of food trade and will be with us as long as there 
is a trade in food. Knowledge is the key to food fraud prevention. And there has 
never been a better time for this book.
John Spink’s footprints on the field of food fraud circle the globe. He is in such 
demand as a speaker; it can be hard to catch up with him even while working at the 
same university. Fortunately, we have his book.
Neal D. Fortin, J.D.
Director, Institute for Food Laws and Regulations (IFLR)
Professor, Food Science and Human Nutrition, College of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources
Michigan State University
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Food fraud has emerged as a serious food safety risk that ranks as one of the biggest 
concerns for both the food industry and government regulators. Food fraud, includ-
ing economically motivated adulteration, is also a top concern with consumers. 
Food fraud is the intentional adulteration for economic gain, a food defense incident 
is intentional adulteration to cause harm, and a food safety incident is unintentional 
adulteration resulting in unintentional harm. However, in the case of food fraud, 
even though the motivation is economic gain, it can result in public health harm. 
The threat of food fraud is not addressed in conventional food safety and food 
defense management systems and need to be considered separately.
Dr. John Spink has been a leading researcher in the area of food fraud and has worked 
closely with the industry to develop vulnerability assessments. His work has helped the 
industry and governments to more effectively identify and manage the root cause of 
this criminal activity. There is a necessity to continue to address the core problem 
behind food fraud and develop a preventative system approach to combatting food fraud.
As the former Cargill Incorporated Vice President of Corporate Food Safety, 
Quality and Regulatory Affairs and the current Chairman of the Global Food Safety 
Initiative Board of Directors, I am keenly aware of the importance and challenges of 
dealing with food fraud. I lived through the melamine crisis as it impacted the 
industry in China and the United States. Food fraud undermines all of our efforts 
around food safety and food defense, and we must be able to impart trust in the 
integrity of our supply networks around the world.
This book focuses on tools that enable solutions to more effectively identify and 
manage the risks of food fraud. It covers all the activities focused on prevention 
starting with the criminal motivation through the responsibility of companies, from 
the boardroom to the factory floor to the farm. This groundbreaking textbook pro-
vides a full picture of food fraud and is filled with tools that companies can use to 
establish preventative systems and train employees to deal with this real threat to the 
integrity and safety of our food supply around the world.
Mike Robach
Chairman, Board of Directors, Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)
Former VP of Food Safety, Quality and Regulatory, Cargill Incorporated
Foreword
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Food fraud is an extremely important and challenging problem for the food industry 
and for national administrations worldwide. It is an issue that has received particular 
focus in the European Union—following some high profile, high visibility, highly 
disruptive incidents—such as the presence of horse meat in internationally avail-
able, commercially recognizable meatballs.
While the horsemeat incident is often thought of as the first major international 
food fraud event, there have been an increasing series of concerns in recent years. 
There are a wide range of food fraud incidents that deceive the consumer and are inju-
rious to public health. These can range from counterfeit alcoholic beverages, to species 
swapping and adulteration of meat products, and to counterfeit country of origin prod-
ucts. These pose many problems that not only have the potential to cause harm to 
consumers but may also result in reputational damage to a company or food sector, 
cause loss of profits and market share, lead to the fall or collapse of a share price, result 
in loss of market access, and can have political and economy-wide impacts.
In my regulatory role, over the past 35  years—more recently as Executive 
Chairman of the Sea Fisheries Protection Authority, and now in my current role as 
Director of Audit and Investigations with the Food Safety Authority of Ireland 
(FSAI)—I have witnessed the increasing sophistication and dangers of food fraud. 
The FSAI has recognized the need for multi-disciplinary multi-agency coordinated 
enforcement action in tackling food crime.
In order to lead the fight against fraudsters that operate within our food supply 
chains, we have engaged in many collaborative international networks such as the 
EU Food Integrity Project, the Interpol Intellectual Property Crime College (where 
I first met the author Dr. Spink at the 2013 conference in Dublin), INTERPOL/
Europol Operation Opson, and in the EU Food Fraud Network. This broad set of 
experiences has led us to understand the complexity and challenge of not only 
detecting and deterring food fraud but also of preventing it from occurring.
This publication will be a benefit to and support for those involved as practitio-
ners in the areas of food safety control, to the investigators of food fraud, and to the 
prosecutors of apparent wrongdoing. This book provides access to the concept and 
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breadth of what is defined as food fraud, and it applies its usefulness as a tool of 
insight as much to the seasoned practitioner as to the student of a number of codes.
Food fraud is not a new problem, but tackling it is a new discipline. This book 
makes it clear that it involves cooperation across a multitude of codes and professions, 
across industries, and across borders. As a concept which is evolved and understood, 
food fraud is given a solid foundation in this publication—this book uses a bedrock of 
established principles to guide us through the complex areas of understanding and 
strategy to tackle food fraud—for the danger, menace, and crime that it is.
Dr. Spink tells us that prevention is as important as the pursuit of the wrongdoers, 
when in pursuit the investigator needs to be as strategic as a chess player, and that 
targeting the reduction of opportunities for such fraud to exist is a paramount 
focus—with significant emphasis being placed by the author on the ‘who is likely 
to commit it’ pattern of thought, which investigators and lawmakers must focus on.
Traceability within and a transparency of the supply chain are deemed important 
and vital in the narrative of this book. In that regard, international relationships are 
deemed vital, as is a tailored risk assessment model for this area—rather than an 
imported model from other food control areas.
In recent years, food fraud has received increasing public and media attention 
and has been the focus of many academic articles and books. Dr. John Spink is a 
leading author in this field and has contributed enormously to the area of food fraud 
detection, management, and prevention. There is an increasing awareness of the 
need for a more wide-ranging and comprehensive consideration of the root causes 
of food fraud. This book examines the essential areas of food fraud prevention; 
demonstrates the need for advanced decision-making in the public and private sec-
tors; addresses the need for industry to have processes in place to identify, assess, 
and control vulnerabilities, and discusses the application of criminological theory 
and the necessity to map and understand food supply chains.
The distinction is clearly made between the use of risk analysis in the management 
of food safety and the evaluation and control of vulnerabilities in the management of 
food fraud. All these areas are brought together in this book to provide an excellent text 
for understanding food fraud prevention and will act as a valuable resource for regula-
tors, the food industry, the academic community, researchers, and students alike.
Over the years, Dr. Spink has been a leader and partner for a wide range of food 
fraud–related groups, and this textbook is the summary of those interactions and 
insights. This book advances food fraud prevention as a specific area of study and 
will support the development of a more strategic approach in the fight against food 
crime. This book provides useful tools for those wishing to reduce the food fraud 
opportunity and to protect consumer health and interests.
Peter Whelan
Director of Audit and Investigations, Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI)
Irish Food Fraud Contact Point, Food Fraud Network, European Union
Irish Representative, Operation OPSON, INTERPOL/Europol
Advisory Board Member, EU Food Integrity Project
Advisory Board Member, EU Food Smartphone Project
FSAI lead for the Codex e-Working Group on Food Fraud
FSAI representative on the Food Industry Intelligence Network (FIIN)
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Preface
 Summary
This book is the culmination of a wide range of activities from outreach, research, 
and teaching. It provides a broad “education” foundation on the topics with practi-
cal application “training” to implement a practical Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, 
lays out an extremely interdisciplinary foundation to help address food fraud pre-
vention, and presents a rational approach that applies sound science to evaluate the 
solution, understand how the countermeasures and control systems work, establish 
a first financial and accounting base in enterprise risk management, explore the 
efficiency of those activities, and then help decide on the course of action that best 
protects consumers. We’ve only just begun the journey to address food fraud pre-
vention—we’re only at the starting line—getting here was the easy part, and now 
the hard work begins. This book is one tool for understanding a holistic and all- 
encompassing perspective on the multidisciplinary Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
 Food Fraud Prevention Research Development
The research on food fraud has constantly been evolving, and until recently an inter-
disciplinary, holistic, and all-encompassing book—let alone a textbook—on the 
topic was not warranted since it would be out of date as soon as it was written. Over 
time, there has been enough research and publication on establishing a broad and 
theoretically sound foundation that a textbook is now appropriate. This book will 
cover the foundational principles and theories, not the current trends or hot topics. 
To be clear, our previous MSU research did not create the food fraud term or 
research area but did help formalize this as a holistic and all-encompassing disci-
pline. When conducting various projects, our team found that there had not been 
research on defining the topic or publishing the details of the problem. Those find-
ings provided the motivation for our 2011 journal article “Defining the Public 
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Health Threat of Food Fraud,” which was the first research project and article 
focused on examining and publishing an explicit definition. While there were previ-
ously published uses of the food fraud term, critically reviewing the definition and 
scope was not the focus of a research project but were included as an assumption in 
the background or introduction section of a scholarly publication.
Our research and experience at the Food Fraud Initiative (FFI) at Michigan State 
University (MSU) has provided a unique opportunity to be involved in some of the 
very first food fraud prevention activities, such as with GFSI, ISO, Codex 
Alimentarius, FDA, INTERPOL, European Union, other Universities, associations, 
and others. Over time, our position as scientists “representing the discipline of Food 
Fraud Prevention” has enabled us to collaborate with many of the US and interna-
tional thought leaders and committee or advisory group activities.
This MSU research began in 2005 with a focus on intellectual property rights 
product counterfeiting in my 2009 Ph.D. dissertation “Introducing the Counterfeit 
Product Risk Model (CPRM)” (see the Risk Assessment Application chapter) 
(Spink 2009). In parallel, I was teaching graduate courses in food safety starting in 
2004. That early dissertation research—combined with graduate course develop-
ment and teaching in the MSU Food Safety Program, MSU School of Packaging, 
and the MSU School of Criminal Justice—led to a focus on a wide range of prod-
ucts such as pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics, luxury goods, and food. 
Specific activities included developing and teaching graduate courses such as 
“Packaging for Food Safety” in 2005 and “Anti-Counterfeit and Product Protection” 
in 2008, which covers all products and intellectual property rights infringement. 
This wide range of activities brought to light an unmet need in prevention of “food 
counterfeiting” which evolved into “Food Fraud Prevention.”
In 2013, there was an opportunity to shift the FFI activities from the School of 
Criminal Justice in the College of Social Science back to its original academic home 
of the Master of Science in Food Safety Program and the College of Veterinary 
Medicine (CVM), where we were able to focus completely on food fraud and pre-
vention. During that transition, the MSUglobal team provided critical insight and 
support by supporting the development of the Massive Open Online Course 
(MOOC) concept, leading to the development of the www.FoodFraud.msu.edu 
website, and encouraging and supporting the blog posts. The shift back to CVM was 
an incredibly important opportunity since there were fewer distractions from com-
mitments to address other products or industries. Also, in hindsight, this was also an 
important reposition to support the more holistic and all-encompassing implemen-
tation of the theories since the food industry is very coordinated and collaborative 
under food safety efforts. Food safety is truly not considered a competitive advan-
tage among companies, and the relationships enabled the harmonized and coordi-
nated focus on prevention.
In 2019, I was enabled to shift to the Department of Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) within the MSU Eli Broad College of Business (BUS). This move to within 
the business discipline was logical and efficient since, over time, the decision-mak-
ing and problem assessment research kept narrowing to the COSO-based enterprise 
risk management practices. This research focus has included the monitoring and 
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control of both supply chains and operations and also specifically to procurement. 
While the ongoing research and activities continue, there is a new focus on how the 
general supply chain management threat of food fraud—and overall product fraud 
or related issues—would most optimally be assessed and managed. The opportunity 
in 2019 to shift to SCM has created a more intense focus on the basic business func-
tions from within—rather than trying to influence from outside—business opera-
tions, logistics, and procurement.
Building the scholarly foundation helped create opportunities to collaborate with 
some of the key food fraud-related committee membership or project leadership 
activities including:
• US FDA Open Meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration: Presented 
as the first nongovernmental presenter on the topic “Defining Food Fraud and the 
Chemistry of the Crime”
• EU Food Integrity Project: Researcher and former advisory board member
• Queen’s University Belfast: Visiting researcher with professor Christopher 
Elliott, the lead researcher for the UK Defra Elliott Review of Food Crime
• ISO Technical Committee 292 Security Management (TC292) and Work 
Group 4 on Product Fraud and Authenticity: Founding chair of the US 
Technical Advisory Group
• ISO Technical Committee 34 Food Products, Subcommittee 17 Management 
Systems for Food Safety, Work Group 8 Food Safety Management—
Requirement (ISO TC34/SC17/WG8)—Management Systems for Food 
Safety (ISO 22000): Observer status
• Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA)—Work Group on Economic 
Adulteration as well as Various Brand Protection Advisory Groups: 
Committee or share group member
• Chinese National Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (CFSA): Foreign 
subject matter expert and researcher
• US Pharmacopeia’s Original Food Ingredient Intentional Adulteration 
Expert Panel: Volunteer member (2009–2018)
• INFOSAN the WHO and FAO-UN Food Safety Information Sharing 
Network: Presenter and researcher
• Codex Alimentarius Electronic Work Group on Food Integrity and Food 
Authenticity: Supporting the US delegation and also as a contributing scientist 
to the EWG
• Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) Food Fraud Think Tank: Member 
(Note: Due to the development and publication of certification requirements—
combined with our continued engagement with a broad range of stakeholders—
this is the most important and impactful activity.)
• Canadian Food Fraud Work Group (FFWG): Ex-officio member supporting 
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) with the goal of implementing 
steps to combat and prevent food fraud in Canada
• ISLI Food Authenticity Project and Task Force: Member
• AOAC Presidential Taskforce on Food Authenticity: Member.
Preface
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These many research projects and engagements since 2005 are the foundation for 
this book. While the science of food fraud prevention is continuing to evolve, there 
is now a need to clearly understand the basic fundamental terms, concepts, theories, 
tools, methods, and processes. Even if the concepts are not yet universally known or 
implemented, the base concepts are published in peer-reviewed journals and, usu-
ally at least, outlined in standards, certifications, and common practice.
This book is the culmination of those activities.
 Personal Insight: Developing Food Fraud
If anything, over time, the food fraud concepts have just become more ingrained and 
more formally recognized. If anything, they have matured from “what is it?” to 
“how to deal with it?” and on the way to “how much is enough?” On the GFSI Food 
Fraud Think Tank, this was referred to as “shifting from “what” to “how.” We find 
that we have shifted from talking about “Defining Food Fraud and the Chemistry of 
the Crime” to “Food Fraud Prevention and Global Trends.”
Our original 2011 research paper on “Defining the Public Health Threat of Food 
Fraud” was conceived during the FDA Public Meeting on EMA in May 2009. The 
conference was held near Washington, DC, at the FDA Center of Food Safety and 
Nutrition (CFSAN) in College Park, Maryland, which ended late on a Friday after-
noon, and I decided not to hurry to the airport for a late flight. This allowed an 
opportunity for possible debriefs after the meeting. I decided to stay with friends 
who lived north of Baltimore and then fly back to Michigan on Saturday morning. I 
had some important time to decompress and allow time to reflect after the day of 
presentations. I had a long slow travel time driving through the rush hour that night 
then the drive and flight the next Saturday morning. I kept thinking about how we 
could do a better job of explaining the food fraud concepts. The base of that article 
was conceived during that trip.
The invitation to present at the FDA EMA meeting in 2009 came from David 
Acheson who was the FDA deputy commissioner for Food Protection. We had met 
earlier in 2007 at the Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO) annual con-
ference and had started conversing about food fraud. (I will admit that I was new to 
these types of sessions and thought I had been invited to present to David and his 
team.) Fortunately, earlier in that week while at the Food Safety Summit, Gale 
Prince, the former vice president of Regulatory Affairs for Kroger, mentioned that 
he heard I was testifying later that week. “Testifying…?” I did a bit of research and 
figured out this was a formal public meeting that was on the record and would have 
a published transcript. I did quite a bit more preparation after hearing this. I am 
grateful to David for recommending me as a speaker and to Gale for giving me a 
heads-up to one of the most important events of my career.
After responding to all those insights, taking on an unsolicited project to define 
a new topic and area of study would seem like a bit of a bold activity since, techni-
cally, I was just a “grad student” and not even a “postdoc.” Later that month, I 
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submitted my Michigan State University Packaging Dissertation, graduated, and, 
the next month, started at MSU as an assistant professor faculty member in the 
School of Criminal Justice. Academic publications are important, so I started think-
ing about how I would write this up to submit to a journal. I was excited about the 
topic and the opportunity to contribute to the innovation, so I didn’t think about 
funding or a publication outlet—yet.
In July 2009, the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), 
housed at the University of Minnesota, had a call for projects. I remember hearing 
about this grant from my MSU SCJ colleague, assistant professor Dr. Robyn Mace, 
only a few days before it was due. I remember staying in the office late on a Friday 
to put this proposal together just before the deadline later that night.
I was fortunate in June 2009 to be awarded the grant just a month into my “soft 
money”-funded MSU fixed-term appointment that covered my annual salary—so 
this grant helped me get off to a running start. I was very fortunate to enlist a gradu-
ate student to help, the now Dr. Douglas C Moyer—and in 2014, now an assistant 
professor focusing on Public Health Administration and Counterfeit Medicines in 
the MSU Program in Public Health. He had 25 years of work experience with Ford 
Motor Company before coming back to MSU to pursue his Packaging Ph.D. and 
was focusing on operational management but was interested in collaborating on this 
food project.
We finished the deliverable for the NCFPD grant and then sought a publication 
outlet. We kept finding that food journals thought this was more of a criminology 
concept. The criminology journals thought it would be better suited in a food jour-
nal. The business and public health journals had not heard of the topic, and we did 
not yet have empirical research or a reputation that would encourage the defining of 
a new concept. All the while, both food and criminology journals said it was outside 
their aim and scope because they had never covered the concept before. There was 
still a general belief that this was more of a corporate crime or only a financial 
crime. Food fraud wasn’t yet defined as a “thing,” and it was not in the “aim and 
scope” of any discipline—yet.
Eventually, while Doug and I were talking out loud about this while having a 
beer during a chilly Fall evening around an outdoor fire pit at the 2010 NCFPD 
conference, a colleague mentioned interest in the article. Dr. Jennifer McEntire was 
the research director for the Institute of Food Technologists (IFT). We had presented 
on several panels for her IFT workshops. She chaired a USDA/FDA Public Meeting 
on food traceability where I submitted public comments on food fraud. She had 
seen the reaction from industry and understood this was an emerging and important 
topic. She asked us to forward the manuscript to the editor of the Journal of Food 
Science and to “cc” her. After several discussions, they took the article into the peer- 
reviewed process; then with quite a bit of effort to find reviewers—and some very 
challenging rounds of edits—finally our article was accepted. “Defining Food 
Fraud” was now a published topic. Food fraud was now a topic that had been defined 
in a scholarly journal. Food fraud was now a “thing.”
Our NCFPD grant was funded from October 2009 to September 2010 with the 
final report published on April 30, 2011. At that time, we began working on the full 
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manuscript and then first submitted our journal article on November 10, 2010; had 
a review process for 9 months before it gets accepted on August 24, 2011; and 
finally published 3 months later on November 9, 2011. The formal research projects 
spanned 25 months from October 2009 to publication in November 2011. The 
 process seems lengthy, but the peer-reviewed, refereed review process is important 
and critical to advance the science.
Over the years, patience and persistence have been critical because we often 
experienced extensive peer-reviewed comments that challenged the very essence of 
“food fraud” as a “thing.” Fortunately, the intense feedback and lengthy review 
process was not a surprise—it was actually to be expected. Many of our senior men-
tors predicted the intense scrutiny and helped us to understand this was important. 
The intense feedback—and our active and thorough responses—was a vital insight 
into what was misunderstood and where we needed to address more of the basic 
foundation.
I have mentioned that many of our colleagues had been publishing on related 
concepts—the basics of food fraud were not the focus of those previous articles. We 
had now published a peer-reviewed, refereed article on the definition of food fraud 
and of the public health impact. Scholarly articles are influential because they do go 
through a peer-reviewed, refereed process. In a top journal, you can’t get away with 
“junk science” or making “flippant” statements. This rigorous process is important 
and valuable. The final product stands the test of time. This article allowed future 
researchers—and us—to be able to reference this article rather than continue to 
argue about the definition of the term and of the threat. Over time, and through 
2019, the definition published in 2011 is referenced as the foundation of almost 
every definition of food fraud.
Later, we realized that “no wonder” we were having so much trouble getting 
traction when talking about food fraud because it had not been defined and widely 
understood to be an actual “thing.” While there have been publications about spe-
cific incidents or test methods, there was no scholarly publication citation that 
explained food fraud was really a problem. While here, in 2019, we’re approaching 
8 years since the article published, we’re just starting to see grants soliciting work 
specifically in food fraud.
 Personal Insight: Defining Food Fraud—Exploring 
a Foundation
Much of the foundation of the food fraud prevention research began earlier at the 
start of my 2005—2009 Ph.D. research on product counterfeiting risk modeling 
within the Michigan State University School of Packaging, College of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources. The Ph.D. dissertation was entitled “Analysis of Counterfeit 
Risks and Development of a Counterfeit Product Risk Model  – CPRM” (Spink 
2009). During that time, I was an adjunct graduate course instructor in the MSU 
Preface
xxi
Master of Science in Food Safety Program (MSFS) within the College of Veterinary 
Medicines. The graduate classes created in 2006 and still taught include “Packaging 
for Food Safety” (co-listed in the School of Packaging (SOP), College of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources; VM/PKG 814) and modules in courses such as “Food 
Protection and Defense” (co-listed in the School of Criminal Justice (SCJ), College 
of Social Science; VM/CJ 821). Later in 2008, based on my Ph.D. dissertation and 
before joining the School of Criminal Justice, I developed and still teach “Anti- 
Counterfeiting and Product Protection” (co-listed in SCJ and SOP; VM/PKG/CJ 
840). From the beginning, the broad scope of “all products” focus on intellectual 
property rights infringement combined with my food safety research applied to the 
concept of “food counterfeiting” to eventually adapt to policy and strategy issues for 
food fraud prevention.
As I was getting close to the end of my Ph.D. in early 2008, I approached SCJ 
director Dr. Edmund McGarrell to propose creating a new assistant professor posi-
tion in the School of Criminal Justice. I helped develop that proposal and started in 
June 2009 reporting to him as a faculty member for 4 years before I was enabled to 
broaden my focus to all fraud while narrowing the scope to only food products. This 
refinement of focus enabled a much deeper immersion and engagement with a sin-
gle industry. This immersion has been critical in building trust, increasing insight, 
and being afforded the time to not only research the topic but also to participate in a 
meaningful policy and strategy evolution.
Over time, while interacting with the food industry, around 2007, a leader said: 
“I’m not just worried about counterfeiting we’ve got a wider range of problems.” 
Also, they stated, “I need to figure how to manage all these problems not just one at 
a time.” During this period, around 2009, the US FDA defined economically moti-
vated adulteration (EMA) as a “substance” for “economic gain” with a “hazard” 
(FDA 2009). We became aware of other related concerns such as in the pharmaceu-
tical industry regarding regulations for stolen, diverted, and smuggled goods (RX- 
360.com, FDA 2004; WHO 2007). Our response was to combine the different 
intentional acts under a common topic that became “food fraud prevention.” We did 
not create the food fraud term, but we provided a more rigorous definition and a 
peer-reviewed, scholarly journal citation.
In an effort to pursue related activities, since 2009, I was the founding chair of 
the US delegation to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
Technical Committee 247 on Fraud Countermeasures and Controls (TC247; this 
shifted to under TC 292 Security Management and Resilience) (ISO 2010, 2017). It 
was interesting, and timely, to attend that first meeting. I remember talking to MSU 
colleagues that I could either wait for the results and write about them or actually 
attend the meeting. While at the meeting, I was approached and convinced to 
become the chair. This ISO activity was very important and had an influence on our 
research on the concept of product fraud, counterfeiting, and eventually food fraud. 
A key need was to define the terms, and eventually a “product fraud” definition was 
published in ISO standard 22380 Security and resilience—authenticity, integrity, 
and trust for products and documents—general principles for product fraud risk and 
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countermeasures (ISO 2018). This ISO standard codified our 2016 published 
Product Counterfeit Incident Clustering Tool (PCICT).
The evolution of the research continued when, in July 2012, the Global Food 
Safety Initiative (GFSI), under recommendation by then Chair Yves Rey of Danone 
and Co-Chair Frank Yiannas of Wal-Mart, convened a “Think Tank.” The mission 
was to review the concept and consider the application under the GFSI Food Safety 
Management System. The group was originally entitled the “Economic Adulteration 
Think Tank,” but based in part on the ISO precedence of referring to this as “product 
fraud,” the name shifted to “Food Fraud Think Tank.” A key for GFSI was that, 
although health hazards are the highest priority, companies needed a system to 
assess and manage all types of food risks. GFSI—and the base functionality of 
HACCP—is essentially a total quality management system, so it focuses not only 
on the highest risks but also on the underlying system variability that can lead to 
nonconformity. The GFSI-FFTT shifted a focus from risk to vulnerability and also 
first conceived the Vulnerability assessment and Critical Control Point plan 
(VACCP) content. VACCP was first formally presented at the 2013 GFSI Annual 
Conference in Barcelona.
Here in 2019, the GFSI food fraud requirement should not be a surprise for the 
industry since; in December 2014, the GFSI Board published their position paper on 
food fraud that stated the concept would be required in the next GFSI guidance 
document. The GFSI Issue 7 published in 2017 and implemented as of January 2018 
includes requirements for the following: (1) a specific Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment, (2) Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (Food Fraud Mitigation Plan), and 
(3) an emphasis on covering the “relevant GFSI scope” which is all types of fraud 
(e.g., from adulterant substances to stolen goods and counterfeits) and for all prod-
ucts (e.g., from raw materials through finished goods in the market) (GFSI 2014, 
2017). In May 2018, the GFSI Board published a Food Fraud Technical Document 
that further clarified and refined what had been published back in the 2014 Position 
Paper and what was in the Guidance Document (GFSI 2018).
Over time, the “all types of fraud” and “all products” broad scope of food fraud 
has been widely adopted by the EC, UK, FSAI, China, INTERPOL-Europol, and 
others (ISO 2011; Spink and Moyer 2011; GFSI 2012; SSAFE 2012; CRS 2014; 
DEFRA 2014; EC 2014; CFSA 2015; CFSA 2015; Manning and Soon 2016; 
CODEX 2017; GFSI 2017; NFCU 2017; van Ruth, Huisman et  al. 2017; CEN 
2018). It is efficient that the food fraud term has a common definition because users 
or assessors can clearly state whether they are addressing all types or just a specific 
area such as adulterant substances.
Over time, food fraud has become a “thing” and is not only a requirement for 
compliance, but it is beginning to be understood to be a critical component of a 
competent Food Safety Management System—and just good business practice. The 
global food supply chain is safer—the global food security is improving.
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During my trips to China, I was hosted and guided by Dr. Miao Hong (Fig. 3). 
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thor on our Food Chemistry article, and we have been constant collaborators on a 
number of projects. At CFSA, she is the deputy director of the Food Chemistry 
Laboratory. My other CFSA colleague is Dr. Zu Ru who hosted me during a large 
group presentation. She is the CFSA deputy director in the Division of Science, 
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Fig. 1 Dr. Spink with book editors Dr. Junshi Chen and Dr. Joseph Jwu-shan Jen
Fig. 2 Dr. Spink Presenting the Valued Partner award to Dr. Wu and CFSA
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Fig. 4 Dr. Spink Presenting the Valued Partner award to Dr. Quiding and China National Research 
Institute of Food and Fermentation Industries (CNRIFFI)
Fig. 3 Dr. Spink Presenting the Valued Partner award to Dr. Xu and Hong
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Zhong Qiding has been providing important insight and support (Fig. 4).
Throughout my shift from “all products” and IPR counterfeiting to food, the 
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Specifically, I am indebted to my now MSU adjunct faculty colleague Frank 
Yiannas (Fig. 6). He has provided insight and experience from early days as one of 
the GFSI board executive champions for the GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank through 
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Preface
xxvii
Fig. 5 GFSI China Focus Day Speakers (left to right): John Spink, MSU & Member of the GFSI 
Food Fraud Task Force; Petra Wissenburg, Director Danone & Chair of the GFSI Food Fraud Task 
Force; Mike Robach, VP Cargill & GFSI Chairperson; Yves Rey, Gen Manager Danone & GFSI 
Board Member; Zaotian Wan, VP COFCO (China) & GFSI Board Member; Anthony Hugget, VP 
Nestle & GFSI Board Member; Cindy Jiang, Sr Director McDonald’s & GFSI Board Member; and 
John Carter, VP Metro Group & GFSI Board Member
Fig. 6 Dr. Spink with Frank Yiannas, VP of Food Safety at Wal-Mart, at the 2013 GFSI China 
Focus Day (Beijing)
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 About the Book
This section reviews the organization of the content in the book. The research is 
presented in a “cloverleaf” structure where several very different concepts will be 
reviewed in detail before the presentation down the narrow stem of the more specific 
application. This is different from the more traditional “keyhole” structure of aca-
demic research that is usually focused on a very specific small center of a concept 
explored in detail before the presentation of the broader application. In addition, the 
content of the book and within each chapter is based on a hierarchy of Key Learning 
Objectives (KLOs).
This book is organized by thematic areas which start with the core food fraud 
definitions and scope. Since this is an interdisciplinary and complex problem, then 
there is no logical, linear path of topics. The information is structured by Key 
Learning Objectives (KLOs) which are statements about what skills and knowledge 
are delivered and why. The hierarchy approach allows a review of what topics are 
important or critical to include, if they have been included, and to explain how the 
learning objective is to be successfully achieved. The KLO hierarchy includes the 
following: (1) book, (2) chapters, (3) three per chapter, and, finally, (4) three sub- 
objectives. Each chapter includes a statement of “What’s In It for Me (WIIFM)” and 
discussion questions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction (Part 1 of 2): Food Fraud 
Definitions and Scope
Summary
This chapter presents the introduction to the scope and definitions related to food 
fraud. The next chapter introduces many of the fundamental concepts. Before get-
ting into a structured review of the definitions and related terms, there will be a 
foundation setting task that considers the end goal such as why do you care, how to 
start, how much is enough, and is the government doing enough.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) Preface to Introduction: before reviewing the concepts, there will be a con-
sideration of why this is a worthwhile effort for the ultimate questions such as 
“how to start?” and “how much is enough?”
• (2) Definitions: to review the types of food fraud and also related terms such as 
food defense, food authenticity, food security, and others. This also considers 
related terms including some common terms such as adulteration, authenticity, 
and integrity.
• (3) Relationship of Food Risk Concepts: the relation between food quality, 
food safety, food fraud, and food defense is presented in the Food Risk Matrix.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoretical 
foundation concepts related to criminology and the fraudster “(A) Theoretical 
Foundation” (Fig. 1.1).
 Introduction
This chapter covers the basics of food fraud prevention. Food fraud and the focus on 
prevention have matured as a discipline—and possibly as a science—enough to 
present a full book and more than “what is it” or “someone should do more.” A set 
of unique terms and methods are being developed and updated. The research has 
started in food science and food authenticity before expanding to law and 
2criminology through business and supply chain management to a unique, hybrid, 
interdisciplinary approach. Overall there is a body of work focused on policy and 
strategy development. This book represents that broad, interdisciplinary approach 
to one central system that is presented as the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC).
A first question is whether the focus should be problem-based or solution-
based. Prevention starts with understanding the root cause or the problem, and then 
this is a problem-based approach. If a technology is found and then followed by a 
search for applications, then this is a solution-based approach. The overall food 
fraud prevention research—consistent with previous product counterfeiting 
research—is “problem-based” not “solution-based.” This means the activity starts 
with a focus on the “problem” and then seeks the most efficient and effective 
“solutions” (Fig. 1.2). Many times there is a backward process of a “solution look-
ing for a problem.” When starting with the problem, the specific problem can be 
clearly and explicitly defined using specific incident factors. Often there are a 
series of root cause factors that create the fraud opportunity. Each root cause factor 
may require a separate—though often very simple and low or no cost—risk treat-
ment. Then, a solution can be sought that directly and efficiently solves specific 
aspects of the problem.
The best place to start this Introduction chapter and the book is to review the defi-
nition and scope. Using ISO 31000 Risk Management standards, this would identify 
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
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Fig. 1.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
Fundamental Concepts”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014a, b; Spink et al. 2019)
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3the very first step of “Establishing the context” (ISO 2009). While a specific depart-
ment or agency may be accountable or responsible for one type of problem, the 
companies or countries need to address all food risks not just public health hazards. 
Any starting point that does not begin with the “all risks approach” will likely face 
resource-allocation challenges due to an incomplete proposal that does not calibrate 
this risk with all other risks.
 Key Learning Objective 1: Preface to Introduction—Why 
Act? Do I Need to Act?
This section reviews a few foundational concepts that should be considered through 
to the review and management of food fraud prevention. These may seem overly 
simplistic reviews, but they are essential. The focus is on supporting efficient and 
effective resource allocation to maximize the ultimate goal which is to protect cus-
tomers from harm by reducing the fraud opportunity. These key questions will not 
be answered yet since the first step is “Establishing the context.”
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) “How to start?” and “how much is enough?”
• (2) “Who cares?” and “why do I care?”
• (3) Then, is the government doing “enough”?
Fraud 
Opportunity
Problem2
Solution2
Problem3
Solution3
Problem4
Solution4
Prolem1
Solution1
Fig. 1.2 Example of identifying the fraud opportunity, the defining specific problems before seek-
ing precise solutions
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4 Do I Need to Act? How Much Is Enough? How to Start?
Yes, “food fraud” is bad. Yes, “more” should be done. Ok, now what? Is food fraud 
the top priority for your entire enterprise? Is it a top-10 priority? Should you drop 
everything right now and call the president of your company? Should you stop read-
ing and send a note to your crisis management team? Can you wait until you get 
done reading this chapter? Can you wait until tomorrow? Do you have a process to 
prescribe your activity?
Then, to address “how much is enough,” “I need more funding” is a desperate 
plea and not a strategic proposal. Stating “we don’t have any more budget money” 
is not a tactical position and not risk-based justification. If your company has $1 
million to spend on one project, should it be to address food fraud? Can it identify 
competing projects that are outside the scope of food fraud, food safety, or all food 
risks? What specific food fraud prevention project would you propose, and could 
you defend that as the #1 project for all the possible food fraud prevention counter-
measures and control systems? Very few people or companies can answer “yes.” 
Some people even become belligerent when pressed on these questions that they 
now realize they cannot answer.
The lack of a clear method is the fault and responsibility of the theorists includ-
ing academics. It is our fault that a question exists and our collective responsibility 
to address this unmet need.
The first step in recovery is admitting there is a problem.1 The next step is to 
understand the root cause of the dysfunction, and ISO 31000 Risk Management 
identifies this in “Establishing the context” (ISO 2009).
The food fraud problem is based on the following general risk analysis concepts 
such as ISO31000, Six Sigma, or others; the steps to address food fraud include 
(Spink et al. 2019):
 1) Establishing the context
 a) What is food fraud?
• There are many publications that define the concept and provide examples of 
incidents.
 b) Is it a problem?
• Next, the publications expanded to discuss incidents and to define the public 
health and economic harms. This also includes examples of how and why 
incidents occurred. It sometimes also includes reviews of laws and 
regulations.
1 The term “problem” is used in criminology. Problem: “…the basic unit of police works rather 
than a crime, a case, calls, or incidents. A problem is something that concerns or causes harm to 
citizens, not just the police. […] Addressing problems means more than quick fixes: it means deal-
ing with conditions that create problems” (Clarke and Eck 2005) Clarke, Ronald V and John E Eck 
(2005). “Crime analysis for problem solvers in 60 Small Steps.” Washington, DC: Center for 
Problem Oriented Policing.
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5 c) How to detect specific fraud acts, are new tests needed, and then validate 
the test methods?
• The vast majority of food fraud published research is related to test methods, 
results, and either validation or verification of both.
 2) Do I need to act?
• As the basics are becoming more clearly defined or defended, there is begin-
ning to be a research focus on decision-making and specific regulatory or 
commercial requirements. For example, is there a law, a company compliance 
requirement, or a direct order from your superior that requires the activity? 
Alternatively, is it just something you “should do?”
 3) How to start food fraud?
 a) What to do?
• This is covered, in part, above in the research on detection tests.
 b) How to measure success?
• This is probably one of the currently most under-researched areas. It appears 
that quality management concepts will present the best opportunity for effec-
tive and efficient success metrics. Utilizing quality management principles 
such as critical control points is well known. For public policy or law enforce-
ment agencies, this will be a bigger challenge since the agencies have really 
been set up to respond to incidents or current problems rather than strategic 
prevention.
 c) How much is enough?
• This question applies to immediate activity or longer-term resource alloca-
tion. There is often a gut feel for how much you should do (or is really how 
little do you dare not to do?). A first judgment is if there is a regulatory defi-
nition of compliance. Is there a food safety audit nonconformity that needs to 
be rectified? Is there is an internal control or COSO type audit nonconfor-
mity that need to be rectified? The next judgment is if there is an enterprise-
wide risk or vulnerability compliance system such as COSO type Enterprise 
Risk Management. For a new or recently defined problem type, it is logical 
that there is not yet a structure or process for decision-making for “how much 
is enough.”
 4) Continuous review and process improvement.
• Identify critical factors that can be assessed and monitored.
Next, the objective is to explore these questions and present insight into the 
underlying factors. Addressing these questions will help inform resource-allocation 
decision-making.
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6 Who Cares? Why Do I Care? Why Does Anyone Care?
These are conceptual questions at the core of the problem and challenge. “‘Someone’ 
in the enterprise must be responsible for food fraud prevention, right?” The response 
is “Ok then who? Tell me a name.” What often follows is a blank stare or even an 
increased agitation.
“Who cares?” This is more a question of “who acts?” and “who has a budget?” 
This is a challenging question for countries as well as companies. There is a belief 
that “more” should be done, but at least at the start, there is no budget and no free 
resources (Spink 2014a, b). There is a gap, and without clear assignment of the 
problem to someone specific—such as when using the Food Risk Matrix—then 
often nothing gets done. “That’s bad, but it’s not my job.” When nothing gets done, 
then incidents such as melamine or horsemeat are fraud opportunities that could 
become food fraud incidents. The answer to this question is based on strategy or 
policy commitments and then defined by the prevention strategy assigned in “key 
job responsibilities.”
“Why do I care?” You have a set of key job responsibilities or success metrics. 
Food fraud is probably not specifically listed… at least not yet. I’ve heard some-
thing like “I’m responsible for food ingredient contamination, so I’m not concerned 
with all types of fraud.” Ok, understood. However, by stating this, you individually 
and personally have knowledge that food fraud is probably not being completely 
addressed at your company. You have knowledge of a regulatory violation. You 
probably have a role as a “mandatory reporter” of violations—this is especially true 
and could be literally criminal if you have knowledge that a law is being broken. If 
there is a death from food fraud, your knowledge and lack of activity could be 
criminal. Will criminal prosecution always follow, of course not, but it is possible, 
and do you want to take that chance? Also if you know of smuggling or a criminal 
act—such as the weights of fish being not accurately listed on a label or manifest—
your lack of activity could be criminal. If that fish was imported and sold in the 
USA, you would have knowledge of “smuggling,” and each incident carries a maxi-
mum penalty of 20 years in prison (see keyword “smuggling” in later sections on 
laws and regulations).
“Why does anyone care?” This is an important question to understand the prior-
ity for governments or consumers. Do they understand food fraud? Are they out-
raged when it occurs? What type of food fraud outrages them the most that leads to 
more enforcement or prosecution? The bottom line for a company is that food fraud 
is illegal and could lead to a product recall at “best” and criminal prosecution and 
incarceration “at worst” especially if the incident led to a death or deaths. Regardless 
of the level of enforcement and prosecution, food fraud must be addressed. 
Following upon this, the first steps and countermeasures and control systems are 
often not costly or time-consuming; the only reason to not start would be a lack of 
a plan.
Over time, the needs and the challenges have been more clearly identified, and 
the way forward is now more apparent. These questions are addressed through an 
interdisciplinary, holistic, all-encompassing focus on food fraud prevention.
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In the past food fraud was a known problem, but there was not enough information 
to really establish a common, practical, preventative approach. In a 2010 govern-
ment public meeting, I was asked if I thought “industry was doing enough to address 
food fraud,” and I responded with “based on the way we academics and the laws 
have defined food fraud and prevention, I that think industry and agencies are doing 
a fine job.” The key is how food fraud is defined and addressed in the laws and regu-
lations. The focus should be on who is assigned the task. With the awareness of the 
enterprise-wide risk, the leadership is presented with a clear path forward. The lead-
ership is “accountable” for this “inherent risk” and assuring that food fraud preven-
tion is explicitly addressed. There are great strides being made considering how 
little is really known about food fraud prevention.
 Key Learning Objective 2: Definitions
This section reviews the interdisciplinary nature of prevention by considering how 
the “fraud opportunity” is created and the many academic disciplines that help 
understand the optimal countermeasures and control systems.
The Key Learning Objectives for this section are
• (1) To review the underlying concepts of framing a problem
• (2) To review the definition and scope of food fraud
• (3) To review the types of food fraud
 General Concepts
Over time there has been more and more clarity of the need to continually explore 
and present definitions of key terms. It is fascinating how often there is confusion or 
debate on even the most basic terms or concepts. Over time there has been a collec-
tive embrace of the food fraud term as well as the focus on prevention. More recently 
there is an awareness that the root cause is a human adversary so the research must 
include social science and criminology. The diagnosis of the problem includes a 
root cause that is understood by applying criminology. Also, as programs are devel-
oped, there is an identification of the need to focus on resource-allocation decision- 
making to address the question of “how much is enough.”
This book will begin with a brief statement of the definitions and scope before 
moving to the general food fraud prevention concepts.
Undoubtedly product fraud has been conducted since the start of all commerce, 
and food fraud has been recorded in history since at least 960 BCE during the Song 
dynasty in China (Wu et al. 2017). What starts as a savvy negotiation can evolve into 
deception.
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with the base terms of food and fraud:
• Food (Codex): “… means any substance, whether processed, semi-processed or 
raw, which is intended for human consumption, and includes drink, chewing 
gum and any substance which has been used in the manufacture, preparation or 
treatment of “food” but does not include cosmetics or tobacco or substances used 
only as drugs.”
• Fraud (COSO): “…is any intentional act or omission designed to deceive others, 
resulting in the victim suffering a loss and/or the perpetrator achieving a gain” 
(COSO 2016).
• Fraud (Codex): Codex Alimentarius does not seem to have defined this basic 
term.
Combining the basic terms and the modern application, a simple, holistic defini-
tion is:
• Food fraud (basic short version): intentional deception for economic gain using 
food
There is a hesitance in providing a reference for this definition here since this is 
such a general concept. What is important is the broad definition which covers all 
food-related product fraud. The broad definition covering all types of fraud and for 
all products is often a new perspective since there has usually previously been a 
focus on the most prevalent public health threat which is from a dangerous ingredi-
ent intentionally added to the product. It is generally considered that the most dan-
gerous—but by no means, the only—acts are from an adulterant, and the act is 
adulterant-substances and product counterfeiting.
The research and development of a more detailed definition of food fraud were 
published in a peer-reviewed, scholarly 2011 article “Defining the Public Health 
Threat of Food Fraud” (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b). This research activity began by 
reviewing laws, regulations, standards, and certifications. This then reviewed schol-
arly articles for food fraud and related topics. Through this research, the broad defi-
nition was developed and published. This definition has been quoted and references 
for the industry standard developed by the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI),2 
the European Commission’s Referendum on Food Fraud, the UK DEFRA Elliott 
Review, the US Congressional Research Service, the CODEX Electronic Working 
2 GFSI may not be as recognized by some as the standards from BRC, IFS, FSSC 22000, SGS, or 
others. GFSI is a major emphasis in this report since the requirements are widely adopted. GFSI 
will be covered in more detail later. It is important to note that GFSI establishes the expectation or 
benchmark for what should be in a Food Safety Management System (FSMS). GFSI does not cre-
ate standards but “recognizes” or endorses standard organizations that are referred to as Certification 
Program Organizations (CPOs—formerly referred to as scheme owners). The manufacturers that 
would be certified to an FSMS are from FSSC 22000, BRC, and IFS or others. The standards are 
audited by Certification Bodies (CBs). The CBs are recognized or endorsed by the CPOs to con-
duct the audits. Not every auditor or CB can provide an officially certification for every CPO.
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9Group on Food Integrity and Food Authenticity, and ISO 22380 on product fraud 
prevention (among others see: EC 2014; CODEX 2017; GFSI 2017; ISO 2018). It 
has been adopted as a de facto definition of food fraud and the related deceptive 
economically motivated acts. From the original NCFPD backgrounder report, that 
was the core research for the later Journal of Food Science publication:
• Food Fraud: “Is a collective term used to encompass the deliberate and inten-
tional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food ingre-
dients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements made about a 
product, for economic gain. Food fraud is a broader term than either the eco-
nomically motivated adulteration (EMA) defined by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) or the more specific general concept of food counterfeit-
ing” (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b).
 – Product Fraud: Wrongful or criminal deception that utilizes material goods 
for financial or personal gain Note 1 to entry: Fraud means wrongful or crimi-
nal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain that creates social 
or economic harm; Note 2 to entry: Products include electronic media carried 
on material goods; Note 3 to entry: Fraud related to digitally transmitted elec-
tronic media shall be considered separately” (ISO 2018).
A longer, more comprehensive definition is:
• Food Fraud (basic long version): “Is a collective term used to encompass the 
deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation 
of food, food ingredients or food packaging, or statements about the product for 
economic gain. Food fraud is a broader term than both the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) definition of economically motivated adulteration 
(EMA) or the more specific general concept of food counterfeiting” (Spink and 
Moyer 2011a, b).
For review, two Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) definitions are presented 
here and demonstrate the evolution of the concept and similarity of scope (GFSI 
2014, 2017).
• Food Fraud (GSFI 2014): “Including the subcategory of economically motived 
adulteration, is of growing concern. It is deception of consumers using food 
products, ingredients and packaging for economic gain and includes substitution, 
unapproved enhancements, misbranding, counterfeiting, stolen goods, or others” 
(GFSI 2014) .
• Food Fraud (GFSI 2017): “A collective term encompassing the deliberate and 
intentional substitution, addition, tampering or misrepresentation of food, food 
ingredients or food packaging, labeling, product information or false or mislead-
ing statements made about a product for economic gain that could impact con-
sumer health” (GFSI 2017).
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A closely related—and often confused—term is “economically motivated adul-
teration.” This term came into prominence when the subject of a US FDA Public 
Meeting (FDA 2009). The definition was identified as a “working definition” in the 
meeting invitation was published in the US Federal Register. This became and 
remained the FDA “working definition.” The term has often been incorrectly used 
as the same as food fraud.
The 2009 FDA Working Definition of EMA—which was confirmed in 2018 by 
FDA as still current—is provided here and was (emphasis added) (FDA 2009):
• “Economically Motivated Adulteration (FDA) Working Definition (emphasis 
added): “For purposes of this public meeting, FDA proposes a working definition 
of EMA as the fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a 
product for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reduc-
ing the cost of its production, i.e., for economic gain. EMA includes dilution of 
products with increased quantities of an already-present substance (e.g., increas-
ing inactive ingredients of a drug with a resulting reduction in strength of the 
finished product, or watering down of juice) to the extent that such dilution poses 
a known or possible health risk to consumers, as well as the addition or substitu-
tion of substances in order to mask dilution” (FDA 2009).
• Economic Adulteration is an earlier and related term that many groups were 
proactively using especially after the melamine in infant formula and pet food. 
The term “economic adulteration” was a common term. This term seems to be 
first used in the USA in the 1996 GAO report on fruit juice adulteration (GAO 
1995). Regarding the “economic adulteration” incidents in the GAO Fruit Juice 
report, there was an emphasis on “…they pose little threat to the public’s health 
and safety.” There are reasons why this is a problematic term to use. First, it 
insinuates adulteration and not the broader fraud concepts. Second, by the gram-
matical construction of the phrase, it insinuates that the impact or result is only 
economic harm. Later, there was a trend in the US to evolve the concept of “eco-
nomically motivated adulteration.” This still was limited to adulterant-substances 
but was a notable shift to focus on the motivation or intent.
A close review of the FDA working definition of EMA, it becomes clear that 
EMA is a “substance” for economic gain so would be a sub-category of food fraud 
including only the “adulterant-substance” type. It appears from the scope that this 
definition only applies the EMA term when there is a “known or possible health 
risk.” If this is a correct interpretation, then it is possible that the horsemeat in the 
beef incident would not technically be classified as an FDA defined “EMA”  incident 
since there was no known health risk. The debate is futile since any all types of food 
fraud for all products are illegal under the U.S. Food Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA) 
sections on “Adulterated Foods” and also “Misbranded Foods” (FDA 2015). Also, 
the U.S. FSMA law section on “Hazard Analysis” requires “a documented hazard 
analysis regardless of the outcome” and including “intentional acts for economic 
gain” (FDA 2011, 2015).
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Though the basic scope is defined, the definition, challenges, thoughts, and 
derivation of the definitions will be reviewed in much more detail later.
 Types of Food Fraud
Before 2011, the food fraud term has been previously used, such as by the UK Food 
Standards Agency (UK FSA), but the definition and scope had not been rigorously 
or thoroughly researched as the subject of project or publication. Other research-
ers—such as UK FDA Woolfe and Primrose as well as Elliott et al. and van Ruth 
et al.—widely published on the topic with a focus on authentication and testing not 
the scoping of the basic problem, root cause, or prevention strategies (Primrose 
et al. 2010; Huisman and Spapens 2016; Barnard and O’Connor 2017; van Ruth 
et al. 2017, 2018).
A 2011 research publication presented the definition and scope of food fraud 
with a list of types of food fraud. This was expanded to include other terms such as 
are used by the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). This work is correlated to a 
2015 article which published the Defining the types of counterfeiters, counterfeit-
ing, and offender organizations (Spink et al. 2013). This work drew heavily upon 
other research in intellectual property rights counterfeiting of many products includ-
ing food, medicines, medical devices, automobile parts, luxury goods, consumer 
electronics, industrial electronics, and others. It was especially important to identify 
types of fraud, to define where and how intellectual property rights counterfeits fit, 
and to define that some types of fraud were not a violation of a law. For example, in 
most cases, diversion is not illegal but could be a violation of the commercial 
agreement.
The following table is included to provide the types of food fraud examples and 
the public health vulnerability (Table 1.1) (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b).
The entire research project evolved and expanded to work through several con-
cepts at once including reviewing the food fraud incident types, the food risks, the 
food protection plan, and in applying the Situational Crime Prevention and the 
Crime Triangle (Table 1.2). This considered known incidents with more detailed 
research that would follow later. It was especially important to identify adulterant- 
substances as only one of the types of food fraud.
Regarding the “adulterant-substance” term, the definition and scope have been 
codified in 2018 where ISO 22380 includes a table of “Types of Product Fraud” 
including counterfeiting, IP rights infringement, adulterant-substance, tampering, 
substitution, simulation, diversion, theft, and overrun (ISO 2018). The description 
is: “A component of the finished product is fraudulent; example: Adulteration of 
infant formula by melamine in China, Estimate 300,000 victims including 6 infants 
dying; potential consequence is low quality or unsafe products leading to human or 
environmental harm” (ISO 2018).
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Table 1.1 Food fraud incident types (in (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b)
Term Definition Example
Potential public health 
threat that may lead to 
illness or death
Adulterant- 
substance 
(adulterate, 
adulterated, etc.)
A component of the 
finished product is 
fraudulent
Melamine added to milk Fraudulent component
Tamper Legitimate product and 
packaging are used in a 
fraudulent way
Changed expiry 
information, product 
up-labeling, etc.
Fraudulent packaging 
information
Overrun Legitimate product is 
made in excess of 
production agreements
Underreporting of 
production
Fraudulent product is 
distributed outside of 
regulated or controlled 
supply chain
Theft Legitimate product is 
stolen and passed off as 
legitimately procured
Stolen products are 
comingled with 
legitimate products
Fraudulent product is 
distributed outside of 
regulated or controlled 
supply chain
Diversion The sale or distribution 
of legitimate products 
outside of intended 
markets
Relief food redirected to 
markets where aid is not 
required
Shortages or delays of 
relief food to needy 
populations
Simulation Illegitimate product is 
designed to look like 
but not exactly copy the 
legitimate product
“Knock-offs” of popular 
foods not produced with 
same food safety 
assurances
Fraudulent product of 
lesser quality
Counterfeit All aspects of the 
fraudulent product and 
packaging are fully 
replicated
Copies of popular foods 
not produced with same 
food safety assurances
Fraudulent product
Adapted from Spink (2007, 2009a, b)
Note: In each case, fraudsters may not be following Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAPs), or Good Hygiene Practices (GHPs)
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Table 1.2 Food fraud types, definitions, and examples (as published in (GFSI 2018) which 
references (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b; GFSI 2014; SSAFE 2015; PWC 2016; Spink et al. 2016a, 
b; GFSI 2017))
GFSIa type of 
food fraud Definition from SSAFEb
Examples from GFSI 
FFTTc
General type of 
food fraud
Dilution The process of mixing a liquid 
ingredient with high value with 
a liquid of lower value
Watered-down 
products using 
non-potable/unsafe 
water
Olive oil diluted with 
potentially toxic tea 
tree oil
Adulterant- 
substance 
(adulterant)
Substitution The process of replacing an 
ingredient or part of the product 
of high value with another 
ingredient or part of the product 
of lower value
Sunflower oil partially 
substituted with 
mineral oil
Hydrolyzed leather 
protein in milk
Adulterant- 
substance or 
tampering
Concealment The process of hiding the low 
quality of food ingredients or 
product
Poultry injected with 
hormones to conceal 
disease
Harmful food colouring 
applied to fresh fruit to 
cover defects
Adulterant- 
substance or 
tampering
Unapproved 
enhancements
The process of adding unknown 
and undeclared materials to 
food products in order to 
enhance their quality attributes
Melamine added to 
enhance protein value
Use of unauthorized 
additives (Sudan dyes 
in spices)
Adulterant- 
substance or 
tampering
Mislabelling The process of placing false 
claims on packaging for 
economic gain
Expiry, provenance 
(unsafe origin)
Toxic Japanese star 
anise labeled as 
Chinese star anise
Mislabeled recycled 
cooking oil
Tampering
Grey marketd 
production/ theft/
diversion
Grey market production/ theft/ 
diversion are out of scope for 
this tool. However, it may be 
picked up anyway
Sale of excess 
unreported product
Product allocated for 
the US market 
appearing in another 
country
Overrun, theft, or 
diversione
Counterfeiting The process of copying the 
brand name, packaging 
concept, recipe, processing 
method, etc. of food products 
for economic gain
Copies of popular 
foods not produced 
with acceptable safety 
assurances
Counterfeit chocolate 
bars
Counterfeiting
Notes:
aGFSI—Global Food Safety Initiative
bSSAFE—Safe Secure and Affordable Food For Everyone
cGFSI FFTT—Global Food Safety Initiative: Food Fraud Think Tank
dGray market—a market employing irregular but not illegal methods; theft, something stolen
eDiversion/parallel trade—the act or an instance of diverting straying from a course, activity, or use
Comment: This table is used as the types of fraud list and definitions in the GFSI Food Fraud 
Technical Document published in 2018. That report is the reference used for GFSI compliance
14
Sidebar: Types of Fraud Defined—Why Include Diversion and 
Simulations
The book Counterfeiting Exposed (2003) was a very important influence on 
my thinking because it is one of the most thorough and practical presentations 
of the problem and how to address it (Hopkins et al. 2003). The authors were 
very realistic—based on experience—in the role of government, the role of 
consumers, and what really can be done to reduce counterfeiting. They 
expanded from “counterfeiting is bad” and “what wasn’t being done” to a 
presentation of fundamental concepts and a practitioner-based focus on 
implementing strategies. They specifically refer to “detect, deter, and control” 
which our MSU research evolved from “control” to “prevention.” Also, they 
build upon the general concept of “no product is too cheap to counterfeit” and 
“if you can make it, they can fake it”—which for me evolved to a focus on the 
overall fraud opportunity.
An important foundational concept covered in the book was addressing the 
types of counterfeiting which our MSU research evolved to more broadly 
cover all the types of fraud. If product fraud is occurring, then there is a sup-
ply chain lack of control that could be a vulnerability for counterfeits to enter 
the market. They define:
• Counterfeiting: “the knowing duplication of a product by a party who 
wishes to usurp the brand or trademark of another” (Hopkins et al. 2003).
• Simulation or Copycat: “By contrast [and different than counterfeiting], 
is a copy of a product in form or substance with no attempt to actually 
duplicate the brand name” (Hopkins et al. 2003). Though the trademarked 
name is not used, this may be a violation of other intellectual property laws 
such as “trade dress” or “patent.” “They are attempting to profit from asso-
ciation with the brand and may face other legal challenges.” The presence 
of simulations signals an unmet market need and is a possible indicator 
that counterfeits may also be in this supply chain.
• Overruns/production-overruns: “Although often of identical quality to 
the legitimate product, are produced in violation of the brand owners’ 
rights” (Hopkins et al. 2003). This is conducted by an authorized and legit-
imate co-manufacturer or partner who produces the product without the 
authorization of the right holder. The right holder does not get paid for the 
sales of this branded product. This is sometimes referred to as a “ghost 
shift” or “fourth shift”—there are three, 8-hour shifts per day. In some 
cases, the “unauthorized overrun” could be identical or a clone of the genu-
ine product. If this is food, then it would be considered illegal under the 
“Adulterated Foods” section of the US Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
because it was manufactured outside the control of the company. Other 
times the substandard product is reclaimed (not properly disposed of) and 
sold. As with the other definitions, the presence of overruns signals a lack 
of control of supply chains—or in this case the production—which is a 
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possible indicator that counterfeit products may be in this supply chain. 
Also, from the US Department of Justice guidance for prosecuting IP 
cases, “As with overrun goods, the marks on gray market goods are placed 
there with the mark-holder’s authorization. What the mark-holder has not 
authorized is the sale of those foreign goods within the United States” 
(DOJ 2013).
Regarding overruns, a unique situation with designer apparel is that often 
the brand name is trademarked, but the design or patent is not. Thus, a con-
tract manufacturer of a designer brand leather jacket could legally sell the 
exact same jacket if the brand label was not used. There may be commercial 
agreements that control these sales, but without the design or patent, then this 
would not be illegal and not a criminal act.
• Gray Market or Diversion (or Parallel Trade): “When products which 
are shipped into specific distribution channels are shipped out of those 
channels into others, often in violation of distribution or sales contracts” 
(Hopkins et  al. 2003). Also see US Department of Justice guidance for 
prosecuting IP cases, section on “Authorized-Use Defense: Gray Market 
Goods.” From Black’s Law Dictionary, “A market in which the seller uses 
legal but sometimes unethical methods to avoid a manufacturer’s distribu-
tion chain and thereby sell goods (especially imported goods) at prices 
lower than those envisions by the manufacturer. See Parallel Imports.”
• Illegal Diversion—First-Sale Doctrine: They clarify legal or illegal 
diversion based on the first-sale doctrine which defined who legally con-
trols the product after a legitimate first sale, based on the first-sale doctrine. 
This would be illegal after a legitimate first sale, and this would only if the 
export to a specific country is illegal and if the sales in the new country 
would be a violation of a different law, for example, sales of controlled 
substances of some medicines that are not approved in a country or their 
distribution is tightly controlled. A violation, such as commercial geo-
graphic distribution agreements, could be subject to a civil lawsuit but not 
prosecution in a criminal proceeding.
• Black Market (Black’s Law): An illegal market for goods that are con-
trolled or prohibited by the government, such as the underground market 
for prescription drugs. Also Shadow Economy or Underground Economy.
• Parallel Imports (Black’s Law): Goods bearing valid trademarks that are 
manufactured abroad and imported into the US to compete with domesti-
cally manufactured goods bearing the same valid trademarks. Domestic 
parties commonly complain that parallel imports compete unfairly in the 
US market. But US trademark law does not prohibit the sale of most paral-
lel imports. Also termed “gray-market goods.” See “Gray Market” under 
“Market.”
(continued)
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• Parallel Imports/Parallel Trade (WTO): “When a product made legally 
(i.e., not pirated) abroad is imported without the permission of the intel-
lectual property right-holder (e.g., the trademark or patent owner). Some 
countries allow this; others do not.”
• Shadow Economy (Black’s Law): Collectively, the unregistered economic 
activities that contribute to a country’s gross national product. A shadow 
economy may involve legal or illegal production of goods and services, 
including gambling, prostitution, and drug-dealing, as well as barter trans-
actions and unreported incomes. Also termed “black economy,” “black 
market,” and “underground economy.”
Regarding diversion, the activity signifies a supply chain may be “porous” 
which is a possible indicator that counterfeit product may be in this supply 
chain. “Furthermore, global supply chains have become increasingly frag-
mented and indirect. It is therefore relativity easy to blend fake product with 
the legitimate product in the gray market or to find unauthorized dealers over 
the internet” (Hopkins et al. 2003). A concerning situation since this lack of 
transparency can create an opportunity for stolen goods to reenter the legiti-
mate supply chain, products “decoded” with their traceability or authenticity 
features removed or others. Also “criminals also use [parallel trade] as a chan-
nel for mixing of real with fakes and for the importation of counterfeits” 
(Hopkins et al. 2003).
• Illegal Diversion—Stolen, Decoded, Substandard: these products are 
illegal for those reasons such as stolen goods represented as legal, products 
“decoded” with their traceability or authenticity features removed, or prod-
ucts that may be substandard based on local laws or regulations.
The book Counterfeiting Exposed presented a practical approach to pre-
vention and presented an obvious need to focus on the criminal motivation for 
any and all types of fraud. This book helped the research expand from coun-
terfeiting to all types of fraud.
Sidebar: Expanded Review of the First-Sale Doctrine—The Right to 
Resell Legitimately Purchased Products
From the US Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource Manual, CRM 
1500–1999, Criminal Resource Manual 1801–1899 (DOJ 2019):
• 1854. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT—FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
• “Few issues have created greater confusion in criminal copyright prosecu-
tions than the ‘first sale doctrine.’ The doctrine is one of the specific statu-
tory restrictions which Congress has placed on the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners. Criminal defendants frequently resist prosecution by 
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claiming that they believed that the works they were selling had been the 
subject of a legitimate first sale. Moreover, several criminal copyright con-
victions have been overturned because of inadequacies in the government’s 
proof on this issue.”
• “‘The first sale doctrine,’ codified at 17  U.S.C. § 109, provides that an 
individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from 
the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose 
of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright 
owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that 
particular copy.”
The first-sale Doctrine is related to the exhaustion rule:
• Exhaustion (sales exhaustion rule) (WTO): In intellectual property pro-
tection, the principle that once a product has been sold on a market, the 
intellectual property owner no longer has any rights over it. (A debate 
among WTO member governments is whether this applies to products put 
on the market under compulsory licenses.) Countries’ laws vary as to 
whether the right continues to be exhausted if the product is imported 
from one market into another, which affects the owner’s rights over trade 
in the protected product. See also parallel imports or first-sale doctrine 
(WTO 1994).
For food fraud prevention, there are a couple of situations where this may 
apply. First is selling product outside an authorized distribution area. For 
example, consider a distributor who is contracted to be the authorized seller of 
your product in Michigan who decides to sell the product in Ohio. This act 
may be a violation of a contractual agreement, prosecutable in civil court, but 
may not be a violation of a specific criminal law. Second, a short-dated prod-
uct (product near the expiration date) may be sold at a deep discount to an 
exporter for sale in another country. This would provide a benefit of receiving 
some revenue for that product before it would need to be destroyed and also 
to be sold in a faraway market that would not impact the local market price. 
Considering the first-sale doctrine, this is a legal sale of a genuine product so 
the buyer could legally resell that product to the first market. This would not 
be a violation of the criminal law but could be subject to a contractual viola-
tion and possibly prosecuted under civil law. The best option is to have a 
strong contractual agreement and understanding of where this product is 
allowed to be sold. There is another example of a product where the labeling 
or recipe is legal in one country and not another. The sale of the diverted prod-
uct into an illegal market would not be a specific violation of the first sale 
doctrine but would be illegal under possibly many other laws such as smug-
gling or food labeling.
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Sidebar: The Special Problem of Overruns
Several of the types of food fraud may seem to be determined by casual or 
unsophisticated decisions, but there is often case law to support the inclusion. 
For example, product overruns are defined in US law and include guidance for 
prosecutors (DOJ 2013). For example, here is text from a legal defense:
• “Overrun: goods or services, that is, goods or services that an otherwise 
authorized manufacturer or producer makes and sells on the side without 
the mark-holder or licensor’s knowledge or approval.”
It is important to note that some of the overruns are not considered techni-
cally “counterfeits.” “If a licensee manufactures overruns during the course of 
the valid license, the marks on those goods will remain non-counterfeit for 
purposes of this act.”
Examples of the types of overruns are:
• Overproduction: “For instance, consider a trademark licensee who is 
authorized to make 500,000 umbrellas bearing the licensor’s trademark but 
who manufactures without authorization an additional 500,000 umbrellas 
bearing that mark during the course of the license. Joint Statement, 130 
Cong. Rec. 31,676 (1984). Because the trademark owner in this situation 
can protect himself through “contractual and other civil remedies,” 
Congress felt that it was “inappropriate to criminalize such practices.” Id. 
Thus, “[if] a licensee manufactures overruns during the course of the valid 
license, the marks on those goods will remain non-counterfeit for purposes 
of this act.” Id.
• Expanded Product Line: “a licensee produces a type of goods in connec-
tion with which he or she was not authorized to use the trademark in ques-
tion.” … For example, “if a licensee is authorized to produce ‘Zephyr’ 
trench coats, but without permission manufactures ‘Zephyr’ wallets, the 
overrun exception would not apply.” In this example, the licensee could be 
prosecuted for producing the wallets only if the ‘Zephyr’ mark was regis-
tered for use on wallets as well as trench coats.”
• Production After Authorization Ends: “limited to goods or services for 
which authorization existed “during the entire period of production or 
manufacture.”
• Sales of Rejected or Substandard Production: “The use of a licensee’s 
rejected irregular goods.”
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Sidebar: FAO and Praedial Larceny Including Agricultural Theft
The food fraud prevention concepts apply to a wide range of food supply 
problems, including theft, which is one of the types of food fraud. Within food 
fraud/theft, there are many different “hot products” and “hot spots” that can 
efficiently and effectively adapt the general prevention concepts to specific 
problems (Lam and Spink 2018; Spink 2019)—in this case to a very specific 
problem of the theft of agricultural products and related production and pro-
cessing equipment (Fig. 1.3).
While possibly not a well-known term or widely understood problem, 
praedial larceny has been identified as one of the most critical food security 
and criminal activities in many regions of the world. The cost and public 
health harm are also probably vastly underestimated around the world and in 
the USA because the many types of incidents are reported under a wide range 
of laws such as motor vehicle theft, grand larceny, smuggling, food adultera-
tion, food misbranding, or others (FAO 2013).
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has 
had an ongoing focus on addressing the challenges of praedial larceny or what 
is also categorized as a wide range of agriculture-related thefts (FAO 2013):
• Praedial (\ˈprēdēəl\): Being or made up of land or immovable property or 
the profits therefrom (Roman law) (Black’s 2014).
• Larceny: “The unlawful taking of property other than a motor vehicle 
from the possession of another, by stealth, without force or deceit. Includes 
pocket picking, non-forcible purse snatching, shoplifting, and thefts from 
motor vehicles. Excludes receiving and/or reselling stolen property (fenc-
ing) and thefts through fraud or deceit” (US DOJ 2017).
(continued)
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Fig. 1.3 Praedial larceny 
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• Praedial Larceny: The theft of agriculture products […] to include the 
theft of agricultural equipment, agriculture inputs and secondary products 
such as feed and fodder (FAO 2013).
From the FAO Issue Brief on Praedial Larceny in the Caribbean (FAO 
2013):
• The most extensive among all crimes committed in the [Caribbean] sub- 
region in terms of the number of persons and families affected.
• 98% of all producers surveyed have experienced this type of loss.
• The single greatest disincentive to investment in the sector.
• Estimates are that 18% of the value of farm output regionally is taken by 
thieves.
The FAO report differentiated between a thief who steals product for their 
own consumption and criminals who steal to resell or trade the products. It is 
documented that, in some cases, criminals or gangs convert the livestock into 
cash to buy drugs or guns which creates a national security threat. There is 
also ongoing research on the different types of victims, including the farmers, 
processors, producers, and retailers. A specific type of Praedial Larceny or 
Agricultural Theft (PLAT) includes losses of food aid and humanitarian aid 
which could include food or related food security contributions such as seeds, 
fertilizer, feed, agricultural equipment, or even products such as gifts of ani-
mals used for breeding or food production.
So, the victims are identified, and the consequence or result of the fraud act 
is well documented. A next step is to understand how this problem fits into 
other broader problems and overall global priority-setting. When the agricul-
tural products are stolen, it reduces the food available for the producer to sell 
or the aid organization to distribute. The ultimate impact is that food fraud—
and Praedial Larceny or Agricultural Theft—negatively impacts food security.
While the impact on food security may seem intuitive at first, it is impor-
tant to note that the ultimate goal of food security is to create and sustain 
continuous food production and prosperity. Specifically, the food security pri-
orities for the WHO include (emphasis added):
From the World Health Organization—Goals for Food Security:
• Eradicating poverty and promoting prosperity for a changing world priori-
tizes the following goals (WHO 2009):
• Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and 
promote sustainable agriculture
• Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation
For food fraud prevention, there are clear applications deep into problems 
that can have broad impacts beyond the immediate victim to entire markets 
such as increasing global food security.
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 Definitions of Food Risks: Food Quality Food Safety, Food 
Fraud, and Food Defense
To consider food fraud in relation to the bigger picture, the other food risk types are 
defined (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b):
• Food Quality: Product meets the specification. This is an unintentional act with 
no intent to harm.
 – Food Quality (CODEX): “Quality includes all the attributes that influence a 
product’s value to the consumer. This includes negative attributes such as 
spoilage, contamination with filth, discoloration, off-odours and positive attri-
butes such as the origin, colour, flavour, texture and processing method of the 
food” (CODEX 2014). Note: it is interesting that the 2014 Codex definition 
includes “the origin” and “processing method”—thus, a fraudulent act could 
violate that part of the definition and define a lack of quality.
 – Quality Assurance (CODEX CCFICS): “all those planned and systematic 
actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a product or service 
will satisfy given requirements for quality (ISO-8402 Quality – Vocabulary).”
• Food Safety: Product causes a health hazard. This is an unintentional act with a 
health hazard.
 – Food Safety (Codex): “The assurance that food will not cause harm to the 
consumer when prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use” (CODEX 
2014).
• Food Fraud (basic short version): Illegal deception for economic gain using 
food.
• Food Defense: An intentional act with the intent to harm as defined in terms of 
psychological terror, economic harm, or a public health threat.
 – Food Defense (FSMA-IA): The US Food Safety Modernization Act includes 
an Intentional Adulteration Final Rule that narrows a focus of Food Defense 
to “wide-scale human health harms” (FDA 2016). When addressing food 
defense, it is critical to state the definition and scope of the project to avoid 
confusion related to regulatory or certification compliance.
It is understood that food fraud is a description of the unacceptable act, not the 
prevention activity. Over time, it seemed that there was no more efficient term to 
use. Of course, food safety is protecting the food from health harms, food defense 
is to protect the food from an intentional act intended to harm, and so food fraud 
prevention is protecting the food from fraudulent acts.
The food risk definitions and examples are expanded (Table  1.3) (Spink and 
Moyer 2011a, b):
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Table 1.3 Types of food risks with examples, the cause and motivation, the effect, the public 
health risk type, and secondary effect
Discipline 
risk
type Example
Cause and 
motivation Effect
Public 
health 
risk 
type
Secondary 
effect
Food 
quality
Accidental 
bruising of fruit
Mishandling Unsalable product 
or possible 
additional 
contamination 
with E. coli 
O157:H7
None or 
food 
safety
Reduced brand 
equity or food 
safety incident
Food 
fraud
Intentional 
adulteration of 
milk with 
melamine
Increased 
margin
Toxic poisonings Food 
safety
Public fear and 
possibly lower 
prices 
industry-wide
Food 
safety
Unintentional 
contamination of 
raw vegetables 
with E. coli 
O157:H7
Limited field 
protection and 
control during 
harvesting and 
processing
Illnesses and/or 
deaths
Food 
safety
Damaged 
industry, 
product recall 
expense, and 
public fear
Food 
defense
Intentional 
contamination of 
ground beef with 
nicotine
Revenge intent 
against the 
store/manager 
through injury 
to consumers
Nonlethal 
poisonings
Food 
defense
Adulterated 
product, 
damaged 
industry, 
product recall 
expense, and 
public fear
Adapted from Spink and Moyer (2011a, b)
Sidebar: Common Dictionary Definitions of Food Fraud-Related Terms
The product fraud, product anti-counterfeiting, and food fraud literature and 
application are rapidly changing. There are many terms that have been—or 
are—using common practice but possibly not based on formal review or 
intent. Several dictionary definitions are noted here (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Webster’s):
• Counterfeit: “To copy, with the intent to deceive” and “made in imitation 
of the genuine so as to deceive”
• Diversion: “A turning aside from a course, activity, or use”
• Simulation: “1: The act or process of simulating 2: an object that is not 
genuine 3: imitation by one system or process of the way in which another 
system or process works”—“simulate: to give or create the effect or 
appearance of”
• Tamper: “1: to carry on underhand negotiations (as by bribery) < ~with a 
witness>2: to interfere so as to weaken or change for the worse <~ with a 
document>3: to try foolish or dangerous experiments”
• Knockoff: “noun: a copy or imitation of someone or something popular”
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 Definition of Contaminant and Contamination
Before moving on, to cover the related topics, we will review contaminants and 
contamination. Adulterant/adulteration and contaminant/contamination are closely 
related terms that are often incorrectly interchanged. The most official and direct 
definition of a contaminant is by the Codex Alimentarius (CODEX) (CODEX 2014):
• Contaminant (Codex): Contaminant (CODEX, Procedural Manual). Codex 
Alimentarius defines a contaminant as follows: “Any substance not intentionally 
added to food, which is present in such food as a result of the production (includ-
ing operations carried out in crop husbandry, animal husbandry and veterinary 
medicine), manufacture, processing, preparation, treatment, packing, packaging, 
transport or holding of such food or as a result of environmental contamination. 
The term does not include insect fragments, rodent hairs, and other extraneous 
matter” (CODEX 1995).
CODEX does not define an acceptable amount of the contaminant only that it is 
“any” “substance” that is “not intentionally” “added.” CODEX does not define 
deliberate contamination, but a definition can be inferred. An adulterant is not 
defined so the definition of the term “adulteration” cannot be inferred.
 Definition of Food Counterfeiting and Food Crime
The term “crime” and “counterfeiting” has been applied to food. Both are applica-
ble in specific situations. When there is a shift of focus from the “effect” to the 
“cause”—and to build on our 2005–2012 research focus on IP violations and coun-
terfeiting—we first used the term “food counterfeiting.”
There is a challenge of using the term “counterfeit” because although the dictionary 
definition applies to deception and fraud, there is an insinuation that the term applies to 
only intellectual property rights. On several occasions, food industry managers stated 
that they didn’t have a “counterfeit” problem, but they did have broader “fraud” prob-
lems. Food fraud was a more widely applicable and understood term than food coun-
terfeiting. This is a term emphasized in the UK and in the UK DEFRA Elliott Review.
Another related concept is “food crime.” There are two definitions (Manning and 
Soon 2016; van Ruth et al. 2017):
• Food Crime (UK DEFRA): All types of food fraud that is conducted on a large 
scale (NFCU 2017). Long Definition: “Dishonesty relating to the production or 
supply of food that is either complex or likely to be seriously detrimental to con-
sumers, businesses or the overall public interest. Food fraud becomes a food 
• Knock off: “verb: 1 to stop doing something 2: to do quickly, or 
carelessly”
• Replica: “noun 1: an exact reproduction (as of a painting) executed by the 
original artist 2: a copy exact in all details: duplicate”
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crime when the scale and potential impact of the activity is considered to be 
serious. This might mean that the criminal activity has cross-regional, national or 
international reach, that there is a significant risk to public safety, or that there is 
a substantial financial loss to consumers or businesses. Clearly, the full extent 
and impact of food criminality may not be immediately apparent when informa-
tion is first received” (NFCU 2017).
• Food Crime (general): Incidents involving food that is a violation of a criminal 
statute. Long definition: None.
The food crime term is confusing for two reasons: (1) crimes are sometimes 
defined only as a violation of a criminal statute, and some food fraud is outside this 
scope, and (2) any crime using food could include activities beyond the economic 
motivation to the scope of food defense (intent to harm) or food quality (legal viola-
tion or criminal negligence).
Every crime may be a fraud, but every fraud may be a crime. In most cases, the 
term food crime does apply. That said, food crime is a term that is understandable 
to many. The first goal is clear communication of the message. If food crime is the 
term that gets attention, then use the term but be clear about the definition and scope.
 Key Learning Objective 3: The Food Risk Matrix—Food 
Quality, Food Safety, Food Fraud, and Food Defense
This section reviews the relationship between the food risks including the presenta-
tion in the Food Risk Matrix. The relationship of these food risks, in addition to a 
wider set of related terms, helps clarify the wide range of prevention activities. To 
understand the currently applied definitions, it is helpful to examine the origin of 
several of the key terms.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Review of the Food Risk Matrix
• (2) Consideration of the relationship of other food fraud terms
• (3) Then a consideration of the foundation of related terms such as adulterated, 
misbranded, and economically motivated adulteration
 The Food Risk Matrix
One way to review and organize all food risks is by using the Food Risk Matrix 
(Fig. 1.4) (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b). The Food Risk Matrix is a way to review the 
food risks and how they relate to each other. To start the definitions are 
(Spink and Moyer 2011a, b). The Food Risk Matrix was developed to focus on pre-
vention which is the cause—not the effect—of an incident. This is an important 
concept because it covers all types of food risks that are the responsibility of an 
entire enterprise which could be a company or a country.
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 Definitions of Additional Related Terms
There are several additional related terms that will be reviewed here. One separate 
concept that is often confused is food defense and food security. Food defense is 
protection from an attack with the intent to harm, and food security is the continuous 
supply of enough food. As defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
widely adopted, it is to ensure the supply of food, not protecting food from attack.
• Food Security (WHO): “…exists when all people, at all times, have physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household 
food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individu-
als within households as the focus of concern” (WHO 2009).
In addition, other food fraud-related terms are included. Currently, the defini-
tions of both terms are being evaluated and edited by groups including Codex 
Alimentarius. The definition and reference will probably change in the future.
• Food Authenticity (Elliott Review): Food is what it says it is (DEFRA 2014). The 
long definition “… is about ensuring that food offered for sale or sold is of the 
nature, substance, and quality expected by the purchaser (Section 14 Food Safety 
Act 1990). Authenticity can be a particular issue for faith groups or consumers 
with particular food preferences who do not want to purchase products contain-
ing certain ingredients” (DEFRA 2014).
• Food Integrity (EC, FIP): The product is of the specification defined such as qual-
ity and label claims (EU FIP 2017). “The long definition is “the state of being 
whole, entire, or undiminished or in perfect condition.” Providing assurance to 
consumers and other stakeholders about the safety, authenticity, and quality of 
Fig. 1.4 Food Risk Matrix. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2007; Spink and Moyer 
2011a, b)
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European food (integrity) is of prime importance in adding value to the European 
Agri-food economy. The integrity of European foods is under constant threat from 
fraudulently labeled imitations that try to exploit that added value” (EU FIP 2017).
The final definition is for the term food protection. There have been several infor-
mal definitions that are based on the previous food defense definition of protecting 
against intentional acts, and some others include protection from any type of harm 
including food safety incidents.
• Food Protection (FDA 2007): Address food safety and food defense (including 
food fraud/ EMA) (FDA 2007) and in (Petrova Dickenson and Spink 2019). A 
long definition from FDA is: “A Food Protection Plan (the Plan) that addresses 
both food safety and food defense for domestic and imported products. … 
Address both unintentional and deliberate contamination” (FDA 2007).
Together, these are all terms related to food fraud as well as all food risks.
 Food Risk Terminology Relationship Matrix
To provide clarity on the relationship between the terms, the figure was created 
(Fig. 1.5).
Unintentional Intentional
Social Responsibility
EMA
(substance)
Food Defense
(Intentional Act to Harm)
H
ar
m
V
al
ue
E
co
no
m
ic
 (
G
ai
n/
lo
ss
)
Food Terrorism
Food Security (supply of Food)
Food
Protection
Food Quality
(Unitentional Act, no
harm, out of specification)
Food Safety
(Unitentional Act with
Harm)
Food Fraud
(Intentional Act, no
harm, economic gain)
Attribute: Food
Authenticity
(Confirmed
attribute or
identity)
Food Integrity (Meets all expectations)
Fig. 1.5 Hierarchy and relationship of food fraud-related terms with the addition of food protec-
tion, food integrity, food authenticity, social responsibility, and food security
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Sidebar: The Importance of Clear Definitions: The Four Definitions of 
“Food Quality” (MSU FFI 2018)
Title: The Importance of Clear Definitions: The Four Definitions of “Food 
Quality”
By John Spink • February 24, 2014 • Blog
“Argh… are those academics crazy for being such sticklers about defini-
tions?” Not at all! So far — with scholarly articles to quote and reference — 
we’re all creating a harmonized starting point for food fraud prevention the 
important work is to just start defining and clarifying even the most basic 
terms. We all need to stay focused because the laws, regulations, and industry 
certifications are just now being finalized.
Our definition of food fraud is getting quite a bit of attention, being quoted 
in the many US and global regulations or reports. As we’re all developing our 
responses to FDA’s formal request for comments on the Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA), another concept that’s important to review is 
“food quality.”
While we have presented food quality in presentations or in our MOOC, 
we haven’t directly addressed it in a publication. This discussion is essential 
to demonstrate why accurate definitions are so critical… moreover, how we 
can get on the wrong track with inaccurate ones.
When we were researching our NCFPD backgrounder on Food Fraud 
recently (Spink and Moyer 2011a, b), we found these varying definitions of 
“food quality” or “Quality Food”:
• Public Health Professional: doesn’t make people sick
• Food Manufacturing Manager: product attributes that lead to consistent 
end product and manufacturing operations
• Food Standards and Certification Leader: meets the defined specifications 
such as viscosity, density, color, texture, etc.
• Consumer: a high quality or premium
While you may not agree on every aspect of the definitions, an understand-
ing of the different assumptions is essential. If the four stakeholders in those 
bullet points were working together on a project, without clear definitions, 
they could all start arguing about project details that might actually be the 
same. Right or wrong, different groups can have different understandings of 
the meaning of what seems to be the most rudimentary of terms. This chal-
lenge becomes even more of an issue when translating and interpreting 
between languages and alphabets. On a current food fraud prevention project 
involving the US, Russia, and Korea we were taking a proactive approach of 
first creating a background document with the definitions – translated into 
each language. We’re also engaging linguistics scholars to help study the pro-
cess of translating between languages. As with other food fraud research, this 
is helping establish a very firm foundation for future work.
(continued)
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 Adulterant, Adulteration, and Adulterated Foods
A source of confusion has been the use of the term economically motivated adul-
teration which is abbreviated as “EMA.” Initially, adulteration was the subject of an 
1820 book by Frederick Accum on A Treatise on Adulteration of Food and Culinary 
Poisons (Accum 1820) (for more on Accum, see later section). The key challenges 
from Accum’s work are (1) no definition of adulteration and (2) no definition of 
adulterant. The book focuses on methods to detect “counterfeiting and adulteration” 
of either substituted or lower quality substances. Later the term “economic adultera-
tion” was introduced seemingly from the 1996 US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report on “fruit juice adulteration.” This report stated, “Although 
these types of adulteration provide an economic advantage (and are therefore 
referred to as economic adulteration), they pose little threat to the public’s health 
and safety” (GAO 1995). That report repeatedly emphasized there was “little threat 
to the public’s health.” To note, a 2018 internet keyword search using Google did 
not find any mentions of “economic adulteration” before the GAO report published 
on November 5, 1995. Another search in 2018 on “economically motivated adul-
teration” did not find any results for that term before 2000.
From the Federal Register published meeting invitation (emphasis added),3 
expanding on the FDA EMA definition quoted above, FDA did not exactly define 
adulteration or adulterant:
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing a public meeting pertaining to 
economically motivated adulteration (EMA). The purpose of the meeting is to stimulate and 
focus a discussion about ways in which the food (including dietary supplements and animal 
food), drug, medical device, and cosmetic industries, regulatory agencies, and other parties 
3 Note: See the glossary for re-specific and formally published definitions of key words such as 
interested parties, organization, management, top management, management system, documented/
documented information, test, exercise, and others.]
While the world is developing the first food fraud prevention laws, regula-
tions, and industry standards, it is critical that we continue to focus on defin-
ing and explaining the foundational concepts. This is important whether it is 
for FSMA Intentional Adulteration, the European Parliament/ European 
Commission/ European Union draft regulation on food fraud, the UK Elliott 
Review of food fraud, the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) guidance doc-
ument, or the International Standards Organization activities.
So, pay attention, engage, and stay involved when these laws, regulations, 
and industry standards are being defined. If we all engage early and often, we 
have a better chance of all getting on the same page and reducing confusion. 
Hopefully, these efforts help to support the implementation of efficient and 
effective countermeasures and control systems. We will continue to present 
those key reports in this blog series. Stay tuned. MSU-FFI.
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can better predict and prevent economically motivated adulteration with a focus on situa-
tions that pose the greatest public health risk. FDA invites interested individuals, organiza-
tions, and other stakeholders, including industry representatives, to present information 
pertaining to predicting and preventing EMA of food (including dietary supplements and 
animal food), drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics. The agency also requests interested 
parties to submit comments on this issue to the public docket.
Remember, as quoted earlier in this document, the FDA Public Meeting on 
Economically Motivated Adulteration Invitation was published officially and publi-
cally in the Federal Register and included a “working definition” of EMA as 
(emphasis added):
Fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for the purpose 
of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its production, i.e., 
for economic gain. (FDA 2009)
It is important to note that although this is a formal publication, it is a meeting invi-
tation and not a researched publication or a final agency conclusion. FDA has con-
tinued to use this as a working definition. FDA has had no reason or requirement to 
review or update this term.
An especially confusing aspect of this working definition of EMA is that the 
“adulteration” term is defined in conflict with the “Adulterated Foods” Section of 
the US Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) of 1938 (FDA 2015). The FDCA 
defines “Adulterated Foods” as anything that compromises the product including a 
genuine product that spoils and a product where the Good Manufacturing Practices 
cannot be confirmed such as stolen goods that have been outside the control of the 
owner. The FDCA has a separate section on “Misbranded Foods” which refers to 
labeling and claims.
The confusion is that the working definition of economically motivated adultera-
tion requires a “substance”—or adulterant—but the FDCA “Adulterated Foods” 
section does not. (Consider the challenge of trying to explain to a foreign language 
translator that an “adulterated product” is not necessarily required to include an 
“adulterant.”)
Later the US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) of 2011 added more con-
fusion—but maybe some clarity if the ambiguity is considered intentional text and 
interpreted literally—in the Preventive Controls (FSMA-PC) Final Rule. The origi-
nal FSMA law does not mention or cite the term EMA (so economically motivated 
adulteration is not a term that the FDA legally must use). FSMA-PC refers to eco-
nomically motivated adulteration but not “EMA” and does not include any mention 
to the working definition of EMA or the previous public meeting (there are no men-
tions of “EMA” and 33 uses of the phrase “economically motivated adulteration”). 
Later the FSMA-PC for Human Foods Qualified Individual training (PCHF-QI) 
also does not define the term or use “EMA” while introducing new terms including 
“economically motivated hazard” and “economically motivated food safety haz-
ard.” There would have been no confusion if either of those two terms was used in 
the 2009 public meeting.
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The result is that globally the problem has been referred to as food fraud. 
Occasionally economically motivated adulteration is still used to refer to food fraud 
that occurs with and adulterant-substance. The food fraud term is short and easy to 
say as well as correlates with the related terms of food quality, food safety, and food 
defense.
Due to all this confusion, when even referring to a substance that was intention-
ally added for economic gain, there has been a trend to shift from EMA or adultera-
tion to “adulterant-substance.” Adulterant-substance is used in this research and 
more often by other scholars.
Sidebar: Regulatory Definition of “Adulterated Foods”—A US Example
The general concept of an “adulterant” and “adulteration” should not be con-
fused with the US-centric “Adulterated Foods” concept. In the Food and Drug 
Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FDCA), adulteration is defined and explained in a 
section on Adulterated Food (21 USC §342, 2007) which is separate from 
misbranding, which is defined in a separate “Misbranded Foods” section (21 
USC §343, 2004). Reviews of this FDCA section usually focus on the health 
hazard and not the violations for lack of control or the ability to verify that 
Good Manufacturing Practices have been attained and maintained.
Details of the sections on “Adulterated Food” and “Misbranded Food” are 
presented with a listing of each subsection and details needed. For a product 
to be a regulatory violation of “Adulterated Food” section, there must be an 
actual hazard which is not required and just a concern that “whereby it may 
have become contaminated.” The FDCA definition of “Adulterated Foods” is 
(only applicable sections are included) (FDA 2015):
• ‘§ 342. Adulterated food
• A food shall be deemed to be adulterated—
• ‘(a) Poisonous, insanitary, etc., ingredients
• ‘(1) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which 
may render it injurious to health.
• ‘(2) if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious sub-
stance (other than a substance that is a pesticide chemical residue in or on 
a raw agricultural commodity or processed food, a food additive, a color 
additive, or a new animal drug) that is unsafe…
• ‘(3) if it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed 
substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food; …
• ‘(4) if it has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions 
whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may 
have been rendered injurious to health; …
• ‘(5) if it is, in whole or in part, the product of a diseased animal or of an 
animal which has died otherwise than by slaughter; or
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• ‘(6) if its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or 
deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health; 
…
• ‘(7) if it has been intentionally subjected to radiation, …
• ‘(b) Absence, substitution, or addition of constituents
• ‘<(1) If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part omitted or 
abstracted therefrom;
• ‘<(3) if damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or
• ‘<(4) if any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed therewith 
so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or strength, or 
make it appear better or of greater value than it is.
• ‘(c) Color additives
• ‘< If it is, or it bears or contains, a color additive which is unsafe within the 
meaning of section 379e(a) of this title.
• ‘(d) Confectionery containing alcohol or nonnutritive substance
• ‘(e) Oleomargarine (or margarine or butter) containing filthy, putrid, 
etc., matter
• ‘(f) Dietary supplement or ingredient: safety (unsafe or unapproved)
• ‘(g) Dietary supplement: manufacturing practices (same as for “(a)”)
• ‘(h) Reoffer of food previously denied admission
• ‘< If it is an article of food imported or offered for import into the United 
States and the article of food has previously been refused admission under 
section 381(a) of this title, …
• ‘(i) Noncompliance with sanitary transportation practices
There are also often sections applying to specific products such as infant 
formula:
• ‘§ 350a. Infant formulas
• ‘(a) Adulteration
• An infant formula, including an infant formula powder, shall be deemed to 
be adulterated if—
• ‘(1) such infant formula does not provide nutrients as required by sub-
section (i) of this section,
• ‘(2) such infant formula does not meet the quality factor requirements 
prescribed by the Secretary under subsection (b)(1) of this section, or
• ‘(3) the processing of such infant formula is not in compliance with the 
Good Manufacturing Practices and the quality control procedures pre-
scribed by the Secretary under subsection (b)(2) of this section.
(continued)
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The FDCA is focused on public health threats, and the definitions define 
the effect not the cause. For example, a genuine product that has spoiled 
would be defined by the FDCA as an “Adulterated Food,” but clearly there is 
not “adulteration”—at least not in line with the intentional adulteration or 
economically motivated adulteration concepts.
Thus, when looking at the definitions, a product that meets the definition of 
an “Adulterated Food” might not require an adulterant.
Sidebar: Regulatory Definition of “Misbranded Foods”—A US Example
Since the terms adulteration and misbranding are often mentioned together—
including in the Food Safety Modernization Act—it is essential to review the 
FD&C definition of “misbranding” (FDA 2015):
§ 343. Misbranded food
A food shall be deemed to be misbranded—
• ‘(a) False or misleading label
 – < If (1) its labeling is false or misleading in any particular, or (2) in the 
case of a food to which section 350 of this title applies, its advertising 
is false or misleading in a material respect or its labeling is in violation 
of section 350(b)(2) of this title.
• ‘(b) Offer for sale under another name (of another food)
• ‘(c) Imitation of another food
 – < If it is an imitation of another food, unless its label bears, in type of 
uniform size and prominence, the word “imitation” and, immediately 
thereafter, the name of the food imitated.
• ‘(d) Misleading container
 – If its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading.
• ‘(e) Package form
 – If in package form unless it bears a label containing
 – <(1) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or 
distributor; […]
 – <(2) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of 
weight, measure, or numerical count, […]
• ‘(f) Prominence of information on label
• ‘(g) Representation as to definition and standard of identity
• ‘(h) Representation as to standards of quality and fill of container
• ‘(i) Label where no representation as to definition and standard of identity
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 – Unless its label bears (1) the common or usual name of the food, if any 
there be, and (2) in case it is fabricated from two or more ingredients, 
the common or usual name of each such ingredient and if the food pur-
ports to be a beverage containing vegetable or fruit juice, a statement 
with appropriate prominence on the information panel of the total per-
centage of such fruit or vegetable juice contained in the food; …
• ‘(j) Representation for special dietary use
• ‘(k) Artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservatives
 – If it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or 
chemical preservative, unless it bears labeling stating that fact, except 
that to the extent that compliance with the requirements of this para-
graph is impracticable,
• ‘(l) Pesticide chemicals on raw agricultural commodities
• <If it is a raw agricultural commodity which is the product of the soil, bear-
ing or containing a pesticide chemical applied after harvest, unless the 
shipping container of such commodity bears labeling which declares the 
presence of such chemical in or on such commodity […]
• ‘(m) Color additives
• ‘(n) Packaging or labeling of drugs in violation of regulations
• ‘(q) Nutrition information
 – <label or labeling bears nutrition information that provides— (A)(i) the 
serving size which is an amount customarily consumed and which is 
expressed in a common household measure that is appropriate to the 
food, or
 – <(B) the number of servings or other units of measure per container,
 – <(C) the total number of calories—
 – <(D) the amount of the following nutrients: …
 – <(E) any vitamin, mineral, or other nutrient …
• ‘(r) Nutrition levels and health-related claims
• ‘(s) Dietary supplements (other requirements apply)
• ‘(t) Catfish
 – < If it purports to be or is represented as catfish, unless it is fish classi-
fied within the family Ictaluridae.
• ‘(u) Ginseng
 – <If it purports to be or is represented as ginseng unless it is an herb or 
herbal ingredient derived from a plant classified within the genus Panax.
• ‘(v) Failure to label; health threat
(continued)
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 FDA Historical Foundation of the “Economically Motivated 
Adulteration” Term
The term “economically motivated adulteration” (EMA) was brought to the fore-
front when the US Food and Drug Administration (US FDA) announced a public 
meeting on EMA.  The meeting addressed all FDA-regulated products including 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, dietary supplements, and not just food. Led by 
Randall Lutter, the former Deputy Commissioner for Policy (currently Senior 
Science and Regulatory Advisor in the Immediate Office of the Commissioner 
reporting directly to FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb) 2009, the US FDA posted 
a Federal Register notice of a Public Meeting on EMA that was held in May 2009 
• ‘(w) Major food allergen labeling requirements
 – <(1) If it is not a raw agricultural commodity, and it is, or it contains an 
ingredient that bears or contains, a major food allergen, unless either— 
(A) the word “Contains”, followed by the name of the food source …, 
‘(B) the common or usual name of the major food allergen in the list of 
ingredients required …,
• ‘(x) Nonmajor food allergen labeling requirements
• ‘(y) Dietary supplements
• <If it is a dietary supplement that is marketed in the United States unless 
the label of such dietary supplement includes a domestic address or domes-
tic phone number through which the responsible person is identified…”
Since “Adulterated Foods” are defined in regulations separately from the 
“misbranded foods,” then if the word EMA is used, there should also be “eco-
nomically motivated misbranding.” Thus, considering the full scope of food 
fraud would cover economically motivated adulteration and also economi-
cally motivated misbranding.
Applying the section of this act regarding misbranding, then food fraud 
would be comprised of economically motivated adulteration and economi-
cally motivated misbranding (Fig. 1.6).
Economically 
Motivaed 
Adulteration
Economically 
Motivated 
Misbranding
Food 
Fraud
Fig. 1.6 Food fraud as comprised of EMA and EMM
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(FDA 2009). While EMA has been a term mainly used since then by the food 
industry, the public meeting covered all FDA products. Specific examples of inci-
dents published in the notice included (FDA 2009):
• Melamine in pet food: “In March 2007, FDA received reports of kidney failure 
among cats and dogs and a report that cats died during taste tests of certain 
brands of pet food. … Over 150 brands of pet food and 1000 products were vol-
untarily recalled by a number of companies.”
• Heparin in kidney dialysis medicine: “In January 2008, FDA received reports 
of adverse reactions in pediatric dialysis patients … associated with heparin 
manufactured by Baxter Healthcare Corp. that was administered during the dial-
ysis procedures.”
 – Impact: “FDA’s investigation ultimately identified almost 150  U.S. deaths 
occurring between January 1, 2007, and May 31, 2008, that appeared to be 
associated with the use of these heparin products.”
• Melamine in milk powder and infant formula: “In September 2008, FDA 
issued a Health Information Advisory in response to reports of melamine- 
contaminated milk-based infant formula manufactured in China. Melamine was 
apparently added to diluted milk in order to increase measured nitrogen levels 
(indicators of protein content) and thereby inflate the apparent protein content 
found in the product.”
 – Impact: “To date, official reports from the Chinese Ministry of Health state 
that nearly 300,000 Chinese infants were sickened by the contaminated infant 
formula, and that six infant deaths were likely due to the contamination.”
• Diethylene Glycol (DEG) in various medicine products: “Adulteration of glyc-
erin, an ingredient in cough syrup and other drugs, with diethylene glycol (DEG) 
has resulted in several mass poisonings around the world in the past two decades.”
 – Impact: “In 1996, contaminated acetaminophen syrup was responsible for the 
deaths of more than 70 children in Haiti. In 2006, tainted cough syrup resulted 
in dozens of deaths in Panama. In Nigeria, between 2008 and 2009, more than 
50 children died after ingesting contaminated teething syrup. Incidents of 
DEG contamination in these two decades have not resulted in any reported 
U.S. deaths or illnesses, but in 2007, foreign-made toothpaste contaminated 
with DEG was reported in the United States resulting in recalls and restriction 
on imports of suspect toothpaste.”
The day-long FDA public meeting included presentations from many industry 
leaders from beyond the food industry. The presenters are listed here in order of the 
presentations on the meeting website (there were additional members listed on the 
agenda) (Table 1.4).
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Everything might have been different if that first working definition of EMA 
referred broadly to “adulteration” as specified in the FDCA. Nevertheless, terms 
that are now used in FSMA guidance such as the qualified individual training 
are “economically motivated food safety hazard” and “economically motivated 
hazard.”
Table 1.4 Organizations and links to presentations at the FDA EMA public meeting in agenda 
order (Note: as listed on the FDA website in September 2018—additional presenters were listed on 
the agenda but not included in this set of links to the presentations) (FDA 2009)
Organizations who presented at the FDA EMA public meeting in order of presentation (as 
listed on the FDA website in September 2018—additional presenters were on the agenda)
1. Michigan State University (Defining Food Fraud & The Chemistry of the Crime. Presenter: 
John Spink, Ph.D., Associate Director Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Protection Program 
(A-CAPP), School of Criminal Justice)
2. US Pharmacopeia (Economically Motivated Adulteration, Roger L. Williams, M.D., Chief 
Executive Officer Chair, Council of Experts, US Pharmacopeia)
3. IPEC (International Pharmaceutical Excipients Council) (Efforts to Ensure Excipient Safety, 
Irwin Silverstein)
4. Amgen Incorporated (Economically Motivated Adulteration, Martin VanTrieste, Vice 
President Quality; Commercial Operations, Amgen)
5. National Fisheries Institute (Summary of Comments: Economically Motivated Adulteration, 
Lisa Weddig, National Fisheries Institute)
6. Science Personal Care Products Council (Suspected Economically Motivated Adulteration of 
FDA-Regulated Products, John E. Bailey, Executive Vice President– - Science Personal Care 
Products Council)
7. Natural Products Association (Economically Motivated Adulteration, Daniel Fabricant, 
Ph.D. Vice President, Scientific & Regulatory Affairs)
8. American Herbal Products Association (Simple Authentication Methods for Herbal Ingredient 
Integrity in the face of EMA, Steven Dentali, Ph.D., Chief Science Officer)
9. Council for Responsible Nutrition (Avoiding economic adulteration of dietary supplements: 
The need for ingredient supplier qualification guidelines, Andrew Shao, Ph.D., Vice President, 
Scientific & Regulatory Affairs)
10. ConsumerLab.com (Economically Motivated Adulteration in the Dietary Supplement Market 
Place, William Obermeyer Ph.D., VP Research)
11. The Pew Charitable Trusts (Protecting Consumers from Adulterated Drugs, Allan Coukell, 
Director, Pew Prescription Project)
12. Center for Science in the Public Interest (Comments on Economically Motivated 
Adulteration, Xuman Amanda Tian, Research Associate, Food Safety Program)
13. Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) (Economically Motivated Adulteration, Craig 
W. Henry Ph.D., Senior Vice President, and Chief Operating Officer, Scientific and Regulatory 
Affairs)
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Sidebar: A Treatise on Adulteration of Food in 1820 by Frederick 
Accum
An appropriate end to this Introduction chapter on definitions is to review the 
very earliest research on food fraud. The food fraud concept has been confus-
ing from the start. Accum’s book published in 1820 was apparently the first 
citation for the use of the term “food adulteration.” Frederick Accum pub-
lished A Treatise on Adulteration of Food (Accum 1820). The full title is “A 
Treatise on Adulteration of Food and Culinary Poisons exhibiting the 
Fraudulent Sophistications of [various products] and the Methods of Detecting 
Them.” There are no definitions of adulteration, adulterated, adulterant, coun-
terfeit, or contaminant, and he does not use the term “substance.”
Accum’s statement is (emphasis added):
• “This treatise, as its title expresses, is intended to exhibit easy methods of 
detecting the fraudulent adulterations of food, and of other articles, classed 
either among the necessaries or luxuries of the table; and to put the unwary 
on their guard against the use of such commodities as are contaminated 
with substances deleterious to health.”
But, what exactly does he think is adulteration?
Accum did mention “the fraudulent adulterations of food,” “the detection 
of frauds,” and “counterfeit” products then shifted the focus of the research to 
test methods for “detection of the adulteration of foods.” He refers to “the 
adulteration of food” (interpreted as the intentional deception of usually a 
lower quality version of the product) and “counterfeit” (interpreted as the 
intentional deception of substituting a different product) though here he does 
not use the phrase “food adulteration” or “adulterant.”
Thus, Accum appears to consider that of the many types of adulteration of 
food, one type is fraudulent adulteration using a lower quality substance, and 
another is counterfeiting by substituting another product. The lack of a clear 
definition has created confusion from the very start of attempting to prevent 
food fraud.
 Conclusion
This Introductory Chapter—and the starting point for the book—began at the most 
logical starting point which is reviewing the definition and scope of food fraud. 
Considering the definition of this and related terms—including a consideration of 
the prevention-focused objective—helps set the direction of the research. The direc-
tion from the 2018 CODEX CCFICS Chairman directed the Electronic Working 
Group on Food Integrity and Food Authenticity food fraud and was consistent with 
this idea that definition clarity would self-direct the next steps. The first conclusion 
is that the most logical starting point to review the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy 
Conclusion
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is, to begin with, the definition of the term. As a series of incidents have become 
more and more impactful, the problem has been more clarified from covering adul-
terant-substances to mislabeling and then counterfeiting and a realization that a 
holistic, all- encompassing approach is to address all types of fraud. The second 
conclusion is that food fraud prevention follows the saying that “common sense is 
neither common nor sense.” It might seem that “everyone knows what that means” 
is not always so and when applied to food fraud is often not the case. A simple first 
step is to clarify the definition and scope of the research question and then confirm 
the end use of the information. General information generally helps, and specific 
information specifically helps. Without a clear definition and scope, combined with 
a clear specification of what decision is being addressed, the projects often end in 
confusion or a report that is not useable. The final conclusion is that to understand 
the current state and focus, it is important to review the applicability of the core 
source documents such as Accum’s treatise on food adulterations or the FDA work-
ing definition of economically motivated adulteration. Over time, as the scope of 
food fraud is clarified and the prevention priority, some of the original concepts may 
adapt to be more appropriate.
There is a saying:
We’re not trying to catch bad product but to prevent food fraud from occurring in the first 
place.
The next chapter on an introduction to the concepts will expand on the introduction 
to the concept before a deeper dive into the specific topics (Fig. 1.7).
Food Fraud 
Prevention 
Strategy
Definitions
Criminology
Decision-
Making/ 
Business/ Risk 
Managament
Laws, 
Regulations, 
Standards & 
Certifications
Prevention
Fig. 1.7 Example of confirming definitions and scope before beginning to create the Food Fraud 
Prevention Strategy that is comprised of specific disciplines
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Introduction and Definitions
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all Food fraud is a new topic, and this chapter provides a very thorough review 
and foundation of the definition and scope—just follow the recommendation
Quality team Use this to identify where to expand your focus from traditional food safety 
to food fraud prevention—from biological sciences to criminology and 
business risk assessment
Auditors This supports your awareness of “what is food fraud?”
Management This is scholarly support for the broader foundation that is usually addressed 
by a food quality team
Corp. 
Decision-makers
The employees have a process that is based on a theoretically sound and 
widely researched foundation
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter.
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) Why must FF be addressed by a company or country?
 (b) What are the major challenges to creating and then implementing an FFPS?
 (c) How does a government FFPS differ from a company strategy?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is the definition of a “problem”?
 (b) Why is “Establishing the context” critical?
 (c) How is “success” measured?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is the definition of “food fraud”?
 (b) Explain EMA in relation to food fraud?
 (c) What is the relationship between food authenticity and food integrity?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is the “Food Risk Matrix”?
 (b) How is food fraud different from food defense?
 (c) Where is a “disgruntled employee” applied in the Food Risk Matrix?
Appendix: Study Questions
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Chapter 2
Introduction (Part 2 of 2): Basic 
Prevention Concepts
Summary
This chapter presents the introduction to the fundamentals of product fraud 
 prevention and the application to food fraud. To start, the basic concepts are reviewed, 
then the risks or vulnerabilities, and finally the difficulties and issues that have hin-
dered the focus on prevention. The interdisciplinary nature of prevention is reviewed 
by considering how the fraud opportunity is created and the many academic disci-
plines that help understand the optimal countermeasures and control systems.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) Product Fraud Attributes: This section will present the basic details that 
define the fraud opportunity as well as the key focus areas for prevention.
• (2) Types of Harms and Identifying the Root Cause or Types of Food Risks 
and Vulnerability: To identify these concepts, there is a need to step back and 
review the terms and how they relate to each other.
• (3) Prevention and Problem-Focused Research: After holistically reviewing 
the reaction or tactical responses through reducing the fraud opportunity, there is 
an obvious need to focus on and prioritize multidisciplinary-based prevention 
countermeasures.
This chapter reviews the “(0) Fundamental Concepts” and “(A) Academic 
Disciplines” in the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (Fig. 2.1).
 Introduction
Beyond definitions of terms, there are some key concepts that provide insight to 
address food fraud prevention. The concepts are both about the fraud opportunity 
and also about how to think to address the problem. This chapter addresses a wide 
range of topics that are fundamental concepts.
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Product Fraud Attributes
This section reviews the basic details that define the fraud opportunity as well as the 
key focus area for prevention. This expands from the basic attributes of the product 
fraud risk to the beginning of organizing the response plan.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) The types of food fraud risks
• (2) The types of deceptive and non-deceptive counterfeits
• (3) The goals of the countermeasures and control systems
 Types of Food Fraud Risks: Direct, Indirect, and Technical
A consideration when classifying food fraud incidents is the type of risk that occurs. 
From “Introducing the Public Health Threat of Food fraud,” there are three basic 
types of food risks including direct or acute, indirect or chronic, and then technical 
or nonmaterial (Spink and Moyer 2011).
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
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Incidents
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(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
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Fig. 2.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
Fundamental Concepts” (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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“This research identified three types of food fraud risks for public health: direct, 
indirect, and technical. It is important to note that for all three types, these are the 
effects, not the fraudster motivation.
• Direct food fraud risk occurs when the consumer is put at immediate or immi-
nent risk, such as the inclusion of an acutely toxic or lethal contaminant; that is, 
one exposure can cause adverse effects in the whole or a smaller at-risk 
population.
• Indirect food fraud risk occurs when the consumer is put at risk through long- 
term exposure, such as the buildup of a chronically toxic contaminant in the 
body, through the ingestion of low doses. Indirect risk also includes the omission 
of beneficial ingredients, such as preservatives or vitamins.
• Technical food fraud risk is nonmaterial in nature. For example, food documen-
tation fraud occurs when product content or country-of-origin information is 
deliberately misrepresented.”
In reality, a food fraud incident probably has aspects that are in each category. 
For example, melamine in infant formula did include direct food fraud risk from the 
lethal response in some infants, an indirect food fraud risk due to lower nutritional 
content, and also a technical food fraud risk of the mislabeling. On the other hand, 
a genuine, food product that was manufactured under confirmed Good Manufacturing 
Practices in an authorized facility that has a fraudulent country of origin to avoid a 
high tariff would be only a technical food fraud risk (as long as there was still supply 
chain traceability).
 Types of Fraudulent Deception: Deceptive Versus Non-deceptive Product 
and Primary and Secondary Markets
While it is not usually a debate for food products, generally product fraud includes 
deceptive and non-deceptive products (OECD 2008; Moyer et al. 2017):
• Deceptive Products (counterfeits) are products that are placed into supply chains 
with the intent to deceive the consumer into believing that the product is genuine 
in every way.
• Non-deceptive Products (counterfeits) are products that do not position to 
deceive the consumer into believing the products are genuine by their positioning 
in the market whether through the type of retail outlet in which they are sold (flea 
market, etc.), the price (exponentially low), or the quality (poor).
In addition to the deceptive and non-deceptive description, another consideration 
is the type of market including primary and secondary markets. While there is an 
academic definition of two extremes, the actual marketplace includes variations 
along a continuum.
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• Primary market is through authorized resellers which are for “Consumers who 
demand goods of genuine, non-infringing origin establish a market that is 
referred to in this report as the primary market (Spink 2019). For a fraudster to 
penetrate this market, to maintain the price and continued sales, the product must 
be able to deceive consumers into thinking they are buying genuine products 
(deceptive counterfeits)” (Spink 2019).
• Secondary market (possibly to the clearly illegal and clandestine black market): 
“Under certain conditions, consumers are often willing to purchase products they 
know are not legitimate” (Spink 2019). In this situation, the consumers usually 
understand something is not right or proper about the product whether it is sto-
len, counterfeit, or otherwise substandard (non-deceptive counterfeits). “There 
are other markets in between such as products not sold through authorized resell-
ers, legal diverted product, or other types of ‘gray markets’”(Spink 2019).
There are many important considerations both for how consumers are deceived 
(or not) and how to successfully implement risk treatments (from (Moyer et  al. 
2017):
Food fraud can usually be categorized as a deceptive product since consumers generally 
would not purposefully choose to purchase a counterfeit food. Consumers might seek lower 
prices, a generic version, or discounted sale products, but they would not purchase an out-
right fake food. This distinction actually aids in combatting food fraud as it deemphasizes 
non-deceptive fraudsters who do not have access to food value chains including retailers. 
(Moyer et al. 2017)
Also,
When considering all product fraud, there are deceptive products designed to convince the 
victim that the product is genuine in every way (e.g., branded food, pharmaceuticals, and 
products sold at traditional retail outlets, etc.) (OECD 2008). Conversely there are non- 
deceptive products that do not try to hide the fact that they are counterfeit or fraudulent 
(e.g., luxury goods offered at a fraction of typical market price and sold at non-traditional 
outlets such as flea markets, products that are insinuated to be stolen goods that could be 
counterfeits, etc.). (Spink et al. 2013)
This classification is an important insight when selecting countermeasures:
When selecting countermeasures, it is important to understand the difference and to know 
whether consumers are seeking genuine or counterfeit product since this will affect the 
countermeasures chosen. With deceptive counterfeits, the consumer may not be aware there 
are counterfeit products in the marketplace; increasing awareness through publicity may 
lead the consumer not to buy the genuine brand or product which would not satisfy the 
brand owner. With non-deceptive counterfeits, the consumer is seeking illegal product, so 
identifying a product as ‘fake’ would not deter the sale. (Spink et al. 2013)
Thus, it is important to understand whether the customer is seeking a counterfeit 
product or if they are even aware that there may be fraudulent products in the 
marketplace.
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 Countermeasures and Control Systems: Detect, Deter, 
and Prevent
Based on criminology theory, there are three goals of countermeasures and control 
systems including detect, deter, and prevent. The prevent concept is admittedly aspi-
rational, but the ultimate goal is not only to reduce the criminal act but eliminate it 
from even occurring at all (Spink et al. 2016a, b):
• “Detection (detect) is finding a specific adulterant-substance or product 
anomaly.”
• “Deterrence (deter) is a targeted countermeasure to stop one specific type of 
food fraud or fraudster.”
• “Prevention (prevent) is the application of countermeasures that reduce the 
fraud opportunity.”
Also:
Food fraud is opportunistic in nature and represents a significant challenge to both industry 
and government (Spink 2011). Detection and intervention become more complex when 
incidences of food fraud seem to be random, isolated, or small. Food fraud incidents do not 
fall into a statistically normal distribution, based on the widespread prevalence of the same 
type of fraud. Food fraud risk analysis is further complicated by the fraudsters being intel-
ligent, resilient, clandestine, and good at stealthily avoiding detection. Prevention, through 
deterrence of the chemistry of the crime, is critical because we cannot incarcerate our way 
to safety. (Spink and Moyer 2011)
Sidebar: Home Burglary Analogy for Detect, Deter, and Prevent
In relation to food fraud prevention, the concepts of detect, deter, and prevent 
are difficult to understand in relation to the actual application to food fraud 
prevention. Different stakeholders have different ideas of what the terms 
mean. A food authenticity scientist understands that a species test does 
“detect” an incorrect species. That logically does “deter” and thus “prevent.” 
While this is generally true—of course—there is more to prevention than a 
general theory. “General theories generally apply, and specific theories spe-
cifically apply.” We find that using everyday examples helps to explain the 
topics. For “deter”—and as it is presented in the fraud opportunity—two 
actions are hurdles that make an act more difficult to conduct and guardians 
who catch the crime.
To use an everyday example, we refer to protecting a home from a specific 
act such as a break-in burglary or generally of any type of attack.
For a specific act such as a burglary, we will present how the topics apply:
• Detect: The goal is to monitor any bad guys in your house. “Beep-Beep” 
the motion detector alarm is sounded since a burglar is in your kitchen and 
then flees. You are in your bedroom, so it is good that the burglar did not get 
to you, but it would have been better if they didn’t get into your house at all.
(continued)
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 – For food fraud prevention, an example is conducting a species test on 
incoming raw materials and therefore removing illegal horsemeat 
before it gets into your production. If you catch it, it is fortunate that the 
fraudulent material did not get into your finished product, but it would 
have been better if you were never even shipped the fraudulent goods. 
The higher objective is to deter the fraudster.
• Deter: The goal is to combat—or deter—a specific type of activity which 
is entering the house through a window. Considering a “guardian,” “crash” 
a burglar breaks your kitchen window, but a nearby security office hears 
the noise and stops the burglar. It is an improvement that the burglar did not 
get into your kitchen but you’d really rather they didn’t even try to break 
your window. Considering a “hurdle”—“crash” a burglar breaks your 
kitchen window but hits security bars that you have put on the window, and 
they flee—it is an improvement that the burglar did not get into your 
kitchen but you’d really rather they didn’t even try to break your window.
 – For food fraud prevention, this is either a very alert incoming goods 
quality control person noticing a difference in a product or conducting 
a specific type of authenticity test to reject the product before it is taken 
into inventory. The higher objective is to prevent, the fraudster from 
ever even trying to attack you.
• Prevent: The goal is to dissuade any burglar from even trying to break into 
your house. For the general burglar, your home defense does not need to be 
perfect but just a less attractive target. If your house is locked, lights on, 
dog barking, alarm on with active blinking, and your neighbor’s house is 
dark with a window open, then unless there is something very attractive 
about your house, the bad guy will not rob you.
 – For food fraud prevention, this is a potential fraudster (a motivated 
offender who is looking for a victim, see criminology theory chapter 
below) who does not consider you as a target.
Expanding this home protection from burglary to all fraud, you are con-
cerned about all types of attacks on your house, not just break-ins. If you 
conduct a vulnerability assessment for all crime issues, you might find some-
time link cybercrime through Wi-Fi-enabled systems or malware through 
email. Those are very different from combating a burglar but no less concern-
ing or dangerous. From this perspective, it’s obvious that a different scientific 
discipline is needed to combat that vulnerability.
Now, to take a strategic approach to reduce the overall home fraud oppor-
tunity, once you identify vulnerabilities, you continue to examine the risk. 
Vulnerabilities are system weaknesses that could be compromised. For exam-
ple, a window is left unlocked. A risk is the consideration of the vulnerability 
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 Addressing an Incident: Prevention, Intervention, and Response
The Food Protection Plan of prevention, intervention, and response will be reviewed 
in more detail in later chapters on risk assessment, but here it is important to include 
with the other basic terms. Based on the FDA Food Protection Plan concept, the 
series of activities to address an incident are presented here (Fig. 2.2) (FDA 2007):
• Prevention: to implement risk treatments or change behaviors in a way that 
reduces the likelihood of the event occurring again
• Intervention: to identify the hazard and find a detection method focusing on an 
immediate, direct, and tactical response to “intervention” that is absolutely criti-
cal and proper during a crisis
• Response: to find ways to remove the hazard from the supply chain quickly
in relation to other factors that define likelihood and consequence, for example, 
the unlocked window after considering how many houses have been burgled 
in your neighborhood in the last year (likelihood) and how bad it would be for 
you if you had items stolen (consequence). If there have been many burglar-
ies nearby and you have valuable products, then your “risk treatment” could 
justify a large investment. In part, you may review what other neighbors have 
implemented, so you at least have a system in place that is as good as theirs.
In many cases, the food fraud vulnerability assessments identify simple 
vulnerabilities (such as that window left open) and very easy countermeasures 
and control systems (make sure to close and lock the window when you leave 
your house). Closing the window vastly reduces the fraud opportunity regard-
less of the risk. If there are few burglaries in your neighborhood, your vulner-
ability would vastly be reduced, but the statistical probability would hardly be 
reduced at all. From a “risk-based approach,” it would not be warranted to 
close the window. From a “vulnerability reduction approach,” it is efficient 
and logical to get into the habit of committing those extra couple seconds 
always to close the window.
It is important to note that if someone really wants to get into your specific 
house, it will probably happen. High-security art museums and banks are suc-
cessfully attacked and robbed. The countermeasures and control systems do 
not need to be perfect or impenetrable just “unattractive enough” to reduce 
your fraud opportunity to within your “risk tolerance” (note: “risk appetite” 
and “risk tolerance” are terms that are formally defined in standards and will 
be addressed more thoroughly in a later chapter). There is a saying of “how 
fast do you need to be to outrun a bear? Faster than the person you are running 
with” (insinuating that the bear will stop and eat your colleague)! For food 
fraud prevention, there is a sharing of best practices, so everyone is not getting 
faster but all carrying bear repellant systems. The bear doesn’t try to attack 
any of you.
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The figure identified that the process starts at intervention because there needs to 
be awareness and priority-setting before the process starts. A saying is that “We do 
not prevent everything.”
 The Focus on Countermeasures and Control Systems
Throughout this book, the prevention strategies and risk treatment tactics are 
referred to as countermeasures and control systems. A countermeasure is a risk 
treatment such as an authenticity test or using an authentication code. A control 
system is a monitoring or process control that reduces the fraud opportunity by 
either seeking anomalies or increasing the transparency of the supply chain 
through traceability. The term “control system” was carefully selected after start-
ing with “control plans” and also considering a more proactive statement of a 
“control strategy.” First, a system seems to be more all-encompassing than a plan. 
“System” was used to make sure to not confuse with other concepts, for example, 
HACCP is often referred to as a “plan.” “Control plan” was avoided not to confuse 
the activity with the US FDA-defined regulatory compliance use of the phrase 
(FDA 2011). For example, “in-process control plan” is a specific focus in the 
FDCA specifically here referring to 21 CFR 106 D conduct of audits) (FDA 2015a, 
b; 21CFR106D 2018). The focus of a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy is to create 
an overall management system that could end up meeting regulatory compliance 
but only after further review and adjustment. “Control strategy” was not used not 
to confuse the activity with the CODEX defined the concept of a “National Food 
Control Strategy” (WHO 2003). For example, that CODEX report states “The 
attainment of food control system objectives requires knowledge of the current 
situation and the development of a national food control strategy” (WHO 2003). 
The Codex use of the term “strategy” is consistent with the Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy definition and scope.
Fig. 2.2 Food Protection Plan series of activities: Prevention-Intervention-Response (PIR) with 
the starting point after an incident at intervention (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink and 
Moyer 2011)
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Types of Harms and Identifying 
the Root Cause
This section reviews the food risks and vulnerability which provides a foundation 
for classifying and organizing a response.
The Key Learning Objectives for this section are
• (1) The Food Risk Matrix and relationship between concepts of food quality, 
food safety, food fraud, food defense, and food security
• (2) The supply chain vulnerabilities by identifying each node whether within or 
outside the proprietary or legitimate supply chain
• (3) The root cause of the vulnerability which is an economic gain
 Food Risk Matrix: Connection of Concepts
Expanding on the brief introduction to the Food Risk Matrix above, before review-
ing the types of harms and the root causes, it is important to expand the understand-
ing of the problem, itself further. An important concept is how food fraud connects 
to other types of food risks—this helps define what is and what is not food fraud.
Food fraud risks are already present whether explicitly known or not. A company 
is accountable and responsible for all food risks. The CEO holds the President 
accountable who holds the General Manager accountable who holds the VP of 
Quality Assurance accountable. The VP of Quality Assurance is possibly your boss. 
If you are assigned the responsibility for addressing food fraud, then you are doing 
them a disservice if you do not cover all types of fraud and for all products. You 
could say “that wasn’t my assignment,” but “not my job” is not a wise career move. 
Of course, scope creep and lack of resources are a challenge, but it is recommended 
that you at least define what you do and don’t cover in your project.
Especially when reviewing food fraud prevention for the first time—whether for 
GFSI, the Food Safety Modernization Act Preventive Controls Rule, Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act,1 or others—it is most efficient, and not that much more work, to address 
all types of fraud and for all products. This is also efficient because at some point in 
the future you—or someone else—will be given this task.
One way to review and organize all food risks is by using the Food Risk Matrix 
(Fig. 1.4 from above) (Spink and Moyer 2011). The Food Risk Matrix was devel-
oped to focus on prevention which is the cause—not the effect—of an incident.
In the past, food agencies such as the US FDA categorized health hazards as (1) 
unintentional (Food Safety) or (2) intentional (food defense). With these two 
1 Throughout this book the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX or Sarbox) is referred to as a 
primary compliance requirement for implementing Enterprise Risk Management. While SOX is a 
compliance requirement in the USA for public companies, the basic “ERM” or “ERM-like” sys-
tems are a regulatory or general management requirements for virtually all companies. The owners 
of the company, through the board of directors, require this type of oversight.
 Key Learning Objective 2: Types of Harms and Identifying the Root Cause
52
 categories, of course, food fraud would be classified under food defense. Before the 
FSMA Intentional Adulteration Rule, the US FDA included food fraud under food 
defense. In the rule development process and public comment responses, EMA/FF 
was most efficiently addressed by preventive controls and thus was switched to the 
FSMA Preventive Controls rule (FSMA-PC).
While reviewing how an agency addresses unintentional or intentional acts, it is 
opportune to review details of how the FDA addressed the subject. While all hazards 
are a concern and focus for a public health agency such as the FDA, there was a 
need to define the scope of final rules to address the overall law.
Before the FSMA final rules, the FSMA law (US Code) included clear and direct 
compliance requirements that technically required a food fraud vulnerability assess-
ment for all types of fraud and for all products—specifically there is a requirement 
to assess all hazards, of which acts for economic gain are listed (emphasis added) 
(21CFR117.130 2018):
§ 117.130 - Hazard analysis & Sec. 507.33 Hazard analysis.
‘(1) You must conduct a hazard analysis to identify and evaluate, based on experience, 
illness data, scientific reports, and other information, known or reasonably foreseeable haz-
ards for each type of animal food manufactured, processed, packed, or held at your facility 
to determine whether there are any hazards requiring a preventive control; and
‘(2) The hazard analysis must be written regardless of its outcome.
b) Hazard identification. The hazard identification must consider:
‘(1) Known or reasonably foreseeable hazards that include:
 ‘(i) Biological hazards, including microbiological hazards such as parasites, environ-
mental pathogens, and other pathogens;
 ‘(ii) Chemical hazards, including radiological hazards, substances such as pesticide 
and drug residues, natural toxins, decomposition, unapproved food or color additives, and 
food allergens; and
 ‘(iii) Physical hazards (such as stones, glass, and metal fragments); and
‘(2) Known or reasonably foreseeable hazards that may be present in the food for any of 
the following reasons:
 ‘(i) The hazard occurs naturally;
 ‘(ii) The hazard may be unintentionally introduced; or
 ‘(iii) The hazard may be intentionally introduced for purposes of economic gain.
In FSMA-IA, the FDA defined the “intentional adulteration” section scope to be 
“wide-scale health harms.”
The FSMA Draft Rule provides a table that explained exactly why certain 
intentional acts were outside the scope including disgruntled employees and eco-
nomically motivated adulteration (other issues not mentioned are tampering/ mali-
cious tampering, smuggling, stolen goods, port shopping, and others) (Table 2.1) 
(FDA 2016).
The FSMA-IA Final Rule stated:
We further explained that attacks by disgruntled employees, consumers, or competitors 
would be consistently ranked as relatively low risk mainly because their public health and 
economic impact would generally be quite small. We further stated that disgruntled employ-
ees are generally understood to be interested primarily in attacking the reputation of the 
company and otherwise have little interest in public health harm. Typically, acts of dis-
gruntled employees, consumers, or competitors target food and the point(s) in its  production 
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that are convenient (i.e., a point at which they can easily access the food and contaminate 
it). To minimize or prevent this type of adulteration would require restricting access to 
nearly all points in the food system. Instead, we proposed to focus on those points in the 
food system where an attack would be expected to cause massive adverse public health 
impact. (FDA 2016)
In the absence of a clear FSMA law definition of “adulteration,” this was the FDA 
interpreted the FSMA law statement of “intentional adulteration, including by acts 
of terrorism” and “intentionally introduced, including by acts of terrorism” (FDA 
2011).
Table 2.1 “Scope of intentional adulteration and proposed exclusions and exemptions (table from 
the draft rule but confirmed in the final rule)
Type of intentional adulteration
Coverage within the 
scope of proposed 21 
CFR 121
Brief rationale and the relevant 
corresponding section of the rule
Acts of disgruntled employees, 
consumers, or competitors intended 
to attack the reputation of a 
company, and not to cause public 
health harm, although public health 
harm may occur
Not within the scope 
of intentional 
adulteration covered 
under proposed 21 
CFR 121
Not considered “high risk” 
because not intended to cause 
widespread, significant public 
health harm. See section IV.E of 
this document
Economically motivated adulteration 
(EMA) intended to obtain economic 
gain, and not to cause public health 
harm, although public health harm 
may occur
Not within the scope 
of intentional 
adulteration covered 
under proposed 21 
CFR 121
Considering addressing as part of 
hazard analysis in a preventive 
controls framework where EMA 
is “reasonably likely to occur.” 
See section IV.F of this document
Acts intended to cause massive 
public health harm, including acts of 
terrorism
Covered within scope 
and is the focus of 
proposed 21 CFR 
121
Considered “high risk” because 
the intent of the act is to cause 
widespread, significant public 
health harm
Sidebar: FSMA Regarding Smuggling and also Port Shopping
The FDA Final Rules constantly emphasize they apply to the final rule and not 
the overall FSMA or US legal compliance requirements. There are some 
FSMA law requirements topics that are not explicitly addressed in a final rule. 
The final rules also continue to emphasize that the overarching statutory 
requirement is still the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act of 1938. For food fraud 
prevention, two topics include:
• Smuggling: product that is imported into the U.S. through an act of decep-
tion. FSMA and Smuggled Foods is illegal under 21 USC 2243 and 21 
CFR Sect. 309. Product that has been smuggled would be illegal under 
various laws including the FDCA Adulterated Foods section.
 – “SEC. 309. <<NOTE: 21 USC 2243.> > SMUGGLED FOOD (a) In 
General. <<NOTE: Deadline. Strategy.>  >  --Not later than 180  days 
(continued)
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after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop and implement a strategy 
to better identify smuggled food and prevent entry of such food into the 
United States.
 – (b) Notification to Homeland Security. <<NOTE: Deadline.> > --Not 
later than 10 days after the Secretary identifies a smuggled food that the 
Secretary believes would cause serious adverse health consequences 
[[Page 124 STAT. 3967]] or death to humans or animals, the Secretary 
shall provide to the Secretary of Homeland Security a notification under 
section 417(n) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 
350f(k)) describing the smuggled food and, if available, the names of 
the individuals or entities that attempted to import such food into the 
United States.
 – (c) Public Notification.--If the Secretary--
 – (1) identifies a smuggled food;
 – (2) reasonably believes exposure to the food would cause serious 
adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals; and
 – (3) reasonably believes that the food has entered domestic commerce 
and is likely to be consumed, the Secretary shall promptly issue a press 
release describing that food and shall use other emergency communica-
tion or recall networks, as appropriate, to warn consumers and vendors 
about the potential threat.
 – (d) Effect of Section.--Nothing in this section shall affect the authority 
of the Secretary to issue public notifications under other 
circumstances.
 – (e) Definition.--In this subsection, the term “smuggled food” means any 
food that a person introduces into the United States through fraudulent 
means or with the intent to defraud or mislead.”
• Port Shopping: attempting to import products into a US port after had 
been rejected at another US port. Port shopping is illegal under FSMA 21 
USC 381 and 21 CFR Sec. 115 (FDA 2011). Product that has been smug-
gled would be illegal under various laws including the FDCA Adulterated 
Foods section.
 – SEC. 115. [NOTE: 21 USC 381 note] PORT SHOPPING.
 – “[NOTE: Notification.] Until the date on which the Secretary promul-
gates a final rule that implements the amendments made by section 308 
of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, (Public Law 107-188), the Secretary shall notify 
the Secretary of Homeland Security of all instances in which the 
Secretary refuses to admit a food into the United States under section 
801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 381(a)) 
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Sidebar: Applying the Food Risk Matrix to Key Job Responsibilities
Considering the vertical columns in the Food Risk Matrix, food quality and 
food safety are both “unintentional” acts—there is no intent to create these 
problems. Then, food fraud and food defense are both “intentional” acts—the 
actors know what they are doing.
Food fraud is an emerging and often odd type of problem. Melamine in 
infant formula created a health hazard, so it was initially addressed by the 
food safety product recall team. The food safety countermeasure and controls 
were put in place. Once melamine was not found in the product, the problem 
was considered “resolved” or at least “not a problem anymore.” The food 
safety team would logically not prioritize any further focus on melamine. The 
food safety team would definitely not expand to consider other types of pro-
tein fraud.
For this melamine example, the “effect”—the incident—did have a health 
hazard and so logically would be addressed by the food safety system. The 
challenging issue is that the “cause”—or the root-cause motivation—was 
nothing like any other food safety issue. The problem was not a microbe but a 
human adversary. The human adversary is intelligent, learns, and can actively 
seek to avoid detection. Traditional food safety countermeasures and control 
systems are at best “ill-fitting tools.” Of course, testing for melamine is good 
and will catch melamine, but “the goal is not to catch bad product but stop 
fraud from occurring in the first place.”
Once the effect—the incident—is under control, then preventive measures 
can be considered within the “Food Fraud Cell” of the Food Risk Matrix. To 
effectively and efficiently protect consumers and the company, there are sev-
eral important best practices:
 1. Each new incident must be assigned to a specific cell.
 2. Someone must be clearly defined and recognized as accountable for the 
management of each cell.
 3. A new incident cannot be a switch to another cell until the owner of that 
other cell accepted the switch.
so that the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, may prevent food 
refused admittance into the United States by a United States port of 
entry from being admitted by another United States port of entry, 
through the notification of other such United States ports of entry.”
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 Food Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
The food risks are present throughout the Food Supply Chain whether within or 
outside the proprietary channels. To consider the scope of food fraud prevention, the 
extent of the supply chain risks should be reviewed (Fig. 2.3). The most impactful 
problems have been adulterant-substances added to the raw materials and mislabel-
ing such as origin or type of processing. Considering these food safety issues, the 
focus on ingredients is logical. Most of the food fraud incidents are categorized as a 
food safety hazard and, thus, usually first managed by a food safety workgroup 
(Moore et al. 2012; Everstine et al. 2013; Strayer et al. 2014; Everstine et al. 2017). 
The food safety group is focused on their highest risk products and activities that are 
incoming raw materials. The food safety group is often closely connected to Supplier 
Quality Assurance. This type of workgroup does not have responsibility for a prod-
uct after it enters manufacturing—thus, the focus on food fraud prevention often 
does not expand past the (1) incoming goods and (2) manufacturing steps in the 
supply chain.
While fraud does occur on the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle at location “(2) 
Manufacturing,” the controls here are usually a combination of HACCP as well as 
Corporate Security such as employee theft.
Purchasing, Supplier Quality Control, and Operations usually end their focus 
after the product leaves the production facility to “(3) Finished Goods.” The control 
of the supply chain is often the role of a Traffic or Logistics Group.
4. Technology Transfer & Contract Manufacturing
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Inspection Source: Chapter: Defining Food Fraud & The Chemistry of the Crime,Improving Import Food Safety, Institute of Food Technologists, 2010
Food Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Fig. 2.3 The food supply chain with a focus on vulnerabilities that are identified by either inspec-
tion or investigation. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2012)
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There is a fraud opportunity between “(2) Manufacturing” and “(3) Finished 
Goods” that could be employee theft, reselling of product that was sent for destruc-
tion, downgrading “first quality” product to “substandard” in a criminal scheme, or 
other weights or document fraud.
Of the two segments that are outside the normal operation the first is “(4) 
Technology Transfer & Contract Manufacturing.” The contract manufacturers are 
usually more under the control of the usual product quality but not always. The 
contract manufacturers are outside the day-to-day monitoring, so there is a unique 
“fraud opportunity.” Another segment is technology transfer where a brand may be 
licensed by a company in another country or region. This segment is usually admin-
istered by a legal group managing the legal contract.
There are other incidents that are also found and assigned to other parts of the cor-
poration. For example, a counterfeit or diverted product that is found in a  marketplace 
are often found during global brand protection audits by Corporate Security located 
at “(5) Outside the Supply Chain” and more generally “(6) Marketplace.”
When a problem is identified, it is assigned to the most common or convenient 
business function. If you find the counterfeit product in a far-away country, it is best to 
have Corporate Security engage criminal investigators in those countries (MSU- FFI 
2018). A food science inspector in your home country would not have the skills or 
capabilities to conduct the criminal investigation, and they probably aren’t trained to 
avoid violence and personal security such as avoiding kidnapping. For this situation, 
the intervention is best led or at least coordinated by the Corporate Security function.
 Personal Insight: Technology Transfer and Patent Royalty Payments
I presented at an academic Law School conference where several professors were 
getting great accolades for their patented crops. They were talking about patent 
negotiations and writing licensing contracts. It was a very exciting presentation 
because they were discussing the great financial payments for agricultural produc-
tion based on the number of plants or trees in use. There was a royalty paid for each 
plant or tree used.
Considering product fraud, I asked how they monitored the use of their patents. 
There seemed to be a very high fraud opportunity if the patent buyer was providing 
the data for defining the amount of the payments.
I got blank stares.
I never got invited back to that conference speaker.
 Root-Cause Analysis: Cause and Effect
Now that the type of food risks and the food supply locations of vulnerabilities 
have been presented, it is important to shift to focus on the root causes. The 
“cause” aspect is important to consider separately from the “effect.” The “cause” 
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is the reason why an incident could occur which would have a result of an “effect.” 
For food safety, there is HACCP to focus on the food safety “cause” and a very 
active and extensive system to deal with incidents or the “effect” of those potential 
public health harms. For food defense, there is also a threat assessment and con-
trol system methods to deal with contaminated products. For food quality, there 
are total quality management systems that extensively assess the root cause of 
possible anomalies. For food fraud, the vast majority of incidents do not have a 
public health harm so they do not trigger the food safety or food defense response 
systems. Also, the food fraud vulnerabilities would rank very low on a food safety 
or food defense risk assessment. Likewise, food fraud would be difficult to truly 
consider in a food quality system since there are so few incidents and usually so 
little of an economic impact. For all the traditional food risk responses, addressing 
and prevention of food fraud are just so complex, interdisciplinary, and fundamen-
tally different.
For food safety incidents, there is a focus on the “effect” from “public health 
harm.”
The food safety vulnerabilities and risks are inherent in the nature of the food 
production (e.g., vegetables are grown in dirt, animals have produce feces in their 
bodies, and the food manufacturing operations constantly address these non-sterile 
challenges).
Based on the food safety paradigm, there is a belief that current control systems 
or HACCP plans are holistic and all-encompassing for all public health-related food 
risks. Food safety issues are not the root cause of all food public health hazards. 
When melamine was detected in infant formula and powdered milk, there seemed 
to be a food safety industry impression that the early warning systems worked since 
they detected the product. In reality, melamine was not a substance on the early 
warning system radar, and the “early warning” was the public health incidents—the 
detection was a response to human illness and death. Waiting for illness or death is 
not proactive and not the intent of an early warning system; rather, monitoring for 
illnesses is an outbreak rapid alert system.
The application to food fraud and prevention is that there is often a belief that 
the current food safety response systems and HACCP plans already are competently 
addressing the—and assumed all—food public health hazards.
The root cause of the food fraud incident is fundamentally different than for food 
quality, food safety, or food defense. Thus, a separate root cause analysis for food 
fraud would focus on the unique “cause” which is an intelligent, human, criminal 
adversary who is actively seeking to avoid detection.
For food fraud prevention, really the only practical approach is to consider vul-
nerabilities and address the root cause. When this focus is implemented, there can 
be simple and usually cost-effective risk treatment that vastly reduces or eliminate 
the fraud opportunity and the subsequent costs or illnesses.
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 Examples of Incident Impacts
To continue to focus on the root causes and to understand the complex challenge, it 
is important to review incidents. Food fraud incidents are not new, but there is a 
recent focus on clustering these types of activities and considering holistic, all- 
encompassing risk treatments.
It is widely documented that food fraud was present in the UK back to the 1800s 
by Accum, to ancient times by Pliny the Elder in his book Natural History (Naturalis 
Historia, which was actually not completed at the time of his death in AD 79 during 
the eruption of Mount Vesuvius), and recorded even back as far as 1046 BCE in the 
writings of Zhou Dynasty in China (Wu et al. 2017). The first US food laws in 1906 
and 1938 mentioned “fraud jokesters” and diethylene-glycol which also was cited 
as a danger in the US Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011. The same types of 
food fraud—actually the exact same fraud acts and substances—have continued to 
be a problem.
Several modern food fraud incidents occurred that escalated the danger and risks 
for companies, markets, and even countries. Several of the most impactful modern 
food fraud incidents include (Moore et al. 2012; Everstine et al. 2013; Strayer et al. 
2014; Spink et al. 2016a):
• ~2004—Sudan Red carcinogen colorant in paprika and other spices 
(adulterant-substance)
• 2007—melamine in infant formula and pet food (adulterant-substance)
• 2012—horsemeat in beef (adulterant-substance)
• Continued announcements such as:
 – Peanut Corporation of America selling the product with known bacterial con-
tamination (tampering)
 – Smuggled honey and origin laundering for tax avoidance (diversion)
 – Stolen raw poultry re-introduced to the supply chain (theft)
 – Ground peanut shells used to extend cumin (adulterant-substance)
The seemingly never-ending string of incidents has become more defined and 
catastrophic as an issue for several reasons including more product traveling farther 
and faster around the world, that global reach increasing the minimum efficient 
scale of production (larger manufacturing plants produce more product), a con-
sumer preference for less processed or raw foods, and an increase in both the test 
precision and the availability of more tests being conducted, plus the more rapid 
communication of problems once they do occur.
 The Economic Impact of a Food Fraud Incident
The economic impact of an incident can be very significant or catastrophic. Beyond 
the cost of a product recall or regulatory penalty is a possibly bigger loss of sales or 
loss of market capitalization (the value of a company based do its stock price). 
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It is estimated by Forbes magazine that McDonald’s restaurants lost 0.8% in stock 
price due to an alleged date code tampering fraud in China. The 0.8% drop for a $90 
billion market capitalization is almost a $900 million drop in the stock price. While 
stock prices fluctuate up and down, there is a problem when the fluctuation is based 
on a specific single incident or vulnerability. While not food fraud, another example 
is the impact on the entire New Zealand economy when the Fonterra Corporation 
has a suspected food safety incident. This led to a block of imports of some of their 
perishable dairy products. Fonterra is a co-op that represents New Zealand dairies 
and is a major part of the entire economy. It is reported that the New Zealand cur-
rency devalued during this crisis.
While in Macro, or enterprise-wide, the impact of the incidents is a result of 
micro- or fraudster-specific opportunities. The risks can be summarized to an over-
all impact, but the derivation of the estimates and the understanding of the fraud 
opportunity are specific to the individual actors. For example, the food fraud profit 
per truckload can be very high and even more humongous when considering one 
deal could be many truckloads (Table 2.2) (Moyer et al. 2017).
For more detail on how quickly the food fraud profits can accrue, it is helpful to 
review the details of an incident (Table 2.3) (Moyer et al. 2017).
 Key Learning Objective 3: Prevention and Problem-Oriented 
Research
This section reviews the root cause of the fraud opportunity which leads to a strat-
egy based on an understanding of the root cause to create prevention focused efforts.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are to review
• (1) Why prevention is the primary and most efficient and effective response
• (2)  Working from identification of the problem to seek solutions (and Envisioning 
food fraud prevention as similar to managing diabetes not fixing a broken leg)
• (3) Why an interdisciplinary approach is critical and most effecient
Table 2.2 Review of food ingredients, adulterants, estimated economic gain, and the units of one 
fraud incident
Food ingredient Adulterant
Economic 
gain Units
Wheat gluten Melamine $31,000 Truckload (50k lbs.)
Wheat Urea $11,000 Bin (10k bushels)
Apple juice High-fructose corn syrup or 
hydrolyzed chicory syrup
$18,000 Truckload (50k lbs.)
Tomatoes Maltodextrin $12,000 Truckload (50k lbs.)
Spices (e.g., paprika, 
curry, chili powder, etc.)
Sudan dyes Undefined $0.06 of dye probably 
increases profit by $1+/
lb
Adapted from DeVries (2013)
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 The Efficiency of Prevention: The Only Really Logical Strategy
While it may seem completely logical to state the efficiency of prevention, there 
are often proposed countermeasures or control systems that do not address the 
overall concept. When considering the overall food risk focus, the food fraud prob-
lem is to address all types of fraud for all products and a proactive, strategic 
approach. The fraudsters are focused on any criminal act that allows them a high 
probability of achieving their highest available economic gain, so the response is 
likewise aligned. Once the assessment of the overall problem and the prevention 
strategy is in place, only then can detection and deterrence countermeasures and 
control systems be considered and assessed. The chapter on Risk Analysis and the 
other on Risk Assessment Application will cover this concept in more detail and 
with examples.
Table 2.3 Ingredient-level review of adulterated melamine in a hypothetical protein bar
Food ingredient
Percent 
content per 
bar
Cost per pound 
(of the raw 
material)
Genuine product: 
ingredient coast 
per 1 lb. bara
Fraudulent 
ingredient cost in 
the finished goodb
Peanuts 30% $1.00 $0.30 $0.30
Almonds 25% $2.40 $0.60 $0.60
Wheat gluten 20% $1.25 $0.25 $0.126 ($0.25/2+ 
$0.001)
Sugars 10% $0.20 $0.02 $0.02
Vegetable oil 10% $0.50 $0.05 $0.05
Salt/soda/misc. 5% $1.00 $0.05
Ingredient total 100% $1.27 $1.146
Processing and 
packaging
50% of the total 
cost of goods 
sold (COGS)
$0.64 $0.64
Total cost (per bar) $1.91 $1.786
Food fraud profit 
(per bar)
$1.124
Pounds per truckload 50k pounds
Total profit (per 
truckload; authentic 
vs. non-fraudulent)
$6200
Truckloads per sale 10 
truckloads
Total food fraud 
profit
$62,000
Adapted from Moyer et al. (2017)
Note afor simplicity, a 1 pound single serve bar was used]
Note b10% melamine at $0.01 per pound
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 Shifting to Prevention: Why Hasn’t This Been Addressed Proactively 
Before?
An occasional question is that if food fraud has been around since the beginning of 
recorded history, then why has it not been directly addressed? There is a question of 
why a government would “allow” this to continue not to be directly addressed? 
Also, if there are so many economic harms to a company, why haven’t they addressed 
this sooner? The answer is based on the complexity of the crime and the extremely 
interdisciplinary strategy.
Also, later in the Criminology Chapter, there will be a more detailed discussion 
about the complexity even of classifying product fraud as a “traditional crime” or a 
“white collar crime.” The research led product fraud identified as a hybrid crime 
where the preparation is more of a typical “white collar crime” and the activity is 
more of a typical “traditional crime.” Anytime a problem falls outside of normal and 
simple categories, there are additional challenges regarding accountability and 
responsibility.
Regarding the complexity of the detection of the fraud act, to begin there are two 
parts to the response to the incidents which are detecting the fraud and then preven-
tion countermeasures and control systems. First, there is detecting the food fraud 
act. Industry and agencies already have systems in place to detect contaminants 
(regularly occurring, expected “things”). When an incident like melamine occurs, it 
becomes known, and, if it seems to have a chance of occurring again or in a more 
harmful, the adulterant could be categorized in an Early Warning System as a “con-
taminant.” The reactive systems start to look for that contaminant.
This is applicable to those contaminants that are known and can be expected to 
recur under the same general conditions and in the same way. For food fraud, there 
are a nearly infinite number of adulterants. Also, just because there is a fraud oppor-
tunity (e.g., the price of a commodity sky-rocket), this does not mean there is always 
an incident.
The human fraudster may be a biological organism that does respond to oppor-
tunities. But unlike a microorganism, the human fraudster will not always respond 
the same way each time to the same stimuli or conditions. The human fraudster is 
often intelligent, creative, resilient, patient, and often very well-funded. Also, the 
human fraudster may decide for some reason not to act. Beyond this generalization, 
the macroeconomic conditions do not always apply to an individual human fraud-
ster. Each human fraudster is like a separate species of microorganism—or at least 
a single species that has exhibited a nearly infinite number of mutations or adapta-
tions. Each human fraudster has an extremely varied set of characteristics and 
motivations.
To explain this analogy, consider that E. coli, Salmonella, and Listeria are three 
microorganisms. While most E. coli (the general genus Escherichia) are not only 
harmless to humans but actually play an important role in gut health, there are 
pathogenic strains such as E. coli H1N1 that pose a very serious public health 
threat (CDC 2018). That said, all E. coli will respond to environmental conditions, 
in the same way, every time (admittedly, there may be some mutations or abnormal 
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individual organisms). With the human fraudster, the response to the condition is 
much more individual. For example, the global change in cocoa pricing will have 
no effect on a fraudster dealing with tea. Also, that global change in cocoa pric-
ing may have no effect on a fraudster selling hot chocolate to a company that has 
very strong incoming goods quality control tests—the fraudster may decide it is a 
“rational choice” not to try to commit the fraud act (for more, see the Criminology 
chapters).
To review the question of whether there is a practical and pragmatic response to 
address food fraud prevention, in response to that, the blame is on academia 
(including the authors of this book) for not more fully grappling with the challenge 
sooner. While the academics have been improving detection, and separately grow-
ing criminology concepts such as Situational Crime Prevention, there has been a 
challenge to develop a paradigm-shifting theory that addresses the challenge of 
integrating a multiple of disciplines. It is very difficult to apply a complex web of 
disciplines to respond to a complex problem such as food fraud. The food fraud 
opportunity has continued to grow because of the very nature of the complexity. 
The bad guys have been able to evolve to exploit even minuscule new guardian and 
hurdle gaps—there are capable guardians and hurdles but an even more nimble 
criminal response.
These all are factors that have led to challenges when focusing on the overall 
Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
 Food Fraud as a Disease: Managing Diabetes Rather than Fixing 
a Broken Leg
There is a saying:
Food fraud prevention is like managing diabetes not fixing a broken leg -- for diabetes, 
the patient may look fine today but without monitoring and treatments but danger could 
be close at hand.
Another challenge when considering prevention has been the lack of information on 
the incidents and the general lack of incidents. Let’s consider food fraud to be a new 
disease. We don’t wake up one day and figure a way to cure or manage a disease. 
There are many years of patients showing up sick at the hospital. This is the effect, 
and we don’t yet understand the cause… we don’t even know that it’s a new disease. 
Along the way—or over possibly the 100s of years—we start to see a pattern, but it 
is faint. Each doctor, hospital, or country just doesn’t see that many of these specific 
rare cases. As more information is stored and more readily accessible, and as we 
have more and better testing, we can learn more about the illness. At some point, we 
have a lucky break—usually an outbreak or a cluster of incidents—that lead us to 
identify it is really a new disease.
This is the “eureka” moment when we shift from intervention through response 
to prevention (Fig. 2.2). We don’t start with prevention, and we don’t even start with 
a response. Only after those two can we cycle back up to prevention.
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For example, in the USA, there was an incident where we started to see many 
pets dying. We had no idea why they were dying, but we did the best we could to 
treat them (intervention: the public health system and their healthcare profession-
als). At some point, we figured the root cause was melamine, found it in the pet food 
and the pet food was recalled from the marketplace (response: the marketplace and 
the industry recalling product). Then to focus on prevention, we began to implement 
testing for melamine in raw ingredients and finished goods (prevention and the 
industry conducting tests).
So while the system evolved to address melamine, we were aware that the prob-
lem wasn’t just melamine. The fraud opportunity was not just for melamine but for 
all types of protein fraud. The food industry, agencies, academics, and others began 
working together to understand the fraud opportunity better and to implement holis-
tic, all-encompassing countermeasures. This activity is underway, and a first step is 
improved intervention and detection methods and also establishing a common frame 
of definitions and a prevention focus.
 Personal Insight: Food Fraud Prevention into Action
So, food fraud was known, but there was not enough information to really establish 
a common, effective, holistic, all-encompassing, preventative approach. I stated in a 
public forum meeting in 2010 when asked if I thought “industry was doing enough 
to address food fraud” I responded with “based on the way we academics – and the 
laws – have defined food fraud and prevention… I think industry – and agencies – 
are doing a fine job.” The key is how food fraud is defined and addressed in the laws. 
There are great strides being made considering how little is really known about food 
fraud prevention.
I was told that is it usually at least 5–10 years between an article published in a 
scholarly article makes an impact in the real world. While I continue to emphasize 
that there was excellent work in food fraud before our article, our article was the 
first scholarly article with research focused on the definition of food fraud. So the 
term was defined in November 2011. Just about 2 years later, food fraud had just 
entered the mainstream. Several key dates and milestones include:
• February 2017: The GFSI Guidance Document version 7 was published that 
included food fraud requirements as of January 2018.
• May 2016: The FSMA Intentional Adulteration Final Rule was published with a 
full implementation date in “three years after the publication of the final rule” 
(FDA 2016).
• September 2015: The FSMA Preventive Controls Final Rule was published with 
a full implementation date for large companies “required to be in compliance on 
September 19, 2016 (two-thousand and sixteen)” (FDA 2015a, b). The term eco-
nomically motivated adulteration was included and the term “defraud” and 
“fraudulent” but not specifically “food fraud.” This includes addressing any haz-
ard from any source including the act that is for “economic gain” and for any 
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product—thus, FSMA has essentially required a full Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment and Food Fraud Prevention Strategy since at least September 2016. 
The publication date of the final rule was forced by lawsuits to be published by 
August 31, 2016, so additional changes—such as further addressing EMA or 
possibly expanding to use the term “food fraud”—was not possible due since 
new addition edits would require an additional open comment period (Case4:12- 
cv- 04529-PJH 2012; CRS 2016; Case No.: 3:18-cv-06299 2018).
• July 2014: The GFSI board of directors published the “GFSI Position Paper on 
Mitigating the Public Health Risk of Food Fraud” (GFSI 2014).
• February 2014: The GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank presented their recommenda-
tion to include food fraud in their Food Safety Management System (a final 
report but not a public document)
• February 2014: The GMA published their Brand Protection report (GMA 2014).
• January 2014: The US Congressional Research Service published their report on 
food fraud which is a demonstration of congressional interest in a subject (CRS 
2014).
• December 2013: The first draft of the FSMA Intentional Adulteration draft rule 
was posted on the Federal Register with a request for comments, and it men-
tioned a shift from economically motivated adulteration to the preventive con-
trols rule. This was a significant shift in focus from a local threat or target-specific 
food defense-type countermeasures to more preventive controls (FDA 2013a, b).
• October 2013: The EU proposed a draft referendum on food fraud which pro-
posed a common definition of food fraud (CRS 2014).
• July 2012: The GFSI convened a Food Fraud Think Tank to review the subject.
• November 2011: Peer-reviewed journal publication of “Defining the Public 
Health Threat of Food Fraud” (Spink and Moyer 2011).
Before that publication in November 2011, there was momentum starting on the 
related topics:
• October 2011: The GMA published their Capturing Recall Costs report (that 
included fraudulent and criminal acts) (GMA 2011).
• April 2011: The first draft of the FSMA Preventive Controls draft rule was pub-
lished on the Federal Register with a request for comments, and it had no men-
tion of economically motivated adulteration or fraud (FDA 2013a, b). Later, 
EMA was added to this rule after the Intentional Adulteration draft rule directed 
the change (FDA 2013a, b).
• January 2011: The US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) was signed in to 
law and identified actions for “economic gain” but did not mention fraud.
• November 2010: The GMA published their report on Consumer Product Fraud 
(which featured food fraud) (GMA 2010).
• May 2009: FDA public meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration where 
the “FDA working definition” of that term was first published (FDA 2009).
So, food fraud prevention is being addressed and implemented. There has been 
quite a bit of focus on reactive and responsive actions. This seems to be common for 
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analytical science and also for enforcement organizations. These might seem like 
two very different types of groups, but the core theory is that when faced with chal-
lenges, we, as humans, respond with our current resources, what we know, and what 
we can implement right away.
So, analytical chemists, faced with the melamine adulteration, naturally approach 
the problem from their world view—a natural first step is to increase the focus on 
food authenticity detection. Their focus increases the ability to “detect” fraudulent 
product.
Also, enforcement organizations, faced with melamine adulteration, naturally 
approach those problems from their world view—a natural first step is to find, arrest, 
and prosecute the food fraudsters. Their focus increases the ability to “deter” the 
fraudsters (at least to some degree, for those who are currently committing fraud, 
get caught, and are persuaded not to continue committing fraud -- that will be dis-
cussed further later).
These linear solutions fit for a linear problem. With food fraud, there are a nearly 
infinite number of adulterants, and there are a seemingly near an infinite number of 
fraudsters. (When considering the adulterants, there are also ways to commit fraud 
that do not include an adulterant at all… such as for genuine but stolen products.) 
There is a saying that “for food safety that we will not test our way to safety.” Also, 
we’re not trying to make “food, safe” we’re trying to make “safe food.” For food 
fraud prevention, we’re not going to arrest our way to safety. We’re not trying to 
catch food fraud we’re trying to prevent the fraud opportunity in the first place.
 Prevention Addresses Problems: “Problem Looking for a Solution” or 
“Solution Looking for a Problem”
Since food fraud prevention is focused on the fraud opportunity and a strategic pre-
vention approach, to reduce vulnerabilities, there is an obvious need for countermea-
sures and control systems. The risk manager—brand owner or manufacturer—addresses 
the overall, enterprise-wide, holistic, and all- encompassing strategic problem and 
then to tactically address a specific incident. The specific incident is straightforward 
and a very finite problem and response. On the other hand, the suppliers of the coun-
termeasures and control systems are of course trying to apply their product to the 
user need. The implementation of the overall Food Fraud Prevention Strategy com-
pliance requirements will help with this conundrum. The more harmonized and stan-
dardized the strategy, the more clearly both sides will understand the problem 
(diagnosis or root cause), optimal countermeasures, and control systems (risk treat-
ment) and understand then “how much is enough” (prognosis that results in deci-
sion) (see the section on Diagnosis, Treatment, Prognosis, and Decision).
In the absence of a harmonized and standardized food fraud prevention approach, 
it was most simple to take a direct, tactical approach to start by considering solu-
tions before there was even the creation of an overall strategic vision. At that 
point, the strategic problem was not yet clarified which has been a constant chal-
lenge for anti-counterfeiting and security products suppliers across all industries. 
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Product and service providers—admittedly, including academics seeking funding 
for research or tuition dollars from students—are usually a “solution” looking 
for a “problem.” Suppliers often present only a factual statement about the new 
technology or service “feature” and let the customer figure the actual application 
“benefit” of how it resolves a problem. The problem is that the “features” of the 
product are usually presented without a clear explanation of the specific “benefit” 
for the customer. To be fair, it is the job of the supplier to sell their products not to 
solve the world’s problems.
Sidebar: A Solution Looking for a Problem or a Problem looking for a 
Solution?
The concept of a “solution looking for a problem” may seem abstract or con-
fusing, so an example will be provided.
During the Silicon Valley Dot-Com era, there were massive innovations in 
computer technology and online applications. It was referred to as the “dot- 
com” era because of the Internet websites that ended in “.com” (though later 
referred to sometimes as “dot-bomb” after many of the companies went out of 
business). During that time there was the development of technology “solu-
tions” for “problems” that had not actually been specifically identified. The 
computer science sometimes expanded for technology sake, not for an actual 
market need. There was a saying that it “was a solution in search of a prob-
lem.” In the information technology field, there is often a strategy from the 
venture capitalists to invest in many start-up companies to hedge their bets 
that one will be a low-probability/ high-return investment. It was seemingly 
lucky if a technology innovation efficiently met a market need or “problem.” 
Some of those “lucky” products received big financial gains during their exit 
strategy of selling to a bigger company while some even stayed in business 
and succeeded.
A “solution looking for a problem” is the process to first create a unique, 
patentable, defensible technology and then try to sell it by identifying prob-
lems where it might fit. The opposite approach is to clearly identify and 
research a problem and then consider theoretically the perfect response. After 
clearly identifying the problem, then a targeted solution is sought or 
developed.
In the discipline of Criminology, when addressing a new “problem,” there 
is a focus on “environmental criminology” or the physical space of crime (for 
more, see Criminology chapter) (Beirne and Messerschmidt 2005). The focus 
is also on the human adversaries through concepts such as “rational choice 
theory” and “routine activities theory” (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson and 
Clarke 1998; Clarke and Eck 2005). The criminologists focus on the root 
cause of the problem. An example is the influential publication 
(continued)
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 Personal Insight: The Positioning of Food Fraud Prevention
After reviewing the challenge of considering and selecting countermeasures and 
control system, a more basic question is about what is the science and sciences of 
food fraud prevention?
For our MSU research, the first academic home was in food safety where there 
was engagement in graduate course development, teaching, and research (see point A 
in the figure below) (Fig. 2.4). Next, the packaging science familiarity led to a natural 
consideration of packaging countermeasures and control systems such as traceabil-
ity and anti-counterfeit security features (see point B, in Fig. 2.4). When including 
these two disciplines, the activity was still reactive—catching fraudsters by authen-
ticity tests or counterfeit packaging or labels. The next innovation was including 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) (see point C). Supply Chain Management focus 
is on optimizing the transit of genuine products, so there was no a clear academic 
resources yet. The next important step was digging deeper to the root cause which 
was the human adversary which led us to Criminology (see point D). The first person 
to bring Criminology theory of Situational Crime Prevention to food fraud research 
the MSU School of Criminal Justice colleague Dr. Robyn Mace. Later, another MSU 
School of Criminal Justice colleague Dr. Justin Heinonen helped refine that focus 
into the SARA method and from a Victimology perspective. Our first immersion in 
Criminology was through the book Crime in Everyday Life by Felson (Felson 2002). 
This book introduced the crime triangle which has been a—or the—foundation of 
food fraud prevention.
Since the fraud prevention research was “from the problem outward”—rather 
than trying to apply one academic discipline to the new problem—there were con-
stantly new disciplines that provided incredibly efficient contributions to prevention 
(next Fig. 1.1).
“Crime Prevention in 60-Easy Steps” (Clarke and Eck 2005). This essentially 
explores the details of the “crime opportunity” and then considers counter-
measures and control systems. Essentially this focuses from the “problem 
outwards” to only then consider countermeasures or “solutions.”
Food fraud prevention research began with that focus on the center or the 
“fraud opportunity.” Once that was understood, then it became clearer on how 
to prevent food fraud.
Without a focus on the overall fraud opportunity—or a vulnerability 
assessment for the entire system—then picking countermeasures and control 
systems is a guess at best. Without that enterprise-wide assessment, then 
stakeholders often hear of a new technology (solution) and try to apply it to 
the problem (“a solution looking for a problem”).
The application to food fraud prevention is that it is most efficient—criti-
cal—to focus on the fraud opportunity and then apply that insight to under-
standing what might contribute to detect, deter, and prevent.
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Every time we gave a presentation we seemed to identify another discipline that 
adds to the science. As recently as late 2017, we were researching news media 
responses to suspected food fraud activity. This led—obvious in hindsight—to seek 
out journalism scholars. Michigan State University has a top Journalism Department 
in our College of Communications Arts and Sciences. Eventually, we found a 
scholar colleague Dr. Eric Freedman (Knight Chair in Environmental Journalism, 
director of the Knight Center for Environmental Journalism and a professor in the 
School of Journalism), who had research expertise in a similar area of science jour-
nalism. This collaboration led to a research project and journal article submission 
on investigating food fraud suspicious activity.
Earlier, when the political science and social anthropology were presented, first, 
the basic concepts were identified as critical but foreign to the current researchers. 
To step back, when hearing “social anthropology,” the thought came to mind of the 
movie character Indiana Jones digging up ancient artifacts. That is “archeology” the 
study of humans through their artifacts where “social anthropology” is the study of 
how and why humans interact in their culture. When this concept was presented to 
several senior anti-counterfeiting industry leaders, they were very interested. The 
encouragement led to even more of the research study of the motivation of the 
fraudsters. Not considering social anthropology is inefficient or even dangerous if 
the researchers or practitioners do not understand how and why people interact with 
each other and outsiders they cannot understand how to influence them.
These are all examples of the interdisciplinary nature of food fraud prevention. 
These disciplines have been considered in the development of food fraud prevention 
(Spink 2009).
 The Disciplines of Food Fraud Prevention
Beyond the core disciplines of food safety, packaging science, supply chain man-
agement, and criminology, there are many others that contribute to understanding 
and controlling the problem (Fig. 2.5).
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Fig. 2.4 The first 
disciplines considered to 
address Food Fraud 
Prevention: single or dual 
discipline 
“interdisciplinary research” 
then evolving to 
“multidisciplinary” 
researchers, education, and 
outreach. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) 
(Spink 2009)
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It became evident that almost any and every discipline has a contribution to help-
ing understand the fraud opportunity, the role of the bad guy or consumer, or even 
the overall concept of prevention. This growing list of disciplines led to a focus on 
“food fraud” as a separate discipline.
Later, the science and sciences of food fraud prevention was organized in a hon-
eycomb network of interrelated activities (Fig. 2.6) (Spink 2017).
 Research Approach: Interdisciplinary Versus Multidisciplinary
Food fraud prevention is so challenging because it requires an interdisciplinary 
approach (Gray 2011). Traditionally an event that had a food safety hazard was 
assigned to a food safety group, and—logically—food safety countermeasures and 
control systems were applied. The problem is that “if the biological organism in 
question was a micro then we would use the discipline of microbiology; since the 
biological organism in question is a human we obviously must use the discipline of 
social science and criminology” (Wu et al. 2017). When the starting point is in one 
discipline, it is a challenge to expand to interdisciplinary—especially with such a 
leap such as from microbiology to criminology…let alone adding social anthropol-
ogy, public policy, or political science. What is required is to step back and consider 
the root cause and only then consider the ultimate objective and then seek out the 
disciplines that help. The root cause is a human adversary perceiving a fraud oppor-
tunity and then having the opportunity and motivation to act. The ultimate objective 
is to put countermeasures and control systems in place that dissuade the human 
adversary from acting. Finally, the disciplines that most directly apply are 
Fig. 2.5 Presentation of the extremely interdisciplinary nature of product fraud prevention. 
(Copyright Permission Granted) (FDA 2009; Spink 2009)
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criminology, supply chain management, business (including considering the crimi-
nal enterprise having business characteristics) decision-making, and then science 
and technology to detect the fraud act.
 Multidisciplinary Versus Interdisciplinary Approach
Beyond just the interdisciplinary group, there is a need for multidisciplinary research-
ers. The food fraud problem is very complex, and the fraud opportunity is created 
due to many complex supply chain networks combined with a patchwork of laws, 
regulations, standards, and certifications. Food fraud has not been defined as a spe-
cific area of study or as a particular responsibility of one group. The complexity of 
addressing food fraud is based in part on the need for an interdisciplinary or multidis-
ciplinary understanding of the problem. In 2011, Dr. J. Ian Gray, MSU Vice President 
of Research and Graduate Studies, presented some insights ((Gray 2011) referring to 
(Pain 2003)). He stated that: “Multi-(or plural-) and interdisciplinary research – often 
used interchangeably, but originally referred to different approaches.”
• Interdisciplinary: “When experts from different fields work together on a com-
mon subject within the boundaries of their own disciplines, they are said to adopt 
a multidisciplinary approach. […] If the experts stick to these boundaries of their 
own discipline, they may reach a point where the project cannot progress any 
further. They will then have to bring themselves to the fringes of their own fields 
to form new concepts and ideas – and create a whole new, interdisciplinary field.”
• Multidisciplinary: “A transdisciplinary team is an interdisciplinary team whose 
members have developed sufficient trust and mutual confidence to transcend dis-
ciplinary boundaries and adopt a more holistic approach.”
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Fig. 2.6 The science and sciences of food fraud prevention. (Copyright Permission Granted) 
(Spink 2017)
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As food fraud is researched, it becomes clear that many disciplines contribute to 
the understanding and holistic perspective on the “fraud opportunity.” Food fraud is 
not only a problem of crime, food, business, food authenticity, packaging, trace-
ability, supply chain management, social anthropology, political science, enhanced 
traceability transaction security, a customer problem, or a legal problem.
Dr. Gray also discuss The Third Revolution which is the convergence of the life 
sciences, physical sciences, and engineering (Sharp et al. 2011):
• “Convergence is a new paradigm that can yield critical advances in a broad array 
of sectors, from health care to energy, food, climate, and water.”
• “Convergence is the result of true intellectual cross-pollination.”
Not to get too philosophical, but the Science Fiction writer Isaac Asimov identi-
fied some of the future problems regarding researcher over-specialization (Asimov 
1989):
 1. “Could someone be a truly great mathematician if math was all they knew?”
 2. “Specialists doing to their specialty to avoid thinking about anything else.”
 3. “Over-specialization … it cuts knowledge, and it leaves it bleeding.”
While this multidisciplinary and third revolution convergence may be the future, 
there is usually little funding or resources for this new type of research. While there 
is an effort to support the interdisciplinary research activities of bringing experts in 
disciplines together, University Departments are organized by unique disciplines, 
judged on funding, publications, and thought leadership in their specific field. The 
multidisciplinary researchers are often some of the most productive on campus 
(e.g., at one University the fixed-term versus tenured faculty-led more of the $1 mil-
lion+ funded projects); they are often considered extension, practitioners, or out-
reach functions. So, while food fraud prevention is developing based on a 
marketplace need, due to the slow new funding, the research and multidisciplinary 
teams are slowly organically growing.
 Management Structure: “Who ‘Owns’” It?
The multidisciplinary conundrum is also present in corporate accountability or gov-
ernance with the question “who owns it?”
Another complexity to addressing food fraud prevention is even within a com-
pany and the role of assigning accountability. Before reviewing how to assess the 
problem, there is an important question of “who owns it” or basically what job func-
tion should address food fraud.
There is a complexity to food fraud that has led to inefficient strategies. A chal-
lenge is that the problem and controls are spread across the functions of a company. 
Using Michael Porter’s Categories of Tangible Interrelationships (defines a com-
pany’s job functions as primary and support activities) (Porter 1985), the concepts 
are plotted for identifying what function “creates” the problem, who “cleans” the 
problem, and finally who best can manage to “deter” the problem (Fig. 2.7).
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An old story helps present insight into the complexity of the problem of imple-
menting countermeasures and control systems. Product counterfeiting was a prob-
lem for a company. Corporate security conducted a major investigation and raid that 
resulted in the prosecution of a counterfeiter and the seizure of millions of dollars in 
counterfeit parts. These were “deceptive” counterfeits sold as “genuine,” so each 
part seized directly added to sales. The “ROI” on the seizure was very clear and 
realized by the Sales Department in the next sales cycle (Fig. 2.8). The Packaging 
Department was tasked with identifying and proposing new anti-counterfeit pack-
aging components. When the packaging group sent the decision to the Purchasing 
Department the question was “ok, we’ll purchase the new packaging components 
but whose budget do we charge?” In this case, the Operations Department didn’t yet 
know they would have an additional operations cost!
At this point, the Purchasing Department was not provided additional budget 
dollars to cover the new products. The Sales Department wasn’t interested in volun-
teering the transfer of budget funds because the revenue was the avoidance of loss 
or future gains.
The application to food fraud prevention is that this was a case study the helped 
define the need for an overarching corporate policy as well as engaging enterprise 
risk management to more clearly define what the risk was outside the “risk toler-
ance.” A clearly defined corporate policy cannot be ignored. A risk that is clearly 
defined as outside the “risk tolerance” must be addressed or now disclosed—corpo-
rations don’t want to provide new disclosures of risks…especially inherent risks 
that have been present but unknown…what other risks might be unknown?
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Fig. 2.7 Adaptation of Porter’s corporate structure to show where product fraud problems are cre-
ated, who responds, and where is the most efficient and effective deterrence or prevention. 
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Fig. 2.8 Relationship cycle within and enterprise of benefit, management, implementation, appli-
cation, corporate benefits and then back to the start. (Adapted from (Porter 1985))
Sidebar: Fire Prevention and Ben Franklin
Food fraud prevention is not exciting, and if done right, then it is intentionally 
monotonous and boring. It is exciting and newsworthy when a fireman runs out 
of a burning building rescuing a baby. On the other end of the spectrum, watch-
ing a fire inspector makes sure that the smoke detectors are working and the 
fire exits are well marked is about as exciting as “watching paint dry” (which 
is not very exciting). Listening to a building code review of fire resistance 
structural features is literally reading an engineering textbook (also, even less 
exciting than watching paint dry). But the most efficient and effective way to 
reduce the “fraud opportunity” is the prevention details. It may be exciting to 
purchase new and faster fire engines to put out fires faster, but it’s much more 
efficient to try to prevent the fires from starting in the first place (Fig. 2.9):
• For every 1000 firefighters who are trained in fire intervention, there might 
need to be 1 fire inspector.
• For every 1000 fire inspectors who are trained in the detection of vulnera-
bilities of fires, there might need to be 1 fire prevention engineer.
• For every 1000 fire prevention engineers who are trained in prevention sci-
ence, there may need to be 1 engineer studying fire incidents for new root 
causes.
• And each person and job is critical to protecting society from injury from 
fires. Some of the actors are focused and trained on a different topic.
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• A complex and complicated follow-up assessment is how much is invested 
in each type of job.
Questions to start addressing the question could include the following: Are the 
firemen equipped or trained to conduct fire inspections? Are they educated on civil 
engineering theories about how to reduce the spread of chemical fires? No. Should 
they? No. But the people “accountable” for protecting public safety are “accountable” 
for addressing this root cause or vulnerability.
The famous Ben Franklin quote of “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure” was reportedly based on is work during the creation of first the Philadelphia 
Fire Department (Franklin 1735). When addressing fire prevention, he is reported to 
actually have said: “an ounce of prevention is worth ten pounds of cure.”
The application to food fraud prevention is that the same holds true for food 
fraud prevention. There is a need to step back and consider the root cause as well as 
the most efficient and effective ways to address the prevention actions… regardless 
of your current experience or education. This is consistent with many other concepts 
that will be covered later including ISO 31000 Risk Management that begins with 
“establishing the context.” For every 1000,000 food investigators, there only need to 
be a handful of food fraud prevention scientists.
 Conclusion
This second Introduction chapter expanded on the definitions and scope of food 
fraud to the critical foundational or organizational subjects such as the food risks, 
the types of harm including why there is a fraud opportunity. In combination these 
two Introduction chapters present that for efficiently and effectively reduce the 
fraud opportunity—the goal is not to catch bad product but to prevent the food fraud 
act from occurring in the first place—addressing all types of fraud is critical as is a 
primary and holistic focus on reducing the fraud opportunity through prevention. 
The nature of the fraudsters is to attack any and all vulnerabilities, so an equally 
interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand and respond to that fraud 
1 Specific Type of Fire
Prevention Scientists
100 Fire Prevention
Scientists
10,000 Fire Inspectors
1,000,000 Fire
Fighters
Fig. 2.9 Fire prevention 
human resource allocation 
example of fire fighters, 
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opportunity. The first conclusion is that there are a wide range of food fraud attri-
butes that expand the vulnerability beyond public health harm and traditional detec-
tion and enforcement responses. The second conclusion is that the nature of the 
fraud act and the fraudster leads to vulnerabilities that are outside the usual focus 
areas of the proprietary, authorized, and legitimate supply chain. This recognized to 
also be outside the traditional HACCP programs or scope. The final conclusion is 
that there are many reasons why there has not been a coordinated, strategic, and 
interdisciplinary focus on the fraud opportunity. As with historical innovations such 
as the implementation of quality management or environmental sustainability pro-
grams, there is an unmet need that becomes so extreme that a paradigm shift is 
necessary and then the methods are developed. For food fraud prevention, that para-
digm shift is underway which includes broadening the focus to all types of fraud, to 
all products wherever they are in the supply chain, and then a shift from response to 
prevention through criminology and business management focused efforts to reduce 
the vulnerability or fraud opportunity. If there’s no fraud opportunity, then there’s 
no fraud opportunity. There is a saying:
If there is no fraud opportunity, then you could be buying from the famous criminal Al 
Capone, and he wouldn’t commit a crime against you… if there is no fraud opportunity, 
then he would not find a crime to commit (Of course you’d rather not buy from a known 
criminal).
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Introduction to the Concepts
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
Functional 
Group Application of This Chapter
WIIFM all Due to the complex nature of the risk, expand the focus from just addressing 
a problem or corrective action to the calibration of the overall vulnerabilities 
of the enterprise.
Quality Team Food fraud is very different non-traditional food safety hazard that requires a 
unique shift to prevention, and that has a focus on new and unique 
vulnerabilities.
Auditors The assessments and strategies you see will be very different from health 
hazard assessment and based more on business decision risk assessment.
Management There is a solid foundation of scholarly literature, and there may be a need 
for additional training and education— – but your implementation does not 
need to be costly since there are many synthesized and refined resources.
Corp. 
Decision-Makers
While this may seem like a very odd and abstract risk, there are work 
processes that are very strategically based and integrated with all other 
enterprise-wide risks.
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 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) Why does FF require a fundamentally different approach than addressing 
other types of food risks?
 (b) What are the most dangerous aspects of a FF incident (define 
“dangerous”)?
 (c) Does the type of food fraud change the concern for potential health harms?
 2. Key Learning Objective1
 (a) What is “Product Fraud” and the relationship to “Food Fraud”?
 (b) What are the “Product Fraud” attributes?
 (c) What is the different enterprise risk of a product in a “Primary” or 
“Secondary” market?
 3. Key Learning Objective2
 (a) What is a Food Fraud “Indirect Risk”?
 (b) What is the difference between “Detect” and “Deter”?
 (c) Is Food Fraud a non-deceptive counterfeit product?
 4. Key Learning Objective3
 (a) What is “Smuggling” and in relation to “Diversion”?
 (b) Is “Port Shopping” a type of Food Fraud and if so, then why—or why not?
 (c) Explain why all types of Food Fraud are a compliance requirement of FSMA 
21CFR117?
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Chapter 3
Food Fraud Prevention Overview  
(Part 1 of 3): Basics
Summary
This chapter presents the overall food fraud prevention concept and introduces the 
fundamental theory of prevention, the relation of food fraud to all other food risks 
(e.g., food quality, food safety, and food defense), why the core focus is prevention, 
and finally the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (FFPS). There is a specific focus on 
how these activities interact and also how new information enters the cycle. The 
next chapter will expand to include the application of the Food Fraud Prevention 
Cycle (FFPC).
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) The Interdisciplinary Prevention Approach: This section will start with 
prevention versus reaction and then present the wide range of disciplines that 
cover the entire food fraud problem.
• (2) The Interdisciplinary Nature of Prevention: This section will review the 
interdisciplinary nature of prevention by considering how the fraud opportunity 
is created and the many academic disciplines that help risk assessors understand 
the identification of optimal countermeasures and control systems.
• (3) Understand the Prevention Strategies: This section presents several con-
cepts that are important for shaping the prevention strategies. There are funda-
mental or principal theories that support the need to focus on vulnerability and 
the fraud opportunity.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the overall 
fundamental prevention concepts of “connecting everything to everything” 
(Fig. 3.1).
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 Introduction
Food fraud is a fundamentally unique food risk since the root cause is an intelligent 
human adversary who is actively seeking to avoid detection. The human fraudster 
has the potential for a large economic gain, so they have the incentive and can jus-
tify financial spending to attempt to circumvent the countermeasures and control 
systems. The core goal of the prevention strategy is to reduce that fraud opportunity 
to the point that the fraudsters are dissuaded.
 Key Learning Objective 1: The Interdisciplinary Prevention 
Approach
This section reviews the complex food fraud problem by considering the interdisci-
plinary approach combined with a practical and pragmatic consideration that pre-
vention is the most effective approach.
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
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Fig. 3.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: The 
entire Cycle 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and the fraud opportunity. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 
2014; Spink et al. 2019)
3 Food Fraud Prevention Overview (Part 1 of 3): Basics
83
The key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Interdisciplinary approach
• (2) “Why can’t we just arrest all the fraudsters?”
• (3) The methodical and efficient focus of the prevention approach
 Overview of the Prevention Approach
While many disciplines are required to efficiently and effectively reduce the “fraud 
opportunity.” Each approach to the process, and their value and efficiency, must be 
judged in relation to their contribution to the overall prevention. A single-discipline 
approach is limited in effectiveness. For example, a pure criminology approach to 
food fraud prevention would prioritize crime-fighting activities such as investiga-
tion and enforcement—seizures of products and arrests. A pure legal or prosecution 
approach would prioritize punishment—judged explicitly by successful court cases 
and long-term incarceration. A pure food science or food authenticity approach 
would prioritize validated detection test methods—catching food fraud. A pure sup-
ply chain management focus would prioritize monitoring for anomalies in the 
movement of product and quickly replenish suspicious product—identifying when 
contraband is found. A pure consumer behavior science focus would prioritize edu-
cating buyers and consumers about the dangers of counterfeits and persuading them 
not to take purchasing risks or not to purchase the illegal product. A pure forensic 
accounting focus would prioritize finding financial anomalies that indicate fraud 
has occurred. A pure packaging science focus would prioritize on-package authen-
tication or security features—such as traceability codes printed on the package or 
labels. Each single-discipline focus has limitations since they can be circumvented. 
An interdisciplinary approach can consider many often complex but straightfor-
ward countermeasures and control systems such as adding complex taggants to a 
simple packaging feature (Fig.  3.2). This interdisciplinary approach focuses on 
reducing the fraud opportunity which can vastly increase the challenge for the 
fraudster to commit the act successfully. This focused effort would reduce the “fraud 
opportunity.” The “fraud opportunity” is reduced by (1) increasing the risk of get-
ting caught or (2) increasing the cost of conducting the crime with the most crucial 
step to (3) make sure the fraudsters know of the increased risks of detection. The 
efficiency of resource allocation and reducing the fraud opportunity is rooted in the 
best of many academic disciplines.
While there are core concepts that apply—e.g., criminology, supply chain man-
agement, packaging science, food authenticity testing, consumer behavior, and oth-
ers—there is a need to provide an example of the application. The Food Fraud 
Prevention Cycle (FFPC) combines many basic concepts from a wide range of dis-
ciplines. This interdisciplinary approach is needed to combat the complex threat. 
Traditional research starts with one discipline and then focuses on the complex 
problem. Occasionally there are interdisciplinary teams that gather two or several 
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single-discipline researchers. This research method would be to focus on the prob-
lem from the perspective of those disciplines. Counter to that “solution to the prob-
lem” focus, the MSU-FFI research started with “the problem outward.” A 
multidisciplinary team (experts from different disciplines) is different from an inter-
disciplinary team (colleagues whom each had expertise and experience in a broad 
range of fields including as corporate business managers) (Gray 2011).
The multidisciplinary team has a natural inclination to start with a specific type 
of technology and seeks possibly applications—“a solution looking for a problem.” 
The result of this research was to develop the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle which 
will be reviewed here. Later, another chapter will review the functionality and appli-
cation of the cycle. The intent of this chapter is to provide background on the overall 
concepts and not to delve into the specific components of the cycle.
Sidebar: Can’t We Just Arrest All the Fraudsters? No. (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: Can’t We Just Detect and Arrest Fraudsters? Sorry, But No.
By John Spink • October 3, 2013 • Blog (MSU-FFI 2018)
If we cannot arrest our way to food safety, can we rely only on authenticity 
testing and detection? Forget enforcement? Ignore investigation? Of course 
not… however, you cannot increase the safety of the food supply if you’re 
only running around chasing “bad guys” or just “trying to catch bad product.” 
Prevention is by far the most efficient policy. To focus on prevention before 
developing detection methods will provide insight into the precise technical 
detection needs. A focus on prevention can help Food Science and Food 
Authenticity research to be more efficient.
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Law
Supply 
Chain
Risk Analysis
Managerial 
Accounting
Fig. 3.2 Interdisciplinary 
considerations to address 
food fraud prevention: a 
range of academic 
disciplines that help to 
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opportunity and implement 
a holistic and all- 
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I recently guest-lectured for MSU Food Science and Human Nutrition pro-
fessor Dr. Gale Strasburg’s course FSC 455 FOOD AND NUTRITION. This 
is a class for mostly undergraduate seniors. Even though my guest lecture 
material covered content that isn’t usually included on their tests, I usually 
find a pretty engaged audience. If the only thing accomplished is introducing 
food fraud prevention to the next wave of future industry leaders then it was 
time well spent. I’m even starting to get calls from the alumni as a result of my 
past guest lectures. The ideas are sticking and becoming part of the formal or 
informal curriculum.
When I presented to those MSU students – the food scientists and chem-
ists  – I went through my usual “detect, deter, and prevent” concepts. Our 
discussion led me to really focus on the connection between “detect” and 
“prevent,” skipping over “deter.”
To review, “detect” is like a security alarm sounding in your house, alerting 
you that there is a burglar inside. “Deter” is like the police arresting the bur-
glar as he is breaking in (in Situational Crime Prevention and the Crime 
Triangle this is the “guardian” factor), or like bars on the inside of your win-
dows (barriers or hurdles). Moreover, “prevent” is like having lights on, doors 
and windows locked, an alarm on, and a dog barking – the burglar now has no 
interest in breaking into your house. Clearly, you’d rather have the “bad guy” 
pass right by rather than break your window or be in your house!
For protecting food, we need to focus on the “detect” function – and we 
need to keep developing more precise and targeted tests and equipment. As 
we’ve covered before, there are a seemingly near-infinite number of types 
of fraud, and they keep evolving, so we need to keep evolving. The specifi-
cation of the “detect” innovations must be determined by the ability to 
support the ultimate goal, which is the “prevent” function. After an inci-
dent is under control, the focus must first be on “prevent” before we take 
any other steps.
The “deter” component is also critical, however, I’d rather leave that dan-
gerous function of engaging burglars to the brave and committed law enforce-
ment professionals. Facing potentially dangerous or violent situations is way 
out of the scope of the curriculum for food science, packaging, supply chain 
management, or public health. Hopefully, with the increase in the “prevent” 
and “detect” efficiency, we decrease the need  – and cost  – of the “deter” 
function.
Whether you are a big or small company, a manufacturer or retailer, indus-
try or government, just understanding the “detect” and “prevent” functions 
can help increase the efficiency of time and money.
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Sidebar: Boring Ole’ Prevention (MSU-FFI 2018)
Food Fraud Prevention – Not Exciting or Urgent, But Critical
By John Spink • May 8, 2013 • Blog
No one gets a trophy for implementing a preventative program. Acts of 
heroism are defined in crisis moments, not in a strategic, methodical develop-
ment of a prevention plan. While that is understood, the adage “an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure” still holds true here. Combating food 
fraud is an effort that requires prevention. That prevention is most efficient 
within a coordinated, global public-private partnership.
The concept of governments and industry working together was a recur-
ring topic during the Food Safety Summit held last week in Baltimore (2013 
which as after the 2011 passing of the FSMA law and the 2016 implementa-
tion of the FSMA-PC final rule). As in previous events, this attracted a wide 
range of important regulators and the usual influential food safety members of 
the industry. Those leaders kept mentioning the goal of public-private partner-
ship and the efficiency of a coordinated collaboration. “Collaboration” was a 
common theme from a wide range of regulators including in the town hall 
meeting by Michael Taylor (Deputy Commissioner for Foods, FDA) and 
Elisabeth Hagen (Undersecretary for Food Safety, USDA) and to the employ-
ees at the FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) booth.
The FDA speakers in the food fraud Session defined the overall agency 
objectives and the alignment with the Food Safety Modernization Act 
(FSMA). They stated, “The FDA’s goal is not to just identify violations but to 
help provide safe food.” They also discussed some of the shifting regulatory 
landscape in the US and abroad such as:
• National to Global
• Component View to System Perspective
• Adversarial to Collaborative
• Reactive to Proactive
• Compliance to Oversight
These all underscore the prevention focus and the partnerships with 
industry.
Industry echoed these themes, including in the Keynote Address by Will 
Daniels (SVP of Earthbound Farms… a rousing presentation as expected) and 
by Yves Rey (General Manager of Corporate Quality for Danone and the 
Chair of the Global Food Safety Initiative – GFSI). Regarding food fraud pre-
vention, Yves stated that it’s the perfect time to take a prevention approach 
because the science is still under development. The fundamental concepts and 
work processes can be influenced and shaped here at the start of the develop-
ment of the core concepts. As groups start implementing programs or setting 
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Interdisciplinary Nature 
of Prevention
This section reviews the interdisciplinary nature of prevention by considering how 
the fraud opportunity is created and the many academic disciplines that help provide 
an understanding of the optimal countermeasures and control systems.
The key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Applying social science and criminology
• (2) Considering business and supply chain management and traceability
• (3) Exploring ways to engage packaging science in increasing the “hassle factor” 
for the fraudster and thus reducing the “fraud opportunity”
There is a saying:
Repeat after me – “Social Science is a real science.”
In a room of food scientists, there is often a chuckle and then the start of a lot of 
discussion about the scientific method, validating hypotheses with tests and mea-
sures, and general emphasis on the clear nature of testing for the presence or absence 
of a chemical. A follow-up statement of “if the biological organism in question were 
standards, it will be more difficult to change the industry-wide direction. A 
lack of leadership could end up with a disconnected, confusing, inefficient, 
and non-harmonized set of actions.
With the growing list of high profile food fraud incidents – melamine to 
horse meat to rat meat – others in governments and industry WILL have to get 
going. The governments and industry will be quickly implementing programs 
and countermeasures and control systems. As I mentioned in a previous blog 
post, the GFSI is addressing food fraud and is receiving insight from a Food 
Fraud Think Tank it created (I am one of the five core members). Yves also 
stated “GFSI decided to tackle the issue head-on,” and “food fraud has been 
defined by the [GFSI board] as a food safety issue.” (GFSI is an important 
stakeholder since most of the world’s food safety management systems that 
are implemented by industry are GFSI compliant.)
While responding to a food fraud incident requires a team of crisis manag-
ers, stakeholders are starting to focus on prevention. How to expand the focus 
from detection to deterrence to prevention, and the roles of each player in the 
public-private partnership, are still to be defined… well, to correct that, we 
are all defining it now. This is an unprecedented opportunity for you to par-
ticipate in shaping public policy and industry best practices. Join with your 
industry groups, make sure to submit your comments to the FDA request for 
comments on Economically Motivated Adulteration, and become educated. 
MSU-FFI.
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a microbe we would go to the field of microbiology; now the biological organism in 
question is a human so we must go to Social Science and specifically Criminology.” 
The main focus is on crime prevention and Situational Crime Prevention. This is a 
well-research field. A recent Google Scholar search from 2000 to the present for the 
keyword “Situational Crime Prevention” resulted in over 10,000 results. This spe-
cific topic has been researched since the mid-1970s. When dealing with human 
adversaries, it is critical to engage social sciences.
 Social Science and Criminology
“Social Science is a real science.” “Behavioral Science and Consumer Behavior are 
sciences.” These are hard for food scientists or analytical chemists to believe or 
understand. When confronted with a food fraud incident such as melamine in milk 
powder or horsemeat in beef, the food scientist response is to apply food science 
tools such as authenticity testing. While this is critical when intervening during a 
human health hazard outbreak where the culprit is an adulterant-substance, this is a 
reactionary approach that tangentially contributes to prevention. Of course, detection 
and authenticity testing will help prevent—catching fraudulent product is essen-
tial—but without a prevention strategy, the countermeasures and control systems 
will only catch bad product not prevent food fraud from occurring in the first place.
Sociopaths When dealing with fraudsters and criminals, “it is most efficient to 
remove morals and ethics from the equation.” It is inefficient to try to “shame” the 
fraudsters into not acting. First, to deal with “morals” is to focus from the human 
fraudster outward to prevent the criminal activity. When focusing on the fraudster, 
an important concept to review is the nature of sociopaths. Second, ethics are often 
defined by local custom or tradition. In addition, “ethics” can be situational where 
“stretching the rules” may be more acceptable or practiced in one situation versus 
another. It is most efficient to remove appealing to the ethics of the fraudster and to 
shift to reducing the opportunity to commit the fraud act successfully.
To consider situational ethics, for example, if a parent needs $100,000 for a can-
cer treatment for their child, they may consider stretching a trusted relationship or 
even break the law. If a company is on the verge of bankruptcy that would lead to 
100 employees to lose their jobs with no social safety net, the decision-makers may 
“relax” their “risk tolerance.” They may save money by not paying for preventive 
controls such as supplier verification or expensive food safety testing. While this 
may be illegal or unethical, there may be a situation where someone rationalizes and 
justifies their activity due to prioritizing a “higher morality.”
You Are A Habitual Law Breaker To approach the question from a different 
direction, how much over the speed limit do you drive on the highway? A response 
is sometimes “but I’ve never been pulled over,” “I’ve never been in an accident,” or 
“if the road is icy, then I slow down.” So, where does the actual speed limit fit into 
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Sidebar: Considering Sociopaths Are Everywhere (Everywhere!)
It is important to study the behavioral sciences to understand the motivation. 
The general criminal traits will be reviewed later, and this section will explore 
the more general concept of sociopaths. From an article on the challenges of 
intellectual property enforcement in agricultural products (Spink 2011):
When dealing with responsible parties, the [legal and regulatory] process works. The 
system breaks down when dealing with fraudsters and counterfeiters who are, in the 
worst but unfortunately the very common case, criminals not concerned with break-
ing the law, sociopaths not concerned with cheating or demoralizing others, or unin-
formed and ignorant of risks inherent in the actions. Specifically, counterfeiters are 
often “irresponsible defendants” who hide or flee from prosecution and have laun-
dered their assets out of reach of the courts. ‘Those [counterfeiters and diverters] 
who evade the laws do so with the expectation that they can reap substantial profits 
and the risk of incarceration—or even detection—is minimal. (Spink 2011)
A typical fraudster exhibits sociopathic tendencies by not being concerned 
about the feelings of others and does not worry about cheating society (APA 
2000; Stout 2005). “Sociopaths exhibit asocial or antisocial behavior while a 
psychopath is characterized by the antisocial behaviors that manifest in 
aggressive behaviors” (APA 2000). The potential for harm—even physical 
harm—is not a concern or consideration. The American Psychological 
Association estimates that 1 out of 25 humans would be classified as having 
an “anti-social personality disorder” or labeled as a “sociopath.” Consider that 
statistic for a moment. While different social or professional organizations 
may attract different types of people, consider that of the 25 people around 
you that statistically, 1 has a full-blown “anti-social personality disorder” and 
could be psychologically labeled as a “sociopath.” (Actually upon further 
review this may not be surprising, and maybe some of the vulnerability reduc-
ing strategies may work in your personal life!)
(continued)
the consideration? If you drive over the speed limit, you are breaking the law. 
Period. You justify your activity possibly because you’ve never been penalized. 
What are the decision-making criteria? Is it the risk of getting caught (by the police) 
or the cost of conducting the crime (of wrecking your car from reckless driving in 
dangerous conditions)? If you drive over the posted legal speed limit—especially if 
you do it on a regular basis or basically “constantly”—do you consider yourself 
unethical or immoral?
The most relevant social science discipline that applies to food fraud prevention 
is criminology which is the studies of crime and criminals. The core of food fraud 
prevention is to understand and address the “fraud opportunity.” Since the mid- 1970s, 
there has been an expanded research effort to shift focus from punishment to preven-
tion. Concepts that will be covered more in another chapter are the study of the “space” 
of crime to adjust the physical environment to reduce the opportunity for crime.
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 Key Management Disciplines
 Supply Chain Management (SCM)
Another interdisciplinary consideration is supply chain transparency and traceabil-
ity. The academic research field of supply chain management is covered more in 
another chapter—with over 100 global universities with Supply Chain Departments 
and many offering—traditionally focuses on controlling and optimizing legitimate 
product moving within an authorized network. Supply chain management includes 
A sociopath is defined as someone who exhibits a “high level” of three of 
seven key traits:
 1. Failure to conform to social norms
 2. Deceitful, manipulativeness
 3. Impulsivity, failure to plan ahead
 4. Irritability, aggressiveness
 5. Reckless disregard for the safety of others
 6. Consistent irresponsibility
 7. Lack of remorse after having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another 
person
There is a saying:
“Your best defense [against sociopaths] is to understand the nature of human 
predators” (Stout 2005).
The sociopaths are “satisfied” with their lives and are generally not concerned 
or cognizant of the feelings of others, so they do not seek and are not usually 
influenced by psychological treatment or messages. Sociopaths will not be 
shamed into compliance.
The focus on the fraud opportunity is to reduce the vulnerabilities, so this 
would change the target and thus be effective in changing the behavior of 
sociopaths. “To create a better world, we need to understand the nature of 
people who routinely act against the common good, and who do so with emo-
tional impunity.” The sociopaths typically look for easy opportunities or tar-
gets, so creating barriers or “increasing the hassle factor” is a fundamental 
response—such as reducing the fraud opportunity. While all sociopaths are 
not the same, the physical space around the victim can be addressed system-
atically and universally. This target hardening and vulnerability reducing sys-
tems have been studied in the criminology theory of Situational Crime 
Prevention.
The next discipline to consider is the business function of supply chain 
management.
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massive systems and networks that track and manage billions of global transactions 
almost simultaneously. The amount of “Big Data” is absolutely overwhelming 
unless it is managed by using statistical methods and data analytics.
That said, the food safety traceability systems are built upon trust and mutual 
need for quick and efficient product tracking and product recalls. The human fraud-
ster cannot be trusted and may even use the traceability systems to comingle fraudu-
lent product in the supply chain. For example, fraudulent, hacked, or cloned codes 
could be used to mask (e.g., to cover-up or hide the detection of) the fraudulent 
product. If hackers uploaded fraudulent codes, then legal databases would identify 
the hacked codes as genuine. Once the legal and illegal codes are comingled, it may 
be difficult or impossible to un-comingle the data set—since there would be no way 
to identify which code was genuine and which as fraudulent, every code could 
become considered “adulterated” and “unfit for commerce” per the Adulterated 
Foods Section of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).
Understanding how the supply chain management and transparency activities 
could be vulnerable is important during the shift to focus on how to identify coun-
termeasures and control systems that reduce the “fraud opportunity.” The supply 
chain management systems are already in place and functioning, so they have a 
critical and primary role in the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle.
 Managerial Accounting and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/COSO)
The concepts of managerial accounting and enterprise risk management are so 
important that they will be covered in specific chapters on Business Decision- 
Making, Risk Analysis Fundamentals, and Risk Analysis Application. Managerial 
accounting is the academic discipline of how entities such as companies or countries 
are managed and operate. Financial accounting is the discipline of how they report 
to investors such as stockholders, the Board of Directors, or financial investment 
institutions. The Enterprise Risk Management concept was a system developed to 
meet laws and regulations to serve both managerial and financial accounting.
 Packaging Science
To leverage another discipline, it is also important to consider packaging compo-
nents. Whether an authentication features such as a hologram or a traceability code 
on a label, these are important parts of the overall system (Spink 2012a, b). The 
academic research field of packaging science—includes approximately 10-degree- 
granting universities worldwide, specialties in other disciplines such as polymer 
science and food science, and a $500 billion global industry—traditionally focuses 
on protecting the product from damage and supporting the on-package consumer 
communication. Part of that damage protection includes tamper-resistance/tamper- 
evidence (do not refer to “tamper-proof”—you don’t want to insinuate something 
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cannot be defeated), anti-theft, and anti-counterfeiting. Again, the fraudsters may 
use the packaging-related countermeasures and control systems as a way to infil-
trate the legitimate supply chain. For example, used packages—including the secu-
rity features or authentication codes—can be reused and refilled with the fraudulent 
product. This is the type of fraud defined as unauthorized refill or tampering.
Regarding the consideration of a countermeasure, if one aspirin is good then is 
five better? Is one hologram (or any packaging security product) good then is five 
better? It depends on the contribution of this countermeasure or control system for 
reducing the “fraud opportunity.” Many product security or anti-counterfeit strate-
gies begin and end with packaging components. This is logical and initially efficient 
since the external package is what is seen in the marketplace. Regardless of the 
impact on reducing the “fraud opportunity,” a resource-allocation decision can 
externally show and demonstrate an immediately visible and “aesthetic” result. 
Adding the anti-counterfeit features is overt and visible. These are very valuable 
countermeasures and control systems as long as they are considered in relation to 
the overall fraud opportunity and prevention.
A brand owner or manufacturer may focus on protecting their finished goods or 
consumer packaging, but there are also opportunities for incoming goods or raw 
materials. By reviewing the overall fraud opportunity, for all types of fraud, there may 
be a risk of tampering or unauthorized refill of bulk packaging. By taking a holistic 
approach, all these vulnerabilities are considered in relation to all possible counter-
measures and control systems. By considering the overall fraud opportunity, innova-
tive and synergistic benefits can be achieved such as a packaging component could be 
combined with a supply chain tracking feature then make sure to include a criminol-
ogy focus to understand how fraudsters perceive the changing fraud opportunity. This 
interdisciplinary approach can provide an innovative countermeasure and control 
system that is very simple and yet very effective at reducing the “fraud opportunity.”
Sidebar: Packaging Countermeasures—Multipurpose Components
Expanding on the idea of multipurpose activities, when the holistic fraud 
opportunity is considered, often incremental adjustments can have a signifi-
cant impact. For example, the holistic fraud opportunity may define additional 
countermeasures and control systems that support resource-allocation 
decision- making. For example, a shrink band between a cap and bottle pro-
vides a tamper-evident and tamper-resistant value. The materials and opera-
tions costs of applying the feature have been already justified and implemented. 
If diversion or counterfeiting is a concern, then a microtaggant or security 
printing can be added to the shrink band. The additional countermeasure does 
not require a new packaging component since it is added to the current shrink 
band and there are no additional operations needed to apply the component. 
The band could be preprinted, so no additional manufacturing operations step. 
This is an example of the value of considering all types of fraud within the 
scope of the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
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From ISO 12931, specific types of anti-counterfeiting countermeasures 
apply to authentication and traceability which are overt, covert, and forensic:
• Overt: “authentication element which is detectable and verifiable by one 
or more of the human senses without resource to a tool (other than every-
day tools which correct imperfect human senses, such as spectacles or 
hearing aids” (ISO 2011).
• Covert: “authentication element which is hidden from the human senses, 
utilizes the use of a tool by an informed person, reveals it to their senses or 
else allows automated interpretation of the element” (ISO 2011).
• Forensic: “scientific methodology for authenticating material goods by 
confirming an authentication element or an intrinsic attribute through the 
use of specialised equipment by a skilled expert with special knowledge” 
(ISO 2011).
Sidebar: Package Uplabeling—Using a Unique Lid Stock or Unique 
Cap
Unauthorized or illegal labeling of a packaged product is a unique fraud 
opportunity, and an example provides insight into the risk and possible coun-
termeasures. An example of considering the overall fraud opportunity is to 
combat labeling fraud. A single package style (e.g., 8 ounce, polyethylene 
bottle, polypropylene cap, with paper label and inner seal over the opening) 
may be used for several types of products such as a medicine with 10%, 50%, 
and 80% strengths. A fraud opportunity exists where the fraudster could pur-
chase the less expensive 10% strength product then creates a counterfeit label 
stating the 80% strength. If that counterfeit label is applied to the lower 
strength and lower priced genuine product, that is called labeling. The fraud-
ster could buy the lower priced product, label it, and then sell it for the higher 
price of the 80% strength product.
For that uplabeled product, there will be a lower fraudulent business oppor-
tunity—ability to sell fewer products at the highest price—if they cannot infil-
trate into the legitimate supply chain. That does not mean an individual 
fraudster is not motivated and that they will not seek other opportunities. If the 
low strength product has a retail price of $1 per bottle and the 80% strength is 
$5 per bottle then—combined with the potentially low threat of detection and 
prosecution—this could be a profitable enterprise. The number of fraudulent 
transactions could be increased if the product is sold online on a peer-to-peer 
website or auction website. There are examples of individual fraudsters con-
ducting hundreds or thousands of transactions. The $5 per unit fraud turns 
into $500 or $5000.
(continued)
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 Packaging Component Shortcomings: A Complex Scenario
From the article “Fade to Black” by Liang (2006) (emphasis added) (Liang 2006):
“In almost every case, the technology, be it a hologram, tamper proof labels, embossing, 
thermo-reactive ink, RFID tags, DNA markers, and the like, enable companies to track 
cardboard, not product. In the United States and in the European Union, the two largest 
pharmaceutical markets in the world, repackaging is legal; thus, without violation of any 
law, packaging, with all types of expensive, state of the art secure devices, can end up in the 
trash or worse, in the hands of a counterfeiter, while genuine product is legally distributed 
in packaging with no security features.”
A way to reduce the fraud opportunity is to add another countermeasure 
that differentiates the product strengths. For example, different colors of inner 
lid stock or the color of the cap could be changed for the different strength 
products. Also, to further reduce the fraud opportunity for the fraudster would 
be to use a “proprietary cap” that is harder to replicate (a “proprietary” pack-
aging component would be produced for just the one company whereas a 
stock cap would be sold publically). If the cap is transparent, then the inner lid 
stock could be visible to an investigator or consumer and even if a buyer just 
asks for a photo of the package before making a sale. Presumably, the outer 
cap would be easier to dupe than the inner seal.
An interdisciplinary approach would consider how the consumer is 
deceived which is the criminology concept of victimization. When looking 
for a product online, the websites often use stock photos of the branded prod-
uct. Also, a fraudster could take one picture of the genuine product and post 
that single image hundreds of times when representing the counterfeit prod-
uct. At this point, it may seem there is no hope to reduce the fraud opportunity, 
but stress inspires innovation. “Necessity is the mother of invention.” This 
extra challenge can lead to a rational, practical, and pragmatic approach that 
builds upon all these “givens” and deals with reducing the overall “fraud 
opportunity.”
A key need that can be addressed by packaging components is to help an 
investigator identify counterfeit products. If the investigator can physically 
assess the product—such as at retail—then the lid and cap can be assessed. 
This does not seem possible online. However, the investigator could ask the 
online seller to provide a picture of the product next to a current newspaper. 
The investigator can now visually inspect that product and also compare that 
to what would be received in a “buy.” There is an incremental cost of the 
investigator interacting with the online seller, and the reduced fraud opportu-
nity is potentially significant. This is an example of considering many disci-
plines to reduce the fraud opportunity.
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“Counterfeiters generally deal, not only with the counterfeit product, but with diverted, 
expired, and stolen product as well. Envision the scenario where:
• A counterfeiter steals the product,
• Removes genuine product from the "secure packages," and then
• Puts the counterfeit product in these packages, and then reinserts the counterfeit 
product back into the system.
The counterfeit product would pass through all the readers successfully. What then hap-
pens to the genuine product? The irony is that the genuine product would most likely be 
repackaged in counterfeit packaging with unreadable tags and entered into the distribution 
system. If the RFID system works correctly, the genuine product would be kicked out of the 
system, but later determined to be genuine, undermining any confidence in the system” 
(Liang 2006).
Sidebar: Parallel Trade and Importation
Continuing from the “Fade to Black” article, Liang expands to address paral-
lel trade and importation (Liang 2006):
“Parallel Trade Enablers and Risks:
“Although counterfeit/gray market problems are not well known in the United 
States, they are throughout the rest of the world. International drug counterfeiting 
difficulties are due in part to problems with parallel trade, i.e., international drug 
importation in Europe and other countries around the world. Through parallel trade, 
drugs may pass through many different countries and scrupulous and unscrupulous 
sellers' hands before ending up in a pharmacy. The incentive to engage in this prac-
tice is attributable in part to differences in medicine pricing amongst European coun-
tries and is permitted in the EU under Article 28 of the European Commission Treaty 
for the Free Movement of Goods and Services within the Internal Market of the EU 
countries. This principle of free movement mandates that no country within the EU 
may place legal, legislative, or other barriers preventing trade between members, nor 
may an owner of a trademark use its rights to prevent repackaging of the medicinal 
product if the repackaging will not adversely affect the original condition of the 
product” (Liang 2006).
“There have been significant issues of counterfeits in Europe both domestically 
and across international lines relating to parallel trade. Unfortunately, examples 
abound. The UK recently uncovered one of the largest counterfeiting operations ever 
discovered, which was churning out 500,000 tablets of counterfeit drugs daily, and 
which disseminated those products through parallel trade means across Europe. It 
is interesting to note that in the UK, like the US and Latin America, penalties are 
light. Allen Valentine, the mastermind of the UK counterfeit ring, who had been 
convicted on 14 previous occasions on charges of medication fraud, only received 
5.5 years imprisonment and the sentence was due to his copyright infringement, not 
his threat to public health. He is eligible for release in two years.”
Usually, parallel trade, diversion, and the gray market product is a legiti-
mate product that is safely traded across borders. As was demonstrated in this 
section, diversion demonstrates a system weakness or vulnerability that could 
be—and is—exploited by counterfeiters and fraudsters.
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 Food Science and Food Authenticity Testing
Food authenticity testing will probably always be the most complex and scientifi-
cally challenging aspect of food fraud prevention. A food product is not a synthetic 
chemical that is sold in a homogeneous state such as 99.99% pure. Food is subject 
to so many variables during the processes of growing, harvesting, processing, pack-
aging, storing, distribution, and then during the final consumption and even disposal 
(farm to fork or farm to flush). There are so many variables in the food ingredient, 
and the final chemical composition is even impacted by fluctuations in humidity, 
temperature, amount of sunshine, or rain. An example of this variation is that orange 
juice has very different general product profiles depending on if the product is 
grown in Florida, California, or Brazil. All are genuine orange juice. They are not 
all genuine Florida orange juice. Another factor is whether the product is not-from- 
concentrate or concentrated. Then there is the more common fraud opportunity of 
adding synthetic flavors or diluting with added sugar.
A critical detect role is that,of course during an active incident, there is an urgent 
and immediate need to identify the root cause of the problem especially if there is 
acute public health harm. The medical sciences work with public health sciences to 
identify the root cause and then food science, and food authenticity testing is 
engaged to find a way to detect the problem. For example, during the melamine 
incident, after melamine was identified as the problem, there was an urgent need to 
identify a detection test and appropriate test method and then enough testing capac-
ity to meet the need. For the melamine incident, there was even a basic medical and 
public health question of an acceptable threshold for melamine—in reality, there is 
not a “zero tolerance” but an Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP) that is based 
on a threshold of detection (TOD), a threshold of regulation (TOR), and threshold 
of concern (TOC—or threshold of toxicological concern TTC or TTOC) (ILSI 
2000; CFSAN 2005; EFSA 2015; HC 2016). Per Codex “This concept may other-
wise be referred to as the ‘acceptable level of risk’” (CODEX 2003). Also, “An 
importing country has the right to set a level of sanitary protection it deems appro-
priate in relation to the protection of human life and health. The ALOP may be 
expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms” (CODEX 2003).
A critical deter role is to put a testing plan in place that identifies further prob-
lems from that specific incident.
The most important prevent role is to build upon the understanding of the root 
cause that is used in evaluating the vulnerability assessment that defines the key 
problems and unacceptable risks in a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. That strategy 
would identify the countermeasures and control systems that would most efficiently 
and effectively address first the problems that were above the risk tolerance. 
Considering criminology and crime prevention, such as using Hot Product/Hot 
Spot Analysis, a very precise and specific test and testing plan can be identified, 
developed if needed, implemented, and then monitored (Lam and Spink 2018; 
Spink 2019).
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 Other Important Fields: Law, Accounting, Information 
Technology, and Others
There are many concepts that are critical and addressed below later in the Food 
Fraud Prevention Strategy.
• Laws and Regulations: The laws, themselves, are critical to establishing what is 
illegal and the details of compliance.
• Laws and Courts: The law system and the judiciary are critical to providing a 
criminal, civil, and regulatory penalty that is both a general deterrence but also in 
place to confront the most brazen and bold criminals.
• Accounting—financial accounting (expanding on managerial accounting): The 
communication to the investors and regulators is critical to both support confi-
dent investment but also establish common auditable practices.
• Accounting—forensic accounting and forensic audit: Beyond the concepts of 
managing a company or presenting information for external investors, there are 
separate functions of foresing accounting that includes systems to continually 
monitor for problems as well as a forensic audit that addresses the investigation 
of specific questions.
• Information Technology (IT): This is a very broad field that includes the internal 
communications and reporting as well as all external transactions.
• Consumer behavior: The focus on the full range of consumer to first understand 
why they act, to understand why they often inadvertently make dangerous deci-
sions, and to finally be able to change their behaviors.
• Psychology/Business Anthropology (of buyers, brand protection managers, 
investigators, and others): Beyond consumer behavior, the psychology of stake-
holders is important to understand the underlying principles or habits that shape 
behaviors.
• Risk Analysis and Risk Management: This is the application of managerial and 
financial accounting needs and includes decisions sciences before providing a 
methodical and systematic approach to evaluating and managing the problems of 
an enterprise.
• Decision Sciences: This is an applied focus on how decisions are made beyond 
statistics or analytical analysis to the support, feedback, and reinforcement of 
behaviors.
• Political Science: The world operates within government and agency control 
mechanisms both for the basic rules for a civil society but also for a geopolitical 
balance of resources and power.
• Public Policy: The study of how government policies are developed and changed 
over time.
• Public Administration: The management of the government and agencies is 
based on legal statutory guidelines and boundaries while based on common basic 
practices.
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• Public Health: While healthcare focuses on the individual, this focuses on the 
population-wide issues and programs.
• Medical/Veterinary/Nursing: When considering the health of individuals, the 
medical professionals are the front line in detection and response to public health 
harms.
• And others…
While the list of disciplines could go on, the important point is that there are 
many disciplines that play a critical role in food fraud prevention. To implement the 
most efficient and effective, holistic, and all-encompassing strategy, it is important 
to start with a broad base foundation.
 Key Learning Objective 3: Understand the Prevention 
Concept
This section reviews several concepts that are important to shape the prevention 
strategies. These are underlying theories that support the value of focusing on vul-
nerability and the fraud opportunity.
The key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) The Food Protection Plan is a cycle of prevention, intervention, and response.
• (2) Strategies and tactics are two key types of responses.
• (3) The overall system is considered to implement countermeasures and control 
systems.
 Food Protection Plan: Prevention, Intervention, and Response
When confronted with a new challenge, it is human nature to try to classify the 
unknown in previously known terms and then to apply familiar and currently applied 
risk treatments.
For food scientists or analytical chemists, the application is that if there is a prob-
lem, it should be solved with testing and detection. When melamine was found to be 
the source of the food safety outbreak, traditional food safety systems led to the 
intervention.
A saying is that:
If you are a hammer (food scientist) everything looks like a nail (food science problem).
Following the FDA Food Protection Plan concept, the first crisis step was “inter-
vention”—to identify the hazard and find a detection method (Fig. 3.3) (FDA 2007, 
2008). Focusing on an immediate, direct, and tactical response to “intervention” is 
absolutely critical and proper during a crisis. The next step was “response”—to find 
ways to remove the hazard from the supply chain quickly. The food safety system 
would be the key stakeholder to respond to a food safety hazard including analysis 
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of the seriousness of the hazard, finding the product, and removing it from the sup-
ply chain. A key to reducing the acute health hazard was a quick response and to be 
reactive. Once the crisis is passed, then there is a cycle back to prevention.
 Consider Strategies First and then Review Tactics
If there is a known incident, then there is an urgent need to act immediately—to 
do something. If not then don’t start by just acting. Have a plan, a diagnosis of the 
problem, an understanding of the root cause, and a consideration of the resource- 
allocation decision-making options and limitations, and then consider the counter-
measures. This set of steps is based on having a strategy before selecting tactics.
If food safety prevention concepts were implemented before the development of 
a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (e.g., after finding melamine in the product to 
then only implement melamine testing of incoming raw materials), the countermea-
sures activities would still be “tactical” not “strategic” and possibly not reduce the 
vulnerability (the system weakness may not be for incoming raw materials). The 
management of the activities is “operational.” The focus would naturally not be on 
the fraud opportunity or the overall VACCP plan (see below for more on strategic, 
tactical, and operational).
• Strategic action: addressing an overall problem and then to prevention. Webster’s 
Dictionary includes one definition as: “of great importance within an integrated 
whole or to a planned effect” (Merriam-Webster 2004).
• Tactical action: after “detection” then a specific countermeasure for a specific 
problem which would be “deterrence.” Webster’s Dictionary includes one defini-
tion as: “made or carried out with only a limited or immediate end in view” 
(Merriam-Webster 2004).
• Operational action: the effort to apply the strategic or tactical plan.
To review the strategic and tactical concepts in more detail, there are specific 
definitions of the terms and standards for their adoption. These concepts are not 
defined directly in the quality management standards (e.g., ISO 9000 Quality 
Management) but have been codified elsewhere (such as ISO/IEC TR 33014:2013 
deals with process improvement on three levels) (ISO 2013).
Fig. 3.3 Food Protection Plan series of activities: prevention-intervention-response (PIR) with the 
starting point after an incident at intervention. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink and Moyer 
2011)
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• Strategic: what goals to achieve, the motivation and direction.
• Tactical: how to achieve the goals of process improvement.
• Operational: how to perform the process improvement.
Also, from ISO 24516: 2017 (ISO 2016):
• Strategic plan: “plan containing the long-term goals and strategies of an organi-
zation; Note 1 to entry: Strategic plans have a strong external focus, cover major 
portions of the organization and identify major targets, actions and resource 
 allocations relating to the long-term survival, value and adoption to ongoing 
changes of an organization.”
• Tactical plan: “prioritization in the medium term on the basis of influencing fac-
tors/indicators on performance, costs, risk and failure probability and scale of 
failure, including general determination; EXAMPLE 1: Indicators of damage 
probability can be age, usage, and damage; EXAMPLE 2: Indicators for the 
magnitude of failures can be hydraulic importance and vulnerable infrastruc-
tures; EXAMPLE 3: General determinations can be technology of rehabilitation 
and material.”
• Operational plan: “implementation of rehabilitation measures (short-term 
planning).”
Tactics are, by nature, reactive and can be very efficient if they are selected to 
support a strategy. For example, a food safety “Early Warning System” is usually a 
“tactic” to support the food safety “strategy” of rapid detection and response to 
known hazards (for more detail, see later review of Early Warning Systems). Other 
Food Safety Management System actions focus on prevention of the hazard in the 
first place. Thus, a traditional food safety “Early Warning System” by itself is not 
food fraud prevention but rather “rapid, rapid detection.”
To develop tactics (e.g., “just start doing something” or “we need some data” or 
“it must be good to improve the test method for this adulterant-substance”) before 
understanding the overall strategy is usually inefficient at best and dangerous at 
worst. If the typical fraud occurs at 1%, then a detection test at 10 parts per million is 
not needed. If there are a seemingly near an infinite number of fraudsters, then arrest-
ing 100 or 1000 bad guys probably do not reduce the fraud opportunity. Without 
considering the overall needs and the entire system, there may be gaps in the tactics 
that produce a new critical flaw that may lead to an even bigger fraud opportunity.
It is critical to consider how all the concepts connect together in the Food Fraud 
Prevention Cycle (FFPC)—and applying the concepts to a specific situation or sys-
tem—to understand everything that needs to be covered and how much data or intel-
ligence is needed to make resource-allocation decisions, and to consider how the 
system will be sustainable. Everything should be connected and calibrated to every-
thing else. To consider the holistic and all-encompassing strategy before imple-
menting programs provides an opportunity to identify unmet needs or gaps. If 
everything is not connected to everything, then the process and assessment are static 
and not dynamic—it does not actually re-calibrate and becomes out of date almost 
immediately.
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 An Early Warning System as Prevention for Melamine Fraud? …or Rapid, 
Rapid Detection of an Illness?
After the original melamine food fraud incident in milk powder and then in pet 
food, there was a sense that the food safety system “worked” and was proactive. 
These were intervention and response. After thinking about this, the trigger for the 
“Early Warning System” to look for melamine was the illness and death. So, there 
was a rapid alert that there was a problem which was an early warning of a food 
safety incident not a warning of a new vulnerability that rose to the level of now 
being a hazard that requires a preventive control.
Sidebar: Shift to a Prevention Focus
Food fraud prevention is similar to other food safety management concepts 
such as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point plan (HACCP) and the 
broader business quality management concepts such as Total Quality 
Management (TQM) or Six Sigma (“6S”). While both HACCP and quality 
management faced resistance when first implemented, they are widely 
accepted and understood. Quality is not only part of the corporate culture but 
even is often now a core company value.
Considering the quality management commitment, the core philosophies 
of the control systems are fundamentally similar to other food safety pro-
grams. The same concepts are the idea of identifying hazards, determining 
critical control points that should be monitored, and then a process to make 
sure the countermeasures and control systems are implemented. When devel-
oping and then implementing a new system, for getting buy-in and speed 
understanding, it is effective to start with a known concept to explain the value 
to the resource-allocation decision-makers. Food fraud starts with the highly 
regarded and familiar HACCP concepts and then refines the process to apply 
to the vulnerability uniquely. For food fraud prevention, the concept has been 
a “Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Point plan” or “VACCP” 
(GFSI FFTT 2013; GFSI 2016; FSSC 2018). Addressing food fraud in VACCP 
is identified as different as addressing food safety (HACCP) but yet utilizing 
very similar methods and systems. Food defense—an intentional act with the 
intent to inflict a health hazard, economic or psychological terror— often is 
considered a “threat” so the concept is “Threat Assessments and Critical 
Control Point plan” or “TACCP.” This philosophy creates an overarching set 
of concepts, but that identifies very different control and management 
activities.
When considering food fraud prevention—not just identifying human 
health hazards and implementing critical control points to monitor for an 
adulterant-substance like melamine or horsemeat—the countermeasures and 
control systems are fundamentally different than for addressing food quality, 
food safety, or food defense.
 Key Learning Objective 3: Understand the Prevention Concept
102
To be fair to the food safety legacy systems, it is essential to define the scope and 
fit for purpose of the “Early Warning System.” Many systems were implemented 
to detect a chemical contaminant or pathogen that naturally occurs in the product. 
These systems were not originally designed or intended to monitor other activities 
such as food fraud or food defense attacks. The great opportunity is that an Early 
Warning System tracking and response system is already in place and functioning. 
There is an efficiency in integrating food fraud prevention activities into the current 
functional system.
An Early Warning System is critical to the rapid detection of all health hazard 
or fraudulent activity. To be efficient, a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy should 
inform the Early Warning System to know what to look for. Moreover, to actually 
lead to prevention of the fraud act, the fraudsters must know the prevention system 
is in place. Fraudsters just need to know that the supply chain monitoring is in 
place for “melamine”—and whatever else might be a concern—to dissuade the 
fraudulent act.
In Fig. 3.4, there are separate determinations or threshold of “unacceptable risks” 
for food quality, food safety, food fraud, and food defense. If a single threshold and 
general response were defined—such as a reported illness in a government product 
recall alert—the model would be an “ill-fitting tool.” For example, the US FDA 
CARVER+Shock food defense assessment system has a factor that prioritizes the 
“shock” of an incident. While addressing package tampering is critical, based on 
this assessment system, the 1986 Tylenol tampering incident that changed the entire 
US packaging laws would not have been prioritized. The “shock” would have been 
a low rank of 1 or 2 out of 10 points on the CARVER+Shock scale, and thus other 
higher ranking threats would have been clearly prioritized. Even after the incident 
occurred, the statistics and data on the Tylenol incident would still be prioritized in 
the CARVER+Shock scale as very low.
Fig. 3.4 Contaminant Early Warning System structure of multiple types of risks and implementa-
tion in a quality control system
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With this organizational structure, the food safety Early Warning System 
methods and procedures can be utilized to address multiple types of risks. The food 
safety Early Warning System then broadens to really becoming a food quality Early 
Warning System.
 Optimize the Countermeasure and Control System
Once the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy is in place and countermeasures and con-
trol systems are selected, it is crucial first to create a vision of the goal. At the very 
start of the process, it is important to consider “what are we really trying to do?” 
There are many ways to dissuade the fraudsters from acting. Before jumping to 
complex or expensive risk treatments, consider all your options. Review the coun-
termeasure and control strategies in relation to your Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment and on your corporate risk map. There are some situations where you 
may become aware of more incidents, but they don’t fundamentally shift your fraud 
opportunity. For example, the increased fraud opportunity does not shift the result 
above the “risk appetite.”
Also, before selecting new countermeasures and control systems—and after 
reviewing “what are we really trying to do?”—it is wise to review other testing, 
audits, or monitoring conducted by your company. There may already be subscrip-
tions or processes in place that you can leverage and use.
Once you have identified a vulnerability that is above the “risk appetite” (unac-
ceptable), you can use the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy Cycle (FFPC) to con-
sider countermeasures and control systems. The range of countermeasures and 
control systems should be evaluated on a corporate risk map.
The Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (FFPS) is a self-correcting process that 
dynamically calibrates the fraud opportunity in relation to the goal to at least stay 
just within the risk appetite. As the fraud opportunity rises or lowers, it is compared 
to the evolving risk appetite. If the fraud opportunity drops, then there is a methodi-
cal recommendation that countermeasures and control systems could be reduced. 
Without a lot of evidence and enterprise support, a manager moving into a new 
position would never reduce the countermeasures that are already in place—if after 
that countermeasure was eliminated an incident did occur, that new manager could 
be held accountable for weakening the position of the corporation.
The most important part of the process here is that there are analytical, resource- 
allocation decision-maker-based assessments. Decreasing the countermeasures and 
control systems can be judged without bias or opinion. The process provides a ratio-
nal justification for the decisions.
Engaging the corporate risk map places the risk appetite threshold decision 
where it should be which is at the CEO/CFO. The CEO/CFO is held accountable by 
the Board of Directors to keep the business operating below that risk appetite. The 
Board of Directors is the proxy for the owners and shareholders. All of these leaders 
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must report the risk management process in financial securities regulatory docu-
ments such as a “10-k form” that is part of the annual report. Not addressing these 
risks—or not reporting them—can lead to personal criminal liability.
Sidebar: A Supplier Credit Rating as a Proxy for Financial Duress
This may seem completely obvious, but credit ratings that are already moni-
tored by every company’s credit department are an excellent way to gain 
insight on every supplier continually and very accurately. Potential fraudster 
companies—or owners and managers—do not all of a sudden shift from being 
financially secure to under duress. Unless there is an extenuating circumstance 
or a specific incident, for most situations, the company slips gradually.
During a project, there was a question about evaluating the fraud opportu-
nity by conducting a judgment of the supplier “being under financial duress” 
or the owner “living beyond their means.” These are important root causes for 
someone to be tempted to commit fraud. From a practical perspective, how 
would you, your headquarter-based purchasing managers, your auditors, or 
supplier relationship managers evaluate this factor? Would you investigate 
your suppliers? What would trigger an investigation? How much would it cost 
to conduct an effective lifestyle evaluation across town or halfway around the 
world? What is “living above your means?” In one country is having two cows 
considered wealthy? What about owning a race car? If a fraudster is smart, 
they would not drive a Ferrari to their manufacturing plant but would pretend 
to be personally fiscally responsible and drive an old car.
Thus, the goal is to have some type of automated, data, and fact-based 
system to watch for triggers that might suggest an increasing vulnerability. 
Ideally, to tip you off of potential problems, this would be a currently pro-
duced streaming data that you can have automatically monitored. As we said, 
companies do not usually have an immediate shift in identifying new financial 
duress. Thus it would be an excellent countermeasure and control system to 
monitor something.
A company’s credit department already has the systems in place to monitor 
the credit rating of customers (accounts receivables) and maybe also already 
suppliers (accounts payable). So, an alert could be created to signal some type 
of countermeasure when a supplier slips. For example, if they slip from the 
Dun & Bradstreet creditworthiness rating of AAA rating to AA (of the range 
from a high of AAAAA to a low of HH (Dunn and Bradstreet 2018), there 
could be an automated request to confirm some aspect of their supply chain. 
As long as there is a follow-up to confirm their response, “they know you’re 
looking.” If the supplier slips, again and again, there could be another more 
detailed request such as requiring that the supplier send copies of food safety 
tests or audits. If the supplier passes below a threshold, they could trigger 
routine on-site food safety audit. This is an audit you would be doing anyway, 
but this could just speed up that cycle.
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 Personal Insight: Example of Starting a New Strategic Initiative—
Sustainability, Quality… Food Fraud?
When a corporation takes on a new initiative, there is often little awareness by the 
general employees of why this effort was chosen and why this one and not another 
focus area. There is often an acceptance that “this makes sense” (or the contrary that 
it is “flavor of the month”) but little insight on the enterprise-wide motivations. 
There cannot be ten “top-3” initiatives. In reality, a Board of Directors and C-Suite 
review enterprise-wide risks for the short- and long-term. They then consider how 
their enterprise may reduce the negative impact. Along the way, creating a benefit is 
also the goal. The start of the Wal-mart sustainability effort provides an interesting 
case study (Note: I was fortunate to be the Michigan State University School of 
Packaging representative to the Wal-mart Packaging Sustainable Value Network 
(PKG-SVN) for the second to the fifteenth meeting).
Wal-mart was an early adopter of corporate sustainability initiatives. In 2005, 
their CEO Lee Scott presented his “21st Century Leadership” speech (Scott 2005). 
This was the proclamation that Wal-mart would fully embrace and engage in envi-
ronmental sustainability. He mentioned the main reasons were:
 (1) Merchandising: have the products on the shelves that customers want
 (2) Control costs: predicting that raw materials such as electricity or truck fuel 
prices would increase, so the efficient use of energy would be important
 (3) Attract and retain employees: corporations faced hiring challenges, and there 
had been efforts to put in place, and support, innovative programs
None of these were a change or contrary to the Wal-mart Value Statement or 
culture of taking care of the customer under a motto of “everyday value.”
Fast forward to 2018 and “sustainability” is a common and accepted—even criti-
cal or mandatory—corporate initiative to the point of being core to a culture. The 
original response of suppliers to Wal-mart initiatives was to embrace sustainability 
If this credit monitoring system were to be put in place—even if the control 
system was just an automatically produced email request for some response—
then the fraud opportunity is reduced since, if that supplier feels pressure and 
is tempted to commit fraud, they will perceive you are a lower fraud opportu-
nity than other companies who are not asking. They will remember that 
you’ve been very diligent, engaged, and monitoring many aspects of the busi-
ness. The fraud opportunity will be reduced since they will perceive they may 
get caught if they attack your company.
A burglar who is carousing your neighborhood to scout crime opportuni-
ties (a “motivated attacker” seeking a “crime opportunity”) is not usually try-
ing to specifically break into your house. If your house has all the lights on 
and your neighbor’s house is dark… the fraud opportunity is at your neigh-
bor’s house.
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just to sustain or grow sales. Along the way, companies refined their programs to 
support good business growth for new “green” products that customers were seek-
ing, controlling costs, or positioning their corporations to look good for the invest-
ment community.
Environmental sustainability initiatives were not always a “no-brainer.” At the 
very start, a Board of Directors—such as possibly Wal-mart—would have reviewed 
long-term threats to their enterprise. Futurists help envision what could be, what 
might be, and how to position for reducing risk and increasing the chance of success. 
For the 100s of possible initiatives, Wal-mart picked sustainability. The Wal-mart 
senior decision-makers decided where and how to direct and financially support their 
employees to strongly position the company in the short- and long-term. This type of 
awareness of typical Board-level review and decision-making is not well understood 
even by those who work at a company. Many employees just believe that “no-brainer” 
initiatives such as sustainability—or others such as quality, safety, food safety, and 
others—just “make sense,” so they just naturally become part of the culture.
Before sustainability, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an earlier trend 
to implement quality management programs. While an employee for almost 12 years 
at Chevron Corporation, I experienced a wave of initiatives that had ended up being 
core to the Chevron culture and success such as quality (e.g., before Six Sigma there 
was Deming and then Crosby), safety, diversity, and sustainability. Over time these 
“new” initiatives became ingrained in the everyday practices or “culture.” When we 
had positive experiences—or the business kept growing—the efforts became even 
more valued.
While there are frontline compliance requirements such as by GFSI, the concept 
of food fraud prevention is at the very start of the corporate-level implementation 
process as well. There are many competing enterprise-wide priorities, and there is a 
need to conduct this very high-level assessment to help the enterprise consider how 
to best address this vulnerability. Over time there will be a calibration of “how much 
is enough” based on risk and reward. The Food Fraud Prevention Strategy helps 
connect the vulnerability to the corporate risk map to provide that high-level per-
spective. Using ERM/COSO, a food fraud incident can be effectively and efficiently 
compared to all other risks, vulnerabilities, or threats. In this integrated system, all 
risks can be compared to all other risks. There can be a real assessment of this new 
problem above the “risk tolerance” and of what countermeasure specification 
reduces the problem to within that threshold.
Sidebar: Food Fraud Strategy—Managing Diabetes Not Fixing a 
Broken Leg
An important concept is that addressing food fraud is not like fixing a broken 
leg where one intervention can “solve” the problem. Food fraud must be 
“managed.” It is essential to set the expectation or philosophy of managing 
food fraud which is more like managing diabetes than fixing a broken leg. For 
treating diabetes, the patient may look fine right now but without care could 
become very sick very quickly.
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There has been feedback from anti-counterfeit or brand protection managers 
who have been gun-shy to approach their resource-allocation decision- makers 
to ask for more money since they are asked “We’ve been giving you millions 
of dollars each year… so why haven’t you solved this?” The problem here is 
that the countermeasures and control systems were positioned as “solutions” 
not “ongoing management”—a “solution” is expected to “solve” the problem. 
When you “solve” a problem, there is an expectation it no longer exists.
The vulnerability will continue to evolve, so the first step in the treatment 
is to create a methodical monitoring and continuous improvement process, 
program, or system. The second step is to assess risk treatments and imple-
ment effective countermeasures and control systems. Finally, there should be 
agreements on the success metrics. The goal is not to “catch” “more” bad 
product or to arrest “more” criminals; the goal is to “prevent” the incident 
from occurring in the first place. However, this is prevention, so success is not 
only measured by the “nonconformities,” which in these cases are food fraud 
incidents. As with a diabetes patient, we should be monitoring that the patient 
is still alive, but there are other indicators of success or well-being. For food, 
we would call this a product recall. The diabetes patient has other factors that 
indicate the process is under control such as blood glucose monitoring, exer-
cise, a healthy diet, and other indicators.
In a food safety management system such as HACCP, this would be 
referred to as “Critical Control Points.” A proactive and sound patient treat-
ment plan—as with a quality management system—identifies the root causes 
of the nonconformance, reduces out of control activities, and then monitors 
key aspects of that critical control point that are being addressed. For food 
safety, this would be a HACCP that monitors the temperature of a refrigerator 
(e.g., the temperature, that it has stayed even and that the monitoring system 
is stable). For food fraud prevention, this would be a Vulnerability Assessment 
and Critical Control Point plan (VACCP) that monitors the variation in non-
targeted tests such as to see if there are any “unexpected” but not yet “suspi-
cious” results.
The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle is an overall monitoring system to con-
nect specific monitoring activities. The crucial point is that all systems are 
connected and calibrated to interact with all the other systems. The objective 
is to “connect everything to everything.” Without this integrated system, there 
really are no internal controls and no integrated framework to monitor, assess, 
and implement the strategy. Without the cycle then resource-allocation deci-
sions are guesses. From the COSO report “Risk Assessment in Practice” 
(COSO 2012):
• “Without a standard of comparison, it’s simply not possible to compare 
and aggregate risks across the organization.
• “Risk aggregation models are extremely variable from one enterprise to 
another, even within the financial services industry.”
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Sidebar: The Trophy Remains Elusive—How to Define Success? 
(MSU-FFI 2018)
By John Spink • August 22, 2013 • Blog
Melamine, horsemeat, rat meat, Sudan red carcinogen colorant… we 
understand food fraud is an issue, but how big of an impact does it make? 
How do we define the risk or vulnerability? Moreover, probably more impor-
tantly… how do we define progress or “success”? The presenters in the 
Economic Adulteration (Food Fraud/ Economically Motivated Adulteration) 
sessions at the IFT 2013 conference framed these questions… and set the 
direction to find the answers.
This year’s IFT conference was held at McCormick Place in Chicago from 
July 11 to 17. It was reported that over 23,000 people attended. I presented 
three food fraud, packaging, and food defense sections in the HACCP certifi-
cation pre-conference workshop. I was also a part of the MSU Online Master 
of Science in food safety exhibitor team and attended several educational ses-
sions related to my research. Two sessions focused on Economically Motivated 
Adulteration (EMA), which included many mentions of food fraud (FF).
IFT is focused on food science and technology for ingredients, so it was 
logical for the conference to include a session on the adulterant-substances and 
the adulteration aspects of the food vulnerability. IFT and these presenters have 
been increasingly covering the economically motivated adulteration issues.
The first EMA session was on “Strategies and Technology to Prevent/
Detect Economic Adulteration of Food.” The presentations focused on test 
methods to detect EMA. The increased ability to detect product that has been 
adulterated will provide another, better weapon in the countermeasure arse-
nal. The presentations reviewed techniques to increase detection, not preven-
tion. There were many excellent descriptions of fraud identification and 
authenticity testing.
The second EMA session was on “Risk Assessment for Economically 
Motivated Adulteration of Raw Materials and Ingredients: New Tools and 
Research Needs.” This session started with a statement by Joseph Scimeca — 
a food safety VP at Cargill, speaking for the Grocery Manufacturer’s 
Association workgroup on Economic Adulteration  – stating, “Intentional 
adulteration is a game changer” since the potential impact is huge and the pre-
vention countermeasures and control systems are from outside traditional food 
science. He continued to focus on the industry concerns of economic adultera-
tion and, specifically, on the behavioral sciences and criminology aspects of 
prevention. He stated that there is a tremendous need for more research and 
that there is great industry concern on the topic. Next, Markus Lipp – a VP at 
U.S. Pharmacopeia and the Food Chemicals Codex – discussed some of the 
work of its food adulteration-related Expert Panels. Karen Everstine of the 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense (after the US Department 
of Defense funding ended it is now called the Food Protection and Defense 
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Institute – FPDI, who was an early funder of our MSU food fraud research) 
presentation included some of its complex and expansive data-gathering 
activities in the food fraud area. The NCFPD has a deep engagement with its 
U.S. agency funders in protecting our borders and food supply.
The session was moderated by Jonathon DeVries from General Mills/ 
Medallion Labs. He closed with an important concept about prevention – “we 
don’t have a way to claim success.” Later he stated, “If we prevent EMA no 
one knows for sure… we need to find a way to prove our success.”
The key takeaways for me were that food fraud is a critical food industry 
issue. Many great minds are collaborating at very high levels on the subject. 
As we found with our previous MSU-FFI efforts to quantify the economic 
impact or risk of counterfeiting, these fraud events defy our current methods 
and processes. We will need to continue to work together to develop the vul-
nerability and risk assessment systems. Finally, as Dr. DeVries stated, we 
need to find a way to “prove success” in prevention. We need to be able to 
define why food fraud prevention is important and to define how, and when, 
we reduce the vulnerability.
Update 2018: This concept of how to measure success was a key problem 
for quality management and crime prevention. While measuring an actual inci-
dent is important the more proactive measures are to reduce the actions that 
could lead to incidents. For quality management, this is identifying and 
addressing the root causes of an anomaly. Adapted to food in the HACCP plan 
this is identifying and managing critical control points. In crime prevention, 
this is identifying the crime “hot spots” and implementing countermeasures to 
reduce the opportunity. Adapted to food fraud, this is identifying and reducing 
the vulnerabilities. A critical control point or vulnerability can be identified, 
modified, and measured. Thus, the objectives shift to prevention and “success” 
can be defined by controlling those root causes of the problems. To assess food 
safety, we do count the number of incidents, but the greater focus is on moni-
toring and managing critical control points such as the consistent and cali-
brated temperature of a refrigerator. This shift from measuring only outcomes 
to focusing on addressing the root cause of anomalies is the founding principle 
of quality management. Measuring the end product is, of course, key, but the 
real focus and success measures focus on managing the critical control points.
 Conclusion
Over the years, it has become clear that addressing food fraud incidents and imple-
menting prevention strategies require a fundamentally different approach than for 
addressing food quality, food safety, or food defense problems. It has become clear 
that we will “not arrest our way to safety” and not “test our way to compliance.” The 
frustration and exasperation have led to deconstructing the root cause and shifting 
to disciplines such as social science and criminology with decision-making in 
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managerial accounting and enterprise risk management. There has been a simplicity 
in stepping back to consider the entire process and for all types of product fraud. 
The first conclusion is that there is an interdisciplinary approach to food fraud pre-
vention. The basic idea of prevention requires a holistic, all-encompassing view of 
the problem and also awareness through to even the final resource-allocation 
decision- making process. This examination leads to a consideration beyond just 
tactics such as arresting bad guys or seizing product to taking a strategic approach 
to identify the fraud opportunity and then manage the vulnerabilities and root 
causes. The second conclusion is to start with an overall strategic approach and then 
select tactics. Finally, that strategic approach requires a system to consider all 
aspects of the vulnerabilities and the control systems. When there is a consideration 
of “everything,” then a systematic approach can be developed that “connects every-
thing to everything.” This includes seeking new information, considering how that 
new information impacts our understanding of the fraud opportunity, then an assess-
ment of whether this new or changing risk is above the risk tolerance, and then a 
method to select and monitor countermeasures. The final conclusion is to “connect 
everything to everything” in a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
There is a saying:
“If the biological organism in question was a microbe you would logically engage the 
field of microbiology; for Food fraud, the biological organism I question is a human to 
you would logically engage the field of Social Science and specifically Criminology.”
“Repeat after me – ‘Social Science is a real science.’”
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Prevention Basics
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all Follow the process and start first only at a very high level with a quick, 
enterprise-wide assessment… for now
Quality team This is not like any other food risk you are assigned to manage— step back, 
consider the root cause, and follow the process to start with a focus at the 
very high level, enterprise-wide assessment… and then drill down into the 
details
Auditors The nature of the risk is that the controls are based on, and best assessed by, 
enterprise-wide assessments—a manufacturing site requirement may be 
only to not deviate from the corporate-wide plan
Management Let your team follow the process and reinforce a quick, high-level, 
top-down assessment before getting into too much detail and long before 
conducting manufacturing plant-level vulnerability assessments
Corp. 
Ddecision- makers
Believe it or not, the process will provide you with a clear assessment that 
will be immediately applied in enterprise risk assessment type systems
3 Food Fraud Prevention Overview (Part 1 of 3): Basics
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 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) Why was a FF interdisciplinary approach so hard to create and implement?
 (b) How is the FF problem interdisciplinary?
 (c) What are the strengths and weaknesses of a mono-discipline, interdisciplin-
ary, or multidisciplinary approaches?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is “interdisciplinary” versus “multidisciplinary”?
 (b) What are the disciplines in the interdisciplinary approach?
 (c) Are investigation and prosecution a preventive approach?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is a “Sociopath”?
 (b) What is the relationship between a “Sociopath” and a “Criminal”?
 (c) Is a traceability code an overt or covert anti-fraud feature?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is a supplier “Credit Rating”?
 (b) How does the Food Protection Plan start?
 (c) What is the difference between an action that is strategic, tactical, or 
operational?
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Chapter 4
Food Fraud Prevention Overview  
(Part 2 of 3): The Approach
Summary
This chapter presents the application and utility of the overall Food Fraud Prevention 
Cycle (FFPC). Each component is connected to every other component. The deci-
sions are calibrated and correlated to the formal enterprise-wide decision-making 
system. Essentially the FFPC “connects everything to everything” in a dynamic and 
self-correcting cycle. The FFPC components include (1) overall principles (e.g., A, 
B, and C) and steps that are the activities (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 5, and 5).
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are:
• (1) Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC): Presentation of a systematic 
approach to food fraud prevention
• (2) Functionality: The functionality and application of the Food Fraud 
Prevention Cycle
• (3) Individuals Steps: The process steps in the cycle
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the compo-
nents and functionality of the entire cycle (Fig. 4.1). The next chapter will address 
each component of the FFPC.
 Introduction
There were stories of that security products suppliers had challenges in getting 
brand owners to actually make a decision to implement the programs. There was an 
agreement that counterfeiting was “a problem” and that the brand owner must “do 
something.” There would be months and months of presentations and product 
reviews but usually a stall just before the final resource-allocation decision-making, 
the final sign-off from the CFO to purchase the anti-counterfeit component. Early 
on we saw the rate-limiting step was in the final decision. There was a lack of abil-
ity, willingness, confidence, or urgency to make the resource-allocation decision. 
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This led to a review of the entire system and then a focus on supporting that final 
resource- allocation decision-making. The result was the Food Fraud Prevention 
Cycle—a cycle that “connects everything to everything” including presenting the 
proposal in terms that the CEO/CFO needed.
The value of the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) is that all work functions 
or activities are included with methods to convert information into a useable form. 
If new functions or activities are identified, they will be added to the cycle or within 
current activities. The corporate-level risk assessor considers “I understand that 
there might be two deaths. I’m really concerned. I have no idea how I would assess 
this in relation to all other risks.” The resource allocation judgment was apart from 
other proposals. Unless there was a regulatory requirement (mandatory where inac-
tion would be illegal)—or the influence of the General Counsel to “do something”—
the other proposals were implemented.
The final, and transformational, step in the development of the FFPC was incor-
porating the food fraud vulnerability or risk into Enterprise Risk Management on a 
corporate risk map.1 This is important because when the Board of Directors or the 
1 Note: COSO more often uses the term “risk map” or “heat map,” but “corporate risk map” is used 
here and throughout to clarify the intent review the formal and systematic assessment of enter-
prise-wide risk not a basic risk summary.
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Fig. 4.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle: where this chapter applies to the overall concept—the 
entire cycle 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and the fraud opportunity (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; 
Spink et al. 2019)
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C-suite reviews a new risk, at first they are seeking just a broad and quick estimate 
of the issue. “How big is this problem?” “Will there be a big investment or many 
new resources needed?” “Should the CEO/CFO alert the Board of Directors imme-
diately or is this really just another general risk?”
Beyond connecting every step or activity to each other, conceptually this is a 
cycle that is dynamic and self-correcting. The “fraud opportunity” and “risk appe-
tite” fluctuate, and this cycle will provide a guide to increasing—or, key, decreas-
ing—the ongoing investment in countermeasures and control systems. The value is 
that this is (1) a complete system that addresses all types of activities, (2) commu-
nicated in a format that supports decision-making, and that it is (3) self-correcting 
by encouraging a calibrated increase or decrease in countermeasures and control 
systems.
 Key Learning Objective 1: Functionality and Application 
of the FFPC
This section reviews the functionality and application of the Food Fraud Prevention 
Cycle (FFPC). There are work processes for each function or steps that contribute 
to the bigger risk control strategy. The key is the overarching strategy that starts with 
a focus and understanding of the “fraud opportunity” rather than building upon or 
expanding other programs. The FFPC components include (1) overall principles 
(e.g., A, B, and C) and steps that are the activities (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Understand the process to coordinate and optimize countermeasures.
• (2) Continuous monitoring of the fraud opportunity and vulnerability assessment 
to optimize the risk treatment.
• (3) Consider the specific process steps in the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle.
 Coordinating Countermeasures: Scouting Internally for Other 
Current Programs
It may seem either commonsense or utterly simplistic, but after the first review of 
the fraud opportunity, there is an efficiency of scouting across the enterprise for 
other countermeasures and control systems that could apply. Often, when there is a 
crisis, new programs or systems are implemented without extensive planning, coor-
dination, or research. The work groups make the best decision they can under the 
time constraint and with the resources provided. There is usually a focus on one 
specific problem and with resources or insight from within one or a small group of 
experts. The urgency of the crisis does not lend itself to taking time to reflect too 
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much on the enterprise-wide perspective or to conduct a lot of additional data gath-
ering. Also, there is often a “Crisis Management” or “Business Continuity” team 
who does not have a responsibility to review the incident over time or to conduct a 
more prevention-based assessment. Often there is a series of crises…often there is 
“fire after fire.”
Thus, when developing a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, it is efficient to take 
the time to identify related programs or projects that could be helpful to reduce or 
control the fraud opportunity (Fig. 4.2).
Often holistic reviews of the programs or projects identify ways they could be 
connected for a more significant impact. In other instances, the food fraud preven-
tion countermeasures and controls systems may already be in place (during the 
search, the mindset should be that there are other programs already addressing 
part of the problem, so keep searching). Those other projects, activities, or pro-
cesses may be implemented but not yet considered in the Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy.
Considering food fraud in the continuum of all food control programs, it is 
entirely possible that 99% of all audits, testing, oversight, inspections, traceability, 
transparency, and data collection are already implemented (Fig. 4.3). Those pro-
grams just need to be identified and coordinated within the Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy. For example, the separate activities to address food quality, food safety, 
and food defense contribute insight to address food fraud. When utilizing the visi-
bility to risks from those other areas, it is possible that only minor extra effort is 
needed to completely address food fraud.
Many Projects 
Created for Many 
Resons
Review Company -
wide Projects
Coordinated 
Strategy
Create One 
Central 
Coordination 
Point
Fig. 4.2 Creating a coordinated plan that organizes and calibrates a seemingly unaffiliated set of 
activities (often projects are created as a response to one specific incident or required compliance 
requirements—the new project is not necessarily connected or calibrated with all other related 
projects)
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 Selecting Countermeasures and Control Systems
The component “(6) Countermeasures” includes the consideration of countermea-
sures and control systems. A countermeasure is an activity such as authenticity 
testing or including anti-counterfeit authentication features such as a serial number. 
A control system would be monitoring such as traceability or other supply chain 
transparency. The review of countermeasures is similar to a medical response of 
“diagnosis-treatment-prognosis = decision” (DTP).
Think about a sick person visiting a medical doctor. Overall there is a process for ‘diagno-
sis,’ then consider a series of possible ‘treatments,’ and each treatment considers a ‘progno-
sis’ (Fig. 4.4). The diagnosis is similar to considering vulnerabilities. The treatments are the 
countermeasures or control systems which do include ‘do nothing.’ Finally, each diagnosis- 
treatment option should consider a prognosis or result of the effort. For example, if fraud is 
occurring at 1 to 5% of the finished good, then there is no need for a treatment that reduces 
the sensitivity from 1 part per thousand to one part per million.
Food Fraud in the Continuum
•  Probably 99% of all audits, testing, oversight, inspections, traceability,
    transparency and data collection are already implemented…
Food
Fraud
Food
Quality
Food
Safety Food
Defense
Food Protection Continuum
Fig. 4.3 Food fraud in the continuum—considering all food protection programs or projects and 
how they contribute to food fraud prevention (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2015a, b)
Diagnosis Treatment Prognosis Decision
Fig. 4.4 Continuum of diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, and the decision (Copyright Permission 
Granted) (Spink 2019a, b)
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Sidebar: Review of the GMA Brand Protection and Supply Chain 
Integrity Report (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: GMA Brand Protection and Supply Chain Integrity Report
By John Spink • March 13, 2014 • Blog
On February 20, 2014, the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) 
released their new report on “Brand Protection and Supply Chain Integrity” 
(GMA 2014). With my MSU colleague Dr. Doug Moyer, we participated in 
the Brand Protection Working Group that provided guidance for the project. 
This report was commissioned by GMA and the Food Marketing Institute 
(FMI) based on a direct request from their 2012 CEO Leadership Forum—
addressing counterfeit product was “among the highest priorities of the mem-
bers.” The research was conducted pro bono—as are most GMA reports—by 
information technology/transaction management supplier Inmar and product 
authentication supplier Authentix. The report included expert insight by those 
authors, the best practices survey of GMA/FMI members, and was supple-
mented by a consumer survey previously conducted by Inmar.
The project was scoped to only include products with a human or animal 
public health threat (it did not seem to be the intent, but these were all FDA- 
regulated products.)
• “The scope of products covered in this guide includes CPG [consumer 
packaged goods] – food, over-the-counter medicines, pet and health, and 
beauty care products. The guide does not cover coupons, apparel, sporting 
goods, automotive, electronics or other non-food items found in mass mer-
chandisers and specialty retail.”
The report used a broad—or macro—definition of counterfeiting, which 
expanded the focus beyond trademark, patent, or copyright infringement. It 
did zoom in on illegally manufactured or adulterated goods—specifically not 
including stolen goods or actions that do not violate the IP rights. In the USA, 
the “counterfeiting” laws focus on the intellectual property rights.
• “For the purposes of this guide, counterfeit goods are defined as illegiti-
mately manufactured or adulterated goods. This guide does not address 
stolen goods or products such as ‘replica’ or ‘genuine imitation’ items that 
do not otherwise violate a brand owner’s rights.”
There was a focus—consistent with our previous MSU-FFI publications 
and research direction—on “detection, prevention, and deterrence.”
There was a broad range of best practices noted but few direct recommen-
dations for countermeasures in the case study section of the report, except for 
the following regarding packaging:
• “[To address packaging anti-counterfeiting countermeasures] the manu-
facturer enlisted a third-party security company to develop a program that 
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was compatible with already existing programs. Four important steps were 
taken to combat the unauthorized product:
 – Late stage customization to add security post-production
 – Tamper-evident security labels with covert and forensic features
 – Labels supplied from a secure, third-party print facility
 – Labels printed with region-specific information to meet local 
regulations.”
Also, packaging technology expertise was identified as one of the key 
expert areas:
• “Create a dedicated group that has expertise in 4 key areas: law enforce-
ment, supply chain, packaging technology and legal.”
A best practice directly addressed packaging countermeasures:
• “Build anti-counterfeit and brand protection elements into the product 
design process with the goal to employ in-product and on-package authen-
tication technology.”
In summary, this report provides some interesting best practices and a base 
from which companies can start building a Brand Protection response. While 
our MSU-FFI is focused on food, none of us can ignore that the bad guys 
focus on all products. Expanding our perspective to understand the insights in 
reports like this is essential. There are best practices we can learn from by 
many adjacent industries.
Defining Food Fraud Prevention to Align Food Science and Technology 
Resources
Previously published blog post:
Title: Defining Food Fraud Prevention to Align Food Science and 
Technology Resources
By John Spink • December 16, 2013 • Blog (MSU-FFI 2018)
The EU food fraud resolution just advanced from task force committee to 
a full European Parliament vote in early 2014. Defining food fraud and a 
focus on preventative actions are no longer just academic exercises. That said, 
our new “Defining food fraud prevention to align food science and technology 
resources” is perfect timing, with very important insight for implementing 
regulations and industry best practices (Spink et al. 2013a).
Focus Research on Prevention
There have been incredible advances in food science and food integrity 
testing. A key to our success in preventing food fraud will be the balancing 
what we “can” do with what we “need” to do (e.g., “do I need to act?”. The 
effort to focus research on prevention will be critical to protecting the food 
(continued)
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supply – our goal is not to just find adulterant-substances. Our goal is to create 
a system where they don’t get in the food in the first place! From our article, 
“Whilst better means of detecting food fraud are required, ‘successes must be 
measured in terms of how the activities support prevention. We need a sys-
tems approach to optimize the roles of all food supply chain and research 
partners.”
Food Industry Leads the Efforts
In the article, a concept we emphasize and explain is that it is critical to 
have food experts leading—or at least involved in—every aspect of food 
fraud prevention efforts. “There are very unique aspects of the complex food 
production systems that are baffling to outsiders. There are complexities to 
authenticating food that are unlike any other sciences – the complexity of 
profiling a multi-component food product requires methodologies that are 
still far from routine or easy to use and interpret. There is an incredible 
amount of inherent variation in the same food product produced over the 
course of a year.”
Harmonization of Terms
We emphasize in the article that harmonization of terms and prevention 
efforts are both critical to a global, efficient, and effective effort. As I’ve pub-
lished on and presented for years, Situational Crime Prevention and the use of 
the Crime Triangle are great way to deconstruct the fraud opportunity and 
really focus on prevention (we thank you Dr. Robyn Mace, MSU School of 
Criminal Justice, for introducing our food fraud prevention team to the topic 
back in 2006 and then Assistant Professor Justin Heinonen on the SARA 
model and victimology).
The Role of Science and Technology
Of course, traditional food science and the more recent focus area of food 
integrity (Food Authentication) both have critical roles in food fraud preven-
tion. That said, there cannot be just a technology solution. Food fraud preven-
tion requires a systems approach that includes Supply Chain management, 
criminology, and other fields, such as quality management. “For food fraud, 
the straightforward measure of the presence or absence of a contaminant is 
only part of ‘the puzzle,’ and in contrast to food safety hazards, there are a 
seemingly near an infinite number of adulterants. In the case of diversion, 
stolen goods, or production overruns, the fraud does not include an adulterant 
at all. Actually, the food fraud is conducted with genuine products.”
Acknowledging My Coauthors: Christopher Elliott and Kevin Swoffer
I’m very proud and honored to have worked with coauthors Professor 
Christopher Elliott and Kevin Swoffer on this article (Spink et  al. 2013a). 
Chris is a world-renowned expert on foods and has conducted some incredible 
innovative research in food integrity and authenticity. He is the Director of the 
Institute for Global Food Security at Queen’s University (Belfast, Northern 
Ireland, UK). He also is leading an independent UK review of the food 
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Integrated Framework for “How 
Much Is Enough?”
This section reviews an integrated framework based on COSO Enterprise Risk 
Management to get to the most basic question resource-allocation decision of “how 
much is enough?” There are many methods and tools the address one part of the 
system, and the connection to the enterprise-wide management is a final integration 
step.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) The most important and most overlooked step is to define the resource- 
allocation decision-making process.
• (2) The COSO Enterprise Risk Management compliance requirements are the 
overall system.
• (3) Then, these concepts are applied to the other food fraud prevention methods 
and tools into the internal controls and integrated frame to help determine “how 
much is enough?
 Monitoring for Efficiency: Review the Current Decision-Making 
Process
It seems redundant for a risk analysis process to include a review of the risk assess-
ment, but this is the strength and value of the overall controls and provides more 
transparency and accountability. The process includes different levels of the orga-
nization reviewing the risk assessments of other levels. For example, the C-suite 
reviews the operation and vice versa (Fig. 4.5). Both have their risk assessments 
reviewed by the board. The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle incorporates these 
 supplies network following the horsemeat scandal. Kevin Swoffer has been a 
constant colleague and supporter since we met at MSU back in 2007. He is the 
Director of KPS Resources. He has over 30 years of experience in the food 
manufacture and retail sectors. He was involved at the founding of the GFSI 
in 2000 and has been actively involved in its development. More recently, 
Kevin and I have been interacting with and discussing the Food Fraud Think 
Tank for the Global Food Safety Initiative. Collaborating on this article was a 
great opportunity to really harmonize our thinking.
Food fraud is not new, but the science is providing a framework within 
which we all work. By coordinating our activities—as theorists and scholars 
first—we can be much more efficient. Play your part and stay up on the latest 
thinking; link to the article to see the full discussion (MSU-FFI).
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ERM/COSO best practices and connects the ongoing updates of the “fraud oppor-
tunity” with the shifting “risk appetite.” Each level of these “internal control” steps 
includes an “integrated framework” reviews and calibrates to the other functions. 
Each new activity or information has a place to add to the cycle.
ERM/COSO is already a function and standardized method for monitoring the 
risks. Overall ERM is referred to as “internal controls and integrated framework.” 
The “integrated framework” includes assessments across and within the operations. 
An example of calibrating the actions within the organization includes correlating 
the assessments that are conducted. For example, “Principle 8” is “Assess Fraud 
Risk” and includes a method to root out fraud in fraud assessments (for more, see 
the Chapter on Business Decision-Making) (PWC 2014; COSO 2016).
Internal 
Controls
Integrated
Framework
Fig. 4.5 Visual of the horizontal internal controls and the vertical integrated framework—together 
they “connect everything to everything”
Sidebar: ERM/COSO Five Concepts and 17 Principles
The ERM/COSO system explains how the activities are connected when they 
present the Five Components and 17 Internal Control Principles and this 
Guide’s Five Fraud Risk. This emphasizes that “a comprehensive fraud risk 
management program is not only the risk treatments or countermeasures but 
the organization and coordination of the entire process.”
“For organizations desiring to establish a more comprehensive approach to 
managing fraud risk, this [COSO Fraud Risk Management Guide] includes 
more than just the information needed to perform a fraud risk assessment. It 
also includes guidance on establishing an overall Fraud Risk Management 
Program including:
• Establishing fraud risk governance policies
• Performing a fraud risk assessment
• Designing and deploying fraud preventive and detective control activities
• Conducting investigations, and monitoring and evaluating the total fraud 
risk management program.”
The full details of the 5 concepts and 17 principles are presented here. To 
establish the frame, COSO defines the overall scope of the organization  covers 
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the entire enterprise from the very highest board level throughout the opera-
tions to all products and services. From COSO:
• The Organization: “for purposes of the framework, the term ‘organiza-
tion’ is used to collectively capture the board, management, and other per-
sonnel, as reflected in the definition of internal controls” (COSO 2013) .
 – Internal Control: “is a process, effected by an entity’s board of direc-
tors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives related to operations, 
reporting, and compliance.”
Also, the classification of risk treatment of activities includes (COSO 
2016):
• Preventive Controls: “designed to avoid a fraudulent event or transaction 
at the time of initial occurrence.”
• Detective Controls: “designed to discover a fraudulent event or transac-
tion after the initial processing has occurred [and hopefully before the 
accounting transaction is complete].”
Fraud Risk Management Principles (ERM/COSO) (COSO 2016):
Principle 1: Control Environment—The organization establishes and 
communicates a Fraud Risk Management Program that demonstrates the expec-
tations of the Board of Directors and senior management and their commitment 
to high-integrity control and ethical values regarding managing fraud risk.
 1. The organization demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical 
values.
 2. The Board of Directors demonstrate independence from management and 
exercises oversight of the development and performance of internal 
control.
 3. Management establishes, with board oversight, structures, reporting lines, 
and appropriate authorities and responsibilities in the pursuit of 
objectives.
 4. The organization demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and 
retain competent individuals in alignment with objectives.
 5. The organization holds individuals accountable for their internal control 
responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.
Principle 2: Risk Assessment—The organization performs comprehen-
sive fraud risk assessments to identify specific fraud schemes and risks, assess 
their likelihood and significance, evaluate existing fraud control activities, 
and implement actions to mitigate residual fraud risks.
 6. The organization specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable the 
identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives.
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 7. The organization identifies risks to the achievement of its objectives across 
the entity and analyzes risks as a basis for determining how the risks should 
be managed.
 (a) [Note: for food fraud prevention, this defines the requirement to con-
duct a holistic and all-encompassing assessment.]
 8. The organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the 
achievement of objectives.
 (a) [Note: for food fraud prevention, this considers that—beyond risk 
assessors who may not be well trained or expert on the task—there 
may be “fraud in fraud assessments.”]
 9. The organization identifies and assesses changes that could significantly 
impact the system of internal control
Principle 3: Control Activities—The organization selects, develops, and 
deploys preventive and detective fraud control activities to mitigate the risk of 
fraud events occurring or not being detected in a timely manner.
 10. The organization selects and develops control activities that contribute to 
the mitigation of risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable 
levels.
 11. The organization selects and develops general control activities over 
technology to support the achievement of objectives.
 (a) [Note: for food fraud prevention, there should be a prevention strat-
egy before tactical countermeasures or control systems are selected.]
 12. The organization deploys control activities through policies that establish 
what is expected and procedures that put policies into action.
Principle 4: Information and Communication—The organization estab-
lishes a communication process to obtain information about potential fraud 
and deploys a coordinated approach to investigation and corrective action to 
address fraud appropriately and in a timely manner.
 13. The organization obtains or generates and uses relevant, quality informa-
tion to support the functioning of other components of internal control.
 14. The organization internally communicates information, including objec-
tives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support the 
functioning of internal control.
 15. The organization communicates with external parties regarding matters 
affecting the functioning of other components of internal control.
Principle 5: Monitoring Activities—The organization selects, develops, 
and performs ongoing evaluations to ascertain whether each of the five 
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 principles of fraud risk management is present and functioning and communi-
cates Fraud Risk Management Program deficiencies in a timely manner to 
parties responsible for taking corrective action, including senior management 
and the Board of Directors.
 16. The organization selects, develops, and performs ongoing and/or separate 
evaluations to ascertain whether the components of internal control are 
present and functioning.
 17. The organization evaluates and communicates internal control deficien-
cies in a timely manner to those parties responsible for taking corrective 
action, including senior management and the Board of Directors, as 
appropriate.
 (a) [Note: for food fraud prevention, it is clear that not having vis-
ibility or correlation into the ERM/COSO system would be a 
nonconformance.]
The “Internal Controls” are not just monitoring of activities across the 
business but also vertically. A corporate auditing firm may separately (and 
confidentially) audit the Board of Directors, the C-suite, and the business 
operations, and then audit up and down between those functions. This creates 
transparency (Fig. 4.6).
Establish a fraud risk 
management policy as part 
of organizational governance
Perform a 
comprehensive risk 
assessment
Select, develop and deploy 
preventivce and detective fraud 
control activities
Establish a fraud 
reporting process
Monitor the fraud risk 
management process, report 
results, and imporove processes
Fig. 4.6 Ongoing, comprehensive fraud risk management process (based on the 2013 COSO 
framework). (Adapted from (COSO 2012))
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 COSO Principles in Detail: Fraud in Fraud Assessments
COSO is a very rigorous and thoroughly developed concept. There are main prin-
ciples clustered in five groups (COSO 2013). Also, this process is conducted at 
different levels (board, c-suite, and then operations including comparing assess-
ments across multiple businesses) and within levels (comparing assessments 
between levels). These “internal controls” and the “integrated framework” are criti-
cal to maintaining control of the risk tolerance across an enterprise. For a corpora-
tion—big or small—there may be one group or business unit that conducts business 
way above the risk tolerance of the enterprise thus putting the entire company at 
risk. In other instances, one group or business unit may be operating way below the 
risk tolerance and then theoretically reducing the financial return for the enterprise 
(assuming that taking on more risk provides an opportunity for more reward).
It is completely logical for there to be “fraud” in “fraud assessments.” Whenever 
anyone is subject to a positive or negative consequence, there is a potential for bias 
based on an inherent “fraud opportunity.” COSO/ERM considers this and has iden-
tified controls in several of their principles:
Principle 8: The organisation considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the 
achievement of objectives. (COSO 2016)
• “Fraud risk scenarios might include material bias in the development of complex 
accounting estimates, the overriding of controls in stuffing inventory into distri-
bution channels to manipulate revenue recognition, and noncompliance with the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”
• “In identifying and evaluating those risks, management investigates incentives, 
pressures, opportunities, attitudes, and rationalization that might exist throughout 
the company in different departments and among various personnel. This under-
taking equips management to determine the mitigating actions it should take to 
reduce to acceptable levels any risks of material misstatement due to fraud.”
So, “fraud” in “fraud assessments?” The concept of the related bias in business 
decision-making is a science that has been studied extensively by leaders such as 
Bazerman (Bazerman and Neale 1993; Bazerman et al. 2002, 2003; Bazerman and 
Chugh 2006). Here are several basic scenarios that apply to food fraud prevention:
• I want to grow my group: An up-and-coming manager who wants to increase 
their responsibility would have a bias toward finding more fraud and  expanding 
For food fraud prevention, could you provide a documented report on 
examples and evidence that you competently address each concept and prin-
ciple? Would you be comfortable presenting your document to an auditor, 
inspector, or investigator? A first step to providing an answer is to fully under-
stand the details and expectation stated in the question. If you are a manager, 
you might start by asking your food fraud prevention manager or team to 
answer these questions.
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their budget and head count. People don’t get promoted for identifying there is 
“no need for change.”
• I want to reduce my work: Another manager may want to reduce their workload 
and thus would be predisposed to under-estimate the risks to avoid more respon-
sibility or employees to supervise.
• I really do/don’t like this topic”: Then there is a motivation to become—or avoid 
becoming—experienced in a new type of fraud or fraud prevention in general. 
Many times a manager is put into “cross-functional” positions for career growth. 
A “sales” track manager who is put in charge of “Brand Protection” may be biased 
to stay focused more on “sales.” (If they get “too good” at the new work functions, 
they may be forced to stay!) Growing experience in controlling a problem—rather 
than succeeding in a high growth or high impact area—may not be attractive.
• Contractor or supplier—I want more business: An external consultant who is 
hired to investigate or mitigate fraud risks would receive more business if there 
is more fraud. So a fraud investigator would have an inherent bias to find fraud 
to justify more future fraud investigations.
Overall, based on psychology theory and empirical business research, there is a 
potential for “fraud” in “fraud assessments” if the risk assessor has a vested interest 
or benefit from the outcome of the assessment. COSO/ERM considers this in their 
“Principle 8.”
 Iterative Cycle: Review of the Process Itself
An important process step is to take the time to review the base method or process 
itself (MSU-FFI 2017; MSU FFI 2017). Food fraud prevention is an evolving vul-
nerability, and there are many new innovations in not only countermeasures and 
controls systems but also in implementing the process. For example, Enterprise 
Risk Management/COSO is not well known by food safety professionals and with 
even less actual application of the concepts. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was unknown 
to those people developing or managing HACCP plans.
For food fraud prevention, there is an iterative cycle; meaning that when there 
is new information (e.g., a new incident, a changing fraud opportunity, or reduced 
enterprise-wide risk appetite), the entire system is reviewed and could re-calibrate. 
Usually, when resources (e.g., funding or employee time) is allocated, there is no 
mechanism to dial back down the investment. A new countermeasure or control is 
put in place to combat a concern or new issue, but there is no standard method to 
review “how much is enough?” and if systems should be reduced. It is fundamen-
tally contradictory for a food safety professional to increase a risk. The key is not 
just “risk” but to clearly understand and address the level of “unacceptable risk.”
Without the method to reevaluate the current countermeasures and controls sys-
tems in relation to the shifting fraud opportunity, then costs will go up and up even 
if the business is well within the risk appetite. At the same time, there may be some 
risks that are unknown and where the business may be operating at an unacceptably 
high level of risk.
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Sidebar: “How Much Testing Is Optimal?” It Depends
An example would be to test for horsemeat in beef. When there is a crisis, new 
countermeasures and control systems are put in place for detection and emer-
gency response. There are many unknowns, so a broad testing plan is critical 
to getting a perspective on the entire supply chain. Also, there is concern that 
there is an illegal product in the current supply chain so thorough testing is 
critical. Once the new system is in place, usually one of two things happens:
 1. After the crisis is over, the testing stops.
 2. The high “crisis-level” testing never stops.
What is the “right” level of activity rests on “what is the right question?”
In the midst of a crisis where horsemeat is found in the marketplace, then 
massive and holistic “detection” programs should be implemented. This 
would be similar to traditional food safety monitoring tests. After the crisis, if 
there are still active perpetrators or product still trickling in, then a lesser but 
still random “deterrence” protocol is ideal. Once the incident has passed and 
the vulnerability is understood within the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, 
then an extremely efficient yet very small “prevention” program can be imple-
mented and defined.
To provide a more direct application, a hypothetical example is provided 
for the amount of testing to support the activity of “detect,” “deter,” and “pre-
vent.” There are appropriate protocols for different objectives such as “detec-
tion test plan, “deterrence test plan,” and “prevention test plan” (Fig. 4.7).
Detection test plan: The goal is to quickly and thoroughly “detect” the 
fraudulent activity and remove the product from the supply chain to reduce 
future product recalls or liability. The focus of the “detect” activity is for an 
intervention to find known (or confirmed suspicious) incidents. There would 
be a (1) clear identification of a single or few products and (2) particular fraud 
acts or adulterant-substances. During the “detect” focus, there could be (1) 
100’s of food authenticity tests conducted on (2) possibly 100 supplier/prod-
uct combinations which (3) could result in 10,000 tests per month throughout 
the year crisis. The 10,000 tests per month do attract a lot of attention for sup-
plier research and development investment.
• Application: Using the horsemeat incident as an example, during and after 
the incident, there were massive-scale horsemeat species test plans put in 
place. There were also often species tests for related species depending on 
regions such as zebra, fox, pork, water buffalo, and others. The goal was to 
conduct a comprehensive and all-encompassing process to make sure there 
was no fraudulent horsemeat in the proprietary supply chain.
Deterrence test plan: The goal is to “deter” a specific fraudulent activity, 
so fraudsters are persuaded not to attack. The focus on the “deter” activity is 
to combat a specific fraud opportunity that is probably unique to an  ingredient, 
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product, or supplier/region combination. Although there is no active inci-
dent—or this would be in the “detect” category—there is a concern that there 
is a fraudulent product in the supply, and the goal is to find the fraudulent 
product but more to specifically lead the fraudsters to be concerned they may 
be caught. There would be a (1) broad set of target products and (2) particular 
fraud acts or known adulterant-substances. During the “deter” focus, there 
could be (1) 100 s of food authenticity tests conducted on (2) possibly 5 sup-
plier/product combinations per year which could result in (3) 100 tests per 
year. The 100 tests per year is a lot less attractive market for a supplier than 
the 10,000 tests per month in the detect test plan.
• Application: Using the horsemeat incident as an example, after the com-
pany conducted the deter test plan, there was a frequent but lesser series of 
species tests conducted. For example, the company may have reduced the 
focus to the only test for horsemeat and also only for incoming goods.
Prevention test plan: The goal is to “prevent” food fraud across the entire 
product slate and to address “unknown-unknowns”—this is a real intelligence 
analysis science concept. The first “unknown” is that we don’t understand 
who the perpetrators are or even if they will attack (e.g., something that is 
(continued)
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Amout of 
Testing
1
2
3
4
5
100's of tests for each of
the possibly 100 supplier/
product concerns (est.
10,000 per month).
100's of tests monthly
for each of the possibly
5 product or supply
chain problem (est 500
per month).
100's of tests across
the entire product
slate (est 100 per year).
Detect Deter Prevent
A few tests but across
the supply chain to
reinforce that fraud
could be detected.
Some tests for specific
products or supply
chains to combat
specific problems.
Many tests for specific
problems with specific
product/ supplier groups.
Fig. 4.7 Review of the optimal amount of food authenticity testing for specific objectives of 
detect, deter, or prevent (with hypothetical example)
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completely a surprise and what is sometimes referred to as a “black swan 
event”—responses are often “why in the world did they try to do that?”). The 
second “unknown” is that if they do act, we don’t know when or where they 
will attack (e.g., it is known melamine is a type of food fraud, but we don’t 
know where they will attack). For melamine in infant formula, it is a known 
type of attack (the first “known”) but with an unknown exact time and place 
(the second “unknown”).
• Application: Using the horsemeat incident as an example, a company may 
move beyond horse to consider all types of protein fraud—other species, 
lower quality cuts of meat, spoiled meat, non-animal protein, alternate pro-
tein products such as powdered ground meal, country of origin, declared 
processing method, etc. The company would select a wide range of tests to 
be conducted on a wide range of products and on a very small scale.
To continue focusing on the “prevent” plan, these unknown-unknowns, a 
focus on reducing all vulnerabilities is efficient because the perpetrators are 
so creative that we may not yet be aware of how or where they may attack; we 
don’t know what to try to detect or deter. The focus on the “prevent” activity 
is to focus on “vulnerabilities” regardless of whether there is any known or 
even suspicious activity. This is partially just alerting fraudsters that they 
“could” get caught in a random test but also to conduct very broad and ran-
dom information gathering.
• For a “detect” or “deter” focus on preventing food fraud, there would be a 
(1) broad set of target products to protect (a medium size company could 
have 1000 products) and (2) a broad set of fraud acts or adulterant- 
substances to test for (how many adulterant-substances could be used?).
• For a “prevent” focus, there could be (1) 100’s of food authenticity tests 
conducted on (2) possibly 5 supplier/product combinations, which could 
(3) result in 500 tests per month during the crisis.
Thus, an efficient and insightful Food Fraud Prevention Strategy could 
actually require a very small set of authenticity tests to effectively monitor the 
supply chain and holistically reduce the fraud opportunity.
 Key Learning Objective 3: The Process Steps
This section reviews specific key process steps of (1) scanning, (2) Enterprise Risk 
Management-based corporate risk map, and (3) an iterative that is referred to here 
as the “corkscrew approach.” And once the theory is in place, then the overall man-
agement process can be implemented to support the defining the operation of these 
specific functions. This section brings together all the concepts and explains how 
the overall system operates in motion.
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) To understand scanning that gathers and processes new information or insight
• (2) Apply Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/COSO) for decision-making
• (3) The “corkscrew approach” that starts light and goes as deep as directed by the 
needs of the resource-allocation decision-maker
 New Information: Monitoring for Changes
There are several functions that make up the scanning concept including (1) inci-
dent reviews (of known and internal incidents), (2) scanning (broader scouting of 
changes such a market supply fluctuations or external incidents), and (3) public 
policy changes. These three are interrelated, and the information is used to provide 
new insight to understand the “fraud opportunity.” For each of these functions, there 
are no current standard operating procedures yet. It is most efficient to adapt current 
or new work processes to the specific fraud opportunity and needs.
• Incident reviews are known incidents where there is some specific type of infor-
mation. These provide the most detail and value.
• Scanning is both seeking broader changes such as market conditions or of exter-
nal incidents.
• Public policy changes could be either new laws, statements of new priorities, or 
identification of new investigations.
Together these provide broad coverage of the types of new information that could 
influence the fraud opportunity.
Sidebar: Selection of Strategic Authentication and Tracing Programs
Previously published blog post (Fig. 4.8):
Title: Publication—Selection of Strategic Authentication and Tracing 
Programs
By John Spink • February 13, 2015 • Blog (MSU-FFI 2018)
Authentication is a key to food fraud prevention and a critical part of the 
“detect-deter-prevent” continuum. Selecting authentication countermeasures 
that contribute to prevention is often complex and challenging. This challenge 
was the subject of my 2012 chapter on “The Selection of Strategic 
Authentication and Tracing Programs” in the book Counterfeit Medicines 
Volume I: Policy, Economics, and Countermeasures (Spink 2012).
Beyond food products, authentication is a concept that has also been 
widely addressed in efforts to combat product counterfeiting. This chapter is 
based on research with the pharmaceutical industry and is also based on—and 
contributed to—the terminology standards in International Standards 
(continued)
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Organization Technical Committee 247 Fraud Countermeasures and Controls 
(ISO TC 247). The fight against food fraud can leverage this insight and expe-
rience. (Note: I am the chair of the TC 247 US Technical Advisory Group US 
TAG. Also, previous coauthor and research colleague Dr. Hyeonho Park of 
Yong In University (Korea) is the Chair of the Korean TAG.)
The Goal of Authentication Countermeasures
The chapter discussed the pharmaceutical focus on all fraud versus only 
counterfeiting. This is similar to the food industry discussion of combating all 
fraud or adulteration. There is an emphasis on the goal of reducing crime, not 
just catching fraudulent product or the fraudsters. The goal is not to catch 
product but to prevent the attack in the first place. A couple of quotes from this 
chapter addressed these concepts.
• “The term ‘fraudster’ is used as a descriptive, formal term for this specific 
type of criminal and their activity.”
• “The goal is not to see how many infringers can be caught: the goal is to 
reduce the prevalence of counterfeit product in the first place – to reduce 
the vulnerability and determine which countermeasures also increase our 
probability of finding new or evolving threats. To be most efficient and 
effective, the countermeasures must be strategic, holistic, interdisciplinary, 
all-encompassing and proactive rather than single-discipline, narrow, reac-
tive and tactical.”
Fig. 4.8 Blog post image 
(Copyright Permission 
Granted) (MSU-FFI 2018)
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Start with Intervention
Often the selection of countermeasures is a reaction to a single catastrophic 
incident. When horsemeat was found in beef, the logical, urgent, and neces-
sary response was to immediately start conducting horse species authentica-
tion tests (Lam and Spink 2018; Spink 2019a, b). The supply chain had to be 
investigated right now. No discussion of strategy or prevention, the response 
had to be immediate. As we covered in our 2009 article titled “Defining the 
Public Health Threat of Food Fraud,” the starting point after an incident is 
intervention, then we move to response, and only after we have more infor-
mation do we shift to prevention. Unfortunately, enterprises—companies and 
countries—often feel they cannot take the time to shift to prevention or that 
activity is the responsibility of “someone else.” There are good intentions to 
be proactive, but often a new crisis arises that takes the available resources. To 
break the reactive cycle, resources need to be assigned explicitly to prevention.
Intervention Shifting to Response Then to Prevention
To shift from response back to prevention, there must be a strategic priority 
and a systems approach. The Food Fraud Prevention Strategy does not have to 
be complex or big. The hardest part is taking the time to develop the corporate 
policy and establishing the strategy.
Picking a single countermeasure—such as immediately conducting horse 
species tests on all inventories—is a single tactical solution and not in and of 
itself strategic. It is a “product,” not a “program” or “strategy.” The counter-
measure has a very specific and defined objective, which is detection.
• “Picking a single technology and hoping it is a magic solution is easy, but 
technology is only one of the many aspects of an anti-counterfeit strategy. 
The solutions are systems, not tools, and must include what is referred to 
as a layered approach. What is difficult is strategically explaining why and 
how it will help  – including in comparison with all other countermea-
sures – and to not only expect but also anticipate how the bad guys will try 
to circumvent this system or countermeasure.”
If there is a known hazard, it is logical and necessary to drop everything 
and address this problem which is probably considered a “reasonably foresee-
able hazard.” If there are known incidents, then it is by definition “reasonably 
likely to occur.” Beyond what may be written or published in a law, regula-
tion, or rulemaking, this is a legal and brand equity liability.
Systems Approach and Foundation
Without a shift to prevention, there will be déjà vu of reactionary emer-
gency responses that are resource intensive and do not prevent future occur-
rences. Taking the time and effort to focus on a preventative systems approach 
is consistent with quality management principles such as Six Sigma or food 
HACCP programs.
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• “Understanding anti-counterfeit strategy is based on understanding the 
nature of the fraud and the fraudster. When this is achieved, there is a better 
chance of not only combating current risks but, by understanding the inher-
ent vulnerability, predicting and anticipating the next moves as well. [The] 
counterfeit and substandard medicines ‘public health threat is similar to a 
disease that requires continual surveillance, monitoring and treatment 
(e.g., diabetic populations) rather than treating a single event (e.g., a bro-
ken bone)’.” (Spink 2012)
Foundation: Harmonize Terminology
An important foundation is to establish agreement on definitions. Your 
company or country may have unique terminology, so, in that case, it would 
be even more important to define your terms in relation to the other common 
usage of the terms. Refer to standards or regulations whenever possible. From 
the International Standards Organization, International Standard ISO/DIS 
12931: Performance criteria for authentication solutions for anti-counterfeiting 
in the field of material goods, counterfeiting of material goods, or physical 
product (Spink 2012):
• “Counterfeit: (verb) to simulate, reproduce, or modify a material good or 
its packaging without authorization” (ISO 2011).
• “Counterfeit good: material good imitating or copying an authentic mate-
rial good.”
For combating food fraud, it would also be important to define food 
authenticity programs in relation to the ISO definition of authentication. The 
traditional food adulteration concept is similar but usually focused on testing 
the specification of the product; it does not really cover components that are 
authenticated to define that the product is genuine. Our ISO TC 247 felt that 
terminology was very important and it is the subject of a New Work Item 
Proposal (NWIP) and Work Group (WG).
• “As of January 2011 and led by Technical Committee 247 Fraud 
Countermeasures and Controls (ISO TC 247), ISO became involved in 
anti-counterfeiting. The current draft standard ISO/DIS 12931 [11] 
includes working definitions of:
 – ‘(a) authentication as the ‘act of establishing whether a material good 
is genuine or not.’
 – ‘(b) an authentic good as a ‘material good produced under the control 
of the legitimate manufacturer, the originator of the good or holder of 
intellectual property rights.’
 – ‘(c) an authentication tool as a ‘set of hardware and/or software 
system(s) that is part of an anti-counterfeiting solution and is used to 
control of the authentication element.’”
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An ISO development that occurred after this chapter was published the 
definition of product fraud and fraud opportunity and the related food fraud 
topic of vulnerability (ISO/TC247 WG2 N0010 PWI). From that ISO draft:
Scope of ISO TC 247: Standardization in the field of the detection, prevention, and 
control of identity, financial, product and other forms of social and economic fraud.
• “Fraud: ‘1) wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in a financial 
or personal gain
 – ‘2) A willful act of deception that creates human or economic harm.
 – Note 1 – types of fraud may include: product related such as counter-
feiting, illicit diversion, alteration, intellectual property infringement; 
Identity fraud such as identity theft (imposter fraud, disguise, credential 
alteration) and document fraud such as cheque fraud, banknote fraud, 
certificate fraud
 – Note 2 – the consequences of ‘harm’ and ‘deception’ may vary between 
jurisdictions and cultures.”
• “Fraud opportunity: The conditions which provide an attractive target for 
fraudsters, regardless of if a fraud has been perpetrated. This is similar to 
the criminology concept of the ‘crime opportunity’ in the ‘Crime Triangle.’
 – Note1 – A crime triangle means 3 elements; 1. Motivated offender, 2. 
Suitable crime target, 3. The absence of a capable guardian.”
• “Vulnerability: area of exposure to fraudulent activities.”
Assessing the Situation
The first step in a proactive, systems approach to food fraud prevention is 
assessing the situation. There have been many risks or vulnerability assess-
ments developed over the years. There are current activities specifically for 
food fraud prevention. Understanding and explaining the foundation is the 
first step—ISO 31000 refers to this as “Establishing the Context.”
• “This section provides an overview of an anti-counterfeit strategy to assist 
in risk assessment before choosing countermeasures. The first step is to 
conduct a risk assessment of the counterfeit product risk, which includes 
reviewing company and industry incidents. The second step is to seek to 
understand the nature of the fraud and fraudster, which includes under-
standing the criminology aspects of deterrence.”
Defining the needs of data or “intelligence analysis” is critical to the effec-
tiveness of assessments. This is a key focus in our “Analysis of Food Supply 
Chains for Risks and Resilience for Food Fraud/ Food Crime” UK grant with 
Professor Christopher Elliott and Queen’s University Belfast. I am leading 
Work Package 3 “Incident data collection to assist in intelligence analysis” 
(note: results published in 2019 (Spink et al. 2019)).
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Also, my 2009 MSU Packaging Science doctoral dissertation was actually 
on this subject: “Analysis of counterfeit risks and development of a counter-
feit product risk model” (Spink 2009).
To evaluate the situation, there are two parts to the preliminary assessment: 
incident review and the vulnerability assessment. A key point is to define 
exactly how the assessments will be used. Often the incident review is used to 
present the scope of a known vulnerability, as well as to conduct cluster analy-
sis to identify key focus areas (see blog post on our article on a Product 
Counterfeiting Incident Clustering Tool). For evaluation by a company in an 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) system, the assessment must be in finan-
cial terms—public health may be the first priority, but it is because of the 
potentially catastrophic financial impact (see our previous blog post of our 
New Food article on decision-making).
The incident review is often very revealing, especially for managers who 
have not been familiar with the topic. Often the most significant threats are 
from within the legitimate supply chain which includes:
• “Rogue participants are not always autonomous and completely external to 
the supply chain, and can range from organizations outside the supply chain 
to companies in the legitimate supply chain that occasionally perpetrate 
fraud, to a single individual acting alone from within the supply chain.”
• “It is important to understand that, in the worst case, the counterfeiters are 
criminals not concerned with breaking the law, sociopaths not concerned 
with cheating others and not educated about the inherent public health or 
safety dangers.”
• “They are often ‘irresponsible defendants’ who flee, obfuscate ownership 
of their assets and effectively launder their money out of reach, who have 
networks that can re-form unnoticed, and who are often part of violent, 
criminal network.”
The Value (and Risk) of Preliminary Assessments
We are accustomed to conducting extremely data-driven food safety risk 
assessments. For food fraud prevention, as with many other risks and risk 
assessments—such as Military Standard 882D and Delphi method—expert 
opinion and preliminary qualitative assessments have a role. Even though it 
may seem rudimentary and straightforward, a preliminary, top-down, quali-
tative vulnerability assessment helps scope the overall situation. This simple 
method often helps reveal a previously unknown—or until now underappre-
ciated—hazard. It is not uncommon for a full policy and strategy develop-
ment process to get sidetracked to address an identified hazard. Even if this 
is a simplistic, preliminary exercise, the process may identify a severe  hazard. 
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If the hazard is now known and occurring, it is by definition “reasonably 
likely to occur” and a “reasonably foreseeable hazard.” Countermeasures 
must be taken.
Selection of Countermeasures
The published chapter provides a thorough overview of the selection of 
product fraud countermeasures. The key point is:
• “For every countermeasure, there should be a precise description of exactly 
how it detects or deters specific types of fraud and fraudsters.”
The chapter also includes a comprehensive list of product authentication 
countermeasures (MSU-FFI).
End of the blog post.
Sidebar: Selecting Countermeasures—Specific Scoping Questions
There are specific scoping questions from the chapter on “The Selection of 
Strategic Authentication and Tracing Programs” in the book Counterfeit 
Medicines Volume I: Policy, Economics, and Countermeasures (Spink 2012).
“To turn attention to assessing anti-counterfeit countermeasures, several 
practical questions are necessary:
• Overall Anti-counterfeit Goal – To Do What?
• ‘(a) Where is the product being compromised?’
• ‘(b) Where will the product be verified?’
• ‘(c) Who will verify it, using what methods?’
• ‘(d) How will you use the results of the investigation?’”
Then next, “To add to this set of questions, an optimal anti-counterfeit 
programme must include”:
• Basic Understanding of the Fraud Opportunity—Why Will It Work?
• ‘(a) an understanding of how the counterfeit product is entering the 
marketplace’
• ‘(b) the technical capabilities of the range of counterfeiters’
• ‘(c) the capabilities and willingness of supply chain stakeholders to partner 
in fighting the risk’
• ‘(d) the capabilities and willingness of governmental enforcement’
• ‘(e) consumers’ awareness of the problem’
• ‘(f) consumers’ willingness to participate in anti-counterfeit actions (e.g., 
consumer authentication)’
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Sidebar: Product Counterfeiting Incident Clustering Tool—PCICT
There is often a significant challenge of organizing and assessing a wide range 
of food fraud incidents. To help this challenge, the Product Counterfeiting 
Incident Clustering Tool (PCICT) was developed and was published in a peer- 
reviewed, refereed, scholarly journal (Spink et al. 2014). The application of 
the PCICT was further formalized when it was codified in ISO 22380 Security 
and resilience—authenticity, integrity, and trust for products and docu-
ments—general principles for product fraud risk and countermeasures (ISO 
2018). The tool is published in ISO as a recommended method for organizing 
and analyzing incident data.
The PCICT is based on basic criminology theory of incident clustering. 
Clustering is used to identify a group of crimes or criminals usually visually 
presented on a map or in a table. This can be used to inform the assessment of 
the “fraud opportunity” and to complete the Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessments.
An example of the PCICT is provided (Fig. 4.9). A product fraud data set 
was gathered and plotted based on the “type of counterfeiter,” “type of coun-
terfeiting,” and “type of offender organization.” The example shows that the 
incidents were primarily conducted by “occupational” and “professional” 
counterfeiters and the “diversion” and “counterfeiting” types of fraud. The 
offenders were usually “individuals” or “small groups.” This assessment helps 
prioritize countermeasures and control systems. The findings from the inci-
dent clustering would lead to a focus on “diversion” and “counterfeiting.” The 
Recreational Occasional Occupational Professional
Adulteration x
Substitution
Tampering x x
Over-run
Theft x
Diversion x xxx xx
Simulation
Counterfeiting (IPR) xxx xxx
Individual/Small 
groups
xxx
General criminal 
enterprise x 
Organized crime 
members x
Type of Counterfeiter
Type of counterfeiting
Type of 
offense
Type of 
offender
Fig. 4.9 Product counterfeiting incident clustering tool (PCICT) with examples of clustering 
(Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink et al. 2014; ISO 2018)
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types of counterfeiters are “occupational” and “professional” so would seem 
to be informed adversaries who would respond to warnings of tighter supply 
chain controls. Also, the offender organization is identified as “individual/
small groups” so possibly from within the supply chain. Knowing that the 
perpetrators are probably already operating within the legitimate and autho-
rized supply chain leads to a realization that they can be directly communi-
cated through messages sent to current suppliers. By using this tool and 
method, there is the opportunity to directly deter the “motivated offenders”—
remember, the goal is not to catch food fraud but to prevent it from occurring 
in the first place.
The PCICT includes the type of offense which is similar to the types of 
fraud. The types of counterfeiter can also be presented as a type of fraudster. 
The types of counterfeiters or fraudsters include ((Spink et al. 2013b) which 
is also cited in (ISO 2018)):
• Type of Counterfeiters/ Types of Fraudsters:
 – Recreational: for entertainment or amusement.
 – Occasional: infrequent, opportunistic.
 – Occupational: incidents at their place of employment either as an indi-
vidual act, or in collaboration with the company.
 – Professional: crime fully finances their lifestyle .
 – Removed – Ideological: Domestic or international terrorist who com-
mits this act to make an ideological statement or to economically harm 
an entity (note: later this type was removed since the goal of this perpe-
trator is “economic gain.” Later they would use their funds to conduct 
the ideologically motivated act.).
• Food fraudsters seem to be most likely “occupational” type; meaning that 
they conduct their operation within their business (their occupation) in the 
legitimate supply chain. This type of criminal can be patient and wait for a 
favorable fraud opportunity.
And the final factor is (Spink et al. 2013b):
• Type of Offender Organization
• Individual/Small Groups: “Although there are IPR cases involving solo 
or small groups of individuals who operate out of their homes, garages, or 
small storage facilities, there is little reporting and no actual analysis of the 
relative importance of such operators to the threat. … This lack of report-
ing and analysis may be a reflection of the fact that individuals and small 
operations are a less attractive target for law enforcement than larger enter-
prises engaging in a more significant infringing activity or also committing 
other more serious offenses.”
(continued)
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• General Criminal Enterprises (Members): An example used to identify 
this group is “a criminal enterprise of 30 defendants charged with smug-
gling into the United States counterfeit cigarettes worth approximately $40 
million and other counterfeit goods, including pharmaceuticals worth sev-
eral hundred thousand dollars.”
• Organized Crime Members (Members): “‘Organized crime groups are a 
specialized subset of criminal enterprises that maintain their position 
through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, 
graft, or extortion. For example, members of an organized crime group in 
New York trafficked in counterfeit goods and were charged with attempted 
murder and conspiracy to commit murder.’ A challenge of deterring this 
group is their use of violence and the risk of retaliation to a company or 
investigators (e.g., violence or sabotage).”
• Terrorist Organizations (Supporters): “Terrorist supporters have used 
intellectual property crime as one method to raise funds. Central to this 
judgment is the distinction between terrorist supporters who merely pro-
vide funding and resources to a terrorist organization versus terrorist orga-
nization members who engage in the actual terrorist activities of violence. 
… It is widely reported terrorist supporters may use IPR crimes to provide 
indirect financial support to terrorist organizations, but little current evi-
dence suggests terrorists are engaging directly in IPR crimes to fund their 
activities.” There are many confirmed cases of product counterfeiting for 
funding terrorist acts” (for more on this see (Spink 2015a, b)).
• Gangs (Supporters): “According to the National Gang Intelligence Center 
(NGIC), there are three subtypes of gangs: street gangs, prison gangs, and 
outlaw motorcycle gangs. Of these three groups, street gangs most often 
engage in and profit from IP theft, therefore this analysis focuses exclu-
sively on this subtype.”
• Foreign Government Offenders: “The primary motivation in this 
offender group is the theft of sensitive United States information including 
trade secrets and economic espionage. There are examples of state-spon-
sored counterfeits of branded products.”
• Warez Groups: “[A] less common motivation for committing IPR 
[infringement] is personal fame and notoriety. These individuals are often 
members of Warez groups, sophisticated and hierarchical criminal groups 
operating in the United States and abroad that specialize in distributing 
infringing movies, music, and software via the Internet.”
In the types of offender list, there is an additional differentiator defined by 
the FBI as “member” or “supporter” (FBI 2012) in (US National Intellectual 
Property Rights Center [IPR Center] 2011).
• Member: “may have known ties to a larger criminal organization but is 
acting separately for the operation of the fraud. (For example, a member of 
a gang may be producing and selling counterfeit products with or without 
this being a formal activity of the gang.)”
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• Supporter: “may agree with the ideology of a group, but does not partici-
pate in their group activities, and provides some type of product or service 
such as funding. (For example, a supporter of a terrorist organization may 
be producing and selling counterfeit products and then donating some of 
the proceeds to that terrorist organization).”
In the PCICT figure, there is a particular emphasis on “Organized Crime 
Members.” While this may be considered by many as “just another group of 
offenders” a company’s Corporate Security team usually takes a special inter-
est in this group. Organized Crime—not just “crime that is organized” but the 
organized and structured large-scale criminal enterprises—is an especially 
concerning adversary since they may post a wider range of threats including 
sabotage, violence, and unfair competitor practices, and depending on their 
infiltration into the local government could create regulatory or criminal 
threats (e.g., corruption or integration into the local government could lead to 
the use of government regulators to retaliate).
The PCICT was included and codified in the 2018 publication of the ISO 
22380 standard (ISO 2018). When using the PCICT, above referencing a peer-
reviewed, scholarly journal article, an additional level of credibility or author-
ity can be used by reference to ISO 22380.
Sidebar: Analysis of Product Fraud by Using the Counterfeit Product 
Risk Model (CPRM)
There are many reasons to assess the product fraud risk information, and they 
each require a different type of methods or tools. A hierarchy of goals is pro-
vided with an explanation of the need and then examples of methods, tools, or 
processes (Table 4.1).
This section will review the “Counterfeit Product Risk Model (CPRM)” 
which was the subject of a 2009 Ph.D. Dissertation (Spink 2009).
From the report abstract:
Product counterfeiting is growing in both scope and scale. There is a need to take a 
holistic, all-encompassing approach to the anti-counterfeit strategy, including the 
development of a Counterfeit Product Risk Model (CPRM) to support the need for 
an assessment. This research process collaborated and leveraged a wide variety of 
academic and industry expertise utilizing a literature review and interdisciplinary 
peer consultation to develop the Counterfeit Product Risk Model for consumer prod-
ucts. The range of disciplines for the research included: Packaging, Food Safety, 
Criminal Justice, Supply Chain/Logistics, Risk Analysis/Risk Assessment, Food 
Law, Food Safety, food defense, Intellectual Property Rights Law, Political Science, 
and Social Science. For example, the Criminal Justice concepts include ‘the chemis-
try of a crime’ and ‘the crime triangle.’ The Counterfeit Product Risk Model focuses 
on the probability portion of a traditional probability versus severity matrix, uses 
qualitative ranking, and due to the nature of the risk and the data, emphasizes exten-
sive use of expert panels.
(continued)
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This research defines five factors related to counterfeiting: Counterfeit-History, 
Counterfeit-Attractiveness, Counterfeit-Ability, Counterfeit-Hurdles, and Market 
Profile. The Model defines the derivation and integration of sub-factors, which ‘roll-
 up’ to determine the rank of the factors.
Table 4.1 Hierarchy of risk assessment goal, explanation, and examples of methods or tools from 
this book
Goal Explanation
Examples from this 
book include:
To rank all risks in 
relation to the 
enterprise-wide risk 
tolerance
Gather information and insight to conduct a 
Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment. To be 
complete, this will compare this new 
suspicious activity or problem with all other 
risks within the organization
e.g., FFIS/ FFVA
Sort incidents and 
vulnerabilities to 
understand the type of 
counterfeiting, 
counterfeiters, and 
offender organizations
After gathering a wide range of incident 
information or after action reports, there is a 
need to sort and categorize the findings to 
identify root causes. The output would be 
general insight such as a cluster of incidents 
in a specific type of fraud conducted by a 
specific type of fraudster and offender 
organization
e.g., PCICT
Monitor market 
commodity price 
fluctuations
Review the changes in supply and demand 
based on fluctuating current and futures 
product prices. An increase in price, which 
could be signaled by a projected short 
supply of product, is new information to 
consider in a Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment
e.g., Bloomberg 
commodity news feed, 
etc.
Monitor public 
information for new 
incidents or trends
This is a scanning function to gather new 
information and insight on suspicious 
activity or potential problems. The processed 
information would feed into the FFVA
e.g., open source 
monitoring such as 
Internet keyword 
searches, keyword 
news alerts, or social 
media monitoring
Review suspicious 
activity to understand 
the problem in detail 
such as if it is an illegal 
act
This is a method to process suspicious 
activity concerns to evaluate if there is a 
fraud opportunity or incident and also the 
likelihood and severity. The information 
would be fed into the FFVA
e.g., FF-SAR
Use available 
information to identify 
the root cause of the 
system weakness
This is a variation of the other new 
information or insight gathering that 
expands to gather enough information on 
how the fraud act was conducted. The 
analysis would provide support for selecting 
countermeasures and control systems
e.g., open-source 
searches for 
vulnerabilities in hot 
spot analysis, 
pinch-point review
Review the overall 
counterfeit product risk
Review known information and expert 
insight to assess the overall fraud 
opportunity of the enterprise. This provides 
insight into the general system weaknesses
e.g., CPRM
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The model was then validated using a survey of 33 industry and agency experts. The 
survey included 17 ratings by people at a Corporate- or Vice-Presidential level, and 
included six $1–$5 billion revenue companies and sixteen over $5 billion revenue 
companies. A broad and representative balance of industries was included: food, 
beverage, healthcare, pharmaceutical, medical device, law, finance, insurance, risk, 
consumer electronics, software, industrial original equipment manufacturers, and 
consumer packaged goods.
Assessing Agreement analysis was conducted on the surveys, and the interpretation 
of the result was an ‘almost perfect agreement’ with the model. Fleiss’ Kappa analy-
sis was conducted to assess agreement over random chances, and this result was also 
an ‘almost perfect agreement.’ The research included a Case Study to demonstrate 
the use of the Model.
This research provides a valuable analysis of anti-counterfeit strategy, including an 
extensive look into the historical information. It provides a theoretically supported 
Counterfeit Product Risk Model that will assist in disrupting the ‘chemistry of the 
crime.
The overall CPRM hierarchy of risk factors and sub-factors builds to the 
overall risk rank (Fig. 4.10) (Spink 2009). The first step is to develop a draft 
of what seem to be the most important factors and sub-factors—the details are 
expected to adjust and change as more information is gathered and as the risk 
assessor becomes more familiar with the model and problem.
Once the factors and sub-factors have been identified, then the ranks can 
begin to be assessed. The CPRM emphasizes a start beginning with a very 
simple set of information which could be only subject matter expert insight. As 
the “low certainty” and “low robustness” assessment is concluded, there can be 
a process check to identify if or exactly what additional information is needed.
It is highly recommended to start the application of the CPRM with a very 
low-intensity prefilter or initial screen (as is consistent with ISO 31000, 
COSO/ ERM, and others).
The Overall Counterfeit Rank is comprised of five factors which, them-
selves, are comprised of several sub-factors. For example:
• Overall risk rank
 – Factor 5.0: Market profile
• Sub-factors:
 – 5.1 Contract Manufacturing
 – 5.2 Single Distributors Per Country
 – 5.2 Refurbished or Remanufacturing market
An example of the sub-factor assessment is included (Fig. 4.11). This fig-
ure presented three sub-factors that feed into one factor that eventually is con-
sidered for the overall risk rank.
(continued)
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Factor 5. Market Profile
Very High High Medium Low Very Low
Total Rank X
Summary Funcon (for example) A+B+C=D
5.1 Contract Manufacturing X
5.2 Single Distributors per Country X
5.3 Re-Furbished Market X
(Sub-factors list for example)
This would be entered in the table one level 
higher for “Factor 5.0 Market Profile”, see next.
Fig. 4.11 Example of the sub-factor derivation of the market profile factor (Copyright Permission 
Granted)
Counterfeit Product Risk Model:
Overall Risk Rank
Counterfeit
History
Counterfeit
Ability
Counterfeit
Attractiveness
Counterfeit
Hurdles
Market
Profile
Sub-Factors
1
2
3
Sub-Factors
 1
2
3
Sub-Factors
 1
2
3
Sub-Factors
 1
2
3
Sub-Factors
 1
2
3
Sub-Factor 2 Derivation
Define how the rating
was derived
Sub-Factor 3 Derivation
Define how the rating
was derived
Sub-Factor 1 Derivation
Define how the rating
was derived
Fig. 4.10 Counterfeit product risk model overview (Copyright Permission Granted)
4 Food Fraud Prevention Overview (Part 2 of 3): The Approach
147
The assessment of the five factors is combined in a summary report which 
is provided with information from a case study (Fig.  4.12). The summary 
report provides a simple way to present the findings while also including 
much deeper insight into the factors and sub-factors. Also, the summary report 
includes comments so a risk assessor can understand some of the reasons for 
the conclusion.
(continued)
Overall Counterfeit Risk
Probability
Ve
ry
 H
ig
h
Hi
gh
M
ed
iu
m
Lo
w
Ve
ry
 L
ow
Total Rank X
(1) 95+% of the product is manufactured at 
one proprietary locaon, (2) The company 
has comparably low volume combined with 
advanced packaging and product features 
that are somewhat complex to duplicate, (3) 
the company monitors product in the 
marketplace including online C2C
Factors
Summary Funcon: A+B+C+D+E=F All equal, manual derivaon
1. Counterfeit-
History
0 0 0 X 0
No known counterfeits, lile diversion, but 
related lower premium product are faked
2. Counterfeit-
Ability
0 0 X 0 0
The product and from are frequently 
counterfeited, but unique feature reduce 
risk
3. Counterfeit-
Aracveness
0 0 0 X 0
This is a premium product with $2-5x 
generic pricing, but ght supply chain 
controls
4. Counterfeit-
Hurdles
0 0 0 X 0
High hurdles for counterfeiters, in terms of 
packaging features, ght supply chain, and 
monitoring
5. Market 
Profile
0 0 0 X 0
Brand loyal consumers, price insensive, 
pursue reputable sources, and in-house 
producon
Fig. 4.12 Case study overall counterfeit risk (Copyright Permission Granted)
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From the report conclusion (emphasis added):
Companies and agencies constantly struggle to quantify the magnitude of the coun-
terfeit threat from both a global and a specific product perspective. Although there 
are many examples of the dangers of product counterfeiting, the nature of the coun-
terfeiters and counterfeiting makes it difficult or even impossible to determine the 
quantitative, hard data on the risk. Specifically, analysis of the risk, risk model litera-
ture review, in combination with peer-consultation, established a foundation for the 
Counterfeit Product Risk Model (CPRM) and for the supporting non-quantitative 
analysis. It is not practical to conduct quantitative or classical statistical tool-based 
risk assessments for the counterfeit threat because the results cannot be theoretically 
validated. This research set out to break new ground by presenting an overview of 
the product counterfeiting threat as a starting point for the development of a practi-
cal, useful and publically available, Counterfeit Product Risk Model.
This research used a very broad, very interdisciplinary perspective that led to impor-
tant theoretical justifications, such as using a probability versus a severity matrix, 
qualitative ranking, and the language of enterprise risk management. Many current 
anti-counterfeit research projects are extensions of existing research (with a narrow 
focus that is not all-encompassing) or are so theoretical in nature that they are not 
applicable (e.g., very complex models that are not all-encompassing). This analysis 
and the development of the model provides a unique and practical approach in the 
implementation of anti-counterfeit strategies.
This type of research analysis and model has not been presented previously by other 
researchers for several reasons:
• the extremely interdisciplinary nature of the strategy;
• the fact that the hard data is elusive or non-existent—current industry actions 
are usually confidential, and agency actions are usually classified;
• broad, all-hazards risk assessment is still evolving; and
• a risk-based approach to regulation and legislation is only beginning to be 
applied to risks that are very real but very qualitative and hard to evaluate.
Since addressing product counterfeiting is probably no more than 10%of 
any one academic discipline, it is not surprising that there is a lack of research 
focus and leadership in the area of anti-counterfeit strategy. Packaging is a 
logical starting point for this anti-counterfeit research since the most efficient 
anti-counterfeit actions are packaging components, but there are many other 
disciplines that are equally important in an anti-counterfeit strategy. Critical 
disciplines which should be considered in an all-encompassing, strategic per-
spective on deterring counterfeiting include criminal justice, supply chain, 
risk management, social anthropology, consumer behavior, health risk com-
munication, retailing, intellectual property rights law, food law, healthcare 
(medicine, nursing, etc.), public health, political science, international trade 
relations, and many more.
From the further research section:
The very nature of developing propositions for this research established a base for 
future research and model refinement. The logical next step is to use the model to 
gain insights, refine usability, and to present procedures for practical  implementation. 
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As the model is used in practice, more detailed risk-based and classical statistical 
tools could be used to better support anti-counterfeit strategy decisions. Valuable 
insights could be gained from running the model for various industries and by con-
ducting reviews of inter-industry best practices.
This next table builds upon the future research section with additional 
comments from 2019 (Table 4.2).
The early assessments considered one part of the overall question or focused 
only on specific product groups. Over the 10 years since the publication of the 
CPRM, there has been an implementation of compliance requirements that 
dictate an overall, holistic, and all-encompassing approach. Once the overall 
assessments are conducted, there is an identification of further, more detailed 
assessments which could expand to include the CPRM and others.
Table 4.2 Future research recommendation and result 10 years later
Commentary on the 2009 future research recommendations and the application over 10 years
1. The logical next step is to use the 
model to gain insights, to refine 
usability, and to present procedures for 
practical implementation
Yes. This was a resource for new works such as the 
Food Fraud Initial Screening Tool and others
2. As the model is used in practice, 
more detailed risk-based and classical 
statistical tools could be used to better 
support anti-counterfeit strategy 
decisions
Somewhat. In 2017–2019 the Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessments are just beginning to be conducted and 
currently with a prefilter/initial screening approach. 
Also, the available data has not been through enough 
for high-level statistical analysis
3. Valuable insights could be gained 
from running the model for various 
industries and by conducting reviews 
of inter-industry best practices
Yes. The modification to the needs of the food industry 
compliance requirements has let to model development 
and a common approach that enables the sharing of 
best practices
4. Any future research should be 
combined with the evolving Enterprise 
Risk Management practice and with 
case studies to both understand and 
support how financial anti-counterfeit 
strategic decisions are being made 
within companies and agencies
Yes. There have been numerous food industry research 
projects and publications that expand to consider the 
enterprise-wide resource-allocation decision and 
specifically the COSO/ERM resources
5. Another important – probably the 
epicenter of all future anti-counterfeit 
strategy research – is exploring the 
behavioral aspects of ‘the chemistry of 
the crime’ and ‘the chemistry of 
consumer consumption
Yes. Criminology—and specifically Situational Crime 
Prevention—has become a common topic in food fraud 
research and in the application
6. Finally, there should be an ongoing 
review of both the basic propositions 
and the model, itself, with refinements 
implemented as necessary
No. There has not been any further review or 
application of the CPRM. In 2012, part of the MSU 
research shifted from an all-products intellectual 
property rights infringement enforcement to food fraud 
and prevention. As the compliance requirements define 
a simple, basic starting point, further methods are now 
needed which could include the CPRM
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 Role of ERM in Decision-Making: Corporate Risk Map
The two critical parts of the FFPC is the “fraud opportunity” and the “risk appe-
tite.” The current or projected vulnerability is presented on a “corporate risk map” 
(Fig. 4.13) and then two examples in Figs. 4.14 and 4.15. The application of ERM 
is that when there is new information, the fraud opportunity is reassessed, and 
then the new vulnerability is plotted on the corporate risk map. A very quick 
review of “acceptable/unacceptable” can be conducted by plotting the new 
vulnerability.
While the first incidents will need to have a case-by-case review by the entire 
food fraud team, over time, there will be standard operating procedures and thresh-
olds. Consider how other incidents are managed. If there is a transportation problem 
and regular customer deliveries may miss deadlines, then in some cases, expedited 
more expensive transportation may be approved. The first time this would need to 
Probability
High
High
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Very
High
Very
Low
Very
Low
Very
High
S
ev
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it
y
Fig. 4.14 Example of a 
risk map with a range of 
risks or vulnerabilities 
above and below the risk 
threshold (this could be a 
raw material and product 
categories or specific stock 
keeping units) (Copyright 
Permission Granted) 
(MSU-FFI 2017)
ecneuqesnoC
Very 
High A1 B3
High C4 A3
Medium A2 D5
Low D2
Very 
Low
Likelihood
Very High High Medium Low
Very 
Low
Fig. 4.13 Corporate risk 
map plotting food fraud 
initial screening risk 
assessments (Copyright 
Permission Granted) 
(Spink et al. 2016)
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be discussed and debated with the resource-allocation decision-maker. Over time it 
might become clear that every time customer “X” missed a shipping or receiving 
deadline due to bad weather that the CFO approves rush delivery up to $1000.
To further demonstrate the use of an ERM/COSO risk map for resource- allocation 
decision-making, several other scenarios are presented here (Table  4.3 and 
Fig. 4.16).
The scenarios are plotted on a corporate risk map to provide a visual of all the 
shifting vulnerabilities and clear presentation of which are above the risk 
tolerance.
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Fig. 4.16 Risk map 
presenting the shifting 
vulnerabilities from the 
examples
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Fig. 4.15 Example of a 
risk map with a range of 
risks or vulnerabilities 
managed to just below the 
risk threshold (Copyright 
Permission Granted) 
(MSU-FFI 2017)
Table 4.3 Details of shifting vulnerabilities that are plotted on the corporate risk map example
Actions Detail Decision Result
A to B Reduce Food Fraud 
Prevention budget by 
$1 M
No The change is defined to be an unacceptable option 
since the enterprise-wide vulnerability shift to an 
unacceptable situation above the risk tolerance
C to D A lot less of “Action 
1”
Yes Even though there is a reduction in activity, the 
resulting situation is still within the risk tolerance
E to F More of “Test 3” Yes Conducting more of this activity reduces the 
vulnerability to below the risk threshold
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These scenarios included a very challenging question of basic financial alloca-
tion applied to a group such as a food fraud team or a food safety department. The 
corporate risk map can be used to at least start this type of discussion of “how much 
is enough” which is based on exactly what is—or then isn’t—being done. The “we 
need ‘more’” and “the business will be too risky” are subjective statements that 
cannot be compared to other vulnerabilities or risks. Once the reduction of fund-
ing is presented on a chart like this (the current financial allocation is at “Point A” 
which keeps the business under the risk tolerance, while reducing the budget by $1 
million will raise the company to “Point B” and above the risk tolerance). Someone 
has to tell you “no, we don’t believe the business will be in a too risky position.” 
If there is an incident, there will be documentation of who reduced that budget. It 
won’t be you.
The use of ERM/COSO and the corporate risk map synthesizes all—literally 
all—risks across an enterprise. The corporate risk map provides clarity on the risk. 
Full integration of the vulnerability into ERM and the corporate risk map correlates 
and automates the process.
 “How to Start” and “How Much Is Enough”?: “The Corkscrew 
Approach”
Now that the system has been presented and the sections reviewed in detail, there is 
a need to discuss how to start. While the very detailed implementation methods will 
be covered in a later chapter, at this point, it is important to present the overall con-
cepts. The “corkscrew approach” is to start very high level but to make sure to fully 
complete the process. The first step is a very high-level review of the entire system 
including a brief recommendation of next steps. In some instances, the resource- 
allocation decision-maker will have enough information for the decision at hand. If 
not then the resource-allocation decision-maker will be able to explain exactly what 
they need in the way of more information. If a full system review is conducted, there 
can be “management by exception”; meaning they can define exactly what they like, 
don’t like, and what is needed next.
The next turn of the corkscrew will be more in depth. The process will advance 
only as far as the resource-allocation decision-maker defines value. The question of 
“How much is enough?” is defined by this process.
 Conclusion
This second food fraud prevention chapter expanded on the interdisciplinary 
approach and began to frame the question as the needs for a vulnerability assess-
ment, and prevention strategy was being envisioned. The first conclusion is that 
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there are already a wide range of activities conducted by an industry or company 
that already contributes to reducing the fraud opportunity. It is important to search 
across a wide range of business activities to find information and data that is already 
being gathered. The second conclusion is that there should be an assumption that 
there are very competent and thorough current standard operating procedures that 
could immediately apply. Also, while understanding there are thorough and robust 
systems, they probably will not completely apply to food fraud prevention. The 
final conclusion is that while a food fraud is a food issue that is usually managed by 
food agencies that often require food authenticity tests, the selection of countermea-
sures and control systems may focus on many disciplines except the food sciences. 
The most important activity is often the most foreign or abstract which is plotting 
the food fraud risk on a risk map that compares this incident to all other incidents 
across the enterprise. There is a saying:
When addressing food fraud prevention, assume it is twice as complex as you think it is 
and you know half as much as you think you know…and you’ll usually be just about 
right.
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Prevention Approach
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional 
group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all Enterprise Risk Management insights can be adopted into frontline processes 
and which will create dynamic methods that will address “how much is 
enough?”
Quality team This food fraud prevention approach is an enterprise risk assessment linked 
process that will help you assess a new risk in relation to all other corporate- 
wide risks which will enable direct, methodical resource-allocation decision- 
making for “how much is enough.”
Auditors This is more of an introduction to the strategically sound fundamentals behind 
the process.
Management While this may seem very theoretical, it will end up being a very practical and 
directly applicable process to support very logical and obvious resource- 
allocation decision-making.
Corp. 
decision-makers
This may seem like an impossible task, but it works and allows frontline 
employees to use the enterprise-wide risk tolerance insight for decision- 
making (without revealing any commercially sensitive or expose and 
confidential risk assessments).
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 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter.
 1. Discussion Question:
 (a) What is the foundation of the FFFPC?
 (b) What are academic disciplines that are utilized by the FFPC?
 (c) For FF prevention, “how much is enough?”
 2. Key Learning Objective1
 (a) What is the “Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC)”?
 (b) What is the central focus or driver of the FFPC?
 (c) How is a new countermeasure or control system technology reviewed in the 
FFPC?
 3. Key Learning Objective2:
 (a) What is an “Integrated Framework”?
 (b) What is the authority and origin of the “Internal Controls/Integrated 
Framework” concept?
 (c) How are the Integrated Framework and Internal Controls connected and 
calibrated?
 4. Key Learning Objective3:
 (a) What are the process steps in the FFPC?
 (b) Where does “New Information” (such as the awareness of a new industry 
incident) enter the FFPC?
 (c) Where does the FFPC start?
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Chapter 5
Food Fraud Prevention Overview  
(Part 3 of 3): The Implementation
Summary
This chapter presents an expanded review of food fraud prevention to consider a 
systematic approach, the focus on vulnerabilities and then beginning to prepare for 
decision-making and “how much is enough?” The activities are presented in the 
Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019).
The Key Learning Objectives of the chapter are
• (1) Introduction to the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC)—“a system of 
systems”
• (2) The focus on vulnerability before risks or hazards
• (3) Then the decision-making criteria for “how much is enough?”
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the overall 
fundamental prevention concepts of “connecting everything to everything” 
(Fig. 5.1).
 Introduction
After understanding the basics and the approach, there is a pragmatic and practical 
need to actually implement the concepts and get to a point where there can actually 
be resource-allocation decision-making.
1 Note: COSO more often uses the term “risk map,” but “corporate risk map” is used here and 
throughout to clarify the intent review the formal and systematic assessment of enterprise-wide 
risk not a basic risk summary.
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Systematic Prevention—A “System 
of Systems”
This section reviews the process for a systematic prevention strategy that is pre-
sented in a “system of systems” that is the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) 
(Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019). This cycle is comprised of several key components 
that are presented here.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Awareness that is comprised of the incident review and fraud opportunity
• (2) Introduction to the fraud opportunity based on the Crime Triangle
• (3) Consideration of how to seek and process new information.
 Introduction to the Problem
The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) grew out of the effort to connect each of 
the separate activities into one complete cycle (Spink 2014). The FFPC is a “system 
of sub-systems.” Each sub-system cycles within the overall system. Everything is 
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
(B) Fundamental Concepts
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
Traceability
Investigation
or Audit
Testing
Fig. 5.1 Food fraud prevention cycle: where this chapter applies to the overall concept—the entire 
cycle 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and the fraud opportunity. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; 
Spink et al. 2019)
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connected. Each assessment feeds the other assessments in a dynamic process. This 
dynamic process is self-correcting; meaning that as the fraud opportunity fluctuates 
up and down, the countermeasures and controls systems are calibrated with the 
changing risk appetite.
Considering assessments, it is important to review that risk is not necessarily a 
negative. The owners of a company (which includes individual investors who own 
stocks, mutual funds or have a pension) expect a specific and ratable level of risk 
that equates to a financial return—some specific activities are too risky for that 
threshold. A business that is not risky enough will create lower financial returns. 
The financial security regulations create a standardized process for public compa-
nies to report the inherent risk. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) created Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/
COSO) accounting practices which were created in response to the US Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act and later the Frank-Dodd Act (Public Law 107–204 2002; 15 USC 7201 
2006; Public Law 111-203 2010; 12 USC 5301 2018) (for more on US securities 
law, see (SEC 2013)). The Food Fraud Prevention Strategy can be directly inte-
grated into the ERM resource-allocation decision-making system. The terminology 
used to address food fraud is the same terms that are used in ERM/COSO.
For this section, a simple previous version of the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle is 
used. The components and linkages are the same but in a less refined form (Fig. 5.2):
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Fig. 5.2 Simple previous version of the food fraud prevention cycle (FFPC). (Copyright 
Permission Granted)
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 The Engine: The Fraud Opportunity
A saying is that “It’s all about the fraud opportunity.” This means that the root cause 
of the entire food fraud problem is based on a weakness or vulnerability. The Crime 
Triangle concept is based on Situational Crime Prevention which includes on a 
fraudster human adversary identifying a target or victim, in relation to a guardian or 
hurdle gap (for more, see the chapters on Criminology) (Fig. 5.3). To reduce the 
fraud opportunity, the goal is to focus on the criminal motivation, identify factors 
that lead to system weaknesses, and then consider countermeasures to detect, deter, 
and prevent (Spink 2017).
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Fig. 5.3 The main influence on the fraud opportunity which is understood by criminology and 
specifically situational crime prevention. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2017)
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Sidebar: How the Fraud Opportunity Engine Works—Illicit, The Dark 
Trade
In 2005, Moises Naim wrote, “Illicit: The Dark Trade” (Naim 2005). This is 
built upon his previous article “The Five Wars of Globalization” which are 
illicit trade (1) drugs, (2) arms, (3) intellectual property, (4) people, and (5) 
money (Naim 2003). Product counterfeiting, product fraud, and food fraud 
are in the intellectual property category.
Two insights are especially valuable: (1) governments, intragovernmental, 
and nongovernmental organizations have their hands full with a range of very 
complex and very bad problems, and (2) for food fraud prevention, there are 
lessons to be learned from those other problems.
Naim provides some shocking insights on the fraud opportunity including 
that (Illicit, Naim 2005):
[Product counterfeiting] is… more profitable than trafficking heroin… easier 
than photocopying… and with penalties like jay-walking.
A more detailed example is:
• “A batch of 1800 cartons of drugs made in China but labeled as manufac-
tured in India and Pakistan under license from multinational companies…
• Turned out to involve ten copycat manufacturers…
• In five provinces,…
• Using five different suppliers for packaging...
• Manufacturing sites range from small household workshops to legitimate 
factories: a firm that produces a drug under license need only run an extra 
shift with substandard inputs.
• Workers on the line may never know they were doing anything wrong.”
For all the five wars of globalization, there are reasons he says “Why 
Governments Can’t Win”:
• “Technology will continue to spread widely; criminal networks will be 
able to exploit these technologies more quickly than governments that must 
cope with tight budgets, bureaucracies, media scrutiny, and electorates.”
• “Those criminal networks:
 – They are not bound by geography.
 – They defy traditional notions of sovereignty.
 – They pit governments against market forces.
 – They pit bureaucracies against networks.”
Prior to any strategic review of product counterfeiting, it is important to 
establish some key concepts (Naim 2005):
• “Illicit trade is driven by high profits, not low morals
• Illicit trade is a political phenomenon  – illicit traders cannot prosper 
without help from governments or accomplices in key public offices.
(continued)
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Sidebar: Does a Good Food Defense Program Help Prevent EMA? 
Maybe (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: Does a Good Food Defense Program Help Prevent EMA? Maybe.
By John Spink • November 13, 2013 • Blog
This is an excerpt of an email from a food industry leader. If this person has 
this question, then I’m sure many of you do as well. The original question 
was: “Would a good food defense program help prevent ‘intentional adultera-
tion’?” Answer: Maybe, but probably not yet.
The “maybe” is based on questions of scope and scale of the food defense 
program. Let me begin by noting that food fraud is beyond an “adulterant- 
substance” or “economically motivated adulteration” (EMA), for example, 
you may also have problems or product recalls if you have a country of origin 
fraud, mislabeling, or even unauthorized repackaging that compromises 
traceability.
• Illicit trade is more about transactions than products – we are so accus-
tomed to parsing the illicit trades into separate product lines
• Illicit trade cannot exist without licit trade  – all illicit businesses are 
deeply intertwined with licit ones. Indeed, traffickers have strong incen-
tives to combine their illicit operations with legitimate business ventures.
• Illicit trade involves everyone – someone is buying…
• Governments can’t do it alone.”
Ultimately, the insight from Naim may be disturbing or disgusting, but it is 
the reality. Once the underlying concepts are clearly understood and embraced, 
then there can be a rational and pragmatic path forward. The works by Naim 
were fundamental in the development of the food fraud prevention concepts.
 Awareness: Incident Review and Fraud Opportunity
The first function or step in the FFPC is awareness which builds upon the information. 
Information could be from “incident reviews” which are known events, scanning, or 
“horizon scanning” that could be a wide range of “signals” such as price changes or 
commodity shortages and “public policy” which includes increased risk of detection 
or enforcement due to new priority setting (Fig. 5.4) (Spink 2017). This awareness 
building is based on the criminology-based science of intelligence analysis. To pro-
vide the right type of information or intelligence to assess the fraud opportunity or 
problem, there is a systematic gathering and analysis of raw data, a process to moni-
tor changes, and then a step to filer and process this into actionable intelligence.
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(continued)
In most cases, food defense is defined as combating intentional attacks to 
harm another. The harm could be a terror, economic, or public health. The 
attackers often want to get publicity or want to really hurt people, so we often 
find out quickly about the act. With food fraud, they definitely do not want to 
get caught…they’ll be sneaky, actively try to evade our tests and systems, and 
they’ll be both persistent and keep evolving to stay stealthy.
As for addressing with other types of crime problems, prevention is not 
only infinitely more cost and time effective, but it is the only thing that often 
actually works. Using Situational Crime Prevention, we go look for the vul-
nerabilities…then decide how we can reduce that threat.
At that point, when we understand the vulnerability—e.g., species swap-
ping of animal protein—we know what and where we should test. We know 
what we should be testing for, that is, to “detect.” If the frustrater is operating 
within in the legitimate supply chain, then the countermeasure can “deter” 
against that specific attacker. If it is known that the customer does “some” 
species tests when receiving products, and new bad guys can find out that the 
company is testing, then the species tests lead to prevention. Also, you’re 
looking for the right test at the right spot at the right frequency. For example, 
a company was running species tests 24 hours a day for 7 days a week during 
an incident and then completely stopped testing after the food fraud incident 
had passed. They said “Why test? The incident is over.” Click—that was the 
door of their fraud opportunity reopening. They don’t need to test a lot, but 
they should be testing at least some product if only to counter an accusation 
of “willful negligence” for this “reasonably foreseeable hazard.”
In a company, there are often two defined concepts of unintentional acts 
such as food safety and also of intentional acts defined as food defense. If this 
is the case, it is structurally efficient for a company to put food fraud under 
food defense but to understand that the countermeasures and control systems 
and processes are very different. Think of combating shoplifters compared 
to ferreting out suppliers diluting product. What about combating employee 
theft versus country of origin labeling fraud? No one—me included—will 
ever be able to be an expert on all food fraud concepts and threats. We’re try-
ing to create an educational foundation of knowledge, moreover, and then a 
group of colleagues. (I consider myself as a food fraud librarian who is gather-
ing, categorizing, and writing about all the information in the books we find.) 
We will need to help train and support those people who will take the reins of 
food fraud prevention. We will need to start by defining the scope and scale 
of a good food defense plan.
Overall, it is most efficient if food fraud prevention is a separate, stand- 
alone, interdisciplinary, enterprise-wide team or task force function. This is 
similar to anti-counterfeiting and brand protection programs that are coordi-
nated at the corporate level, and then individual responsibilities are distributed 
into the operations and the business units.
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I ended my email to the food industry leader by stating “Actually, this 
would be a great blog post, maybe I’ll post it.” So I am. Consider if your food 
defense plan really does address food fraud prevention. Don’t wait for FSMA 
or GFSI; companies have food fraud risks every day (MSU-FFI).
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Fig. 5.4 The intelligence analysis that provides information and data to understand the food fraud 
problem. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2017)
 Key Learning Objective 2: The Vulnerabilities 
and Countermeasures
This section reviews the next steps which are assessing the vulnerabilities and the 
final actions of judging or selecting countermeasures and control systems. These 
two steps are between other key activities such as understanding the fraud opportu-
nity and conducting the risk rank which supports resource-allocation decision- 
making. Building on theories such as criminology, total quality management, and 
enterprise risk management, it is most efficient and effective to start by understand-
ing the system weaknesses and the root cause of the problem.
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Review the process of vulnerability assessment: initial screen and detailed 
assessment
• (2) Consideration of what assessment or predictive models are even possible
• (3) Then the system to review and select optimal countermeasures and control 
systems
 Vulnerabilities: Understood by Risk Assessment and Decision 
Sciences
Another function or step is the focus on vulnerabilities rather than risks. The core 
concepts of risk and vulnerability will be covered in more detail in the Business 
Risk chapter and the Vulnerability Assessment chapter. The key components are 
building upon an understanding of the fraud opportunity to then conduct assess-
ments which would start with an initial screen before determining if there is a need 
for a more detailed assessment. The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle sub-system of 
vulnerability assessment is a two-stage process that includes an initial screen and 
then a detailed assessment that is conducted as required (Fig.  5.5). To support 
decision- making to reduce the fraud opportunity, the assessment should consider 
the following: is the issue an actual problem, how much of a problem, and then how 
to provide first a quick review before a more detailed assessment.
The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) is based on an objective to focus on 
the cause and effect—both. The food safety systems address the effect or result. 
Once a hazard is found in the food supply chain, it is usually classified as either a 
traditional hazard (e.g., food safety, an unintentional act with naturally occurring 
problems) or nontraditional (e.g., food defense, intentional act with non-naturally 
occurring food safety hazards). The traditional food safety management systems are 
refined to evaluate an acceptable or unacceptable hazard threshold clearly (e.g., 
product recalls are defined as Class I, II, or III (for more see (Fortin 2009)) and the 
industry and regulatory product recall procedures are refined and honed. These haz-
ards are usually well known, researched, addressed by regulations with defined 
thresholds, and defined as biological, chemical, and physical.
On the other hand, the nontraditional hazards – if they don’t fit into the more 
traditional food safety product recall activity – are often addressed by an ad hoc 
process by necessity. There occasionally incidents that don’t seem to fit into general 
categories or response plans, so the responders do the best they can to figure some 
way to address the crisis. An intentional act to harm could be a single disgruntled 
employee or a coordinated, global terrorist network, or anything in between. When 
conducting a suspicious activity review “intervention,” the worst case should be 
assumed in for every incident.
These unknowns related to intentional acts to harm define the efficiency of creat-
ing a separate Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment and Prevention Strategy. Also, 
the variability of the nontraditional hazards emphasizes the importance of focusing 
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Fig. 5.5 The decisions sciences that provide a structured method to conduct the assessment and 
support the selection and implementation of countermeasures and control systems. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) (Spink 2017)
on prevention and thus vulnerabilities. When focusing on reducing the vulnerabili-
ties—and reducing the fraud opportunity—it is most efficient to remove consider-
ation of the human fraudster from the equation. It is easier to respond to the physical 
components of the vulnerability rather than to try to confront a specific fraudster or 
type of fraud act.
These concepts are included in the Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment. These 
methods and processes are in their infancy and continue to evolve and mature as 
they are used. The GFSI Food Fraud Position paper was published in July 2014, the 
SSAFE/PWC Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment was published in January 2015, 
and the Food Fraud Initial Screening Tool (FFIS) was published in November 2016 
(GFSI 2014; SSAFE 2015; PWC 2016; Spink et al. 2016).
Essentially “if there is a fraud opportunity then there is a fraud opportunity.” If 
you did purchase from criminals, they might not commit a crime because they don’t 
perceive an opportunity…though you’d prefer not to purchase from criminals. 
“Where there is fraud opportunity there is a fraud opportunity; regardless of the 
morals, ethics, or honesty of the supplier.”
5 Food Fraud Prevention Overview (Part 3 of 3): The Implementation
167
Sidebar: “It Is Simply Not Possible to Validate Predictive Models of 
Rare Events That Have Not Occurred”
At the 2008 Society for Risk Analysis annual meeting, Robert G Ross of the 
US Department of Homeland Security presented “Observations on the 
Importance of Risk Communication in Managing Homeland Security 
Risk”((Ross 2009) also (Ross 2006a, b, 2007)). He discussed “models for 
insight versus models to predict.” He recommended using a range of risk 
models to provide a wide range of insight on these unique vulnerabilities. 
Regarding probabilistic risk assessment and more advanced quantitative risk 
assessments, he made several important key points that apply to food fraud 
prevention (JASON 2009):
• “[It] is simply not possible to validate (evaluate) predictive models of rare 
events that have not occurred, and unvalidated models cannot be relied 
upon.”
• There is a “…distinction between models for probabilistic risk assessment 
on long timescales… versus specific point production of individual rare 
events.”
• “It is not a realistic goal to anticipate and prevent all rare events, but it may 
be possible to make rare events rarer, and to reduce their effect.”
• “A rare event is preceded by a chain of individually more likely develop-
ments that create intent, capability, and opportunity. Intervention may be 
possible at many points in that chain.”
• “There are two principal problems in applying quantitative models to the 
anticipation of rare events. One problem is that rare events are rare. There 
will necessarily be little or no previous data from which to extrapolate future 
expectations in any quantitatively reliable sense, or to evaluate any model.”
• “In the extreme, how can the probability of an event that has never been 
seen or may never even have been imagined be predicted?”
• “An additional difficulty is that rare event assessment is largely a question 
of human behavior, in the domain of the social sciences, and predictive 
social sciences models pose even greater challenges than predictive models 
in the physical sciences. Reliable models for ameliorating rare events will 
need to address smaller, well-defined, testable pieces of the larger problem.”
This insight provides a foundation regarding rare events for what cannot 
be expected from traditional probabilistic risk assessment. This insight 
encourages a shift in focus from predicting the exact incident that will occur 
to consider the wide range of factors, variables, or vulnerabilities that are 
known. Ross’s presentation encouraged the use of many different types of 
assessments and to focus on “models for insight” rather than “models for 
prediction”—risk-informed versus risk-based decision-making.
 Key Learning Objective 2: The Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
168
 Recalls: Background and Definitions
The FDA website explains the “Types of FDA Enforcement Actions.” Overall, the 
FDA regulatory goal is to “assure compliance with the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (the Act).” While the Act covers a wide range of issues, efficient 
resource allocation is directed by a risk-based approach for a priority on the worst 
public health harms.
The first goal of the logical risk-based approach is to do whatever it takes to 
reduce the current or immediate public health harms. Sometimes this leads to a 
priority for a product recall over a possible extended criminal investigation. An 
immediate product recall reduces the success of a criminal investigation because the 
perpetrators are alerted that the officials know of the problem. It is important to take 
immediate activity since a perpetrator can destroy evidence, modify records, or even 
flee the country (Spink 2011).
“Specific enforcement activities include actions to correct and prevent violations, remove 
violative products or goods from the market, and punish offenders. The type of enforcement 
activity FDA uses will depend on the nature of the violation. The range of enforcement 
activities includes issuing a letter notifying the individual or firm of a violation and request-
ing correction, to criminal prosecution of the individual or firm.”
There are a range of actions or responses available for a regulator such as the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Recalls are actions taken by a firm to remove 
a product from the market. Recalls may be conducted on a firm’s own initiative, by 
FDA request or by FDA order under 21CFR7.3 statutory authority (21CFR7.3 2014).
There are three types of product recalls:
• “Class I recall: a situation in which there is a reasonable probability that the use 
of or exposure to a violative product will cause serious adverse health conse-
quences or death.
• Class II recall: a situation in which use of or exposure to a violative product may 
cause temporary or medically reversible adverse health consequences or where 
the probability of serious adverse health consequences is remote.
• Class III recall: a situation in which use of or exposure to a violative product is 
not likely to cause adverse health consequences.”
There are other potential actions including:
• “Warning Letters – are sent to the individuals or firms, advising them of spe-
cific noted violations; These letters request a written response as to the steps 
which will be taken to correct the violation. These letters constitute one form of 
warning that can be issued under current Agency policy.”
• “Seizure – An action brought against an FDA-regulated product because it is 
adulterated and/or misbranded within the meaning of the Act. The purpose of 
such an action is to remove specific violative goods from commerce.”
• “Injunction – An order by a court that requires an individual or corporation to 
do or refrain from doing a specific act. FDA may seek injunctions against indi-
viduals and/or corporations to prevent them from violating or causing violations 
of the Act.”
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• “Criminal prosecution – may be recommended in appropriate cases for violation 
of Section 301 of the Act; Misdemeanor convictions, which do not require proof 
of intent to violate the Act, can result in fines and/or imprisonment up to 1 year. 
Felony convictions, which apply in the case of a second violation or intent to 
defraud or mislead, can result in fines and/or imprisonment up to 3 years.”
• “Criminal Fines for Food Drug and Cosmetic Act Violations – Misdemeanor 
fines under the Act may reach $500,000 under some circumstances. The Criminal 
Fine Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public Law 98-596) provides for fines for viola-
tions of Federal law. Although it is not part of the Act, the Criminal Fine 
Enforcement Act of 1994 applies to all fines levied under the Act, as well as other 
statutes that contain provisions enforced by FDA.”
When responding to a regulatory or enforcement action, it is important to clearly 
understand the exact scope of each term. Several key terms are provided here 
(emphasis added):
• “(b) Citation or cite means a document and any attachments thereto that provide 
notice to a person against whom criminal prosecution is contemplated of the 
opportunity to present views to the agency regarding an alleged violation.”
• “(c) Respondent means a person named in a notice who presents views concern-
ing an alleged violation either in person, by designated representative, or in 
writing.”
• “(d) Responsible individual includes those in positions of power or authority to 
detect, prevent, or correct violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”
• “(g) Recall means a firm’s removal or correction of a marketed product that the 
Food and Drug Administration considers to be in violation of the laws it admin-
isters and against which the agency would initiate legal action, e.g., seizure. 
Recall does not include a market withdrawal or a stock recovery.”
• “(h) Correction means repair, modification, adjustment, relabeling, destruction, 
or inspection (including patient monitoring) of a product without its physical 
removal to some other location.”
 Countermeasures and Decision-Making
Once the vulnerability assessment is in place and operating, this next component 
includes a review of countermeasures and decision-making in the corporate risk 
map (Fig. 5.6) (Spink 2017). The consideration of countermeasures is a vital sepa-
rate sub-system, so there is a formal way to seek, consider, and reinforce resource- 
allocation decision-making. To connect the functions or steps, this sub-system 
would support the detect-deter-prevent steps and consider currently implemented 
and possibly new technologies which include the popular interoperable enhanced 
traceability innovations and also more tactical responses such as enforcement and 
prosecution. Countermeasures and control systems are the risk treatments that 
should be selected based first on the confirmation of a need to address this vulner-
ability and then the direct contribution to reducing the fraud opportunity.
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Fig. 5.6 The countermeasures and control system linkage that supports the reduction of the fraud 
opportunity. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2017)
 The Determination of “How Much Is Enough” by Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM/COSO)
At this point, there is a realization that there is usually no structured, analytical, 
methodical decision-making process for “how much is enough?” There are two 
critical benefits of applying ERM into the operations (covered in more detail in the 
Business Decisions chapter) which include that holistic countermeasures and con-
trol systems are considered efficiently when vulnerabilities are being assessed, and 
the frontline decision-making includes those overarching, corporate decision- 
making insights (Fig. 5.7) (Spink 2017). At first, the proposals will need to be evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis, but over time the risk assessors will become more 
familiar with what types of hazard levels and countermeasure are (or are not) 
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Countermeasures
Fig. 5.7 The linkage to an enterprise-wide risk assessment that provides guidance resource- 
allocation decision-making and “how much is enough?”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 
2017)
implemented. This sub-system is the resource-allocation decision-making step. By 
calibrating the FFPC to the ERM system, return on investment is only a project 
decision and not a consideration against all other possible allocations; this provides 
a way to review if the current situation is unacceptable as compared to all other risks 
across the enterprise and also correlate with the implemented ERM systems based 
on COSO managerial accounting practices. These sub-systems create a holistic and 
all-encompassing system to manage the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
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Sidebar: Understanding a Generic or Specific Risk Tolerance
The calibration of the vulnerability assessment to the corporate risk tolerance 
is a separate and unique function in the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle. Without 
this calibration, the use of a generic assessment tool creates a generic risk 
rank. What is “high” for one industry, company, or product may not be “high” 
for your company—this could be for many reasons include some countermea-
sure or control system that is not considered in the vulnerability assessment or 
the general nature of your operations or supply chain.
The food fraud assessments and strategies build upon ERM/COSO which, 
itself, builds upon risk appetite or risk tolerance. These are terms that are 
defined in other total quality management systems and specifically in Six 
Sigma and also in a range of ISO standards from ISO 22000 Food Management 
and most importantly in ISO 31000 Risk Management.
• Six Sigma: this principle is based on a cycle of plan-do-check-act (PDCA) 
with a “specification limit.” A limit could be a type of variation or a result-
ing flaw. By design, the limit is “Six Sigma” or six times the standard of 
deviation. The method to determine the limit—or here, the variation or 
flaw—is undefined and refers to another decision-making system.
• ISO 22000 Food Management Systems: this standard is based on a “criti-
cal limit” that is a “measurable value which separates acceptability from 
unacceptability.” The method to determine of the limit—or here, critical 
limit—is undefined and refers to another decision-making system.
• ISO 31000 Risk Management: this standard has a process step to “estab-
lishing the context” which is “defining the external and internal parameters 
to be taken into account when managing risk, and setting the scope and risk 
criteria for the risk management policy.” The method to determine the 
maximum limit of tolerable risk—or here, the parameters—is undefined 
and refers to another decision-making system.
• ERM/COSO: this process is specifically focused on evaluating the maxi-
mum acceptable level of risk or uncertainty for an enterprise. An enterprise 
could be a company, a country, or any organization. Specifically, ERM is 
“designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and man-
age risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.” Also, “an organization’s 
risk appetite should be articulated and communicated so that personnel 
understands that they need to pursue objectives within acceptable limits.” 
And, “ultimately, management and the board need an understanding of 
the entity’s portfolio of top risk exposures affecting entity objectives so 
that they can determine whether it is in line with the stakeholder’s appetite 
for risk.”
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Sidebar: Chase the Problem or Try to Eliminate the Root Cause and 
Motivation?
To optimize the efforts, there is a need to shift the paradigm from addressing 
the problem to reducing the root cause of the anomaly. Henry David Thoreau 
was credited with saying “There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil 
to one who is striking at the root.” Also, there is a question of “how fast do you 
need to run not to get caught by a bear?” The answer is “faster than the person 
you’re running with” (since it assumed that your colleague gets caught and 
eaten). Both of these analogies are considered when shifting the food fraud 
countermeasure and control system focus to prevention.
Continuing the analogy of the home burglary, if there start to be more 
home break-ins around your neighborhood what is the first thing you do? Call 
your politician to ask for more strict laws? Demand more investigation and 
prosecution by the county court? Do you ask for more police to patrol the 
neighborhood and investigate all suspicious characters? If you are concerned 
about those burglaries, maybe the first thing is to make sure you lock your 
doors and windows.
To think about this another way, to protect your house from a burglar: if 
you lock your doors, the criminal may climb in the window; if you lock your 
window, they might just break the glass; if you put bars on your windows, 
they may try to kick in your back door, on and on until the effort to break into 
your house is just too much of a hassle.
To review the selection of a food fraud prevention countermeasure, con-
sider the cost of applying a unique serial code (a significant technological feat 
compared to lot number or manufacturing dates on a long production run) 
includes information technology infrastructure and management to control and 
confirm the application as well as the management through to the consumer. 
Depending on how much the system relies on the code to confirm authenticity, 
there is also a potentially high legal liability. For example, consider a medi-
cine that is used to restart a heart after open-heart surgery. The legal liability 
for the manufacturer could be literally catastrophic if that “authenticated” 
product is really a counterfeit or substandard. The interoperable- enhanced 
traceability system value must be weighed against the loss.
These are examples of the “problem.” A more efficient focus is to consider 
reducing the “motivation” for the fraudsters to commit an act.
For any new countermeasure or control system, the question must be asked 
“how will the counterfeiter circumvent the system” or even “how will the 
counterfeiters benefit from the system.” This takes into consideration the 
counterfeiters will respond. This takes into consideration that counterfeiters 
research how to avoid detection both now and in response to future counter-
measures and control systems. If these are all considered, then an efficient and 
effective countermeasure or control system can be selected and implemented. 
If not then the likelihood of success is a guess.
(continued)
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 Key Learning Objective 3: A Systemic Approach to Food 
Fraud Prevention
This section reviews the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle functionality—“how it actu-
ally works.” The foundation is based first on the detailed framework of all industry 
or regulatory, domestic or international, compliance requirements and then inte-
grates with other current systems. As is taught when addressing a geometry prob-
lem, first lay out all the “knowns” and “givens” and consider applicable “tools” 
before starting to gather more data or solving the problem. There is a need for a 
process or function that coordinates all the activities.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Focus on the root cause which is the “fraud opportunity.”
• (2) Conduct vulnerability assessments including a way to methodically seek and 
utilize new information. This should also consider this risk compared to all other 
enterprise-wide risks before determining a “rank.”
• (3) Define a way to consider and select countermeasures and control systems 
including a feedback loop to dynamically monitor and recalibrate the entire 
cycle.
 The Fraud Opportunity: The Root Cause
A fundamental idea is “It’s all about the fraud opportunity”—every assessment or 
decision is defined in terms of how it contributes to the prevention and reduces the 
fraud opportunity. The engine of the cycle—the center of everything—is the “fraud 
opportunity.” Everything revolves around understanding the characteristics and 
influencers of this Crime Triangle. When the fraud opportunity is understood, then 
there can be a more efficient selection of countermeasures and control systems as 
well as an explanation of how and why the interventions reduce the vulnerability. 
Without an understanding of the fraud opportunity, the risk treatments are guesses—
granted they are educated guesses but still without a methodical approach.
The countermeasures and control systems don’t have to be perfect or com-
pletely eliminate the “fraud opportunity.” The response is calibrated to your 
unique fraud opportunity and reduces the vulnerability to within your specific 
risk tolerance. Often burglars are looking for a soft target. They are not trying 
specifically to break into your home. Usually, if your doors are locked, win-
dows shut, lights on, no tempting bags of money in plain sight, dog barking, 
and the alarm is on, they will probably look for a softer target. That is the goal 
of food fraud prevention: run faster than the person you’re running with and 
move on from raking leaves to hack at the roots of the tree.
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Another fundamental idea is: “If one aspirin is good, then ten is better. Right?” 
“Traceability is good, so more is better. Right?” Then RFID, the blockchain, DNA, 
mass serialization, whole genome sequencing, and other things must be better, 
right? Maybe. The critical question is how these countermeasures and control sys-
tems contribute to the prevention and reducing the vulnerability. The Food Fraud 
Prevention Cycle (FFPC) is used to create and help decision-making in the strategy. 
The strategy is the action plan. The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle is a dynamic pro-
cess since there is a constant fluctuation of the specific fraud opportunity and the 
unique risk appetite. The cycle is used to ramp up—or down—the countermeasure 
and controls systems.
The strength of the FFPC is that it covers all the activities including the resource- 
allocation decision-making and “connects everything to everything” and it is self- 
correcting to optimize the countermeasures and control systems. Without the 
feedback and recalibration step, the countermeasures and control systems usually 
keep adding up and up. With the calibration and review of all implemented pro-
grams, there is now a methodical approach to evaluate what countermeasures and 
controls systems should be scaled down or removed. This would include a corre-
sponding addition or reduction in staffing.
 The Components of the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle: How 
They Fit Together
At this point in the book, the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) is becoming 
familiar since it is the map for all the content. Once the overall Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy (FFPS) is in place, it includes a dynamic Food Fraud Prevention Cycle 
(FFPC). Several vital systems help build awareness of the vulnerabilities and also 
for the entire cycle (see above in Fig. 5.1 from this chapter) (Spink 2014; Spink 
et al. 2019). The FFPC components include (1) overall principles (e.g., A, B, and C) 
and steps that are the activities (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).
Key components of the FFPC include these (the FFPC figure is included again 
here for convenience, Fig. 5.8):
• (A) Academic Disciplines: There is a range of academic disciplines that contrib-
ute to the understanding and management of the “fraud opportunity.” These are 
not specific systems in the FFPC but are important to provide insight on each 
factor.
• (B) Fundamentals: Some basic principles or fundamentals enable the actions and 
provide insight into the working of the cycle and the specific functions.
• (1) Inputs: This function considers new information to add to the review of the 
fraud opportunity.
 – (1A) Incident reviews and review of changing marketplace conditions such as 
commodity price changes.
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 – (1B) Scanning: this is an active review of what is happening externally such 
as market price changes, supply shortages, and other general intelligence 
about vulnerabilities or incidents.
 – (1C) Public policy: changing public policy or regulatory focus.
• (2) Fraud Opportunity: This is based on the Criminology theory of Situational 
Crime Prevention. It is a separate assessment that feeds into the vulnerability 
assessment.
• (3) Vulnerability Assessment: The Enterprise Risk Management/COSO vulner-
ability assessment is a two-stage process starting with an “initial screening” and 
extends to a “detailed screening.” For food fraud prevention, this is demonstrated 
by the Food Fraud Initial Screening Tool (FFIS), the SSAFE/PWC Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment Tool (FFVAT), and others (SSAFE 2015; Spink et al. 
2016).
 – (3A) Initial screening or prefilter: Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS)
 – (3B) Detailed assessment or full review: Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
(FFVA)
• (4) Risk Appetite: The ERM/COSO process extends to applying the vulnerabili-
ties to the Corporate Risk Map. This map helps the corporation determine what 
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Fig. 5.8 This is the entire food fraud prevention cycle (FFPC). (Copyright Permission Granted) 
(Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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Sidebar: Who in Their Right Mind Would Decommission an  
Anti-counterfeit Countermeasure?
Without a rigorous risk assessment system, no one in their right mind would 
reduce a redundant anti-counterfeit countermeasure. For example, a new packag-
ing group manager could inherit a product with ten of the same anti-counterfeit 
features (e.g., holograms, micro-taggants, color shifting ink, etc.). If the decision 
is without a methodical approach or demand, and if there is a new counterfeit 
incident, the manager may be blamed. This would be like deciding that the lease 
on a second battery backup sump pump for your basement was not cost effective. 
That might be a logical decision, but if the basement floods, there will be huge 
consequences for the manager—possibly a career limiting move. Without a clear 
analytical assessment—not just the logic or common sense—the risk assessor 
could get fired. If a customer dies, this could lead to criminal prosecution! Thus, 
no one in their right mind would remove a legacy countermeasure or control sys-
tem without a very thorough and analytical decision-making process.
By using the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle, including plotting the vulner-
abilities on the Corporate Risk Map,1 there is a clear, logical, methodical, and 
analytical assessment that the lease on the second sump pump is illogical. The 
FFPS and FFPC clearly define that removing the second sump pump is a wise 
and logical business decision. If there is an adverse event (e.g., the basement 
floods), the risk assessor can defend the decision to remove the second backup 
sump pump.
Sidebar: Food Fraud Criminal Cases – How to Keep your Boss Out of 
Handcuffs
While food industry managers are not thinking about criminal prosecution—
at least not yet for food fraud prevention—one of the strongest motivators for 
action is a legal liability and the “court of public opinion.” Whether based on 
the EU-type food integrity laws or the US-type public health laws, a 
risks are within the risk appetite. Every new vulnerability or changing assess-
ment does not lead to a risk that is an unacceptable hazard.
• (5) Enterprise-Wide Risk Assessment: Connection to the resource-allocation 
decision-making defined by the “risk tolerance.”
• (6) Countermeasures and Control Systems: These are a wide range of activities 
that either directly confronts specific types of attacks or that provide insight on 
when a product may be “out of control.”
• (C) Application—“The Guardians”: This includes combined external controls or 
programs that investigate, enforce, and prosecute the fraudulent activity.
This system of systems creates awareness that there is a cycle, and within that, 
there is an awareness of how all the emerging and current factors fit together.
(continued)
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suspicious product can be determined to be “unfit for commerce.” A product 
recall is quick and very economically harmful for a company. While addi-
tional liability for gross incompetence or willful blindness is impactful, a 
product recall achieves the most fundamental goal of removing the suspicious 
or dangerous product from commerce.
As for the “court of public opinion,” the impact of social media can be 
catastrophic for a brand or company. Often the risk of a possible product 
recall—or bad press about product integrity—has driven companies to change 
their operations. (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: How to Keep your Boss Out of Handcuffs
By John Spink • May 22, 2013 • Blog
Are food fraud incidents being treated as criminal cases? In the first MSU- 
FFI Food Fraud Overview MOOC earlier this month, I briefly discussed this, 
and I want to follow up with examples and details here. It takes quite a bit for 
a US agency to pursue criminal charges when there are civil law options 
(Goldstone 2001). The burden of proof for a criminal case is much higher than 
for civil charges—and in many situations, even state-level civil cases can shut 
down a business and seize all assets, even when the business is not aware of 
the dangerous public health threat. For example, see the State of Alabama’s 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (AL Code 8-19-1 2017). This Alabama act is 
focused on protecting public health and welfare but also on protecting the 
legitimate innovative businesses that are trying to provide healthy lifestyle 
products: “Legislative intent – The public health, welfare, and interest require 
a strong and effective consumer protection program to protect the interest of 
both the consuming public and the legitimate businessperson.” Several key 
definitions from the Alabama law include (emphasis added):
• “GOODS: Includes but is not limited to any property, tangible or intangi-
ble, real, personal, or any combination thereof, and any franchise, license, 
distributorship, or other similar right, privilege, or interest.”
• “KNOW, KNOWING, KNOWINGLY, KNOWLEDGE, and KNEW: 
Either actual awareness or such awareness as a reasonable person should 
have considering all the surrounding circumstances.”
• “PERSON: Includes but is not limited to natural persons, corporations, 
trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations and any 
other legal entity.”
• “SALE, BUYING, and DISTRIBUTION: In addition to their ordinary 
meanings, include but are not limited to the act of leasing, renting, or 
consigning.”
• “SERVICES: Work, labor, and other services, including but not limited to 
services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods.”
• “TRADE or COMMERCE: Includes but is not limited to the advertising, 
buying, offering for sale, sale or distribution or performance of any service or 
goods, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situated 
and shall include any trade or commerce affecting the people of this state.”
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In a Packaging World Magazine article, legal guru Eric Greenberg discussed 
the criminal charges levied against the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA). 
The criminal charges are outlined in an indictment that is based on intent to 
defraud. One of those people charged already pleaded guilty, so the prosecu-
tion will probably have a willing witness. One broader law, the US Park 
Doctrine, states that charges can be brought against corporate leaders even if 
they didn’t know of the dangerous acts. In the PCA case, there is evidence that 
the leaders did know of the salmonella contamination, so other, more direct 
charges could be levied.
The PCA case highlights a concerning issue for food manufacturers and 
retailers where the fraudster actively seeks to avoid detection. Even in facili-
ties that are audited by competent auditors—even in unannounced inspec-
tions—the bad guys can find ways to hide their fraudulent operations, which 
is what happened when PCA intentionally transferred product from a noncer-
tified manufacturing plant to a certified one after inspections and then pre-
sented the goods as manufactured in a certified manufacturing plant.
Various types of criminal charges can apply. During the MOOC I men-
tioned what the US Customs has called “honey laundering.” This is where 
honey is transshipped from a country with a high tariff through a country with 
a lower tariff and labeled as coming from that low tariff country. The “origin 
laundering”—or “neutralization”—is the fraudulent and deceptive change of 
the country of origin on the label. The fraud opportunity for tax avoidance 
smuggling can be substantial. One honey case led to $180 million in profit 
from the avoided taxes (DOJ 2009; ICE 2010).
There is a public health vulnerability in smuggling for two reasons. First, 
in a product recall, it is not possible to trace the fraudulent honey…or, worse, 
if the traceability codes are incorrect, the wrong product might be recalled 
while the dangerous product remains in the marketplace (CACP 2006; Liang 
2006). Second, we lose transparency on the product itself (Roth et al. 2008). 
With the lack of transparency, there is an increased fraud opportunity to use 
unapproved or dangerous ingredients. At a minimum, the bad guys often get 
greedy and start adulterating the product to further increase their profits.
As was stated in the indictments, several of the food fraudsters did start 
adulterating the honey with sugar. In this instance, the perpetrators all knew 
they were committing a crime, so criminal charges were not a surprise—
though criminals don’t think they’ll get caught.
Regarding food fraud prevention, the takeaway is that we need to reduce 
the fraud opportunity regardless of whether we trust our suppliers or don’t 
think there is any logical reason for anyone to commit fraud. Regarding pro-
tecting your corporate leaders from being led out of your facility in handcuffs, 
be diligent in developing and supporting a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. 
Address “reasonably foreseeable hazards,” and your actions will reduce the 
potential charge of “willful blindness.”
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 Risk Analysis of the FFIS and FFVA: “The Assessment”
There is a need to further expand on how and why “risk analysis” is incorporated in 
the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle. The fraud opportunity is covered in detail in the 
Criminology chapter, and risk analysis and vulnerability assessments were covered 
in other chapters. The application and use within the cycle are not really two distinct 
steps as indicated but a continuum. When starting to review food fraud for the first 
time, a CEO/CFO/CRO may ask “generally, what are we looking at here? Not so 
bad or really bad?” Considering an analogy of checking the weather outside, the 
scale needed could be as broad as “will tomorrow be deathly hot or deathly cold?” 
Their question is not about resource-allocation decision-making yet but more of a 
mental set on what is to come. Also, if this is perceived as a potentially very impact-
ful activity, the C-suite may feel it is crucial to immediately update or warn the 
Board of Directors.
The most basic step is a very high-level prefilter or what Enterprise Risk 
Management refers to as an “initial screen”—for example, a Food Fraud Initial 
Screen (FFIS) (Spink et al. 2016). This is a review of all types of fraud and all 
products but at a very high level and with very quick assessments such as a small 
group of subject matter experts. At this point early in the process of reviewing the 
new risk, it is important to present a full and complete assessment—although pos-
sibly casual, uncertain, and un-robust—because the resource allocation decision-
maker can define how much (if any) more detail is needed. There are examples 
where countermeasures and control systems were approved after just a broad dis-
cussion of the fraud opportunity and brainstorming of some countermeasures and 
control systems.
Through the use of the cycle and the continuous review, there can be an assess-
ment of how much information—as well as the necessary level of accuracy, preci-
sion, and certainty—is needed. If the resource-allocation decision-maker has 
enough information, then that is the final specification. The resource-allocation 
decision-maker has the final say for how much information is enough to make a yes 
or no decision.
 Countermeasures: The Risk Treatment
Consideration of countermeasures and control systems should be reviewed each 
and every time a vulnerability assessment is conducted. The best time for innova-
tive and effective brainstorming is at that first point of awareness, but also it is the 
most dangerous time because an inefficient path and vision could be set. This also 
provides a great service to not only provide an updated vulnerability assessment but 
to already include ideas for countermeasures and control systems. When commu-
nicating problems to management, it is always best to present problems or a crisis 
alert accompanied by some possible responses. After a new incident, the updated 
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vulnerability can be presented as well as possible countermeasures and control 
systems that could get the situation within the risk tolerance.
To support this resource-allocation decision, the FFPC creates a method to 
review and explain countermeasures and control systems as well as utilizes the 
ERM and corporate risk map to explain “how much is enough?”
 Case Study: Peanut Allergen Adulterant—Substances in Ground Cumin
This example uses the peanut in cumin food fraud incident of a company who does 
not have an immediate food safety incident. If a food fraud team did find a health 
hazard from the peanut allergen in cumin, the immediate response would be to con-
tact the food safety or crisis management team. After confirming there is no imme-
diate health hazard for this product, an effective food fraud prevention team use of 
the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle could include:
• The information gathering step of scanning identifies a new issue of “peanut in 
Cumin.” Specifically, the employee who is responsible for scanning receives an 
alert that identifies the new information. The responsible employee considers 
whether they should alert the “food fraud team leader” or wait to present this new 
information at the next regular team meeting. (The team will need to calibrate 
what leads to an emergency meeting or what can wait.)
• The fraud opportunity step considers the new information. The new incident is 
reviewed in terms of the impact on the three components of victim, fraudster, and 
guardian and hurdle gaps.
• Then the vulnerability assessment is updated to include the refined fraud oppor-
tunity details.
• The Enterprise Risk Management developed a corporate risk map that is 
updated including a consideration of the updated risk rank.
 – If the new incident is plotted in the “unacceptable” range of the corporate risk 
map, then countermeasures and control system responses are developed. At 
this point, only possible projects are researched, and they will be reviewed 
later for a final decision.
• It is always good to consider countermeasures and control systems so, if any-
thing, the boss knows you’re already working on it and second to provide a very 
general idea of the effort for applying the risk treatment.
• The risk communication would be to review the new information that is pro-
vided to the resource-allocation decision-maker such as “A new food fraud inci-
dent of peanut in Cumin was identified. The [ways this could] impact on our 
company is”:
 – 1. “The incident does not fundamentally change how we understand our 
fraud opportunity, and the vulnerability is still in the “acceptable” range.”
 – 2. “The incident does fundamentally change the way we understand our 
fraud opportunity and the vulnerability is now in the “unacceptable range.” 
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Hopefully, to calm senior leaders, this should be followed with “the food 
fraud prevention team that is already meeting to consider and implement 
countermeasures and/or control systems within the policy and strategy that 
you have already approved. We will present more details as you require.””
 Conclusion
The previous Food Fraud Prevention Overview chapters established the foundation 
and need for the proactive, holistic, and all-encompassing approach. This chapter 
built upon that and presented how the prevention strategy is managed in a cycle that 
“connects everything to everything.” The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) 
builds upon that prevention concept to demonstrate a systematic approach that 
builds upon the fraud opportunity and connects to a resource-allocation decision- 
making function that is Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/COSO). The emphasis 
is that “It’s all about the ‘fraud opportunity.’” The first conclusion is that there is a 
need for a system that connects all the essential components together with a focus 
on prevention. The basic workings of the cycle include broad concepts from the 
gathering of information, assessing the root cause (the fraud opportunity), conduct-
ing assessments that address all types of fraud for all products that then calibrate 
those assessments with all other enterprise-wide risks, and finally enabling decision- 
making for the selection of countermeasures and control systems before cycling 
deeper through the process again. The second conclusion is that it is possible to 
create a systematic way of assessing and managing the Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy. A complex system cannot be efficiently or quickly implemented. There is 
a need to not build from the bottom up but to start with an approach that considers 
risks across the entire enterprise—all hazards approach for all types of fraud, all 
products, and all enterprise. The Food Fraud Prevention Strategy will then define—
based on the specific fraud opportunity and the unique risk tolerance of the enter-
prise—“how much is enough.” This was referred to as the “corkscrew approach.” 
The final conclusion is that the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy is first imple-
mented broadly but not deeply to then defines where to go deeper. The countermea-
sures and control systems will be drilled down such as the turning of a corkscrew. 
There is a saying:
Combating fraudsters is like a never-ending chess match of strategic moves and 
countermoves.
You can only trust as far back as you can trust (you may need to have the countermea-
sures and controls only focused on testing incoming good… but try to figure out how you 
can reduce the fraud opportunity by trying to dissuade the fraudster from actually attack-
ing you).
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Prevention Implementation
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all While it may seem overly complex at first, after review, the FFPC is a very 
simple “plan-do-check-act”-type method that “connects everything to 
everything”—and this starts at a high level and only goes as deep as you 
require.
Quality team This presented the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) and provided 
methods and case studies.
Auditors This provides more insight into the inner workings of the overall Food Fraud 
Prevention Strategy.
Management This is a presentation of the FFPC which is a very thorough and methodical 
approach.
Corp. 
decision-makers
The FFPC is an information management and business process coordination 
that could actually be used for any decision—but for now fully implement for 
food fraud so you have a working example.
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter.
 1. Discussion Question:
 (a) What is a “system of systems”?
 (b) How is a “vulnerability” different from a “risk”?
 (c) Why is the focus on “prevention” versus “mitigation” important?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is the “fraud opportunity”?
 (b) Must the FFPC be following in the specific sequence?
 (c) Who—or what group—decides whether a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy 
(FFPS) is complete or compliant?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) Define “vulnerability”?
 (b) Is the goal to completely eliminate vulnerabilities?
 (c) How is a vulnerability assessed or defined?
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 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What are “risk tolerance” and “risk appetite”?
 (b) On the FFPC, where is the “risk treatment” applied?
 (c) What is the relationship between an initial screen/prefilter and a detailed 
assessment?
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Chapter 6
Business Decision-Making and ERM/
COSO
Summary
This chapter presents the details of the business decision-making that is based on 
the managerial accounting regulatory requirements laid out in Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM). ERM is based on accounting principles developed by COSO 
(the Committee for the Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
that, itself, was created to add internal control requirements such as for the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of 2002). The overall resource-allocation decision-making is addressed 
under an enterprise-wide system such as the formal concept of “Enterprise Risk 
Management.”
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are:
• ‘(1) Introduction to Enterprise Risk Management: Introduce the concept of an 
enterprise-wide risk assessment method that “compares everything to every-
thing.” This allows an evaluation of this new risk in relation to all other risks and 
also to determine whether specifically above-defined “risk tolerance.”
• ‘(2) Applying ERM to Food Fraud Prevention: Then there are steps to apply the 
enterprise-wide methods specifically to a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
and to incorporate in a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
• ‘(3) Implementing an Iterative Process: Finally, there are methods and proce-
dures to implement an iterative process that continually evolves and innovates to 
more efficiently and effectively balance the evolving fraud opportunity in rela-
tion to the enterprise-specific risk tolerance.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the “(3) 
Vulnerability Assessments,” with “(4) Risk Rank” that is determined by the “(5) 
Enterprise- Wide Risk Assessment” (Fig. 6.1).
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 Introduction
Overall, businesses are financial entities judged by financial metrics. While the 
main focus of a food company is obviously on the food, ultimately they are a busi-
ness. The first level of regulation and controls are on business functions. There are 
specific and unique requirements for financial reporting. One of those requirements 
is for internal controls to manage and report risks.
Companies produce a product and sell into the markets. Some additional regula-
tions and controls focus on those details. Product-specific regulations would include 
the US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) and the US Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA). Market- or trade-related specific regulations would include 
import and export laws such as from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
World Customs Organization (WCO), or the likes of the US Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
Without this calibration at best you are relying on “someone else” to figure it 
out—and no one probably knows the problem better than you. The basic concepts 
are not private or confidential. These are common business practices that are taught 
in undergraduate university courses.
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
(B) Fundamental Concepts
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
Traceability
Investigation
or Audit
Testing
Fig. 6.1 Where this chapter applies Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to 
the overall concept: “(3) assessments” and “(4) enterprise risk rank.” (Copyright Permission 
Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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 Legal Requirements and “Opportunities”
Beyond the legal requirements, there are certifications or standards compliance to 
consider. For food safety, an example is the Food Safety Management System in the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) Guidance Document. While there are specific 
regulatory requirements for financial reporting, there are programs managed by an 
organization such as COSO (Committee of the Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission) who created Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to 
address US Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements specifically.
Companies are instructed to implicitly or explicitly create these monitoring sys-
tems by their stakeholders (e.g., owners would include shareholders who put in 
place a Board of Directors to oversee the corporate-level officers). While finance 
and securities laws regulate public companies, even private owners (e.g., individ-
uals, private equity firms, etc.) would also require some oversight and reporting 
mechanism. Investors don’t just give a billion dollars to a company and hope for 
the best—“good luck and see you in a year.” Ultimately all resource-allocation 
decision-making are accountable by the Board of Directors. Whether the frontline 
“business case” is in the same format or not, there is a central decision. Usually, 
there is a conversion of ERM concepts into everyday metrics—you might not be 
aware of your success measures integrated into the ERM system. There are two 
types of considerations to the decision with one being an increase in earnings (rev-
enue) and the other is the cost of operation (operational costs and managing risk). 
From COSO [emphasis added]:
Opportunities: the possibility that an event will occur and positively affect the achieve-
ment of objectives, supporting value creation [increase sales or profit] or preservation 
[reduce risks]. (COSO 2013)
A central enterprise-wide system is the control mechanism. For many companies 
that system is a formal Enterprise Risk Management system. This chapter will intro-
duce business resource-allocation decision-making and how food fraud (and all 
food risks) would fit into an ERM system (Fig. 6.2).
Risks 
(Costs) Opportunities 
(Revenue)
Fig. 6.2 Considerations for resource-allocation decision-making are a balance of increasing rev-
enue and controlling costs
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Enterprise-Wide Risk 
Management System
This section reviews the enterprise-wide management systems that connect from 
the frontline tactical resource-allocation decisions to calibrate all the way up to the 
strategic assessment within the “risk appetite” of the owners of the company. 
Whether to meet regulatory compliance—or just competent business practices—
these fully integrated mechanisms exist and are critical for a Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy.
The section focuses on the basics of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/COSO).
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) An overview of the legal, regulatory requirements for managerial accounting 
practices such as under the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM/COSO).
• (2) Consider internal controls to harmonize the way separate business units 
assess, report, and manage risks.
• (3) Examine the integrated framework that connects and calibrates the separate 
internal control procedures.
 COSO: Regulatory Compliance for Securities and Finance
Fortunately for Food Fraud Prevention, the enterprise-wide management structure 
concepts are already developed and include standards, training, certifications, and 
many case study examples. Whether formally published by COSO or in scholarly 
journals, there are many resources and examples. The key for Food Fraud Prevention 
is to leverage those processes to (1) use refined systems, (2) leverage current and 
already adopted regulatory training and certification, and (3) communicate clearly 
with financial group colleagues.
Regulatory compliance requires “a” process but not explicitly ERM/COSO. The 
requirement is an overall control system. It is important to explain the difference 
between “formal, full ERM regulatory compliance” and “ERM-like” systems. A 
full and formal ERM “compliance” can be extremely costly and resource intensive. 
This would cover all aspects of the corporation and all transactions. The system 
would include a comprehensive and formal audit of all internal controls and the 
integrated framework. An “ERM-like” system can apply the general principles. 
These general principles would integrate with any of the related systems.
From COSO (2013):
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, man-
agement and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed 
to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.
The definition reflects certain fundamental concepts. Enterprise risk management is:
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• A process, ongoing and flowing through an entity
• Effected by people at every level of an organization
• Applied in [during] a strategy setting
• Applied across the enterprise, at every level and unit, and includes taking an entity 
level portfolio view of risk
• Designed to identify potential events that, if they occur, will affect the entity and to 
manage risk within its risk appetite
• Able to provide reasonable assurance to an entity’s management and board of 
directors
• Geared to the achievement of objectives in one or more separate but overlapping 
categories.
This enterprise risk management framework is geared to achieving an entity’s objec-
tives, set forth in four categories:
• Strategic – high-level goals, aligned with and supporting its mission
• Operations – effective and efficient use of its resources
• Reporting – reliability of reporting
• Compliance – compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
There has been a benefit to assessing Food Fraud Vulnerability within an 
enterprise- wide framework even if there is currently no formal connection or cali-
bration to the corporate-level system was developed or connected. The foundation 
in regulations and standards provides confidence that the Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy is compatible with, and is compliant with, enterprise-wide regulatory 
financial and security compliance requirements. For example, the food fraud inci-
dents can be reviewed within a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment; the results of 
that assessment can be plotted on an unofficial corporate risk map. What is meant 
by “unofficial” is that—even without contact with chief executive officer, chief 
financial officer, chief risk officer (CEO/CFO/CRO), or enterprise risk team—the 
food risk assessors create what is believed to be the risk appetite in terms of very 
high to very low likelihood and consequence. By using the same system as the CEO/
CFO/CRO teams, they can use the assessment. Even if the risk ranks are not corre-
lated between the food fraud assessment and the enterprise-wide system, this is a 
baseline or starting point that can be adapted. For example, the food fraud measures 
of likelihood and consequence can be adapted and then vulnerability assessment 
re-calibrated. If done correctly and thoroughly, the Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment can be directly used in the ERM assessment.
While this may seem very formal and require additional steps, there is usually no 
need for a food safety or food fraud manager to be formally certified or trained in 
full ERM regulatory compliance.
The COSO/ERM concept and components are presented in “the COSO Cube” 
(Fig. 6.3) (COSO 2013).
The components of the COSO Cube include (COSO 2013):
 1. Internal Environment
 2. Objective Setting
 3. Event Identification (re, awareness of a food fraud incident, suspicious activity, 
or identified fraud opportunity)
 4. Risk Assessment (re, Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment)
 5. Risk Response (re, Food Fraud Prevention Strategy)
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 6. Control Activities (re, countermeasures and control systems),
 7. Information & Communication
 8. Monitoring (Re, a control system to continuously evaluate the evolving fraud 
opportunity)
The COSO Cube presents “components of enterprise risk management” in eight 
interrelated management components. This COSO Cube is an effective tool to 
explain this simplicity of connecting a new Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
into the enterprise-wide decision-making system. A new food fraud incident—or 
the first full Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment—would enter at the star on the 
front of the cube in the “Event Identification” component.
Event Identification: Internal and external events affecting achievement of an entity’s 
objectives must be identified, distinguishing between risks and opportunities. Opportunities 
are channeled back to management’s strategy or objective-setting processes. (COSO 2013)
Now that there is a specific component—or management function—to receive 
information on new “Event Identification,” there is now an “accountable” person 
and also a way to structure the information so it can actually be assessed in relation 
to all other enterprise-wide risks. After “Event Identification” the next step would be 
“risk assessment” and then a “risk response” decision that integrates information to 
and from the other sides of the cube including the four categories of objectives (e.g., 
strategic, operations, reporting, and compliance) and entity unit (e.g., entity-level 
(enterprise-wide), division (or operating company), business unit, and subsidiary.
Fig. 6.3 “COSO Cube” representation of the organization of activities and work functions—the 
“start” point for a new concern at the “strategic” and “event identification” point. (Copyright 
Permission Pending) (COSO 2013)
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Once the “enterprise-wide assessment” is added to the Food Fraud Prevention 
Cycle (FFPC), there is an actual decision-making system to evaluate “how much is 
enough.”
 Internal Controls: ERM and ERM-Like
In the USA, the major push for additional regulations occurred after incidents at 
Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat. In these examples, investors were defrauded 
which led to bankruptcy costing losses of $62 billion ($700 million of overstated 
profits), $136 billion ($3.8 billion misappropriated), and $20 billion ($17.6 billion 
in hidden losses) (Oppel and Sorkinnov 2001; Romero and Atlas 2002; Boland 
2008). Each company conducted fraudulent operations that circumvented the then 
current audit and control practices. The failures of these companies—among oth-
ers—contributed to the worldwide financial meltdown of 2001. Each of those three 
corporations went bankrupt, and the implications even extended to the corporate 
auditor companies such as Arthur Anderson.
The US securities and finance regulations expanded “internal controls” and an 
“integrated framework” to increase transparency of transactions and accountability 
of the individual leaders and managers. The regulations were successful in the sense 
that company employees have been prosecuted and sent to federal prison. Even if 
there is no prison sentence, most CEO/CFOs would rather not be convicted felons.
It is important to note that even though the regulatory requirement only applies 
to public companies, private and non-US companies usually have implemented 
similar controls.
• Internal control: “is a process effected by an entity’s board of directors, man-
agement, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regard-
ing the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and 
compliance” (COSO 2013).
• Integrated framework: “The original framework has gained broad acceptance 
and is widely used around the world. It is recognized as a leading framework for 
designing, implementing, and conducting internal control and assessing the 
effectiveness of internal control. […] The Framework will enable organizations 
to effectively and efficiently develop and maintain systems of internal control 
that can enhance the likelihood of achieving the entity’s objectives and adapt to 
changes in the business and operating environments” (COSO 2013).
Other related COSO glossary terms are below (note the similarity and harmoni-
zation with ISO 31000 Risk Management):
• “Inherent risk—the risk to an entity in the absence of any action management 
might take to alter either the risk’s likelihood or impact.”
• “Residual risk—the remaining risk after management has taken action to alter 
the risk’s likelihood or impact.”
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• “Risk appetite—the board-based amount of risk a company or another entity is 
willing to accept in pursuit of its mission (or a vision).”
• “Risk tolerance—the acceptable variation relative to the achievement of an 
objective.”
Other related COSO concepts that demonstrate the application to Food Fraud 
Prevention include (COSO 2013):
• Enhancing risk response decisions: Is a risk tolerable? How do you know? Who 
would dare to let a risk remain in a business operation? ERM provides a way to 
measure and calibrate new or changing risks.
• Reducing operational surprises and losses: By creating a system to look at all 
current risks and potential vulnerabilities—and monitor changes—the enterprise 
works to move quickly. An example is that before the subprime lending crisis of 
2007, several financial firms such as Goldman Sachs shifted out of investments 
that eventually crashed (Taleb 2007). With an ERM-type system, the vulnerabili-
ties were evaluated to have increased above their “risk appetite.”
• Identifying and managing multiple and cross-enterprise risks: Supporting the 
previous item, the enterprise-wide system helps evaluate a wide variety of risks 
and vulnerabilities within one system. For example, is it a better investment to 
hire two new salespeople or put in a metal detector at a plant? Without an 
enterprise- wide system, these two could not be quantitatively or analytically 
compared.
• Seizing opportunities: A company can become crippled if they feel they must 
address every risk. An ERM system helps evaluate the optimal amount of risk 
which frees up resources to pursue new or expanding revenue.
• Improving deployment of capital: Building on seizing opportunities, and out-
side the risk management, is creating a general mechanism to evaluate all finan-
cial and capital resource-allocation. New or different measures could be used 
such as value at risk (VaR) or return on capital employed (ROCE).
ERM/COSO is a critical part of Food Fraud Prevention Strategy since it provides 
a frame for assessing the risk, making decisions, integrating with other enterprise- 
wide systems, and organizing the activities.
 ERM/COSO: Connect Everything to Everything
The ERM system provides internal controls and an integrated framework to increase 
transparency and accountability. The processes work to “connect everything to 
everything.” Each step in the process reviews the other steps—horizontally across a 
function or vertically from the front line to the board.
It is important to note that even if/when ERM systems are in place, they may not 
be evident to everyone across the enterprise. We have several instances where we 
have heard “we don’t do ERM.” Then later—and sometimes later in the same meet-
ing—someone says “yes we do, we just don’t show you those charts!” The assess-
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ment and judgment would be extremely commercially sensitive and actually not 
helpful for day-to-day decision-making for many organizations “as-is.” Also, the 
overall ERM assessment would include a very broad range of risks. For example, a 
food safety group would not provide data or analysis of employee kidnapping 
threats, but that doesn’t mean those risks are not real or important.
In reality, the board-level ERM assessments are comprised of a series of con-
nected measures or activities. The overall ERM charts or questions are reduced to 
specific questions or data requirements from the specific operations or functions. 
Thus, the food safety group probably does provide quarterly statements about food 
safety risks, sometimes even with a requirement for the statement to be notarized. 
These statements feed upwards to a more formal ERM statement. The Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act requires a quarterly statement that is referred to as the 10-Q and an annual 
statement in 10-K.
The ERM system would include assessments and audits, and then the assess-
ments and audits, themselves, would occasionally be audited.
The bottom line for the Board of Directors or CEO is that (1) a monitoring pro-
cess is in place, and (2) the process is competently implemented adapted. A formal 
Food Fraud Prevention Strategy is becoming required to meet that compliance goal.
Sidebar: Fraud in Fraud Assessments—Intentionally Over- or 
Underestimation
Reportedly the guru investor Warren Buffett said “don’t ask a barber if you 
need a haircut.” The barber has a vested interest in the outcome of the analy-
sis. The authors of the Freakonomics books would refer to this as the “influ-
ence of incentives” (Levitt and Dubner 2014). The same is understood to be 
for fraud assessments. This is often hard to even comprehend since most 
people think they make rational, fact-based decisions, without emotion or bias 
(see sidebar on “How (Un) Ethical Are you?”).
• Overestimate Fraud Opportunity: A manager who is trying to get pro-
moted or grow their group has an incentive or personal benefit to overesti-
mate the fraud opportunity. A higher fraud opportunity would lead to more 
high-profile projects, bigger budget, and more direct report employees to 
supervise.
• Underestimate Fraud Opportunity: A manager who is near retirement 
or not looking for more work may underestimate the fraud opportunity not 
to increase their work.
In both cases, the enterprise is at risk. In the first case, the enterprise over- 
invests in prevention and has fewer funds to pursue new markets or prod-
ucts—sacrificing revenue-generating opportunities. In the second case, the 
enterprise is exposed to strategic risks.
The internal framework concept includes an awareness of this inherent 
conflict and puts processes in place to calibrate the risk assessments. 
Essentially the internal controls look for fraud in fraud assessments.
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Sidebar: Detail of an ERM/COSO Corporate Risk Map that Is 
Expanded to Include Both Risks and Opportunities
From COSO publications, the range of risks are presented on a “Combined 
Risk and Opportunity Map” where (Fig. 6.4) (COSO 2012). They state “This 
allows a direct comparison of the highest rated opportunities and risks for 
consideration and prioritization” (COSO 2012). Essentially, the costs of 
reducing risks are balanced with investments that increase revenue. It is 
important to note that the optimal risk level is not “zero risk.” There is an 
important balance between managing operational risk and investing in the 
business.
Illustrative Combined Risk and Opportunity Map Continuum
Risks (Costs) Opportunities (Revenue)
Likelihood
(of risk reduction)
Likelihood 
(of financial gain)
ecneuqesnoC
Very 
High
High Medium Low Very 
Low
Very 
Low
Low Medium High Very 
High
Very 
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High
Medium
Low
Very 
Low
A
B
C
D
Fig. 6.4 ERM/COSO Combined Risk and Opportunity Map with examples. Note: The risks 
above the “risk tolerance” (the general range in red and orange such as point “A”) are either 
reduced or managed (to at least the point “B”). The investments that reduce the risks are balanced 
with the opportunities to increase revenue or profit margin. The revenue-generating opportunities 
include a range from low confidence/low benefit (“C”) to high confidence/high benefit (“D”). 
(Copyright Permission Granted from Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). All rights reserved. Used with permission) (Base adapted from COSO 
(2012) and examples are new)
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These ERM/COSO principles and practices help create a foundation for 
resource-allocation decision-making. Once these are understood and imple-
mented, then the next Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment results can be 
plotted and determine what are “acceptable” what are “unacceptable.” Without 
this type of method to “connect everything to everything,” then “how much is 
enough” is a guess and does not have a measure of success. The Combined 
Risk and Opportunity Map is important to understand the process for resource- 
allocation decision-making. When this is better understood by the risk asses-
sors and risk managers, then more efficient and effective countermeasures and 
control systems can be proposed and selected.
Sidebar: “How Much Is Enough?” and Optimal Risk-Taking
“How much is enough” is often a type of threshold that is calculated within a 
managerial accounting standardized system such as by COSO in their 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/COSO) (COSO 2012). COSO explains 
that there is a “sweet spot” of “optimal risk-taking” (Fig. 6.5) (COSO 2012).
From COSO publications, the risks are plotted on a “risk map” or “heat 
map” (Fig. 6.6) (COSO 2012).
From COSO publications, the risks are plotted on a “risk map” or “heat 
map” (COSO 2012).
COSO then provides guidance on how to “assess risk”:
"eulaV
esirpetnnE
detepxE"
Risk Level - <expand 	tle from COSO>
Risk Level
Sweet Spot
Fig. 6.5 An example of the “sweet spot” of the ideal risk tolerance for an enterprise—optimal 
risk-taking with the identification of the “sweet spot.” (Copyright Permission Granted, Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). All rights reserved. Used with 
permission) (Adapted from COSO (2012))
(continued)
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Assessing risks consists of assigning values to each risk and opportunity using the 
defined criteria. This may be accomplished in two stages where an initial screening 
of the risks is performed using qualitative techniques followed by a more quantita-
tive analysis [detailed assessment] of the most important risks. (COSO 2012)
Thus, the decision of “how much is enough” of a risk treatment is sup-
ported by ERM/COSO identification of a “sweet spot” of “optimal risk- 
taking” and supported by a presentation on a corporate risk map.
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Fig. 6.6 Adapted from 
COSO, an “illustrative heat 
map” where the dots 
represent a risk and the 
size of the dots represent 
the speed of onset (Note: 
the term impact was 
adapted to the ISO 31000 
terminology of 
consequence)
Sidebar: The Influence of Michael Porter and Corporate Strategy
Michael Porter is considered the “father of corporate strategy.” His major 
work that summarized the overall “Competitive Strategy” was published in 
1984 (this is covered in more detail in the other chapter on Market and 
Competitors) (Porter 1980). This work creates an overall theory to consider 
markets, how companies position products and services, as well as how com-
panies manage or monitor the changing internal and external landscape. His 
follow-up book “Competitive Advantage” provides more focus on imple-
menting the concept to achieve success (Porter 1985).
Key concepts from Porter that support the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy 
include:
• Identify the business functions.
• Measure and calibrate risks and rewards.
• Provide an overall perspective on optimizing decision-making.
Overall, there is an advantage—a strategic advantage as well as effi-
ciency—of considering “fraudsters” or “counterfeiters” as a competitor. The 
fraudsters generally make business decisions based on macro (global-level 
trends) or micro (local or individual attributes) factors that are essentially cor-
porate strategic decision-making. Essentially, the bad guys use the same 
decision- making theory as the good guys.
It is also a strategic decision to mention Porter’s theories since he was a 
guru from the mid-1980s to the end of 1990s. He influenced a lot of business 
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academic thinkers and students. The age of those students would now be in 
their mid-50s to mid-60s and who are probably leading your companies or 
agencies. Since those resource-allocation decision-makers will recognize the 
terminology and theories of Michael Porter, his concepts are an important 
anchor for explaining the food fraud problem.
Sidebar: Information Requirement of How Much Is Enough?
Regarding how much information to gather and how to present the assess-
ment, an important question is “how much is enough”? The answer is as 
much—or little—as the resource-allocation decision-maker needs to make a 
decision. In some cases, they may have enough information to make a deci-
sion then; obviously, no further assessment is needed. Sometimes a simple 
review or story can lead to an instant decision. Since a resource-allocation 
decision often needs more information, to provide more structure to the pro-
cess, there is usually a need for a more systematic review of the proposal.
There were two major theoretical new breakthroughs for Food Fraud 
Prevention that frame the question by examining (1) the root cause (2) the 
decision-making process, which will then define the (3) risk treatment needed.
To address this need and the first step in understanding the root cause, a 
first Food Fraud Prevention innovation was to expand from food science to 
apply the Criminology theory of Situational Crime Prevention. The second 
innovation was to apply managerial accounting and decision sciences to 
understand the process to determine “how much is enough.” Finally, after an 
understanding of the root cause and an awareness of the decision-making pro-
cess, the countermeasure and control system risk treatments can be consid-
ered. To not, a countermeasure or control system could be food authenticity 
testing, market monitoring, enhanced traceability, stronger supplier agree-
ments, expanded investigation and enforcement, and others.
For a wide range of industries, this “last” step of selecting countermea-
sures and control systems was informal, at best, and frequently a random pro-
cess that was a reaction to a single incident. For example, after a counterfeit 
incident or lawsuit, a company might figure they need to do “something,” but 
they do not have a systematic way to identify “how much is enough?” 
Sometimes the decision might be made by the General Counsel to consider 
“how much do we need to do to not look bad?” In other instances, a certain 
budget amount may be allocated such as “spend no more than one million 
dollars.” In both cases, there would not be a systematic approach. There is no 
systematic way to judge what level of effort would be “enough to not look 
bad,” and there was also no real rationale as for why spending one million 
dollars (or whatever) was the optimal resource-allocation.
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Applying Enterprise Risk 
Management to Food Fraud Risk
This section reviews the ERM concepts of risk appetite and a corporate risk map 
which creates a theoretical leap for Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (FFPS). Before 
including these concepts, the assessments were stand-alone, not comparable to 
other risks, and that led to decisions that usually either stalled or way over- or 
underinvested.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Introduce the concept of risk appetite as a measure of a threshold.
• (2) Consider the two-stage process for the ERM assessment approach of first an 
initial screening and then a detailed assessment when needed.
• (3) Review these concepts in relation to business economic crimes.
 Risk Appetite and Corporate Risk Map
An overarching objective of ERM/COSO is to create an internal framework to con-
sider all risks across the entire enterprise. The goal is to seek and monitor even the 
most unlikely or unknown threats to the business. The overall ERM activity requires 
a center point to support decision-making to “connect everything to everything.” 
Each resource-allocation decision is evaluated with every other decision in relation 
to the financial goals—the financial goals include a “risk appetite” defined by the 
owners through their proxy, the Board of Directors. To note, the “owners” could be 
individuals who own mutual funds or individual stocks in their retirement accounts—
those individuals expect a consistent rate of return and level of risk that they expect 
the Board of Directors to assure. The ERM system evaluates these risks on a “cor-
porate risk map.”
When applying ERM, the problem is presented in a way that it can be sys-
tematically evaluated in relation to other enterprise-wide concerns. Basically, 
ERM helps assess this risk in relation to other risks.
In every—emphasis on “each and every time”—a new incident or problem 
is identified; it should be run through a systematic review that includes:
‘(1) A review of the suspicious activity (such as using the Food Fraud 
Suspicious Activity Report method—FFSAR (Spink et al. 2019)
‘(2) Conduct a vulnerability assessment.
‘(3) Then plot the problem on the corporate risk map.
Until this review is conducted, it is not defined as to whether the problems 
are unacceptable or shifts to outside the risk tolerance.
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While the exact single “corporate risk map” may not exist—or be so commer-
cially sensitive that it is considered extremely confidential and made public or dis-
tributed widely—this is an effective way to present a novel risk such as food fraud.
The most important result of implementing enterprise-wide risk management is 
defining the “risk appetite” and presenting the risks on a “corporate risk map” 
(COSO 2013). Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a process to assist resource- 
allocation decision-making “…designed to identify potential events that may affect 
the entity, and manage risk to be within the risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” (MSU-FFI 2017).
Traditional food safety risk assessors often do not realize that many of the “lim-
its” are actually a qualitative judgment of a vulnerability-defined point. While there 
may be a quantitative measure, the determination of that limit may have been more 
arbitrary. There were defined limits for food safety such as (1) the legal 5-log reduc-
tion or (2) scientifically based appropriate level of protection (ALOP) or appropriate 
level of sanitary protection (ALOSP) (WTO 1995; CODEX 2003) or a defined food 
safety objective (FSO) (Buchanan 2007, 2016). For example, the US FDA Juice 
HACCP guidance requires a 5-log kill step (evidence that there is a manufacturing 
step that reduces the prevalence of pathogens by five orders of magnitudes). Why 
exactly is 5-log required? Is a 4.9-log reduction 100% lethal, and 5.1-log is 100% 
safe? Why not decide on a 4-log or 6-log requirement?
Sidebar: Introduction to Food Risk Assessments
This is an excerpt from the report “Applying Enterprise Risk Management to 
Food Fraud Prevention” (MSU-FFI 2017).
It is essential to review the concept of “risk” and an “optimal level” that is 
referred to as “risk tolerance” or “risk threshold.” Many Food Scientists and 
food safety managers use the term “risk” to define a point of the unacceptable 
or intolerable level. In Codex Alimentarius (CODEX) this is defined as an 
“Appropriate Level Of Protection” or ALOP. More broadly – including by 
statisticians, data scientists, and business decision-makers – risks are not all 
bad; it is usually inefficient or impractical to eliminate all risks. A company or 
agency that is operating with too-little risk is usually inefficient in meeting the 
overall objectives set by its stakeholders. There are situations of “insufficient 
risk-taking” that are the opposite of “excessive risk-taking.” To use US FDA 
terminology, there are “hazards,” and only some of those are “hazards that 
require a preventive control.” From COSO:
The Risk Assessment Process: Within the COSO ERM framework, risk assessment 
follows event identification and precedes risk response. Its purpose is to assess how 
big the risks are, both individually and collectively, in order to focus management’s 
attention on the most important threats and opportunities and to lay the groundwork 
for risk response. Risk assessment is all about measuring and prioritizing risks so 
that risk levels are managed within defined tolerance thresholds without being over- 
controlled or forgoing desirable opportunities. (COSO 2012)
(continued)
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This excerpt provided insight on an introduction to risk assessments within the 
ERM/COSO principles.
Fig. 6.7 Example of a quarterly submission 10-Q form (Kellogg Company 2017)
In this COSO report “risk” is used as a negative or positive uncertain out-
come which is different from the traditional food safety concept of an “unac-
ceptable risk” or a “hazard that requires a preventive control.” This ALOP 
threshold could be referred to as an “optimal” level of risk. Several important 
points are:
• Not all vulnerabilities are risks
• Not all risks are hazards
• Not all hazards are the FSMA type “hazards that require a preventive 
control.”
A risk is not always bad, or a negative result but uncontrolled risk-taking is 
unacceptable.
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Sidebar: The Sarbanes-Oxley Personal Statements by the CEO and 
CFO
The legal, regulatory document required by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission referred to as an annual submission is referred to as a “10-K 
form” and a quarterly submission which is a “10-Q form” (see Fig.  6.7) 
(MSU-FFI 2017) citing (Kellogg Company 2017). The submission includes 
personal signed statements by the CEO and CFO for both the 10-Q form and 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance (see Figs. 6.7 and 6.8). They are legal and formal 
statements publically available that are the base for the required corporate 
“annual report to shareholders.”
The Sarbanes-Oxley requirements are very explicit and, as the signed 10-K 
forms demonstrate, very personal. Your CEO and CFO are held accountable, 
and they, then, hold the businesses accountable. You might argue “that’s not 
my job” or “I thought someone else was doing that,” … however, that’s not 
very convincing. If you are responsible for Food Fraud Prevention compli-
ance, you are responsible for making sure your company addresses all types 
of fraud and for all products.
Fig. 6.8 Signed Sarbanes-Oxley compliance from the CEO (Kellogg Company 2017)
 Key Learning Objective 2: Applying Enterprise Risk Management to Food Fraud Risk
204
 Assessments of ERM/COSO Initial Screening and Detailed 
Assessment
As mentioned, ERM is a thorough, precise, and formal method. The COSO princi-
ples are clearly defined and presented in many formal publications. These publica-
tions define a “two-stage process continuum from a quick, qualitative ‘initial 
screening’ which is ‘…followed by a more quantitative analysis of the most impor-
tant risks’ (COSO 2012). The goal of the initial screen, or pre-filter, is to produce a 
quick and simple assessment before additional detailed requirements are defined by 
the resource-allocation decision-maker. In many cases the initial screening may be 
enough for a decision – for the specific decision at hand, the resource-allocation 
decision-maker (e.g., CFO, CRO, CEO, etc. or their proxy) defined the required 
level of accuracy, precision, and certainty.”
The continuum could be from one vulnerability assessment for the entire enter-
prise all the way to the other extreme of one for each supplier/product/manufactur-
ing location (Fig. 6.9).
For even a moderately sized company, they could have 300 suppliers with an 
average of 10 products per supplier and possibly an average of 3 manufacturing 
plants for each product. The most detailed implementation in this company would 
result in conducting an impractical 9000 vulnerability assessments.
It is most efficient to address all types of food fraud at the same time and in the 
same system. The enterprise must address all of these risks. “All types of food fraud 
can result in enterprise-wide risks so an enterprise risk management system must 
cover all types of vulnerabilities. The model developed in this paper addresses the 
unmet need for the first stage referred to here as the Food Fraud Initial Screening 
(FFIS)” (Spink et al. 2016).
While the desired outcome for risk mitigation planning are detailed vulnerability assess-
ments, broader initial screening can make the process much more manageable. Often a 
detailed, by-individual-product assessment is not practical due to the nature of the risk, the 
time allotted, or the detail needed for resource-allocation decision-making. (Spink et al. 
2016)
One Assessment
Enterprise Wide
All Variations in-
between 
One Assessment 
for each Supplier-
Product-Location
Initial Screen Detailed Assessment
Fig. 6.9 Example of the continuum of the two-stage process for ERM risk assessment including 
from one initial screen for the entire enterprise through to one assessment for each supplier- 
product- manufacturing plant
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Based on many factors—including the level of risk, cost of countermeasures and 
control systems, and certainty of the incident data, regulatory scrutiny, and vulner-
ability of the end consumer—different levels of assessments may be appropriate for 
different products. For example, “salt” may be able to be addressed with one overall 
initial screen for the entire corporation whereas due to many concerns “iodized salt 
for infant formula” may require a more detailed vulnerability assessment by source 
country, supplier, manufacturing plant, and transportation mode.
 Overview of Business Economic Crimes Including Fraud
It is logical that food fraud, product fraud, and product counterfeiting have not 
been a primary focus of business economic crime or fraud investigations. The nature 
of the food fraud risk and root cause are so different from that of the other types of 
business fraud problems and that the current investigation or auditing fundamentals 
do not apply. A review of the types of business fraud often includes the likes of 
(PWC 2007, 2016):
 1. “Asset misappropriation including embezzlement and deception by employees
 2. Accounting fraud either to benefit the enterprise or a specific business function
 3. Corruption and bribery including racketeering and extortion
 4. Money laundering of a wide range of revenues
 5. IP infringement (a general category for Intellectual Property related issues) 
including trademarks, patents, counterfeit products and services, industrial espi-
onage, etc.”
The first four would be investigated using forensic accounting and forensic 
audits. The investigation processes for these four are traditional accounting audits, 
whereas the fifth requires completely different activities, expertise, and skills. The 
fifth is a catch-all category for all intellectual property infringement beyond trade-
mark and patent where the investigation would include market monitoring, field 
investigations, or other analysis.
The first four types of business fraud generally occur within the company or at 
least at their facilities. The audits would occur inside those proprietary known 
locations or on those known computer systems. The fifth category of incidents prob-
ably occurs outside the company facilities and proprietary computer systems.
Also, the first four occur on a relatively frequent basis, and the methods of 
responses are very similar. Known assessment methods or standard operating pro-
cedures could be used to investigate the incidents. For the fifth, there sometimes 
appears to be as many types of fraud incidents as there are fraudsters.
Finally, for the first four, there is a lot of research, data, and analysis of the quan-
titative, analytical assessment of how much occurs. There are specific methods to 
analyze the extent of the economic impact. For the fifth, the losses are often unknown 
and possibly unknowable. There is even debate on the confidence in estimates of the 
economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy, see OECD (2007). Also, there is 
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uncertainty as to how much an IP infringement actually costs the company. There is 
reduced legal liability if someone is injured—as long as the offending product can 
be confirmed a counterfeit. Also, even lost sales are hard to quantify since abnor-
mally low prices attract some buyers (e.g., a bulk product “near expiration” and 
“selling at a deep discount”) or some consumers actually seek counterfeit products 
(e.g., fake luxury goods).
 How (Un-)Ethical Are You?
What a question. This was the title of a 2003 Harvard Business Review article by 
Max Bazerman. The article essentially reviews and defines how we are not aware of 
our own sources of bias. This is an essential concept for Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessments. Our own “sources of bias” severely endanger our objectivity when 
conducting risk assessments.
Key biases that cloud our judgment include:
• “The illusion of objectivity”: we believe that what we know is right and objec-
tive. If you’ve been in “food safety” for a “long time,” then you think you’ve seen 
everything. Regarding food fraud, an example is an analytical chemist trying to 
conduct an authenticity test on stolen goods. Stolen goods are illegal, unfit for 
commerce, subject to a recall, could be mishandled, and become a health hazard, 
and they are a major concern for a company. That said, an authenticity test would 
only confirm the product is authentic but nothing about being stolen.
• “Lack of awareness”: Combining the previous concepts, we frequently find a 
lack of awareness of the business process from other operations or divisions. We 
frequently heard “we don’t do ERM” only to hear later—sometimes years—“oh, 
we have an ERM manager.”
• “Narrow focus”: “It’s not my problem.” Business is busy enough that we don’t 
need to go looking for work… or, we don’t want to go looking for more work. 
When new concepts are presented, there is often a belief that “someone else must 
be addressing this.” Or “if we don’t have a process, then it must not be important.”
Early in the development of Food Fraud Prevention as a separate research con-
cept, there were repeated statements that the FDA 2009 definition of “economically 
motivated adulteration” already covered everything. Also, there was a belief that the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act already covered everything in the “Adulterated 
Foods” and the “Misbranded Foods” sections. There is a difference between all 
types of food fraud being illegal and the regulations promoting a preventive 
approach. There is a difference between addressing the food safety health hazards 
that result versus addressing all food fraud vulnerabilities.
When applying the FDA EMA working definition in relation to the FDCA defini-
tion of what was actually illegal, there were three revelations occurred:
• (1) Economically motivated “adulteration” (a “substance” only) was different 
from “adulterated” as defined in the FDCA Adulterated Foods section (any prob-
lem including spoilage of genuine product or stolen goods).
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• (2) The food adulteration laws administered by FDA prioritized on health haz-
ards and did not consider unique root causes that could be addressed with a pre-
ventive control.
• ‘(3) The laws and regulations were focused on compliance and not prevention (of 
course, increased compliance or enforcement penalties had a secondary motiva-
tion to persuade companies to prevent).
Building on the Bazerman concepts are “confirmatory bias” and “trust-bias.”
• “Confirmatory bias”—We seek confirmation for our beliefs… then we often 
conduct no more additional research. Once we find one article or report that sup-
ports our view, then we feel we’ve “researched” it.
The application to food fraud is that when other researchers or risk assessors 
heard those statements that “everything is already covered,” they stopped looking 
and thinking… done and now move on to the next thing.
• “Truth bias” or “Truthiness”—We trust the people we know (Levine et  al. 
1999; Alba and Hutchinson 2000; Lapinski and Levine 2000; Park et al. 2002; 
Skurnik et al. 2005; Levine 2014; Levine et al. 2014; Van Swol et al. 2015). Or, to 
consider it from another perspective, when we’ve had a long history of experience 
with someone, then we feel we have no reason to mistrust the people we know. 
We trust people whom we know, are familiar with, and have interacted with for a 
long time. We can’t imagine we would cheat people we know, so we project that 
value system on other people who are around us. There is a comfort in the known. 
We aren’t aware of a problem so everything must be ok. Right? Also, there is a 
danger or risk of finding out that our present decisions have been sloppy, danger-
ous, or incompetent. We don’t seek problems especially when they could hurt us.
Thus, understanding how and why there is bias, we can present new risks such as 
food fraud into a frame that can be understood and directly addressed. It is impor-
tant to understand not only how other people behave and abuse trust but also in how 
we are biased in our own assessments. This is extremely complex. To reduce the 
complexity, it is efficient to “take morals and ethics out of the equation” and only 
focus on the “fraud opportunity.” Regardless of the environment or the adversaries, 
“if there’s a fraud opportunity then there’s a fraud opportunity.” Considering this 
human nature and our biases can help shift focus to very effective and efficient risk 
treatments that are in control of the guardians (for more on guardians and guardian-
ship, see the chapter on Criminology).
 Key Learning Objective 3: Iterative Process or Mitigating 
Food Fraud Risk Using ERM
This section reviews the interdisciplinary nature of prevention by considering how 
the fraud opportunity is created and the many academic disciplines that help under-
stand the selection of optimal countermeasures and control systems.
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Detail of ERM by a further review of the COSO Cube
• (2) Integrating ERM concepts into quality assurance and food safety standard 
operating procedures
• (3) Examples of applying ERM to Food Fraud Prevention resource-allocation 
decisions
 COSO Cube in Detail
COSO has presented the ERM concepts in what is referred to as the “COSO Cube” 
(above, see Fig. 6.3). This is a way to explain how all the control activities interre-
late. This is also a visual representation of the process to explain how food fraud 
assessments and reporting is connected with the enterprise. This is a clear way to 
explain how the overall processes fit together.
For Food Fraud Prevention, the COSO Cube provides a visual identification of 
where and how the Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment fits into the overall, 
enterprise- wide assessment. The “risk assessment” entry point is a place for the new 
assessment to be correlated and calibrated with other enterprise-wide risks. The 
ERM system can provide a structure and process for assessing the new risk in a way 
that it can be seamlessly integrated into the overall enterprise-wide decision-making 
system.
The original COSO Cube was 3 × 5 (and later expanded to 4 × 8) and included 
three sides: front, top, and side (COSO 2013):
• Front: The front consists of the control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities. These are 
five separate processes that create an interconnected hierarchy. For Food Fraud 
Prevention, the entry point is at the risk assessment.
• Top: The top consists of operations, reporting, and compliance. These are three 
separate activities. For Food Fraud Prevention, this would remain in the risk 
assessment/reporting cell.
• Side: The side expands across the enterprise from an entity (corporation), divi-
sion, operating unit, and function. For Food Fraud Prevention, until the overall 
Food Fraud Prevention Strategy is developed and implemented, the focus is on 
the strategic and entity-level. In many cases and unless there are some local 
anomalies, an entity-level Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) is 
acceptable for each level of the entity.
When considering the overall concept of the COSO Cube, next there is a consid-
eration of the relationship between objectives and components.
A direct relationship exists between objectives, components, and the organiza-
tional structure of the entity. Although they are not actually noted on the cube, these 
are fundamental concepts that explain the working of the cube.
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• Objectives: The three categories of objectives—operations, reporting, and com-
pliance—are represented by the columns. These are what an entity strives to 
achieve.
• Components: The rows represent the eight components: Control environment, 
risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and moni-
toring activities. These represent what is required to achieve the objectives.
• Structure: The third dimension represents an entity’s organizational structure: 
Entity level, division, operation, and function.
Sidebar: Integrated Framework Between the Organizational Structure
The “internal controls” are the process to review, manage, and communicate 
risks. The “integrated framework” is the process for each level of the organi-
zation to calibrate and coordinate the internal controls (Fig. 6.10).
How this report can be used depends on the roles of the interested parties 
(COSO 2013) (emphasis added for “accountable” and “responsible” 
persons):
• The Board of Directors—“The board should discuss with senior manage-
ment the state of the entity’s system of internal control and provide over-
sight as needed. Senior management is accountable for internal control and 
to the board of directors, and the board needs to establish policies and 
expectations of how members should provide oversight of the entity’s 
Board
C-Suite: CEO, 
CFO, CRO
Senior 
Management
Other 
Management
Associations, 
Academics, 
Consultants, Other
Internal 
Auditors
External 
Auditors
“Accountable” for 
making sure the internal 
controls are in place and 
effective
Integrated 
Framework
“Responsible” for 
implementing the
internal controls
Fig. 6.10 Relationship between the internal controls (within business functions) and integrated 
framework (between functions)
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internal control.” Also, “The board should challenge management and ask 
the tough questions, as necessary, and seek input and support from internal 
auditors, external auditors, and others.”
• Senior Management (including C-suite of CEO, CFO, CRO, or their rep-
resentatives or proxies): “Senior management should assess the entity’s 
system of Internal Controls in relation to the Integrated Framework, focus-
ing on how the organisation applies the seventeen [ERM] principles in 
support of the components of internal control.”
• Other Management and Personnel: “Managers and other personnel… 
should consider how they are conducting their responsibilities in light of 
the Integrated Framework and discuss with [other] senior personnel ideas 
for strengthening Internal Controls. More specifically they should consider 
how existing controls affect the relevant principles within the components 
of Internal controls [presented in the COSO Cube]” (COSO 2013).
• Internal Auditors [1st- or 2nd-party auditors]: “Internal auditors should 
review their internal audit plans and how they applied the 1992 edition of 
the framework. Internal auditors also should review in detail the changes 
made to this version and consider possible implications of those changes 
on audit plans, evaluations, and any reporting on the entity’s system of 
internal control” (COSO 2013).
• Independent Auditors [2nd- or 3rd-party auditors]: “In some jurisdic-
tions [such as for GFSI related certification], an independent auditor is 
engaged to audit or examine the effectiveness of the client’s Internal 
Controls over financial reporting in addition to auditing the entity’s finan-
cial statements. Auditors can assess the entity’s system of Internal Controls 
in relation to the Integrated Framework, focusing on how the organization 
has selected, developed, and deployed controls that affect the principles 
within the components of Internal Controls. Auditors, similar to manage-
ment, may use the Illustrative Tools as part of this evaluation of the overall 
effectiveness of the entity’s system of internal control” (COSO 2013).
• Other Professional Organizations and Educators/Academia:
 – Other Professional Organizations: “Other professional organizations 
providing guidance on operations, reporting, and compliance may con-
sider their standards and guidance in comparison to the Integrated 
Framework” (COSO 2013).
 – Educators/Academia: “With the presumption that the Integrated 
Framework attains broad acceptance, its concepts and terms should find 
their way into university curricula” (COSO 2013).
Each of the interested parties has a role in the further development of inter-
nal controls as well as the strengthening of the integrated framework. Each 
interested party has a role in holding the other parties accountable for their 
responsibilities.
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 Integration with Standard Operating Procedures 
and Terminology
When presenting a new concept or theory, it is most efficient to anchor or root the 
resource-allocation decision-maker to some known and accepted concept. For 
example, if Food Fraud Prevention is presented as:
• “HACCP but for Food Fraud Prevention called vulnerability and VACCP.”
• “This is just ERM but applied to Food Fraud Prevention.”
• “It’s basically total quality management or Six Sigma applied to Food Fraud 
Prevention.”
• “We identify CCPs (critical control points), but instead of measuring oven tem-
peratures for HACCP, we’re verifying correct shipping documents for VACCP.”
Explain Food Fraud Prevention by comparing it with a procedure or example 
they already know, understand, and trust. Using these types of explanations, some-
one not familiar with food fraud can have a clear vision and mental anchor of under-
standing from a comparison to a familiar and successful standard operating 
procedure. There is a reduced concern because new systems are not being devel-
oped. There is a reduced concern about an organization’s adoption of new or differ-
ent required procedures. At this point, the Food Fraud Prevention concepts have 
been presented in terms of common, implemented, widely accepted, and successful 
programs. Food Fraud Prevention research leveraged these concepts when forming 
the methods and processes.
It is just as important for a government agency to define their prevention 
actions in business terms since the concepts have been well researched, but also 
decision- makers or industry will be familiar with the methods. To note, many of 
the evaluators or critics of a government may be from the business world, so using 
business terms and methods is an efficient way to explain the functionality of the 
programs. A total quality management system or internal control framework is 
applicable to a government. The government agency does have a challenge that 
many of the final metrics are the social good (of course they must remain within 
budget, but success is ultimately a social measure such as “public health”) versus 
clearly financial (e.g., return on capital employed, dividend amount, share price, 
or net profit).
A first important standard operating procedure is a quality management system. 
Initially, this was developed by Deming, Crosby, Juran, and others through total 
quality management, to now a Six Sigma-type program. This creates a framework—
while keeping an eye on final performance—to shift focus to processes and systems 
that are the root cause of anomalies that could lead to a nonconformance. A version 
of quality management tailored for the food industry is the hazard analysis and criti-
cal control point plan (HACCP). The application is focused on identifying a critical 
control point (CCP)—e.g., a refrigerator staying at an appropriate and constant tem-
perature—rather than just “is there a dangerous pathogen in the finished product.” 
Expanding to focus on the controls, business adapted to create what ERM/COSO 
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defines as an “Internal Controls-Integrated Framework.” The application is 
 checking—and cross-checking—that the right controls are in place and they are 
properly implemented.
The goal is to present Food Fraud Prevention in a way that the thought is “oh, this 
isn’t really anything new. This is just expanding our current program to address this 
new topic.”
 Decision-Making Examples to Find the Ideal Scenario
There is a continuum of the types of risk assessments from operational risk (e.g., tac-
tical, quantitative, and expressed in “return on investment”) and enterprise-wide risk 
(e.g., strategic, qualitative, and expressed as “vulnerability” and success is measured 
by reducing below the “risk tolerance”) (Fig. 6.11). The operational risks that are 
tactical usually impact a specific group, product, or manufacturing plant and could 
impact the operation, though probably not put the entire enterprise as risk—there is 
usually a finite sample size that could often be 100% inspected (see other content on 
strategic and tactical actions), for example, metal shavings found in a packaged food 
product at the end of a manufacturing package fill line. If needed, the entire produc-
tion lot could be set aside and tested with metal detectors. 100% inspection could 
be conducted. The enterprise-wide risks are strategic in the sense that they could 
Fig. 6.11 Enterprise Risk Management Continuum from operational risk. (Copyright Permission 
Granted) (Spink 2009)
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impact the entire enterprise and could be catastrophic could impact the entire 
company’s brand, across the entire market, and could occur anywhere in the world, 
for example, the overall product counterfeiting threat. Assessing the risk or preva-
lence is extremely difficult because the sample population would be anywhere the 
product is sold anywhere in the world, including on the Internet and in illicit markets.
There is a continuum from the very specific and local event such as the metal 
shavings to the global event completely outside the legitimate supply chain. An 
example is assessing shoplifting losses in a retail store. Assessing the risk could 
include a physical inventory of the store, but it would not consider employee theft, 
incorrectly rung-up goods at the cash register, a damaged product that was destroyed 
but not recorded, or a product that was actually never received. This will be explained 
in more detail next in the example provided.
 Example of Resource-Allocation Decision-Making with How to Measure 
Success
To provide an example of the different types of risks, several scenarios are pre-
sented. These examples span the continuum of operational/tactical to enterprise 
risk/strategic.
Metal Shavings
 1. Incident: An incident is known with 100% certainty. If an incident occurs, then 
there is evidence there have been actual metal shavings in the finished products.
 2. Scale: The inventory can be checked to approach 100% certainty. Each package 
could be tested.
 3. Cost of nonconformance: This can be defined with certainty due to the cost of a 
recall, product disposal, and related costs, e.g., $4 million.
 4. Cost of risk treatment: This is a “known” based on what countermeasure is 
selected, e.g., $1 million to purchase metal detectors.
 5. How to measure success: Use the metal detectors. Create a process to calibrate, 
and make sure the metal detectors are used, e.g., high confidence if purchases 
quality equipment.
 6. Confidence in the risk treatment: Create a process to calibrate, and make sure the 
metal detectors are used, e.g., high confidence if the operations are in control.
 7. Financial assessment: In this case, an actual “return on investment” can be used. 
The very high-confidence savings (actually reducing in the loss of earnings—
operations cannot be profit centers) of $1.5 million investment compared to the 
cost of $1 million will give an instant and—for a return of 1.5:1—a low rate of 
return but near 100% confidence in the return.
 8. Conclusion: Unless there are other pressing issues or business opportunities, 
this payback within 1 year would lead to a “yes” resource-allocation decision. 
This is a payback project within the year.
 Key Learning Objective 3: Iterative Process or Mitigating Food Fraud Risk Using ERM
214
Retail Shoplifting
 1. Incident: There are probably reported and recorded incidents. The loss of inven-
tory has many other root causes why a product may not be physically in the store. 
Other assessments or countermeasures and control systems may be needed for 
other issues such as employee theft. One assessment or countermeasure will not 
address the entire issue.
 2. Scale: The inventory can be checked to approach 100% certainty but, again, not 
complete.
 3. Cost of nonconformance: For the loss of inventory—though not only shoplift-
ing—this can be defined with certainty due to the financial and inventory sys-
tems. Industry-wide, shoplifting—or “leakage”—is estimated to equate to 3% of 
corporate revenue, and so even industry-leading levels of shoplifting may be an 
additional 2% for a total of 5% of sales. For the last Fortune 500 company, with 
$500 million in revenue, this could be $10 million. Even if there are credits from 
the supplier or other offsets such as some type of insurance, every product that is 
stolen is lost revenue. That $10 million loss would be much higher than the metal 
shavings loss.
 4. Cost of risk treatment: This is a “known” based on what countermeasure is 
selected. A $500 million retailer might have ten locations that each would be 
addressed, for example, $3 million for additional electronic article surveillance 
system upgrade.
 5. How to measure success: Monitor the shoplifting alert, or capture and continue 
to count the inventory. Both of these will be very certain.
 6. Confidence in the risk treatment: For shoplifting, the measures will provide high 
certainty but not for all inventory losses (unless the losses are almost or com-
pletely eliminated). For example, there is high confidence that the loss is from 
shoplifting, but only time will tell if that is the actual root cause of the problem.
 7. Financial assessment: This will only become high confidence after imple-
menting the system and measuring over time. So for resource-allocation 
decision- making, this financial benefit is uncertain.
 8. Conclusion: There could be a 50% confidence in the risk treatment reducing the 
$10 million loss by implementing the $4 million system for a return of 10:4 with 
a 50% confidence.
Product Counterfeiting
 1. Incident: An incident is known with a near 100% certainty—if you find a coun-
terfeit product, then you know it is occurring. The data collection could either be 
reactionary (what people send you) or proactive (which could expand to seeking 
counterfeit product even in markets where there have been no past known 
incidents).
 2. Scale: The scale is unknown and probably unknowable (Spink and Fejes 2012). 
If the OECD economic impact of counterfeiting estimate is used, then 5–7% of 
global sales could be lost to counterfeiting. For the last Fortune 500 company, 
with revenue of $500 million, that could be $25–35 million. Different industries 
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differ, so the estimate could be higher or lower. There is also a variable of whether 
there are deceptive or non-deceptive counterfeits. A deceptive counterfeit would 
be a 100% loss of a genuine product sale if there would not be any other 
replacement product (e.g., not finding a $50 pair of pants that usually retail for 
$200 may not lead to the consumer purchase the $200 genuine product; the con-
sumer may opt for a $60 pair of discount pants—for more see (USITC 1988)). 
The economic impact of counterfeiting could really be defined as a broad range 
of possible financial impacts with a very low certainty of the actual dollar cost. 
It is known that it is occurring and that the corporation is incurring some costs. 
The most certain costs are the cost of lawsuits or anti-counterfeit countermea-
sures and investigations.
 3. Cost of nonconformance: One counterfeit incident can lead to a worldwide recall 
and massive loss of brand equity. The estimate of “5–7%” loss could be for just 
one incident if that incident was significant. Thus the loss could probably be 
from $10 to $250 million per year, but let’s use a very conservative $50 million 
here.
 4. Cost of risk treatment: This is a “known” based on what countermeasure is 
selected—actually probably multiple countermeasures and control systems. For 
example, let’s use a high $20 million for various countermeasures and control 
systems.
 5. How to measure success: This is more complex since a primary source of esti-
mating the impact is by conducting in-market inspections… all around the world, 
including in illicit markets. Conducting market monitoring in dangerous coun-
tries or marketplaces increases the liability risk and danger to the investigators. 
Basic food safety inspectors are not trained—or have the liability insurance—to 
engage criminals in situations where there could be physical violence. To start, 
increased surveillance would add to the cost. The countermeasures and control 
systems need to be continually updated to stay ahead of the evolving counterfeit-
ers, so there are additional management costs.
 6. Confidence in the risk treatment: The counterfeiters continue to evolve—e.g., 
possibly shift their focus from counterfeiting to stolen goods—so the overall 
enterprise risk reduction is difficult if not impossible to assess. Market investiga-
tions can determine whether some counterfeiters have been deterred, e.g., 
there is a low confidence—high uncertainty, many unknowns, and difficulty in 
data collection—in the countermeasures and control systems.
 7. Financial assessment: In this case, if an actual “return on investment” can be 
developed, the uncertainty would be so high that the resource-allocation decision- 
maker would run out of money by funding other projects before selecting this 
low certainty, high-cost project.
 8. Conclusion: There would be a very low confidence (30%?) in reducing the coun-
terfeit product in half from $100 to $50 million in losses with a cost of $20 mil-
lion for a return of 50:20 with a maximum of a 30% certainty.
When reviewing the details presented here, the CFO would instantly approve the 
metal shavings project, approve getting more detailed proposals for the shoplifting 
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countermeasures and control systems, and then possibly work with their General 
Counsel to determine “how little they can do” to address the counterfeit product. In 
all seriousness, the General Counsel and CFO then would assess the corporate risk 
appetite. These could use ERM/COSO type processes to define and defend “how 
much is enough.”
 Conclusion
When there is a new or novel incident, the response and responsibility are naturally 
assigned to an “intervention” stage activity (referring to the prevention- intervention- 
response plan). For example, when a contaminant in a health hazard was found in 
pet food, the intervention was to detect the contaminant that was causing harm. The 
next effort would be to implement actions to remove the contaminated product from 
the marketplace. A final activity may be to implement incoming goods’ contaminant 
testing to try to prevent the additional fraudulent product from reentering the opera-
tions. This is a traditional food safety intervention, and often the proactive next 
step—of reducing the fraud opportunity—is not taken. The need to implement the 
last prevention step is often not done; for one, there is usually a regulatory definition 
of the “appropriate level of protection” or the scientifically measurable point of 
what is unacceptable. Waiting to respond after an incident is not proactive. Unlike 
for food safety and an adversary such as E. coli, for Food Fraud Prevention, the 
adversary is a human. This human behavior is studied within the field of social sci-
ence and criminology. While studying the motivation of the adversary is the root 
cause, it does not include setting the limit. And in the absence of a regulatory or 
standards set unacceptable level, this is not a determination of the risk tolerance. 
The first conclusion is that business decision-making is a separate activity and dis-
cipline where systems are already usually in place including Enterprise Risk 
Management COSO. There are millions of theories or basic methods in the world, 
so the challenge is identifying what is applicable and adapting the response to a 
unique problem. Specific incidents are reviewed to refine and reassess the applica-
tion continually. The second conclusion is that ERM-type systems can be adapted to 
create an efficient and straightforward application to Food Fraud Prevention. Once 
a general system is established, then there is a need for a standard operating proce-
dure that both creates efficiency in the process and also continually monitor and 
evaluate the efficiency of the system. The final conclusion is that there is a need here 
based on ERM/COSO, for common internal controls paired with an evaluation sys-
tem such as an integrated framework. There is a saying:
Connect everything to everything – evaluate this new risk or vulnerability in relation to 
all other enterprise-wide problems in relation to the overall risk tolerance.
“We need to do ‘more’” or “you should do ‘more’” is not a business case. “This is really 
bad” is also not an assessment that can be compared. At worst you are not being proactive 
or providing the resource-allocation decision-makers with the information they need.
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Business and ERM
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all ERM/COSO is very logical and provides a common language for enterprise- 
wide, top-to-bottom risk communication, and decision-making
Quality team This chapter presents the widely adopted and very thorough COSO-based, 
ERM-type process that will be a foundation for “how much is enough?”
Auditors The overall concepts provided ERM awareness and how it is implemented 
within the auditee organization
Management This ERM overview will help with communication upwards into the 
organization and to the C-suite—you may want to apply it to all your 
business risk and decisions
Corp. 
decision-makers
Expect the front line and managers to be able to speak the language or risk 
and ERM/COSOs
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) Who defines the “risk tolerance” in a properly or improperly managed 
system?
 (b) What is the regulatory foundation for business decision-making and deter-
mining an acceptable risk tolerance?
 (c) How does a food fraud versus a food safety incident impact the risk toler-
ance and ERM-based decision-making?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is “Sarbanes-Oxley”?
 (b) Who is required by law to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley?
 (c) When Sarbanes-Oxley may not be a legal requirement, what systems are in 
place to manage risk and risk tolerance for a company?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is a “corporate risk map” or “risk heat map”?
 (b) How does a CFO decide if a risk or vulnerability is so bad it must be reduced 
(or disclosed to investors)?
 (c) What is the most challenging aspect of applying ERM to FF?
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 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is a “2nd”- and “3rd”-party auditor?
 (b) What is the COSO Cube?
 (c) Where does a food fraud incident enter the COSO Cube, and who does the 
review advance?
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Chapter 7
Criminology Theory (Part 1 of 2): 
Foundational Concepts
Summary
This chapter presents the criminology concepts that apply to not only catching bad 
guys but for preventing food fraud from occurring in the first place. Criminology 
addresses the root cause which is a human adversary who identifies a crime oppor-
tunity and is motivated to act. A key point for food fraud prevention is on guardian-
ship which includes the monitoring the physical space of crime and putting hurdles 
in place that makes the act riskier or less profitable. Specifically, these crime preven-
tion theories are based on Situational Crime Prevention, routine activities theory, 
and rational choice theory. The expansion to apply the social sciences and criminol-
ogy theories is critical since the root cause is a human adversary.
The Key Learning Objectives for this chapter are:
• (1) Introduction to Crime prevention theory overview: Introduce the basic 
tenets of criminology and crime prevention.
• (2) Examine the Crime Triangle and Situational Crime Prevention: Several 
theories or applications are especially helpful when addressing food fraud 
prevention.
• (3) Adapting the Criminology theory to Food Fraud prevention: Finally, the 
theories are present in an application to food fraud prevention.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoreti-
cal foundation concepts related to criminology and the fraudster “(A) Theoretical 
Foundation” (Fig. 7.1).
 Introduction
The central and most important point is to understand the fraud opportunity before 
any countermeasure or control systems are evaluated. For food fraud prevention, the 
root cause is criminology theory and focused on the “fraud opportunity.” Without a 
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clear understanding of the reason why a specific, individual, human adversary 
attacks the selection of a countermeasure or control system is a guess—an educated 
guess at best but still a guess. Fortunately the field of criminology—and specifically 
the crime prevention concepts including Situational Crime Prevention—provides a 
well-researched and developed theoretical foundation.
The general topic of “human situations and opportunities” was reported to be 
built upon a project led by Marcus Felson and Ron Clarke in 1973 during research 
on why some students ran away from reform schools and others did not. Later in 
1976, “Crime as Opportunity” was published which expanded on the concepts. The 
core principles of Clarke, Felson, Eck, and others were based on the practical and 
pragmatic ideas (Clarke and Eck 2005):
• “Don’t get fancy.”
• “Don’t worry about academic theories. Just go out and gather facts about crime 
from nature itself (observation).”
• “Focus on very specific slices of crime, such as vandalism against telephones or 
soccer violence [or food fraud species swapping during transfer of ownership 
from supplier to the customer]. Even the crime ‘vandalism’ would be far too 
broad!”
• “Try to block [prevent] crime in as practical, natural, and simple way, at a low 
societal and economic cost.”
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
(B) Fundamental Concepts
Traceability
Investigation
or Audit
Testing
Fig. 7.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(A) 
Academic Disciplines.” (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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These concepts are the foundation for the study of “environmental criminol-
ogy”—the physical space where a crime occurs not the environmental sustainability 
of the earth—started in the 1970s in part based on a foundation research paper 
“Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach” by Cohen 
and Felson (1979). The supporting literature and theories have been well researched 
with thousands of research projects. An August 2017 Google Scholar search resulted 
in over 10,000 documents with the phrase “Situational Crime Prevention.” The 
“environmental criminology” study of prevention and the space of crime concepts 
are a deviation from the “traditional criminology” which focuses on the criminal, 
courts, and the corrections system (Beirne and Messerschmidt 2005).
Situational Crime Prevention departs radically from most criminology in its orientation. 
Proceeding from an analysis of the circumstances giving rise to specific kinds of crime, it 
introduces discrete managerial and environmental [the physical space of crime] change to 
reduce the opportunities for those crimes to occur” (Clarke 1997a, b). The base theories and 
reports are often presented in very practical ways that can be easily and quickly imple-
mented by practitioners. The underlying research is very scholarly, but the application is 
often referred to as practical or “down-to-earth. (Felson and Boba 2017)
Thus, [Situational Crime Prevention] is focused on [physical] settings for crime, rather than 
those committing those criminal acts. IT seeks to forestall the occurrence of crime, rather 
than to detect and sanction offenders. This seeks to eliminate the criminal or delinquent 
tendencies through improvement of society or its institutions and not merely to make the 
criminal activity less attractive to offenders. (Clarke 1997a, b)
These concepts are aligned with the objectives and needs of total quality man-
agement. These criminology theories are proactive and focused on what the enter-
prise can do and control rather than wait for outside entities to organize and respond.
Situational Crime Prevention focuses on the crime, not the criminal, and more 
specifically on “why crime occurs” (Clarke 1997a, b). Focusing on “why the crime 
occurs” is helpful for addressing food fraud since the focus of vulnerability shifts 
from “the suspect living beyond their means” to “identify a ‘fraud opportunity’.” For 
assessing a food fraud problem, a practical question is how would a risk assessor—
probably a manufacturing quality control employee in a corporate office in a Western 
country—evaluate if a Bangladeshi farmer is living beyond their means? Would the 
supplier who owns two cows be equivalent to a Westerner owning a Ferrari? Also, if 
the fraudster were an intelligent adversary, they would not drive their Ferrari/second 
cow to the business where it could be viewed. Even if this was known, how would 
the risk assessor conduct an investigation into the lifestyle of the farmer?
If the fraud act is species swapping, then the vulnerability is a lack of specific 
tests conducted by the receiving company for the correct hot product and at the 
precise crime hot spot. There could be many species tests conducted but at the 
wrong spot and for the wrong product. That manufacturing quality control employee 
could recommend, and almost immediately implement, incoming goods testing for 
the correct hot product and at the hot spot. Regardless of whether the supplier is a 
criminal or not, the fraud opportunity would already be vastly reduced to the point 
that there may not be an opportunity to commit the act—that is, as long as the fraud-
ster and all other suppliers know that new species tests are being conducted.
 Introduction
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A focus on supply-side Situational Crime Prevention is very practical, can be 
quickly approved and implemented, and is easy to explain not just the features 
(what it does) but the benefits (how it specifically helps reduce the problem). The 
idea is so simple that it seems even intellectually offensive that “Reducing opportu-
nities for crime can indeed bring a substantial net reduction in crime” (Clarke 
1997a, b).
 Key Learning Objective 1: Crime Prevention Theory
This section presents Key Learning Objective 1 which is to review crime preven-
tion theory and specifically Situational Crime Prevention. The practical and appli-
cable concepts are a natural fit to help implement food fraud prevention. The Crime 
Triangle is the start and center point for the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC).
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Fundamentals of Criminology and Crime Prevention
• (2) Review of Criminology, Crime Science, and Criminal Justice
• (3) Introduction to A range of Criminology Theories
 Fundamentals of Criminology and Crime Prevention
Situational Crime Prevention is a structured and systematic approach to crime 
fighting. In the 1998  second edition of Crime in Everyday Life, the author Dr. 
Markus Felson stated that “[between 1994 and 1998] Criminology also changed in 
noteworthy fashion and more quickly than I would have dreamed in writing the first 
edition. We know much more about situational crime prevention. Also, those of us 
who study how everyday life produces or prevents crime have gathered more facts 
and ideas. We also are better able to tie together loose ends and to know what to 
study next.”
The “Crime Triangle” was presented in Felson and Clarke’s chapter “The 
Chemistry for Crime” in Crime in Everyday Life (Felson 2002). This built upon 
earlier work on Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson 1979). The founda-
tional concept is that “[Criminals] typically behave like criminals only in certain 
settings, that is, slices of time and space within which relevant people and things are 
assembled” (Felson 2002). The original Crime Triangle included:
 1. “Suitable target”
 2. “Likely offender”
 3. “Capable guardian” (applied to food fraud this was later adjusted from Absence 
of a Capable Guardian (Felson 2002))
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Before reviewing the Situational Crime Prevention application of the Crime 
Triangle, it is important to note that the use of a triangle to present a criminal or 
fraud opportunity is widely adopted for many different research questions. For 
example, “The Fraud Triangle Revisited” by Schuchter and Levi is based on earlier 
work by Cressey which focused on financial crimes such as embezzlement (Cressey 
1950; Schuchter and Levi 2016). This has been a starting point and base for training 
for forensic accounting and fraud examiners. The “Fraud Triangle” considers moti-
vation, opportunity, and rationalization which are similar to the suitable target, the 
absence of a capable guardian, and likely offender (Schuchter and Levi 2016). This 
“Fraud Triangle” was expanded to add the capability to a “Fraud Quadrangle” or 
“Fraud Diamond.” Schuster and Levi make the statement that:
We do not contest that all fire triangle elements are required for first (at least in the absence 
of severe rain) are sufficient to ignite. At this point, we strongly suggest that a distinction is 
made. Their conclusion by analogy misses the following point: the Fraud Triangle with its 
components can create a condition for fraud. As Romney, et al. (1980) note, all elements, 
even opportunity, are substitutable. (Schuchter and Levi 2016)
With this perspective, the Crime Triangle and the Fraud Opportunity is consid-
ered as a model that helps frame thinking, but it is not a rigid formula. As the food 
industry—and food authenticity and food science researchers—begin to consider 
food fraud as a unique and separate concept, the generalized Crime Triangle is help-
ful to understand the underlying elements that comprise a fraud opportunity (Lam 
and Spink 2018; Spink 2019).
An important aspect of crime prevention and Situational Crime Prevention is to 
provide a simple and obvious idea end method for practitioners rather a complex 
model for theorists. The focus is very practical and on implementation that consid-
ers a lack of time and competing for human resources to apply to the project. Also, 
there is an awareness and acceptance of a hierarchy of assessments that start with 
straightforward applications and then can become more complex and thorough (cer-
tainty, robustness, etc.) as needed or as is possible. Felson stated: “If anything, I 
have tried to get even more down-to-earth about crime as a tangible phenomenon” 
(Felson and Boba 2017).
The thought leaders of crime prevention have openness and drive to adapt their 
theories to new crime problems. This was an ideal starting point for food fraud 
prevention.
The original Situational Crime Prevention and Crime Triangle concepts were 
from the original publication by Cohen and Felson (1979). “In [Social Change and 
Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach] we present a ‘routine activity 
approach’ for analyzing crime rate trends and cycles. Rather than emphasizing the 
characteristics of offenders, with this approach, we concentrate upon the circum-
stances in which they carry out predatory criminal acts. Most criminal acts require 
convergence in space and time of likely offenders, suitable targets and the absence 
of capable guardians against crime” (Cohen and Felson 1979).
This research was combined and presented the original Crime Triangle (Fig. 7.2) 
(Felson 2002).
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This was adapted from Food Fraud Crime Triangle (Fig. 7.3) (Spink and Moyer 
2011).
The two were combined here to provide one visual (Fig. 7.4).
The three legs of the triangle must be present for a crime to occur. The important 
insight or contribution—which is direct, simple, logical, and immediately action-
able—is that removing one of the three legs of the triangle removes the fraud oppor-
tunity. Reducing the length of a leg of the triangle reduces the “fraud opportunity.” 
They stated, “We further argue that the lack of any one of these elements is suffi-
cient to prevent the successful completion of a direct-contact predatory crime…” 
(Cohen and Felson 1979).
Later a more sophisticated Crime Triangle was presented by Clarke and Eck 
(2005) and Felson (2002) (Fig. 7.5) (Felson 2002; Clarke and Eck 2005). This was 
adapted to consider that some of the factors actually apply all around the triangle 
rather than on a specific side. The original Crime Triangle has been efficient for the 
food fraud prevention needs and users.
Considering the emphasis and willingness to apply and adapt the core concepts 
to new problems, this was applied to food fraud prevention. Many different theories 
were evaluated and included in food fraud prevention.
While there have been further advances in a more complex criminology Crime 
Triangle, the adaptation of the original Crime Triangle has been efficient.
Absense of 
Guardian
Target
Offender
Crime 
Opportunity
Fig. 7.2 Original Crime 
Triangle. (Adapted from 
Felson (1998) or Cohen 
and Felson (1979))
Guardian & 
Hurdle Gaps Vicm
Fraudster
Fraud 
Opportunity
Fig. 7.3 Adaptation of the 
Original Crime Triangle 
Components. (Adapted 
from Felson (1998) or 
Cohen and Felson (1979))
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Absense of
Guardian Target
Offender
To: Guardian & Hurdle Gaps
To: Victim
To: Fraudster
Fig. 7.4 Adaptation of the Crime Triangle to food fraud prevention. (Adapted from Cohen and 
Felson (1979) and Felson (2002) and published in Spink and Moyer (2011))
Fig. 7.5 Crime Triangle 
from Crime analysis for 
problem-solvers in 60 easy 
steps. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) 
(Clarke and Eck 2005)
Sidebar: Application—SSAFE Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
Tool and Criminology
The Crime Triangle and the focus on the fraud vulnerability are crucial con-
cepts in a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA). One early presenta-
tion of this concept was by the GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank and published in 
the GFSI position paper on Food Fraud (Spink 2013; GFSI 2014). This was 
expanded upon by the SSAFE Organization-funded model developed with 
Wageningen University (Netherlands) which is as defined in van Ruth, 
Huisman, and Luning (2017). In “GFSI Position on Mitigating the Public 
Health Risk of Food Fraud,” the GFSI Board publically recognized and 
(continued)
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supported the SSAFE Food Fraud mitigation guidance that includes the FFVA 
(GFSI 2012). From the SSAFE report: “In accordance with the routine activ-
ity theory, food fraud vulnerability can be defined by the three elements: 
opportunities (suitable target), motivations (motivated offender) and control 
measures (guardianship) as presented in Fig. 1” (Fig. 7.6) (van Ruth et  al. 
2017). The three elements of the fraud opportunity are presented in a formula 
here and then later in a funnel and then spider diagram.
From the GFSI position paper on Food Fraud: “The GFSI Board will sup-
port SSAFE’s initiative which aims to develop and publish practical guide-
lines for companies on ‘how’ to assess and control food fraud vulnerabilities 
within their organizations and supply chains. SSAFE is worked to have these 
guidelines available before the release of Version 7 of the GFSI Guidance 
Document so that companies and Certification Program Organizations (CPOs, 
they create the actual standards, formerly referred to as scheme owners) can 
prepare their organizations before the new requirements are effective” 
(Fig. 7.7) (SSAFE 2015).
Opportunities Motivations
Control
measures
Fraud
vulnerability
Fig. 7.6 Schematic presentation of the food fraud vulnerability concept based on the routine activ-
ity theory—SSAFE Main Body or Report noted in Figure  1. (Copyright Permission Granted) 
(SSAFE 2015)
Motivations
Opportunities
Fraud Vulnerability
Fraud control
measures
Fig. 7.7 Fraud 
vulnerability: the three 
elements affecting criminal 
behavior—SSAFE 
Appendix. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) 
(SSAFE 2015)
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Then SSAFE presents the motivation, opportunities, and control measures 
on a spider diagram that is a variation of Crime Triangle factors (e.g., victim 
to opportunity, fraudster to motivations, and guardian and hurdle gaps to con-
trol measures) (Fig. 7.8). This figure presents the “company’s decreasing span 
of control” where there is more control within the company and then less and 
less control through the supply chain and into the open global market.
The core criminology theory that applies to food fraud prevention is 
Situational Crime Prevention. There is a simplicity, rationality, and pragma-
tism to focusing on the physical space of crime rather than concerns that 
include less direct control such as the mental state of potential fraudsters. 
Applying and adapting scholarly theories can be a delicate endeavor espe-
cially since there are many firmly held beliefs and sometimes a deep commit-
ment to one theory or another.
Motivations
Opportunities
Control Measures
Company’s
Decreasing
‘Span of Control’
Company
Company’s Supply Chain
Industry segment
Global Environment
Country / Regional
Environment
Fig. 7.8 The environment of the company and three elements of food fraud—SSAFE Appendix. 
(Copyright Permission Granted) (SSAFE 2015)
Sidebar: The Incredible Value of the Peer Review Process—Peer 
Correction (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: The Incredible Value of the Peer Review Process: Peer Correction
By John Spink • June 17, 2015 • Blog
To expand on the delicate nature of applying and adapting scholarly theo-
ries, a previous MSU FFI blog post presents some of the challenges and 
opportunities. This blog also provides insight into some of these activities.
From the blog post:
The peer review, scholarly journal process is long and tedious and abso-
lutely critical to building a firm foundation for food fraud prevention. At least 
(continued)
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food fraud is now considered as a topic worthy for scholarly publication. 
There have now been more scholarly journal articles that include the words 
“food fraud” in the last 4 years than in the previous 100 years combined.
Sometimes – especially when dealing with interdisciplinary concepts – we 
focus so much on the process of writing that we do not step back to see how 
the foundational concepts have evolved. We recently had two key concepts 
clarified during the peer review process in our recently-submitted articles.
Article 1: Types of Counterfeiters  – Remove “Ideological” 
Counterfeiter
A reviewer of our “Defining the Types of Counterfeiters, Counterfeiting, 
and Offender Organization” article questioned the inclusion of the 
“Ideological” type of counterfeiter in our list (published in Crime Science in 
2014) (Spink et al. 2013). They argued that a terrorist would conduct a fraud 
act to make money. Making money is not an “ideological” act for the terrorist. 
The money they make could be used for a terrorist attack, which would be an 
“ideological” act. Considering the criminal motivation, the food fraud activity 
would probably fall under the “Opportunistic” type of counterfeiter.
The core research on defining the types of counterfeiting  – or, more 
broadly, types of product fraud—for this article started during the several 
State of Michigan led food defense projects, so our initial focus was on terror-
ists. Through the evolution of the manuscript development, we shifted to eco-
nomic crimes but did not entirely filter out the “Ideological” fraud motivation.
Removing the Ideological type was nuanced and not core to our hypothesis 
or discussion, but it was an excellent opportunity to get it right.
We are grateful to Editor Dr. Gloria Laycock (University College London) 
for organizing a reviewer team that is motivated and engaged enough to help 
us clarify this point.
Article 2: Situational Crime Prevention, Routine Activity Theory, or a 
Hybrid
We received comments from a reviewer for another article that was under 
review and is now published (Spink et al. 2014). The reviewer provided an 
incredibly thorough set of comments. The reviewer pointed out that we had 
not clearly explained our application of Situational Crime Prevention and 
Routine Activity Theory. These are two distinct theories but seem very similar 
to three core factors, often presented in a triangle, and often discussed together 
in the research.
• Situational Crime Prevention: This is a more overarching concept that 
includes “Environmental Criminology” (the space of crime not protecting 
nature), “Rational Choice Theory,” “Routine Activities Theory.” The the-
ory is based on “victim,” “offender,” and “place” to create a “problem.”
• Routine Activities Theory: This is a more applied theory that focuses on 
everyday events in the life of criminals. The theory is based on a “suit-
able target,” “motivated offender,” and “absence of a capable guardian” 
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to  create the “Criminal Event.” The entire system is often referred to as 
“The Chemistry for a Crime.”
Our research evolved while working with practitioners such as during our 
Executive Education/Short-Course programs. During that work, we move 
through the concepts of Situational Crime Prevention and then to Routine 
Activities Theory. We summarize the concepts into a single triangle figure 
that is fundamental to Routine Activities Theory titled “The Chemistry for a 
Crime.” Our first major article, “Defining the Public Health Threat of Food 
Fraud,” referred to this as “The Crime Triangle” and stated it was adapted 
from Felson’s Crime in Everyday Life (Spink and Moyer (2011) adapted from 
Felson (1998)). While there are many triangles applied to criminology theory, 
we utilize the Crime Triangle adapted from Felson’s model of the target (vic-
tim), offender (fraudster), and capable guardian (guardian and hurdle gaps). 
“These three elements produce the predatory crime triangle. […] With a 
guardian present, the offender avoids attempting to carry out an offense in the 
first place. […] Most offenders, however, have a pretty good idea of what they 
can get away with” (Felson 2002).
The clarification of Situational Crime Prevention and Routine Activities 
Theory was nuanced and not core to our hypothesis or discussion, but it was 
an excellent opportunity to help us clarify this point.
We are grateful for this editor for organizing a reviewer team that is moti-
vated and engaged enough to help us clarify this point.
It is important that articles on food fraud be submitted, entered into the 
peer review process, and get such intense attention from reviewers. Food 
fraud is also becoming a topic for published articles.
Food fraud Topics are (Finally) Being Reviewed, Accepted, and Published
If a concept is not published in a scholarly journal, then academics seem to 
consider the concept does not exist. What is lost in the discussion in this blog 
post is a great accomplishment that food fraud articles are being reviewed, 
accepted, and published.
When we submitted our article “Defining the Public Health Threat of Food 
Fraud” – which was published in IFT’s ranked Journal of Food Science in 
2011 – we had to persuade and defend that this was in the “aim and scope” of 
a food journal.
The Food Fraud Term in Scholarly Publication
A Google Scholar search on the topics:
Term
Google Scholar search 
results before 2011
Google Scholar search results 
from 2012 to 2017
Food fraud 247 394
Economically motivated 
adulteration
14 183
(continued)
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 Personal Insight: Adapting Theories in New Disciplines: Discussion 
with Jay Albanese and Michael Levi
Further expanding on the challenges, there are also many examples of embracing 
the adaptations. I was fortunate to present on a panel at the 2015 American Society 
of Criminology (ASC) Annual Meeting in Washington, DC, with Nick Lord and Jon 
Spencer of the University of Manchester (UK) and Wim Huisman of the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam (Netherlands). We presented a session on “Food 
Adulteration  – The Organization of Food Crime.” After the session, we had the 
opportunity to talk with two highly published criminology thought leaders who are 
Jay Albanese and Michael Levi.
It was very encouraging to hear positive feedback on our approach and specifi-
cally how traditional criminology theories had been adapted for application to the 
food industry. Specifically, they were supportive of using the simplified Crime 
Triangle when introducing criminology theories to the food industry. They were 
supportive and cognizant of the challenges of introducing new theories to other 
 non- criminology disciplines such as food science. Discussions like these have 
helped us be more creative when researching food fraud prevention.
 Introduction to the Concepts of Crime Science, Criminology, 
and Criminal Justice
From the US Department of Justice/Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services funded Problem-Oriented Policing Center (POP Center), “Most crimino-
logical theories focus on what makes people ‘criminal.’ They find causes in distant 
To emphasize that point there have been more scholarly publications 
related to food fraud in the last 4 years as there had been in the previous his-
tory of publishing scholarly articles.
For emerging issues in food fraud and food safety, there has been an 
emphasis on a “science-based approach” that especially values the “peer 
reviewed” and “scholarly” publications. This emphasis is not to create a bar-
rier to new ideas but to make sure the foundational concepts are well thought 
through and clear. This blog post provided two examples of the value of the 
peer review process. It is important for scholars and practitioners to pursue 
scholarly publications. Fortunately, food fraud is now defined as in the “aim 
and scope” of food journals. More articles are being submitted and published. 
With this success and momentum, more scholars will be more motivated to 
conduct food fraud research. Utilize these vast resources by reading these 
articles.
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factors, such as child-rearing practices, genetic makeup, and psychological or social 
processes. These theories are very difficult to test; are of varying and unknown sci-
entific validity; and yield ambiguous policy implications that are mostly beyond the 
reach of police practice” (Clarke and Eck 2005).
Several key terms or concepts are criminology, crime science, criminal justice, 
traditional criminology, and environmental criminology.
Criminology (Traditional Criminology) “Most criminological theories [crimi-
nology] focus on what makes people ‘criminal.’ They find causes in distant factors, 
such as child-rearing practices, genetic makeup, and psychological or social pro-
cesses. These theories are very difficult to test; are of varying and unknown scien-
tific validity, and yield ambiguous policy implications that are mostly beyond the 
reach of police practice.”
• Criminal Justice: “Interdisciplinary academic study of the police, criminal 
courts, correctional institutions (e.g., prisons), and juvenile justice agencies, as 
well as of the agents who operate within these institutions. Criminal justice is 
distinct from criminal law, which defines the specific behaviors that are prohib-
ited by and punishable under law, and from criminology, which is the scientific 
study of the non-legal aspects of crime and delinquency, including their causes, 
correction, and prevention. […] The field of criminal justice emerged in the 
United States in the second half of the twentieth century. As the Supreme Court 
of the United States gradually expanded the rights of criminal defendants on the 
basis of the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, the gap between the 
actual performance of criminal justice agencies and what was legally required 
and legitimately expected of them began to grow.”
• Crime Science: “takes a radically different approach. It focuses not on the rea-
sons why criminals are born or made, but on the act of committing the crime. It 
seeks ways to reduce the opportunities and temptations for crime and increase 
the risks of detection. In doing so, it seeks contributions from a wide range of 
disciplines, including psychology, geography, medicine, to which it helps to 
reduce crime on our streets, and in our homes and businesses” (Romero and 
Atlas (2002) in Clarke and Eck (2005)).
• Traditional Criminology: “seeks to improve understanding of the psychologi-
cal and social forces that cause people to become criminals in the hope of finding 
ways to change these causes” (Romero and Atlas (2002) in Clarke and Eck 
(2005)). “Traditional criminology seeks to improve understanding of the psycho-
logical and social forces that cause people to become criminals in the hope of 
finding ways to change these causes. […] It seeks ways to reduce the opportuni-
ties and temptations for crime and increase the risks of detection.
• Environmental Criminology: “…The theories and concepts of environmental 
criminology (and of the new discipline of crime science) are very helpful in 
everyday police work. This is because they deal with the immediate situational 
causes of crime events, including temptations and opportunities and inadequate 
protection of targets. You will be a stronger member of the problem-oriented 
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team if you are familiar with these concepts. The problem analysis triangle (also 
known as the Crime Triangle) comes from one of the main theories of environ-
mental criminology – routine activity theory. This theory, originally formulated 
by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson, states that predatory crime occurs when 
a likely offender and suitable target come together in time and place, without a 
capable guardian present” (Clarke and Eck 2005).
 Introduction to a Range of Criminology Theories
After considering the core concepts of Situational Crime Prevention and some of 
the challenges and opportunities of adapting theories, it is essential to provide a 
foundation that considers those other theories. Several basic criminology terms are 
the foundation of the discipline (Clarke 1997a, b).
• Situational Crime Prevention: Reviewed throughout this chapter is “opportunity- 
reducing measures that (1) are directed at specific forms of crimes, (2) involve 
management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as sys-
tematic and permanent way as possible, (3) make crime more difficult or risky, 
or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders.”
• Rational Choice Theory: Essentially those criminals believe they will not get 
caught and will benefit from an act.
• Routine Activities Theory: Essentially those crime opportunities are most preva-
lent when and where perpetrators have access to or awareness of the victim or 
target.
• Action Research Methodology: A model where “researchers and practitioners 
work together to analyze and define the problem, to identify and try out possible 
solutions, to evaluate the results, and, if necessary, repeat the cycle until it is 
achieved (Lewin 1947).”
• Problem-Oriented Policing: This is based on “…operational effectiveness for 
the police was not through improvements in organization and management but 
through detailed analysis of everyday problems they handle and the devising 
of tailor-made solutions.” This process required “identifying these problems 
in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the nature of 
the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of exist-
ing authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to 
present responses, weight the merits of these alternatives, and choosing among 
them.”
These core concepts are often adapted or evolved to address the specific needs of 
the practitioners. A system that has been adopted is the Criminology SARA approach 
(Eck and Spelman 1987). This is similar to the ISO 31000 Risk Management and 
Six Sigma quality management concepts of plan-do-check-act (PDCA).
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Your work can help answer four fundamental questions. These questions corre-
spond to the stages of the Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment (SARA) pro-
cess (Fig. 7.9):
 1. What is the nature of the problem? (Scanning)
 2. What causes the problem? (Analysis)
 3. What should be done about the problem? (Response)
 4. Has the response brought about a reduction in the Problem? (Assessment)
The practical applications are relevant and apply to real-world needs and situa-
tions such as limited funding. The reality of limited and dwindling resources for law 
enforcement, investigation, and prosecution has been the subject of study. The 
insights from “Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps” are so pro-
found and applicable to food fraud prevention that many of the quotes are included 
here. From the report (Clarke and Eck 2005):
One of the primary concerns in policing in the United States today [published in 2005] – 
and for the foreseeable future – is the severe constraint on spending. The lion’s share of 
police budgets is consumed in personnel costs. As a result, many police agencies are already 
operating significantly below their authorized strength. Funds to hire new officers to meet 
growing needs are hard to obtain. And, of special relevance here, traditional forms of polic-
ing, because they are so heavily dependent on personnel, are being curtailed. Calls cannot 
be handled as completely and quickly as in the past. Personnel cannot be as freely assigned 
to increasing the police presence on the streets in labor-intensive tactics, such as crack-
downs, sweeps, and special task forces. …And [the constrained resources lends fresh impe-
tus to meeting a long-standing, neglected need  – the need to equip the police with an 
institutionalized capacity to examine its work product; to routinely ask, before committing 
to more of the same, what it is that the police are expected to accomplish and how they can 
more effectively accomplish it. … This is the essence of problem-oriented policing. (Clarke 
and Eck 2005)
There are more criminology theories, but these are several that have been applied to 
food fraud prevention.
Scanning Analysis Response Assessment
Fig. 7.9 Eck’s SARA model for problem-oriented policing: scanning, analysis, response, assess-
ment, and repeat. (Adapted from Eck and Spelman (1987))
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Article Review – Create Investigation Networks that Mirror the 
Criminal Network (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Article Review – Create Investigation Networks that Mirror the Criminal 
Network
By John Spink • November 13, 2017 • Blog
Our article focused on a recommendation for how the Public-Private- 
Partnership – that is, governments working together with industry and oth-
ers – could be optimized to reduce the “fraud opportunity.” One co-author was 
Peter Whelan, who is the head of food fraud prevention for the country of 
Ireland (Irish Food Safety Authority  – FSAI) and also a member of the 
European Union Food Fraud Network and INTERPOL Operation Opson 
(food crime).
One key concept in the article is the creation of investigation networks that 
mirror the criminal organization structure. A typical food safety incident 
investigation team may not have the expertise to address food fraud incidents. 
For example, food fraud is detected or deterred by focusing on cyber-crime, 
tax avoidance smuggling, or trade-based money-laundering.
Recommendations from the journal articles (Wheatley and Spink 2013; 
Heinonen et al. 2014; Spink et al. 2016a, b):
 1. Create a unique and specialized team: Treat a food fraud incident and 
investigation with a fundamentally different approach than for traditional 
food safety or food quality problems. Consider the attributes of the unique 
food fraud network and then gather the specific experts.
 2. Be realistic about resource allocation and practical impact:
 (a) Law enforcement priority setting (what can food investigators 
expect from other agencies, prosecutors, the judiciary, and the leg-
islators): The priority that consumers expect are: public safety (drugs, 
guns, violence), public health (major harms), large scale economic 
crimes that disrupt governments or markets (government bribery, sub- 
prime mortgage lending crisis), large economic crimes than impact 
many (billions across a market), and then smaller economic crimes 
and that impact one or a few stakeholders. Conclusion: Most food 
fraud incidents would fall into the last category and lowest priority.
 (b) Investigation and prosecution methods for results (the goal is not 
to catch bad guys and bad product but prevent food fraud from 
occurring in the first place): Product fraud and counterfeiting is con-
sidered a “hybrid” crime with aspects of “white collar” crime and “tra-
ditional” crime (Heinonen et al. 2014). The planning and reward is a 
typical “white collar crime” while the violation is “traditional crime” 
where a victim has physical contact and impact of the act. A “tradi-
tional” law enforcement investigation would focus on where the crime 
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is conducted to either produce the illicit good or to work with the 
victim. For product fraud, it is very complex, difficult or often 
approaching impossible to even find the origin of the product or the 
fraudster (Spink and Moyer 2011). Also, when considering some sim-
ple types of tampering instead of major production locations, there 
could be thousands of home-based fraudsters (Wheatley and Spink 
2013). Conclusion: Traditional food safety investigation methods 
may be impractical or inefficient.
From the “The role of the public-private-partnership in food fraud preven-
tion—includes implementing the strategy” (Spink et al. 2016a, b):
Scope of the Public-Private Partnership
• “The [Public Private Partnership] may be a unique collaboration with a 
non-traditional focus. Government agencies have been traditionally cre-
ated and focused on compliance and enforcement. This contributes to pre-
vention but is often through dis-connected, reactive detection and 
prosecution. If there is a focus on an overall Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy, then the resources could be defined in terms of exactly how they 
coordinate to reduce the overall fraud opportunity.”
• “More arrests or more seizures do not necessarily mean that a problem is 
actually decreasing. More seizures could be due to more efficient detection 
methods or a focus on a specific product. Fewer arrests could result from 
an actual decrease in fraud or the fraudsters evolving to new types of crime 
or the lack of attention to food fraud detection and prevention.”
• “It is also most efficient to align countermeasures to the structure of the 
crime and the criminal networks:”
Example of Investigation Task Force Mirroring the Criminal Network
 – Caribbean On-Line Species Substitution: For example, if the fraud 
opportunity is within the Caribbean region and involves online market-
places as well as species substitution, then the task force would ideally be 
staffed with a Caribbean team with cyber-crime and species identification 
expertise.
 – International Broker Network for Spice Dilution: If the fraud opportu-
nity is ground spices through a broker network from India to South America 
through free trade zones, then the task force would ideally be staffed with 
an international trade team familiar with brokers.
 – European Wine Trade-Based Money-Laundering: If the fraud opportu-
nity is a trade-based money-laundering of premium wines within Europe, 
then the task force would be ideally staffed with a European team with 
smuggling and wine experience.
(continued)
 Key Learning Objective 1: Crime Prevention Theory
238
• “The most effective and efficient government countermeasures are 
the combination of controls where there is a regulated change of prod-
uct ownership such as import tariffs or sales tax. Governments have the 
most control of the food supply chain at border crossings and in regulat-
ing the point of consumer purchase. Industry has the most control at the 
ownership exchange when receiving materials and at the sale to consum-
ers. For these reasons, food fraud prevention is most efficiently achieved 
for the country, market, and world at these exchange points through a 
public-private-partnership.”
The most important conclusion is that there are a growing awareness and 
literature on food fraud prevention, including the investigation and enforce-
ment. The most inspiring realization is that many global law enforcement 
agencies  – e.g., UK National Food Crime Unit (Andy Morling and team), 
Dutch Food Crime Unit (Karen Gussow), Scottish Food Crime Unit (Ron 
Naughton), etc. – are taking this novel and broad approach. We look forward 
to continuing to learn from these thought leaders. MSU-FFI.
Sidebar: Review of Food Integrity Handbook (EC Food Integrity 
Project)
One of the deliverables of the European Commission-funded EU Food 
Integrity Project was the publication of this comprehensive food authenticity 
testing handbook. This is one of the most—if not the most—comprehensive 
and helpful guides to food authenticity testing. Most practitioners will not 
need to seek any other resources other than when searching for methodology 
details or actual test results,
From the Foreword from Professor Christopher Elliott: “A major element 
in the fight against fraud is the development, validation, and implementation 
of novel methodologies that can detect and often quantify the level of cheating 
that has occurred.”
Regarding the scope “The prime focus of this Handbook is, of course, food 
authenticity and the analytical solutions available to address existing con-
cerns.” The target audience was industry quality control managers who are 
starting to review food authenticity response and also “young scientists start-
ing their career in food science and to students and researchers with little prior 
knowledge of the area.”
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 Definitions
The definition of food fraud that is baed on the CEN Workshop (agreed by the 
attendees but not reviewed by the entire CEN) is:
• Food fraud: An activity “intentionally causing a mismatch between food prod-
uct claims and actual food product characteristics, either by deliberately making 
claims known to be false or by deliberately omitting to make claims that should 
have been made.”
For the types of food fraud, the report referenced the GFSI Food Fraud Think 
Tank and the CODEX Food Fraud draft discussion paper.
To review the exact statement in the handbook, the quoted the Codex EWG:
• “Food fraud is ‘any deliberate action of businesses or individuals to deceive oth-
ers in regards to the integrity of food to gain undue advantage’.”
 – For food fraud prevention: Note—the action by the fraudster where the 
response would be food fraud prevention.
• “‘Food authenticity’ and ‘food integrity’: Both are a status of a food product, 
but the former is the state of being ‘not altered or modified with respect to 
expected characteristics including, safety, quality, and nutrition,’ while the latter 
is the state of being ‘genuine and undisputed in its nature, origin, identity, and 
claims, and to meet expected properties’.”
 – For food fraud prevention: Note—a state of being or status of the product 
where the response would be to confirm the claims.
In the same way, the definition of an “Authentic food product” given by the CWA 
is very close to that of food fraud:
• Authentic food product: “A food product where there is a match between the 
actual food product characteristics and the corresponding food product claims; 
when the food product actually is what the claim says that it is.”
The handbook specifically focuses on adulteration, stating “One of the most 
common frauds is adulteration.”
• Adulteration: “A type of food fraud which includes the intentional addition of a 
foreign or inferior substance or element; especially to prepare for sale by replac-
ing more valuable with less valuable or inert ingredients.” This practice is some-
times referred to as Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA). This term is 
defined in the Codex Alimentarius position paper. It is recognized as “a subset of 
food fraud.”
The handbook notes other types of food fraud that are outside the scope of the 
FIP Handbook:
• “Grey market: this term includes production, theft, and diversion involving 
unauthorized sales channels for products. An example of this is the sale of the 
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excess unreported product when there are production agreements or quotas for the 
product and the product in question is deliberately produced in excess of these. A 
fish product originating from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is 
another example. This term also applies when there is a geographical restriction on 
the sale and distribution of the product, and the product in question is deliberately 
sold or distributed in other areas; this is often referred to as ‘grey market’ sales.”
• “Counterfeit: is a case when where Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) infringe-
ment is in effect. This could include any or all aspects of the other product or 
packaging being fully replicated, for instance, the process of copying the brand 
name, packaging concept or processing method for economic gain. Imitation 
wines and spirits with fake labels of a popular brand is a classical example (see 
the chapter on Spirits).”
• “Mislabelling: is a special case of food fraud. It concerns the process of putting 
false claims on packaging for economic gain. Selling farmed salmon as wild 
salmon, or conventional fresh produce as organic are examples of this fraud. 
Expiry date modifications fall under this category. However, mislabelling may 
apply to all forms of food fraud: to be efficient, a fraudulent product must indeed 
be ‘mislabeled’ to be purchased by a buyer. But the expression is mainly used to 
indicate distortion of the information provided on the label.”
 Product Commodities Addressed
The handbook covers a wide range of product commodities that are generally under-
stood to have a high fraud opportunity (Table 7.1). Each of the 20 product chapters 
includes a by-fraud-type review of the authenticity test methods. Examples of the 
sections from the milk and dairy chapter are authenticity issues, species substitu-
tion, geographical origin and rennet origin, technological processes (heat process-
ing, freezing), and maturation. The types of authenticity issues for milk and dairy 
include undeclared addition of certain ingredients, adulteration with water, adul-
teration of nitrogen content, adulteration of the fat content, synthetic or reconsti-
tuted milk, and adulteration with preservatives. The handbook did include a mention 
of how this handbook contributed to the overall GFSI food fraud compliance 
requirements for all types of fraud and for all products.
Table 7.1 Product commodities covered in the Food Integrity Handbook
Milk and milk 
products Eggs and egg products Honey Meat and meat products
Fish, seafood, 
and related 
products
Cereals and cereal- 
based products—
wheat, rice
Species origin of 
gelatine in foods
Cocoa, cocoa preparation, 
chocolate, and chocolate-based 
confectionery
Spices Saffron Wine and must Spirit drinks
Fruit juices Vinegar Coffee Tea and flavored tea
Olive oil Vegetable oils Food flavorings Nuts, nut products, and other 
seeds
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Situational Crime Prevention 
in Detail
This section reviews the criminology theory of Situational Crime Prevention in 
detail. Since the mid-1970s, there was an expansion of criminology theory to 
address questions such as the root causes related to the physical space and opportu-
nities. The “environmental criminology” concepts provide an especially practical 
and pragmatic for food fraud prevention.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Review the Situational Crime Prevention fundamentals.
• (2) Apply the theory in relation to other crime-fighting objectives.
• (3) Then review application examples or case studies.
Sidebar: Unique and Widely Adopted Concepts and Definitions—LEO 
or Gemini?
One challenge when conducting interdisciplinary research is understanding 
the general concepts, basic terminology, specific definitions, and “common 
sense.”
Leo or Gemini? Coming from a food science, food safety, and packaging 
background, originally there was little interaction with the law enforcement 
literature or community. Overheard while going through security screening 
into a US Government Building.
• Guest: “With the bad weather, did you have trouble commuting in here 
early to your security post?”
• Security Guard: “No, we got here before the snow started. Now, please put 
your bag on the conveyer belt and your keys in this bowl.”
• Guest: “Ok. I do not mind the snow since I just slow down and try to enjoy 
the trip. I guess I expect delays so if we get here quickly, then it is a nice 
surprise.”
• Security Guard: “Are you a Leo?”
• Guest: “No, I am a Gemini. So I am patient and didn’t mind the long 
commute.”
• Security Guard and a big group of colleagues: Outburst of laughter.
• They asked a security question of whether the guest was a “Law 
Enforcement Officer”—abbreviated “LEO”—they were not asking the 
guest’s astrological sign.
When addressing food fraud prevention, there should be an assumption 
that other disciplines have unique expertise and efficient practices and phrases.
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 Situational Crime Prevention in Detail
The focus of Situational Crime Prevention is on “opportunity-reducing measures” 
(Clarke 1997a, b; Felson 2002). Situational Crime Prevention comprises opportunity- 
reducing measures that have a food fraud application (Clarke 1997a, b):
• “Situational crime prevention comprises opportunity-reducing measures that:
 – Are directed at highly specific forms of crime,
 – Involve management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment 
in an as systematic and permanent way as possible,
 – Make crime more difficult or risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged 
by a wide range of offenders.”
Four Components of Situational Crime Prevention are (Clarke 1997a, b):
• “Four Components of Situational Crime Prevention
 – A theoretical foundation drawing principally upon routine activity and ratio-
nal choice approaches,
 – A standard methodology based on the action research paradigm,
 – A set of opportunity-reducing techniques, and
 – A body of evaluated practice including studies of (crime) displacement.”
The criminology authors specifically and intentionally are general since 
“Situational crime prevention is assumed to apply to every kind of crime, not just to 
‘opportunistic’ or acquisitive property offenses, but also to more calculated or 
deeply-motivated offenses”(Clarke 1997a, b). “This [value of the theory is that it] 
avoids speculation about the source of the offender’s motivation, which distin-
guishes it immediately from most other criminology theories” (Clarke 1997a, b). 
This is exactly why these vulnerability reducing crime prevention concepts simply 
and directly applied to food fraud prevention.
 Review of Criminology Terms
The core criminology theories are the general models, and then there are specific 
terms used for aspects of the application. Regarding the goal of a crime prevention 
strategy, several fundamental concepts include anticipatory benefit, crime displace-
ment (shift the target), diffusion of benefits (one activity will provide multiple ben-
efits), and ultimate crime diffusion (there is no motivated offender), while the fourth 
goal of Situational Crime Prevention is “including studies of (crime) displacement” 
(Felson 1998). The ultimate goal here is to reduce the fraud opportunity to such a 
low level that the offenders are encouraged to attack elsewhere or give up on even 
trying to commit a crime—the ultimate goal is to reduce or eliminate the motivation 
to prevent the act from occurring in the first place (Fig. 7.10).
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• Anticipatory Benefits, Crime: “Benefits from crime prevention that begin prior 
to initiation of crime prevention treatments” (Clarke and Eck 2014). Also, “…
benefits were noted if a pre-initiative drop in a crime measure was observed” 
(Smith et al. 2002). The criminals reduce their activity in anticipation before the 
crime prevention countermeasures are implemented.
• Displacement (Crime): “is the relocation of crime from one place, time, target, 
offense, or tactic to another as a result of some crime prevention initiative” 
(Guerette 2009). Also, “Overall, displacement is viewed as a negative conse-
quence of crime prevention efforts, but in some cases, it can still provide some 
benefit” (Guerette 2009):
 – “Temporal—offenders change the time at which they commit a crime
 – Spatial—offenders switch from targets in one location to targets in another 
location
 – Target—offenders change from one type of target to another
 – Tactical—offenders alter the methods used to carry out crime
 – Offense—offenders switch from one form of crime to another.”
• Diffusion of Benefits (Crime): “…entails the reduction of crime (or other 
improvements) in areas or ways that are related to the targeted crime prevention 
efforts, but not targeted by the response itself. Though less recognized than dis-
placement, diffusion is recorded in many research evaluations of crime preven-
tion responses. Diffusion effects are referred to in a variety of ways including the 
“bonus effect,” the “halo effect,” the “free-rider effect,” and the “multiplier 
effect.” “The opposite of crime displacement is diffusion of crime control bene-
fits. Crime diffusion entails the reduction of crime (or other improvements) in 
areas or ways that are related to the targeted crime prevention efforts, but not 
targeted by the response itself (Guerette 2009)”. The criminals decrease a wide 
range of their activities even beyond where the crime prevention countermea-
sures are implemented.
Crime Reduction/ 
Dissipate
Crime Diffusion of 
Benefits
Crime Displacement
Anticipatory Benefits
Fig. 7.10 Hierarchy of 
criminology terms
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• Prevention (Crime): “Crime prevention is about reducing the risk of occurrence, 
and the potential seriousness, of crime and disorder events by intervening in their 
causes. This definition is deliberately inclusive—centering on no particular kinds 
of causes or theories of crime, and favoring no kinds of intervention over others” 
(Ekblom 2013).
• Reduction (Crime): “is simply about decreasing the frequency and seriousness 
of criminal events, by whatever (legitimate) means. Crime prevention is inter-
vention in the causes of criminal and disorderly events to reduce the risk of their 
occurrence [prevention] and/or the potential seriousness of their consequences 
[mitigation]. Most reduction is delivered through prevention, although some 
involve intervening directly in unfolding events” (Ekblom 2013).
 – Designing Out Crime (Newman 1972). This is a similar concept within crime 
reduction and applies to food fraud due to the focus on opportunity 
elimination.
While it is not a criminology term, for food fraud prevention the idea of crime 
reduction, designing out crime or even a hybrid with crime displacement would be 
to eliminate the fraud opportunity and could a to “dissipate.”
• Dissipate (applied to crime): “to cause to disappear; to cause (members of a 
group) to move widely apart” (Merriam-Webster 2004)
An extension on these criminology concepts, in relation to the food fraud preven-
tion, could be vulnerability elimination or the removal of a system weaknesses or 
attributes necessary for a crime to occur. Remember, the three legs of the Crime 
Triangle are required—in the presence of a “motivated offender”—for a crime even 
to be able to occur.
To note, there is a resistance for criminology theorists to even refer to “eliminate 
crime.” There is a general understanding that crime cannot be completely elimi-
nated. For a specific type of crime such as food fraud, the environmental criminol-
ogy focus would be on understanding the root cause, displacement to less dangerous 
problems, and then to shape the space to that the frequency and seriousness are 
reduced to an optimal or acceptable level.
Sidebar: The Ecosystem of Organized Crime (and How to Disrupt Food 
Fraud Vulnerabilities) (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: The Ecosystem of Organized Crime (and how to disrupt food fraud 
vulnerabilities)
This is a summary of Markus Felson’s 2006 report and presentation on The 
Ecosystem of Organized Crime (Felson 2006). As consistent with his other 
works and Situational Crime Prevention in general, the most efficient focus is 
on how and why a crime opportunity exists which is more than just catching 
bad guys or bad product.
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Before getting into the details of this report, it is important to take a 
moment to consider the concept of “organized crime,” “crime that is orga-
nized” and “criminal cooperation.” Felson often addresses the public percep-
tion where “The televised version of organized crime depicts highly organized 
people in business suits sitting around a table for meetings, with intricate 
coordination across a vast field, and a certain brilliance of mind.” Felson 
emphasizes that “Scholars have long told us that the televised version of orga-
nized crime is substantially wrong  – that most organized crime is much 
smaller in scale and coordination.” From a personal communication with 
Marcus Felson (2018):
Sometimes organized crime is very organized, such as in places where the state is 
very weak. Sometimes it is more a network. Sometimes it is more rudimentary.
Felson provided a footnote in the report regarding the organized crime 
term that “Note 4: I use the term ‘criminal cooperation and organization’ 
because of my allergic reaction to the term ‘organized crime.’ The latter con-
veys a specific image popularized by television, one not substantiated by 
scholarship and experience. However, this [ecosystem] paper does not include 
all criminal cooperation, much of which is too rudimentary to fit under the 
rubric of ‘organized crime,’ rightly understood.”
The ecosystem in this reference is not the components of the crime oppor-
tunity (see the Crime Triangle including the victim, criminal/fraudster, and 
guardian) but the attributes or activities that feed an entire criminal organism. 
For a very simplistic example from nature, bugs are eaten by birds that are 
eaten by mammals that then decompose to be nutrients for the bugs.
To address the problem of criminal cooperation, Felson provides insight 
into the environment. For our observation of the problem and consideration of 
the more effective and efficient countermeasures, there is a need to be aware 
of how much that can be actually observed:
Semipublic and semi-private settings: “These are very important for crime to occur. 
The following scale helps us understand how cooperative crime surfaces and where 
it is most exposed to interference:”
 1. “Public Settings – Minimal supervision, easy contact with strangers
 2. Semipublic Settings – Transition and transfer settings seen by many, but not all
 3. Semi-private Settings – Transition and transfer settings seen by a few
 4. Private Settings – Limited access.”
Consistent from feedback in other investigations, it is that often the prod-
uct fraud events are conducted in secret, in private settings, and by actors from 
within the legitimate supply chain. For food fraud prevention, the consider-
ation of the crime settings provides insight into why food fraud acts are diffi-
cult to see or find since they would seem to occur mostly in the semi-private 
and private settings.
(continued)
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Next, Felson presents the ecosystem of how the smaller crimes feed into 
bigger operations:
“The Web of Crime Cooperation: The interplay of many crimes produces a web of 
interdependence. […] This web of crime cooperation exposes each crime to a larger 
environment, without which it cannot thrive. ([Felson has] explained elsewhere the 
multitude of interdependencies between illegal and legal activities.”
• “Small time thefts lead to fencing stolen goods,
• Providing thieves money,
• For purchasing small amounts of illegal drugs,
• Contributing to small-time drug dealing,
• Feeding into large-scale drug dealing.”
For food fraud prevention, there should be a consideration of why and 
how the first “small-time theft” opportunity is identified and the potential for 
that fraudster to advance from diluting a food to selling illegal drugs. The 
occupational type of criminal usually grows their operation within their cur-
rent infrastructure which would be related to the legal sales of food… and 
with the exception of extreme and desperate situations, this would not be 
deciding to switch from selling diluted beverages to selling illegal narcotics.
So, considering the concept that crime is difficult to observe and there is a 
symbiotic relationship between hierarchies of crime actors, Felson builds 
upon other Situational Crime Prevention theories to present some – where 
Felson admittedly refers to them as “unusual”  – guidelines to efficiently 
address a crime problem. To consider each idea in relation to food fraud pre-
vention further discussion is provided here. The incident used for the example 
is the UK 2012 incident where lower cost horsemeat was illegally and fraudu-
lently blended into the product that was presented as 100% beef.
“These ideas lead me towards an unusual set of recommendations for understanding 
organized crime in society, as well as reducing it:”
 1. “Focus on the acts, not the group engaging in it.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, focus on the vulnerability or system weakness, not the 
perpetrators. For horsemeat, this would be a focus on where and how the fraud was 
enabled to occur not on the specific fraudsters.
 2. “Divide cooperative and organized crimes into very specific types.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, focus on very specific types of fraud acts with the bigger 
crime. For horsemeat, this would be narrowing the focus to the documentation 
vulnerability.
 3. “Study the vast variation in criminal cooperation and organization.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, this would be to assess how the seemingly common fraud 
acts differ. For horsemeat, this would be to consider the specific relationships and capa-
bilities that led to each fraud act, not the overall horsemeat vulnerability.
 4. “Assume minimal levels of cooperative complexity, that such crime is seldom 
ingenious.”
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 (a) For food fraud prevention, this is first to consider very simple vulnerabilities and 
straight-forward countermeasures. For horsemeat, this could be announcing to suppli-
ers that species tests will be conducted. Remember, the goal is not to catch food fraud 
but to prevent it from occurring in the first place.
 5. “Don’t follow the money; follow the physical transactions.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, it is important to remember that the fraud acts are not the 
end objective but making money off the fraud is the goal. A disruption at the very end 
of the supply chain could vastly increase the risk of getting caught or the cost of con-
ducting the crime. In Felon’s terms, the “Ecosystem” would be disrupted. For horse-
meat, this could be an organization conducting even just a few, but routine, market 
species tests.
 6. “Don’t look for deep secrets; look for the obvious and almost obvious.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, building on item 4, it is efficient to start with the most basic 
and most obvious vulnerabilities. While there may be more clandestine and complex 
actions occurring, addressing the simplest crimes may create a ripple effect on all of the 
more complex crimes. If anything, there is a statement to the marketplace – and more 
importantly to any fraudster who may be lurking in the supply chain – that there is an 
increased focus and scrutiny. For horsemeat, this would build upon the discussion in 
item 4 to start with a focus on straightforward fraud acts.
 7. “Find out how one crime depends on another.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, this builds upon the previous items to consider the 
“Ecosystem” of the fraud act. Each criminal relies on another system to achieve spe-
cific goals. For horsemeat, a supplier of meat must have a group that enables the docu-
mentation to be forged, and the fraudulent company needs a customer who is not aware 
of the fraud act, doesn’t care, or is complicit. Compared to other types of crime, food 
fraud seems too often be very simple.
 8. “Find out how crime feeds off legitimate and marginal activities.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, the biggest opportunity is probably to co-mingle fraudulent 
and legitimate product. The fraudulent supplier needs a buyer for their product. The 
biggest opportunity is with buyers who are in the legitimate supply chain. After that, 
there are more opportunities in marginal activities that may have less oversight or con-
trols. For horsemeat, this could be the series of digital brokers who consolidated and 
coordinated a series of bids that reduced transparency and highlighted the fraud 
opportunity.
 9. “Tease out the sequence of events for ongoing criminal cooperation.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, this is to consider the basic activities or components of the 
transactions including vulnerabilities or system weaknesses. It is critical to understand 
the specifics and nuance of specific fraud acts. This deeper focus helps define how a bad 
guy thought they were making a rational choice to conduct this act – the rational choice 
is that they can make a profit and get caught. For horsemeat, the understanding of the 
sequence of events could identify specific hotspots where even very simple counter-
measure or control system could vastly reduce the fraud opportunity.
 10. “Interfere with that sequence, access to the customer, or modus operandi.”
 (a) For food fraud prevention, this is to define and implement efficient and effective coun-
termeasures or control systems that target very specific parts of the vulnerability and 
disrupt the ecosystem.
(continued)
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 Examples of Situational Crime Prevention for Other Crimes
Ultimately, while counterintuitive to many of the food fraud strategies, 
considering the crime ecosystem concept is very effective since it both identi-
fies the overall system weaknesses and explains the simples and most obvious 
first steps. If you are investigating or analyzing a food fraud incident, there are 
many resources to provide you with insight including this report by Felson on 
“The Ecosystem of Organized Crime.” Do not reinvent the wheel. First, seek 
out previous works by experts and then adapt to your problem. MSU-FFI.
Sidebar: Simple Example—Caller ID Reduces Obscene Phone Calls
An example of the hierarchy of criminology terms is considering how tele-
phone caller identification reduces the frequency of obscene phone calls. 
Some of the best examples or case studies are very obvious. For this discus-
sion, just the title explains the application telephone automatic caller identifi-
cation (caller ID) of Situational Crime Prevention. The introduction of “caller 
ID”—telephones providing the phone number and name of the caller to the 
called—fundamentally changed the fraud opportunity where the perpetrator 
was no longer anonymous (Clarke 1997a, b). Over time, some perpetrators 
may no longer commit the act (prevent crime); they may change their meth-
ods (displacement), or they may act less (diffuse crime).
A broad focus on the fraud opportunity would identify that “obscene phone 
calls” are a function of the use of the “phone.” The underlying act is “obscene” 
contact with a victim. Applying Situational Crime Prevention—and for food, 
a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy—the general vulnerability changes and was 
not eliminated. It would have been understood and logical that the perpetra-
tors would shift to other methods of attack based on the underlying perpetra-
tor motivation. The crime would evolve. Cyberstalking is an example of the 
evolution.
Sidebar: 
Case Study of Applying Situational Crime Prevention—Nigeria
To provide an example of the theories and terms of applying this case study 
of the Nigerian combating, counterfeit medicine initiative is presented 
(Fig. 7.11). A case study of applying Situational Crime Prevention is in the 
article “Addressing the Risk of Product Fraud: A Case Study of the Nigerian 
Combating Counterfeiting and Sub-Standard Medicines Initiatives” (Spink 
et al. 2016a, b). Here the Crime Triangle is used to present seven specific coun-
termeasures and control systems and how they reduce the “fraud opportunity.”
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The study is on counterfeit medicines in Nigeria, but the underlying con-
cepts apply to all product fraud including food fraud. The Nigerian situation 
was a national public health crisis where in 2001 over 60% of their pharma-
ceutical market was counterfeit or substandard. The focused countermeasures 
and control systems led to a reduction identified in a World Health Organization 
survey and reported to 16% in 2004. Ongoing surveys found even further 
reductions in specific markets or sales channels.
From the article: “A methodology was developed to consider strategic coun-
termeasures and control systems based on Situational Crime Prevention which 
includes the Routine Activities Theory and the Crime Triangle. The Nigerian 
SSFFC initiatives were used as a case study to apply this theory. The insights 
apply to reduce the public health risk of SSFFC in other countries. This article 
is a case study with an impact assessment that provides the foundation for 
application of a criminology theoretical perspective” (Spink et al. 2016a, b).
The holistic perspective on the entire countrywide fraud opportunity is 
important and effective when requesting—or defending—government 
resource allocation. “Each anti-counterfeiting countermeasure has a unique 
incremental benefit that, in combination, strengthens the entire system. The 
overall benefits include increased public health, a growing pharmaceutical 
manufacturing base, and reduced opportunity for crime. The development and 
(continued)
Fig. 7.11 Case study details of the review of the Nigerian fraud opportunity for Counterfeit 
Medicines. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink et al. 2016a, b)
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presentation of the overall fraud opportunity—or a product fraud vulnerabil-
ity assessment at the country-level—“…shifts the question from ‘which coun-
termeasures to keep’ to a future review of ‘what additional countermeasures 
will further reduce the fraud opportunity’” (Spink et al. 2016a, b).”
For food fraud prevention, the insight is that a country-level assessment 
of the impact of the fraud opportunity has actually been completed and 
presented.
 Key Learning Objective 3: Overview of the Crime Triangle
This section reviews the Crime Triangle and the related details from Situational 
Crime Prevention. The Crime Triangle has been one of the fundamental concepts to 
explain the food fraud “crime opportunity” or adapted to refer to the “fraud 
opportunity.”
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) From Crime Opportunity to Fraud Opportunity
• (2) Victims and Fraudsters
• (3) Guardians and Hurdle Gaps
 From Crime Opportunity to Fraud Opportunity
Situational Crime Prevention is based on Routine Activities Theory which is pre-
sented visually in the “Crime Triangle.” Throughout the related research, there was 
a focus on “Action Research Method” being the engagement and interaction of the 
researcher with the practitioner. There are many reports and adaptations of the core 
concepts of new crime problems. Food fraud—and more broadly all product fraud—
is a new crime problem where the crime prevention theories apply […] with some 
innovations and adaptions.
For food fraud prevention, Situational Crime Prevention is a very effective and 
widely adopted process that has been adapted for use by the food industry for this 
new crime problem.
Sidebar: Is Product Fraud a Traditional or White-Collar Crime? Both
Food fraud is not a “traditional crime” or “white collar crime” so more of a 
“hybrid crime” (Heinonen et al. 2014).
We demonstrate that product counterfeiting incidents have properties both consis-
tent and inconsistent with white-collar crime as traditionally defined, which some-
times occur concurrently. To advance criminal justice and security research and 
practice, we conclude that product counterfeiting defies broad classification and is 
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best considered a distinct crime event. Failure to embrace this broad classification 
can lead to ineffectively estimating its occurrence and its effects on the economy, 
public safety and health, and brand owners. (Heinonen et al. 2014)
There are several fundamental properties of “white-collar” crime that do not 
all always apply to product fraud incidents (Table 7.2).
The need to classify a crime into one category has been a challenge for 
getting priority for food fraud prevention research or enforcement.
Sidebar: Situational Crime Prevention—“Trends in Human Activity 
Patterns”
The concept of “Trends in Human Activity Patterns” by Cohen and Felson 
(1979) directly applies to the food industry and food fraud (Cohen and Felson 
1979). Changes in the space of crime and global markets—“human activity 
patterns”—have changed the fraud opportunity and the public health and eco-
nomic consequences of food fraud. Even before there was data empirically 
identifying the new crimes, the social anthropology insight would identify 
that there was an evolving vulnerability. An early understanding of the evolv-
ing vulnerability could lead to countermeasures and control systems that 
short-circuit the opportunity for new crimes to occur.
The discussion about the weaknesses in the criminal justice system 
“appeared so ineffective in exerting social control since 1960 [to the publica-
tion in 1979]” (Cohen and Felson 1979). “For example, it may be difficult for 
institutions seeking to increase the certainty, celerity [swiftness of movement] 
and severity of punishment to compete with structural changes resulting in 
vast increases in the certainty, celerity [swiftness of movement] and value of 
rewards to be gained from illegal predatory acts” (Cohen and Felson 1979). 
Essentially, in a traditional crime-fighting scenario, the fraudsters perceive 
such a high reward with such a low risk that they will accelerate their criminal 
activity. This is an essential theoretical foundation where a focus on new or 
evolving vulnerabilities can lead to proactive countermeasures and control 
systems even before an actual crime or incident is found.
The application for food fraud prevention is that being realistic about 
human and financial resource availability for crime fighting, the only way to 
get ahead is to focus on vulnerability and to reduce the “fraud opportunity.”
Table 7.2 Properties of White-Collar and Traditional Crime. (Adapted from Heinonen et  al. 
(2014), #3816)
Offender status Special social and occupational status No special status
Offender technique Trivial/nonphysical Nontrivial/physical
Contact with victims Separated Not separated
Access to crime location Specialized Not specialized
Offender appearance Superficially legitimate Not legitimate
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 Victims and Fraudsters
The victim and fraudsters can be considered together because they are both human 
actors. The human actors have motivations and awareness and can be influenced.
A related concept is the “likely offender” compared to an “offender.” Many peo-
ple are “likely offenders” but never actually get to the point that they decide to act 
or become “actual offenders” (Cornish and Clarke 1987). A focus on vulnerability 
allows for countermeasures and control systems that universally apply regardless of 
the mindset of the offenders.
Situational Crime Prevention theory identifies several victim related concepts 
(Felson 2002):
• Value of target to the likely offender: Some targets are preferred or many and 
sometimes complicated reasons. “For example, ATM robbers wait until after the 
victim takes out money.” The victim is a higher value target after they have 
money. For food fraud prevention, the value is when and what are the goods that 
are exchanged or sold.
• Inertia of target to the likely offender: There are some high-cost products that 
are actually not a frequent target for crimes (such as shoplifting of home appli-
ances such as refrigerators). For food fraud prevention, inertia may be created by 
more very specific countermeasures and control systems.
• Visibility of target to the likely offender: There are situations where fraudsters 
clearly see the target and also a lack of guardianship. For food fraud prevention, 
the visibility is more focused on presenting countermeasures and control systems 
that could catch the fraud act.
• Access to the offender with a chance to exit easily: There are situations where 
fraudsters have easy access to, and exit from, the fraud act. For food fraud pre-
vention, the access is conducting regular, legitimate business with the victim.
For the general “chemistry of the crime,” there are specific details that combine 
and react in the same ways. This is presented as “chemistry.” The chemistry concept 
is especially practical and useful for food fraud prevention since many in the food 
industry have a chemistry or related educational background (Felson 2002).
• “Figure out who and what must be present and absent for a crime to occur.”
• “Find out what slice of space and time (setting) makes this likely?”
• “Determine how many people move into and out of the setting when committing 
an offense.”
In the science of chemistry, “everything is connected to everything” with the 
equilibrium concept that “for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.” 
If you change different factors, the “chemistry” or “reaction” can be influenced—
pressure, temperature, moisture amount of elements, new elements, or others. The 
same is true for crime and the fraud opportunity.
For food fraud prevention, a focus outward from the problem (the human adver-
sary in relation to the attributes of the physical space of the crime) to the solution 
(the countermeasures and control systems or vulnerability reducing actions) can 
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create a simple and useable model. One model is the food fraud vulnerability assess-
ment, Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, and that strategy as managed by the Food 
Fraud Prevention Cycle.
 Guardian and Hurdle Gaps
One of the most important concepts is that “With a guardian present, the offender 
avoids attempting to carry out an offense in the first place” (Felson and Boba 2017). 
Several concepts are “Defensible Space” and “Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design” (Felson 2002). The ideas are that intentional changes can 
reduce the fraud opportunity and crime.
The third leg of the triangle is the “guardian and hurdle gaps.” A “guardian” is 
someone monitoring the activity such as a forklift driver observing the incoming 
goods. A “hurdle” is an activity that makes the fraud act more difficult to conduct. 
This is similar to food industry “hurdle technology” that hinders the lifecycle of a 
pathogen. The guardian and hurdle gap leg is where a company or country can have 
the maximum impact on reducing the “fraud opportunity.”
The fraud opportunity is reduced by increasing the risk of getting caught or the 
cost of conducting a crime. Contrary to popular belief, the number 1 goal of a crimi-
nal is not to make money. The number 1 goal is not to get caught! This awareness 
leads to an efficient and primary food fraud prevention focus on “Guardian and 
Hurdle Gaps.”
There are 16 types of situational prevention attributes that consider the fraudster. 
Four general categories of TIGER are (Felson 2002):
• “T – Target’s rewards, reducing
• I – Inducement, temptation
• G – Guilt
• E – Effort, increasing
• R – Risk on the spot, of getting caught.”
First, guilt or empathy is inconsistent and difficult to control category. To review, 
the worst case—which should be the base case—is that the fraudsters are sociopaths 
not concerned with cheating others and criminals not concerned with breaking the 
law. Any appeal to empathy or social justice would not change the fraud opportu-
nity—actually it might identify new fraud opportunities (see the book Freakonomics 
and Think Like a Freak (Levitt and Dubner 2005, 2014).
The other categories apply to both:
 1. Increase the risk of getting caught.
 2. Increase the cost of conducting the crime.
Increasing the risk of getting caught could be new detection and deterrent coun-
termeasures and control systems. Increasing the cost of conducting the crime might 
be to force the fraudster to use higher cost or scarcer components or alternate distri-
bution routes.
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An aspect of Situational Crime Prevention that applies to guardianship is “How 
to Forecast Crime.” It is important to note that at this point the term “predict” is not 
used by the criminologists. The prediction has more complex actions that require 
more data, more complete data sets, many incidents, and further complex assess-
ment. The focus of Situational Crime Prevention is on understanding how external 
factors influence the fraud opportunity or shifting vulnerabilities. “We must not let 
the offender stay two steps ahead. Not only do we now know much more about 
crime and its prevention, but we also know how to learn still more. We know what 
questions to ask about new products and settings” (Felson 2002).
This also shifts focus to the concept of “Designing Out Crime.” This “Defensive 
Space” concept is usually applied to spaces or locations such as banks, but a food 
supply chain is a discrete system and can be considered a “space” (Newman 1972).
The application to food fraud prevention is that there are three main factors that 
must be present for a crime to occur—whether a crime has or will occur these are 
factors that create a “fraud opportunity.” The most direct control is by the actions of 
increasing guardianship or increasing hurdles.
 Conclusion
This criminology chapter addressed the foundational terms, concepts, and theories 
that apply to food fraud prevention. The next criminology chapter will expand to 
consider application both from the practitioner perspective but also as to how gov-
ernments or agencies are addressing food fraud and related topics. The first conclu-
sion is that criminology is a scholarly, academic field that has had an active focus on 
reducing the physical environment in a way that methodically reduces the fraud 
opportunity. The focus on pragmatic, practical, and often very low coast opportunity 
reducing actions can often be very quickly implemented, and the benefits immedi-
ately realized. If you lock the front door of your house, you have immediately 
reduced your vulnerability, and you can measure the success by just checking the 
door. The second conclusion is that the Social Sciences and Criminology theories 
are very simple and logical. After reviewing the root cause—the human adversary 
who perceives a system weakness—the Criminology focus is not only logical but 
completely obvious. The final conclusion is that although there are very detailed and 
complex research reports and systems, there is value in the beginning with simple 
concepts such as considering the fraud opportunity in tools such as the Crime 
Triangle. Crime prevention theory is not complex, but it is reinventing the wheel if 
you have never studied the field. An important linchpin to all strategies or counter-
measures and control systems is that the human adversary can and often will directly 
respond to our actions…if they can see that we are acting.
There is a saying:
Warning—Counterfeiters Attend Anti-Counterfeit Conferences. Complaint about it 
or use it to your advantage.
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Criminology Foundation
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all The field of criminology—and specifically situational crime prevention—has 
many very sound theories that have had a tremendous amount of research and 
very simple concepts that can immediately help reduce the fraud opportunity
Quality team This was an overview of crime prevention theory to provide basic insights to 
understand how to dissuade this intelligence human adversary
Auditors This provided some insight into the types of prevention strategies that will be 
utilized and that the decision is based on a wide body of scholarly literature
Management Repeat after me, social science is a real science—the foundation of the root 
cause is the human adversary that can only really be understood and 
addressed by criminology
Corp. 
Decision-makers
The root cause is a human adversary, and even though these will probably be 
very novel to you, there are many criminology concepts that will be 
efficiently applied
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) What is “traditional” and “environmental” criminology?
 (b) Which type of criminology applies to food fraud prevention? Why?
 (c) What is the role of criminology in food fraud prevention?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is “Crime Prevention”?
 (b) What is the difference between the original Crime Triangle and the updated 
version?
 (c) How do Routine Activities Theory and rational choice theory apply to food 
fraud prevention?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is Situational Crime Prevention?
 (b) What are the three components of the Crime Triangle and Situational Crime 
Prevention?
 (c) Where does food science and technology influence the fraud opportunity on 
the Crime Triangle?
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 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is “designing out crime”?
 (b) Is Food Fraud a “white-collar” or “traditional” crime?
 (c) What are “guardian and hurdle gap”?
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Chapter 8
Criminology Theory (Part 2 of 2): 
Application Review
Summary
This chapter presents the criminology concepts that include how to visually present 
the fraud opportunity, how governments have addressed the broader product fraud 
problem, and then a review of lessons learned from other types of crimes that are 
related to food fraud. These all apply to not only catching bad guys but for prevent-
ing food fraud from occurring in the first place. The first criminology chapter pre-
sented the key terms, concepts, and theories. This third part builds upon that 
knowledge and presents applications such as how practitioners actually address the 
problem and also how governments or agencies assess the problem or aligns to 
coordinate responses.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) The Crime Triangle
• (2) Review of governmental reports that address product fraud
• (3) Other crimes that are related to food fraud
On the food fraud prevention cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoretical 
foundation concepts related to criminology and the fraudster “(A) Theoretical 
Foundation” (Fig. 8.1).
 Introduction
After reviewing the foundational concepts of criminology, it is helpful to consider 
examples of the application to food fraud prevention. Beyond the main key learning 
objective, this chapter will include a series of examples or sidebar commentaries. 
Together, this book provides a foundation for understanding what and how the crim-
inology theory applies as well as develops a “gut feel” for how and when to adopt 
formal theories to this specific application.
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Simplifying the Crime Triangle 
for the Food Industry
This section reviews the simplifying of the Crime Triangle for the food industry 
through examples that help select strategic countermeasure and control systems. 
The Crime Triangle provides a mental frame to consider how and why a fraudster 
perceives a fraud opportunity so efficient, and effective responses can be 
identified.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) The motivation that is macro—or micro—or both.
• (2) The motivation that is a “social scientific conception.”
• (3) Education is a weapon.
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
(B) Fundamental Concepts
Traceability
Investigation
or Audit
Testing
Fig. 8.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(a) 
academic concepts”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014a, 2014b, Spink et al. 2019)
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 Motivation that Is Macro or Micro or Both
It is too simple just to consider that motivation for a food fraudster is “to make 
money.” That is actually the goal of all legitimate or illegal food businesses or oper-
ations. To focus on prevention, there is a need to deconstruct why and how a perpe-
trator perceived a fraud opportunity for a company protects itself or a government 
protecting their local consumers. It is also too simple to only focus on macroeco-
nomic trends such as shifting commodity prices. It is too simple to only focus on the 
role of “organized crime” (i.e., capital “O” and capital “C,” formally defined and 
categorized organized crime not just a criminal organization or “crime that is orga-
nized”). Of course, in general, the macro-level global commodity price and avail-
ability fluctuation have an influence, but an individual criminal will decide to act 
based on their micro-level unique factors.
These micro-level factors are unique to the fraudster. By only considering the 
macro-economics, the fraud act may seem illogical or impossible. For example, a 
fraudster may have excess expensive beef product, while they are out of stock of 
lower-priced horsemeat. In some instances, substituting a higher priced product 
may be the “fraud opportunity.” For example, if an urgent order is received for 
horsemeat, the fraudster has a decision: (1) turn down the revenue from this order, 
(2) try to delay the order, (3) try to acquire more horsemeat quickly, or a fraud 
opportunity to (4) substitute the next best on-hand alternative which happens to be 
beef. If the order is very important—such as trying to win a new customer or not 
risk annoying a disgruntled customer—the microeconomic factors lead to the 
decision.
These microeconomic factors are similar to the criminology concepts of rational 
choice theory and routine activities theory. The problematic application is that the 
criminal may not share your idea of what is a “rational choice,” and you may not 
understand their “routine activity.”
 Motivation as a “Social Scientific Conception”
To provide another example of the complexity of generalizing the fraud opportunity 
or the challenge of general prevention countermeasures and control systems is the 
“social scientific conception” outlined by Lord, Elizondo, and Spencer (Lord et al. 
2017a). They present a “threefold typology of fraud” based on the work of Michael 
Levi (Levi 2007, 2008, 2016a, b). This theory helps to reinforce that there are many 
ways that fraudsters decide to commit the act. Lord et al. present three motivations 
(Levi 2008; Lord et al. 2017b):
 1. “Pre-planned fraud, where a food fraud activity or scheme is set up from the 
start with the intent of defrauding victims (e.g., other businesses, individuals, the 
state);”
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 2. “Intermediate fraud, where people start out obeying the law but consciously 
turn to food fraud later (likely as a response to a particular event or state or 
condition);”
 3. “Slippery-slope fraud, where deception spirals, often in the context of trying, 
whether absurdly or over-optimistically, to ensure that a business does not go 
bankrupt or cease trading.”
“The key argument to take from this typology is that ‘motivation to defraud can 
be heterogeneous [of many sources or reasons] rather than a single phenomenon’” 
(Lord et al. 2017a). While seeking to understand the many aspects of the motivation 
and the fraud opportunity, the countermeasures and control systems can be more 
completely judged. Most importantly, a broad view of the motivation usually shifts 
a focus to broad prevention and reducing vulnerabilities. When including insight on 
the “threefold typology,” the food fraud prevention can consider each unique fraud 
opportunity and assess specific countermeasures and control systems.
Sidebar: Expanding on the Types of Fraudsters Is a Concept by Scholar 
Michael Levi
Criminology scholar Michael Levi identifies three types of fraudsters being 
(1) pre-planned (business plan from the start), (2) intermediate frauds (a con-
scious move to illegal business), and then (3) slippery slope fraud (deception 
spirals often when trying to save a business) (Table 8.1) (Levi 2008):
• “In ‘The Phantom Capitalists’ (Levi 2016a, b), I suggested the utility of 
looking at bankruptcy and other frauds in terms of a threefold typology: (1) 
pre-planned frauds, in which the business scheme is set up from the start as 
a way of defrauding victims (businesses, public sector and/or individuals), 
(2) intermediate frauds, in which people started out obeying the law but 
consciously turned to fraud later; and(3) slippery-slope frauds, in which 
deceptions spiraled, often in the context of trying—however absurd and 
over-optimistic—to rescue an insolvent business or set of businesses that 
in reality had no hope of repaying its debts in the future.”
• For food fraud prevention this is helpful when considering the type of 
offender organization or how participants shift from legitimate activities to 
fraud. For all three, if there is no fraud opportunity, then there is no fraud 
opportunity. For the first two, the fraudsters are actively seeking targets or 
victims. The slippery slope root cause is a bit different because it is a busi-
ness that does not really want to commit fraud but is tempted. For this third 
type, similar countermeasures or control systems apply but the lack of a 
vulnerability – or the awareness that they might get caught if they attack 
you – should be a lot more obvious. Investigations and reports of the crimi-
nal actions can be “easy to find” for those who are seeking fraud opportu-
nities (Levi 2008).
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Table 8.1 The process of fraud and other crimes for gain (Levi 2008)
Concept
Application to a current food industry 
stakeholder who may be tempted by 
potential offender
1. See a situation as a “financial crime 
opportunity”
A person is operating in the food industry 
and perceives an opportunity during their 
“routine activities”
2. Obtain whatever finance is needed for the 
crime
A person may already be working in the 
food operation or access to manufacturing so 
may not need new equipment
3. Find people willing and able to offend (if 
necessary for the crimes contemplated) and who 
are controllable and reliable
In addition to finding others, co-conspirators 
are willing to commit the offense; a person 
may be able to trick their employees or 
colleagues into inadvertently supporting and 
engage in the criminal enterprise
1. Obtain any equipment/data needed to offend A person may already be working in the 
food industry and thus may already have 
insight or data from their current routine 
activities—they may become inadvertently 
aware of opportunities. This is within the 
“occasional” type of counterfeiter (Spink 
et al. 2013)
5. Carry out offences in domestic and/or overseas 
locations with or without a physical presence in 
the jurisdiction(s). This will usually involve 
manipulating—with varying degrees of 
complexity, technology, and interpersonal 
communication skills—victims’ perceptions of 
“what is happening”
For food fraud, there does need to be a direct 
transfer of the material good to the victim, 
but this can be accomplished without direct 
physical contact either through contracted 
delivery, through a courier including an 
e-commerce mail shipment or even pick up 
from a neutral location
6. Minimize immediate enforcement/operational 
risks. Especially if planning to repeat frauds, 
neutralize law enforcement by technical skill, by 
corruption, and/or by legal arbitrage, using legal 
obstacles to enforcement operations and 
prosecutions which vary between states
A person would be conducting the criminal 
activity in a “private setting” and also within 
a current trusted relationship that may not 
have intense oversight (see Felson and The 
Ecosystem of Organized Crime)
7. Convert, where necessary (e.g., where goods 
rather than money are obtained on credit), 
products of crime into money or other usable 
assets
A person needs to figure out how to mask 
their illegal gains, and sophisticated money 
laundering may not be in the expert area 
without expanding the operation to other 
co-conspirators
8. Find people and places willing to store 
proceeds (and perhaps transmit and conceal their 
origin)
Depending on the number of criminals 
involved and the scale of the criminal 
cooperation, a person may just be pocketing 
the extra cash, laundering it through the 
legitimate business, or creating a web of 
shell companies to receive the proceeds
(continued)
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 Education as a Weapon
When starting to address food fraud, there is a frustration and concern that the crim-
inals may research and try to circumvent or neutralize the countermeasures and 
control systems. Generally, product fraud prevention—and prevention of crimes 
that are complex or organized—is a chess match against very skilled and highly 
motivated adversaries. Once this is understood and accepted, many of the preven-
tion actions are more transparent and more straightforward. While each and every 
action should not be made public instead of trying to keep the entire program confi-
dential, there is some information that really should be shared publically. If the 
fraudsters do not know you are implementing new food fraud detection tests, then 
all you will do is “catch” fraudulent product and not actually prevent it!
Considering the worst-case situation is that fraudsters will conduct a thorough 
review, monitor, and test your countermeasures and control systems for weaknesses; 
this is just another consideration in the prevention strategy. Several important strat-
egy considerations include:
• Constantly adjust or change the prevention system (so if they do not adjust their 
fraud act that they will eventually get caught).
Expanding on the concept of how a person is tempted to conduct a fraud 
action is the development of a general type of crime scripts. The scripts are 
processes or required components that could create a “motivated offender.” 
There may be a misconception that this section is positioned to “blame the 
victim” since the countermeasures and control systems do not consider the 
fraudster. This section actually focuses on the guardianship or “guardian and 
hurdle gaps” since this is where the most direct controls can be implemented 
and controlled. In this scenario, the victim is often also in the role of guardian. 
This type of proactive, preventive approach is consistent with quality manage-
ment efforts. For example, ISO quality management is based on “enhanced 
focus on root-cause investigation and determination, followed by prevention 
and corrective actions” in combination with “enhanced ability to anticipate 
and react to internal and external risks and opportunities” (ISO 2015).
Table 8.1 (continued)
Concept
Application to a current food industry 
stakeholder who may be tempted by 
potential offender
9. Decide which jurisdiction(s) offers the optimal 
balance between social/physical comfort and the 
risk of asset forfeiture/criminal justice sanctions. 
Indifference in any one state or sub-state arena 
may suffice to neutralize an investigation, and 
staffing inadequacies, as well as corruption, may 
be the cause of official inaction
A person may already be operating within 
the food industry so already in the supply 
chain, so there are no necessary additional 
decisions
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• Find a way to delicately but effectively enable fraudsters to find that there are 
fraud detection and prevention actions (so they are dissuaded from attacking).
• Increase to the point where there are many other better opportunities for the 
fraudster (this is crime displacement that can be implemented to the point that 
there is an extremely low or no fraud opportunity).
It is highly recommended that a food fraud prevention strategy includes a team 
member from the corporate communications staff. This will establish an official and 
informed evaluation of the balance between the benefit of tipping off bad guys that 
you are a hard target while not coincidently increasing the general liability or to 
inadvertently create consumer panic. For example, there is a possible increase in 
general liability from public statements or actions by employees that end up creat-
ing risks or costs for a company. For example, there may be responsibilities if 
anyone at a corporation conducts a formal Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
that is public and identifies a “suspicious activity.” This risk awareness may become 
a requirement for the company to investigate the problem or possibly even be legally 
required to report this suspicious activity to the government—not reporting the 
known vulnerability may be, in and of itself, a crime. Also, regarding package label-
ing or information materials, a statement on a package of information materials 
such as “new anti-counterfeit features for your safety” sounds great, but consumers 
could interpret this as “our product is counterfeited so other products are safer.”
The goal is that if a fraudster is scouting for new targets that your product, brand, 
or company does not appear attractive. There are several ways that proactive and 
benign messages can be communicated that you are a hard target and have a com-
petent food fraud prevention strategy. Examples of the communication weapons 
include:
 1. Mentioning food fraud in supplier contracts noting requirements for a vulnera-
bility assessment and strategy,
 (a) To go a step further, whether the action can or would actually take place, to 
require suspicious activity to be reported by your employees to government 
law enforcement, food agency, and customs authorities. If possession and 
ownership do not transfer until the product is accepted and then if the gov-
ernment seized the product, the supplier would lose the cost of the entire 
shipment (and you would not be liable for paying that invoice).
 2. Including a review of food fraud prevention activities during supplier audits or 
interviews.
 3. Sharing food fraud information in supplier newsletters or news alerts.
 4. Recommending food fraud prevention training or education resources such as 
webinars or online classes.
Finally, “education as a weapon” refers to strategically using training and educa-
tion resources as a warning to suppliers, potential fraudsters, and fraudsters that you 
are aware of the vulnerability and taking action. Education is a weapon in your food 
fraud prevention arsenal since even just communicating the links to courses could 
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lead the fraudster to increase their concern for you as a target which would reduce 
the fraud opportunity.
Sidebar: Translating Courses—“MOOC to Mandarin”
From MSU press release: July 8, 2014
Mandarin Language MOOC
“We are pleased to have received a sponsorship from the Wal-mart Food 
Safety Team to translate our MOOC to the Mandarin language, focusing on 
our Chinese partners. Wal-mart issued a global press release:
Wal-mart to Sponsor Food Fraud Prevention Online Course In China, PR 
Newswire, Wal-mart China, June 29, 2014, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
wal-mart-sponsor-food-fraud-prevention-020000444.html
From the Wal-mart press release:
Frank Yiannas, Vice President of Food Safety for Wal-mart said, “At 
Wal-mart, we take the issue of food fraud very seriously. Because prevention 
of food fraud is a shared responsibility and education is a key to deterrence, 
Wal-mart is delighted to be able to help Michigan State University make the 
course more broadly available to regulatory officials, industry professionals, 
consumers and other stakeholders in China.”
Dr. Spink said, “We are grateful for forward-thinking companies like 
Wal-mart who are working, and investing in, improving the safety of the 
world’s foods.” He elaborated that, “When we rapidly expand the education 
and awareness-building at this early stage in the development of the science, 
we can more efficiently establish a starting point and trajectory of our actions.”
“Food fraud has been recognized as a common challenge not only for 
retailers but also the whole supply chain,” Wal-mart China Chief Compliance 
Office Paul Gallemore said. “As the largest retailer in the world, Wal-mart 
intends to leverage global food safety expertise and best practices to help our 
suppliers address the problem together in order to provide even greater assur-
ance of food product quality, authenticity and safety to our customers.”
Please join us in creating a public forum and expanding awareness of the 
fraud vulnerability. By participating in the MOOC, you demonstrate that this 
concept is vital to your organization. By forwarding this information to your 
colleagues around the world, you help build harmonization of terms and the 
prevention focus.”
Sidebar: Publication—“Defining the Types of Fraudsters” and 
“Development of an Incident Clustering Tool”
Another example of adapting and applying the criminology theories is pre-
sented in this blog post that summarizes two articles. The first article 
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Start of the excerpt (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: New Publications – ‘Defining the Types of Fraudsters’ and ‘Development 
of an Incident Clustering Tool’
By John Spink • April 30, 2014 • Blog
We just published two articles that are already contributing to advancing 
food fraud prevention. They are scholarly, peer-reviewed publications, which 
are especially helpful in supporting the development of government regula-
tions and reports (scholarly journals meet the government need for “science- 
based” insight). These articles are already making an impact, as they are cited 
in a product fraud standard by the International Standards Organization (ISO). 
Both articles are published in an “open” journal so you can access them for 
free in the two links below.
The peer-review process is important not only for developing the theories 
but also because the rigorous process supports the articles as credible. We had 
some excellent and vital discussions and revelations during the intense review 
researched and published definitions of the types of counterfeits and types of 
counterfeiting and identification of the offender organizations. Previously, the 
definition of the concepts had not been the subject of a peer-reviewed, refer-
eed, scholarly journal article. The second article applied those terms and 
introduced an incident clustering tool. This tool enables the organization of 
incident details to allow a focus on the most important and frequent types of 
problems.
The incident clustering tool was published in the ISO 22380 Security and 
resilience—authenticity, integrity, and trust for products and documents—
general principles for product fraud risk and countermeasures under the 
Technical Committee 292 on Security Management and Resilience. This is an 
important step since the method is being codified by an international standard 
organization after an international, official government-entrusted partners’ 
thorough, rigorous, consensus-based review process. The ISO standard—in 
addition to other standard activities such as Codex Alimentarius, GFSI, and 
others—will expand the use of the tool and support more harmonization and 
enable sharing of best practices. While the ISO process is not quick, it is thor-
ough and builds a global consensus. This standard was conceived in an ad hoc 
product fraud terminology workgroup in 2014 (the work changed from 
Technical Committee 247 Fraud Countermeasures and Controls, WG2 ISO 
WD 19564 Product Fraud Countermeasures and control—General 
Principles—to TC 292 and the same content and title but now ISO 22380) 
(ISO 2018). The time and effort are important since it supports the harmoniza-
tion of all terms, the focus on prevention, and now standardized processes that 
can be benchmarked and refined.
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process. We would like to especially recognize Crime Science Journal editor 
Dr. Gloria Laycock, University College London, for her support and 
encouragement.
Beyond collaboration with the editors and reviewers, my co-authors and I 
are entrenched in the evolution of the research. By being directly involved 
with the theorists and practitioners, we can get a better feel for what exactly is 
needed. This series of articles and the implementation of standards and certi-
fications is an example of the value of this research immersion.
The first article is a research project studying the fraudsters, the fraud act, 
and the fraudster organizational structures. The second article described a tool 
we developed to organize the often seemingly disconnected incident data. The 
first article helps establish the foundation, and the second helps us understand 
the data that will inform decision-making. Using these definitions and the 
incident clustering tool will help with the selection of efficient food fraud 
prevention countermeasures and control systems.
Regarding “Defining the Types of Counterfeiters, Counterfeiting and 
Offender Organizations” (Spink et al. 2013):
• We realized that before we presented the incident clustering tool, we 
needed to establish and define the core definitions. We were surprised to 
find that terms like “counterfeiting” and “counterfeiter” had not been the 
focus of an academic research article – many articles or reports just state 
definitions without any scholarly review. This article will help future 
researchers because instead of spending limited article space on justifying 
their interpretation of the definitions they can just cite this article. This 
actually helped us in our second article, where we could quickly review the 
terms but not go into the typical excruciating academic detail.
Regarding the “Development of a Product-Counterfeiting Incident 
Clustering Tool (PCICT)” (Spink et al. 2014):
• We had been trying to organize incident data and could not find a product 
fraud-related application directly addressed in a scholarly journal. We also 
didn’t find any standardized incident analysis model or tool. So we started 
with core crime science and Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and 
adapted it to provide insight specifically for product fraud incidents. The 
tool has already been a great help, and we have used it many times.
An example of the impact of these articles is considering the use such as by 
the International Standards Organization (ISO) projects. Both articles are 
already being quoted and referenced in standards and certifications. I am the 
Chair of the US Technical Advisory Group ISO Technical Committee 247 on 
Fraud Countermeasures and Controls. Co-author Dr. Hyeonho Park leads the 
Korean group. We have collaborated on many ISO projects, including a termi-
nology standard and now a New Work Item Proposal (NWIP) based on these 
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two articles. It was during our ISO work that we realized the need for a stan-
dard and a scholarly article, so the articles were really driven by the practitio-
ner need.
A third, related publication is “When Crime Defies Classification: The 
Case of Product Counterfeiting as White Collar Crime” (Heinonen et  al. 
2014). This project was led by Dr. Justin Heinonen while he was an Assistant 
Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at MSU. He has a very sound theo-
retical criminology foundation that was established during his Criminology 
Ph.D. work at the University of Cincinnati under the tutelage of committee 
members John Eck and Bonnie Fisher.:
• The connection to food fraud is that it defines how the crime exhibits white 
collar crime characteristics in the planning (and prevention), and tradi-
tional crime in the act (humans consuming the products). This is an impor-
tant – critical – point when considering how the crime is classified, which 
influences the government’s focus on enforcement, prosecution, and pre-
ventative countermeasures and control systems. A key is that white collar 
crimes are often perceived as “victimless crimes.” This article lays a firm, 
theoretically sound foundation that food fraud and product counterfeiting 
are hybrid crimes. This article will contribute to ongoing reviews such as 
the UK Elliott Review of food fraud, the EU/DG-SANCO-led resolution 
on food fraud, and the China National Center for food safety Risk 
Assessment work in examining broad countermeasures and control sys-
tems. It will also contribute to the food fraud-related work of the Global 
food safety Initiative and possibly future reviews of food fraud by the US 
Congressional Research Service.
The food fraud and Product Fraud concepts are maturing. Peer-review 
articles are a key to the process. Beyond the journal being accessible through 
the most extensive scholarly databases, we felt these were such important top-
ics that we sought publication in “open” journals that are free for anyone to 
access. The more people, who get full, free access to the articles, the more 
people who can use the concepts and the more significant impact of the work. 
These open educational resources (OER) are an important growing focus for 
academia. The goal is not to just fill our Curriculum Vitae/ Resume […] why 
we should lock away great research where no one can find it? Please stay 
engaged and asking questions. We will continue to listen and try to support 
your needs.
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 Government and Law Enforcement Priority Setting
There are several key concepts to help to understand the government and law 
enforcement priority setting which is based on the direction set by resource alloca-
tion by the legislative branch.
Sidebar: Law Enforcement Priority Setting—“Who Cares?” (Where Is 
Food Fraud a Priority and Who Funds the Work and for How Long?)
After reviewing the fundamental theories, the key terms, and the analysis of 
the problems, there is a need to focus on the practical question of who is 
accountable and who will actually take action. After an incident, there are 
often outrage and public demands that the “government” “do something.” 
Law enforcement officers seek training and education on how to investigate 
and develop cases, so there is no lack of interest. As with business enterprise- 
wide assessments and priority setting, governments must also consider the 
scarce human and economic resources.
At the Food Fraud Conference in April 2017—and he reinforced in October 
2017—the US FDA Deputy Commissioner of Foods, Dr. Steven Ostroff, 
posed the question of: “Government Priority Setting: “In circumstances where 
no regulatory agency has unlimited resources, where and how does EMA 
[Food Fraud] fit onto a list of priorities” (Ostroff 2017a, b; Newkirk 2018).
Dr. Ostroff responded that they consider the FDA mission as a public 
health agency and prioritized problems with—severe—health hazards. 
Considering this point, the commercial food fraud issues would be under the 
US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the related economic issues 
possibly under the Department of Commerce (DOC) which would be pursued 
by FBI or others such as the US Marshals. From the FBI website in 2018, 
When considering “who cares” and “who has funding,” the publically stated 
agency priorities are a starting point (FBI 2018):
• US FBI Priorities (2018)—in order:
• (1) Protect the United States from terrorist attack.
• (2) Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and 
espionage.
• (3) Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technol-
ogy crimes.
• (4) Combat public corruption at all levels.
• And others.
Also for reference, here are the FDA strategic priorities, 2014–2018, FDA 
(FDA 2018):
• FDA’s core mission goals and objectives are:
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• Goal 1: Enhance oversight of FDA-regulated products.
• Goal 2: Improve and safeguard access to FDA-regulated products to ben-
efit health.
• Goal 3: Promote better informed decisions about the use of FDA-regulated 
products.
• Goal 4: Strengthen organizational excellence and accountability.
Another way to consider the question is “importance vs. priority.” From 
the OECD report on The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy 
(OECD 2007):
“Importance vs. priority – From an industry perspective, there is frequently a differ-
ence between the importance that governments attach to counterfeiting and piracy, 
and the priority is given to relevant authorities (such as police, customs, and prose-
cutors) when resources are allocated, and there seems to be some logic to explain 
their experiences. For example, it would be understandable that a greater proportion 
of resources are allocated to areas that deal with the more serious illicit activities, 
such as drugs, weapons, and people-smuggling, or even smuggled goods that avoid 
excise. As a serious, but “less serious” crime, counterfeiting and piracy could find 
itself towards the tail end of resource-allocation priority lists. Within the resources 
allocated to counterfeiting and piracy, there is also some logic for a pragmatic (if not 
intentional) hierarchy. For example, efforts to uncover pharmaceutical, food and 
drink, car parts and other items that have potential health and safety risks, may have 
greater access to resources than the more innocuous items, such as CDs, DVDs, and 
t-shirts. These priorities are matters for governments, and it is up to them to decide 
how to allocate their resources, but it is nevertheless worthwhile to at least note that 
in the experience of industry there is a clear difference between importance and 
priorities.” (OECD 2007)
Considering this hierarchy of priority, food fraud is not within the defini-
tion of “high technology” and not to the threshold of “public corruption.” 
Food fraud would not only not be a high priority; there is no category where 
it would be included.
To explore this challenge, over 2011–2012–2013, the MSU Food Fraud 
Initiative conducted surveys of the residents of the State of Michigan (USA) 
regarding several intellectual property rights topics including law enforce-
ment priority setting. The findings were (Spink 2014a, b):
• “There was general support for increasing the investigating and prosecut-
ing product-counterfeiting incidents (55% supported).”
• “There was little support for increasing funding or incarceration rates if it 
takes away from other types of law enforcement activity (2% supported).”
• “Of this, a minority (29% supported) supported increasing taxes to fund 
the anti-counterfeiting activities.”
Considering more detail from that report (Spink 2014a, b)
“Related Law Enforcement Priority Setting:
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• “While there is general support for investigating and prosecuting product- 
counterfeiting incidents, there is little support for increasing funding or 
incarceration rates if it takes away from other types of law enforcement 
activity. There is an opportunity for State and Local law enforcement to 
continue to try to pursue federal or industry-funded enforcement. In 2013 
there was a drop in the respondents who thought the “government” should 
do “more” to combat counterfeiting (from 56 then 59% to 51%in 2013). 
There was also a drop in the percent for who tax support – 71% did not 
support more taxes to fund the anti-counterfeit activities.”
This research provides valuable insights into several aspects of product 
counterfeiting that are important for a holistic and all-encompassing perspec-
tive on public policy trends. These include:
• “While this assessment is concerning the lack of human or financial 
resources for law enforcement investigation and prosecution is a fact. 
Government funding is not growing as directed by the taxpayers instruct-
ing their elected officials. FDA, FBI, or other law enforcement has been 
willing to expand their operations and focus on product fraud, but there has 
been a lack of resources. Agencies are already capacity constrained and 
they – themselves – need to prioritize for their maximum impact. When the 
resident and lawmaker priority is “public safety (drugs, guns, violence 
including terrorism), public health (major public health incidents), and 
then large-scale economic crimes that disrupt governments or markets, and 
then de-escalating economic crimes” food fraud would be at the end of the 
list.”
To get to the question of “Who cares?” this ends up being based on who is 
harmed the most and who will be punished for not addressing the problem. A 
more important influence in the broad prevention or intervention activities is 
“Who pays?” This is a good question since as of June 2017 the total number 
of US-funded grants with the term “food fraud” or “economically motivated 
adulteration” was four (4). (To note, an ERM approach would help define if 
this was too little or too much government investment.)
The application to food fraud prevention is that the role of law enforce-
ment is often minimal due to constrained resources and mandates a shift for 
victims to focus intensely on prevention. “New plans or expansion of scope 
should consider that there will probably be no—or little—additional resource 
allocation or funding for inspection, enforcement, and prosecution. For any 
expanding or new regulations it will be important to incorporate and leverage 
current activities” (Spink et al. 2016, 2019).
8 Criminology Theory (Part 2 of 2): Application Review
273
Sidebar: US DOJ Guidance on “Deciding Whether to Prosecute an IP 
Case”
When considering food fraud prevention, a key insight is the role of the pros-
ecutors and courts including an understanding of their priorities. One type of 
food fraud is intellectual property rights counterfeiting. While this section 
only addresses counterfeiting, the insight is valuable when considering and 
government enforcement and prosecution priority setting.
Regarding criminal prosecution and conviction, there are many steps in the 
process including the Department of Justice setting priorities for the limited 
resources of the prosecutors, the judiciary, and the penal system. There are a 
wide range of illegal acts that—while still illegal and could lead to prosecu-
tion and incarceration—are not prioritized. One way to gain insight is to 
examine guidance for the prosecutors including the US Department of Justice 
(DOJ) published “Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes” (this fourth edi-
tion in 2013 is an update from 2006 earlier in 2001) (Goldstone 2001; DOJ 
2006, 2013)).
The DOJ routinely publishes guidance for the US prosecuting attorneys. 
This document was published by the Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section (CCIPS). While this document, not a law with “no regula-
tory effect, confers no rights or remedies and does not have the force of law,” 
it does provide “assistance not authority” in how these employees meet their 
key job responsibilities.
There is an awareness that civil or criminal liability may be “a cost of 
doing business” and the perpetrator may “and continue their infringement 
after civil sanctions, albeit with different products or under a different corpo-
rate guise.”
One key insight is “When Infringement Is Criminal” (emphasis added):
“Any instance of infringement will generally entitle a copyright owner to a civil 
remedy, such as damages or injunctive relief. But not every infringement is a crimi-
nal offense. Throughout the history of copyright in the United States, criminal copy-
right penalties have been the exception rather than the rule. Although criminal 
copyright law has greatly expanded the scope of the conduct it penalizes over the 
past century, criminal sanctions continue to apply only to certain types of infringe-
ment—generally when the infringer knows the infringement is wrong, and when the 
infringement is particularly serious, or the type of case renders civil enforcement by 
individual copyright owners especially difficult. As described in more detail below, 
a willful violation of any exclusive right for commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain is a misdemeanor, whereas only a violation of the rights to reproduction and 
distribution under certain circumstances constitutes felony infringement.”
A challenge for prosecutors is to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that 
the accused “knows the infringement is wrong.” They emphasize that both the 
felony and misdemeanors require a “willful violation.”
Specifically of interest is the section on “Charging Decisions” or what and 
when cases should be prosecuted.
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“Broken down further, the relevant considerations include (emphasis 
added):
• The federal interest in intellectual property crimes.
• Federal law enforcement priorities.
• The nature and seriousness of the offense.
• The deterrent effect of prosecution.
• The individual’s culpability in connection with the offense.
• The individual’s criminal history.
• The individual’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecu-
tion of others.
• The probable sentence and other consequences of conviction [including 
the length of sentence].
• Whether the person is subject to prosecution in another jurisdiction.
• The adequacy of alternative non-criminal remedies.
• Special considerations for deciding whether to charge corporations.”
Next, special considerations of “the following factors in determining 
whether to commence prosecution” (emphasis added):
• ‘a) the scope of the criminal activity, including evidence of involvement by 
a foreign government, foreign agent or foreign instrumentality;
• ‘b) the degree of economic injury to the trade secret owner;
• ‘c) the type of trade secret misappropriated;
• ‘d) the effectiveness of available civil remedies; and
• ‘e) The potential deterrent value of the prosecution.”
Further on the “nature and seriousness of the offence”:
• “The offense’s nature and seriousness are indicated by the usual factors, 
with special importance placed on
 – threats to health or safety, …
 – the volume of infringement as measured by the amount of revenue and 
profit, …
 – the involvement of organized crime, … and
 – Whether substantial harm was done to the reputation of the rights 
holder.”
The guidance provides additional priority setting considerations (emphasis 
added):
• Federal criminal prosecution is most appropriate in the most egregious 
cases. … Even then, the government must prove its case beyond a reason-
able doubt, including a high state of mens rea.
• Limited federal resources should not be diverted to prosecute an inconse-
quential case or a case in which the violation is only technical. Even some 
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branches of civil intellectual property law recognize the maxim, “de mini-
mis non curat lex [Note: “The law does not care for, or take notice of, very 
small or trifling matters. The law does not concern itself about trifles” 
(Black’s 2014).].”
• Federal prosecution is most appropriate when the questions of intellectual 
property law are most settled [the violation of the law is clear, obvious, and 
has a history of case law].
• Victims have a broad range of civil remedies that include restitution, dam-
ages, punitive or quasi-punitive damages, injunctions, court costs, and 
attorneys’ fees.
• The more strongly an intellectual property owner acts to protect its rights, 
the stronger the interest in prosecution.
• Many intellectual property offenses include multiple victims, not only the 
owners of the intellectual property that was infringed but also customers 
who were defrauded. Both classes of victim deserve protection, and one 
class’s lack of interest in prosecution should not countermand prosecution 
when the other class’s interest is strong.
• The sources or manufacturers of infringing goods and services are gener-
ally more worthy of prosecution than distributors.
• Counterfeit goods or services that endanger the public’s health or safety 
deserve the highest consideration for prosecution.
Finally,
“The Adequacy of Alternative Non-Criminal Remedies”:
• “Department of Justice policy allows a prosecutor to decline criminal pros-
ecution in a situation that could be adequately addressed by non-criminal 
remedies. Almost every federal intellectual property crime has an analog in 
civil law—be it state or federal—and those laws generally offer victims 
generous relief, such as injunctions, restitution, damages, punitive and 
quasi-punitive damages, court costs, attorneys’ fees, and even ex parte sei-
zure of a defendant’s infringing products.,”
• “The prosecutor should also consider whether existing civil remedies have 
been or are likely to deter a particular defendant. For those undeterred by 
civil suits and remedies, criminal prosecution may be more appropriate. 
When the defendant has violated an earlier civil order, however, civil or 
criminal penalties for contempt of court may be an acceptable alternative 
to prosecution for criminal intellectual property violations.”
For food fraud prevention, it is important to consider the role of the courts 
in the reduction of the fraud opportunity. This section provided an awareness 
of the resources, priorities, and information needed to pursue criminal prose-
cution. A key first step for protecting a company is to protect the product and 
reduce the fraud opportunity.
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 Wine Spectator Article
Wine Spectator is a leading English-language magazine that covers wine. Its recent 
cover story was about the food fraud counterfeit wine case of Rudy Kurniawan who 
was arrested in Los Angeles in 2012 and who received a 10-year federal sentenced 
in 2013 for wire and mail fraud. “The FBI believes Kurniawan made more than 
$130 million in sales this way. These fakes were often well-crafted blends of old 
wines from poor vintages and young wines, designed to fool experts even when they 
opened and tasted.” (Note: the DOJ.gov press release states $30 million.)
Also “No one knows exactly how large the [overall product] counterfeit problem 
is, but a report by the International Chamber of Commerce projected that more than 
$1.77 trillion worth of counterfeit goods will be traded worldwide in 2015, up from 
$550 billion in 2008” [Note: this estimate and report was the subject of a previous 
article reviewed in a previous blog post]. The wine spectator article did mention 
several wine food fraud incidents. There were no mentions of health hazards. The 
incidents mentioned were:
• $2.8 million for 400 + bottles ($7000 per bottle)
• $60 million for 1.8 million bottles over 10 years (arrested for importing 1.4 mil-
lion liters of table wine and bottling it as Brunello and Chianti Classico—60 
shipping containers) ($33 per bottle)
• $4 million for 20,000 cases ($16 per bottle)
Food fraud for a product like wine can fall into several categories, with a range 
of consequences, which lead to priority setting by law enforcement. To classify the 
investigation, rare wines were more categorized as “collectibles” and directed to the 
Counterfeit Wine Food Fraud Part I: The Challenge of Enforcement 
and Prosecution with a Review of the Wine Spectator Article (MSU-FFI 
2018)
Title: Counterfeit Wine Food Fraud
By John Spink • December 2, 2015 • Blog
“Counterfeit wine is almost as old as wine itself, a problem that [Roman 
Philosopher] ‘Pliny the Elder’ decried in first-century Rome.” A wine expert 
stated that “if someone is faking Miraval, a $25 rose, I could be drinking 
counterfeit rarities.” This is a review of the November 30, 2015, Wine 
Spectator Magazine article of the investigation and prosecution of a major 
wine counterfeiting operation in the USA. The focus of the Wine Spectator 
story was on the collectible, rare wines ($1000+/bottle) but there is also a 
discussion of more common wines.
The report on food fraud counterfeit wines provides insight into the very 
complex investigations and the priority-setting challenges for law 
enforcement.
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FBI/ DOJ artwork forgery investigators. “They were collectible. Whether the 
collectible at issue is art or antique or wine.” As with many counterfeit cases, it is 
difficult to prosecute unless the seller knowingly sells a fake. For example, in a 
report by the US Chamber of Commerce/Coalition Against Counterfeiting and 
Piracy, the law firm Tory’s stated that “every” counterfeiter they prosecuted stated 
they were just diverting genuine product—so the counterfeiters say “prove it.” 
“[The DOJ’s] biggest question was whether Kurniawan was a counterfeiter or had 
been duped into selling fakes he’d purchased unknowingly.” If there was a health 
hazard (e.g., illnesses or deaths)—or even a vulnerability that violated FSMA or 
FD&C—this would have been a priority for FDA and even FBI.
A major base of evidence and insight for this investigation and prosecution was 
from a previous private investigation funded by “William Koch, the energy com-
pany billionaire, and avid wine collector who in 1985 purchases four bottles of wine 
he understood to be eighteenth-century Bordeaux once owned by Thomas Jefferson.” 
A 2003 Forbes article noted that a single Jefferson bottle was insured for $225,000. 
In a 2011 California Court of Appeals document, Koch vs. Kurniawan identifies five 
bottles from 1934 to 1949 that cost a combined $75,000. “‘Koch was a great 
resource,’ says Wynne. ‘He had been defrauded and had no problem saying. ‘I’m 
the victim.’”
The investigation and prosecution were helped by Kurniawan’s naiveté when a 
raid found his entire counterfeiting operation…in his house. All that evidence—and 
the case—was almost thrown out because the search of the house was conducted for 
a “protective” sweep looking for other dangerous criminals. The article noted that 
Rudy and his mother were the only people home. The situation did not seem to be 
very dangerous:
“Rudy Kurniawan [38 years old], a man of slight build, with piercing eyes under heavy 
brows, stands there in his silk pajamas.” He was standing in front of his house in “This 
leafy, suburban Los Angeles neighborhood just east of Pasadena, is the home to the Santa 
Anita horse track and the city’s botanical gardens.” “His mother, who owned the house and 
lived there with her son, was asked to stand beside him. To make sure the house was empty, 
[the FBI special agent] Wynne ordered some of his men to perform a protective sweep.”)
The case and prosecution hinged on that critical “smoking gun” of the seizure of 
the “counterfeiting paraphernalia.”
Also, less than 10% of federal cases actually to a trial, so this was a major 
resource commitment for the federal court and attorneys.
 Law Enforcement Conundrum: Priority Setting
The Wine Spectator Magazine article covered the investigation and noted: “The 
case was a first [counterfeit wine] for federal law enforcement…” (note: a search of 
the DOJ.gov website resulted in only this case). The investigation took 21 months 
from the raid to the wire and mail fraud conviction. The court case took 8 months. 
Beyond the time and effort for this type of case, expertise is often a problem where 
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“The Justice Department did not have any wine specialists in its ranks.” The govern-
ment expertise was lost since the FBI investigator retired, and the article stated he 
now worked for the bank HSBC. An internet search found the DOJ Assistant US 
Attorney now a shareholder at the law firm Stearns Weaver since 2014.
In general, there is a challenge to prioritize complex or nonviolent cases. If this 
had been classified an intellectual property rights counterfeiting case, rather than a 
collectibles/art case, it would be handled by the DOJ Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS). A review of the 2015 DOJ press releases for 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) resulted in 70 entries 
comprised of 4 pornography cases, 28 intellectual property rights/counterfeiting, 
and 34 cybercrime/trade secret theft (we did not review for duplicate cases). The 
DOJ 2014 Annual Review stated that there were over 12,000 cases “favorably 
resolved” in FY 2014.
There is citizen interest for increased enforcement but a lack of support for 
diverting other law enforcement resource or for raising taxes. From one of our pre-
vious survey reports:
“Related Law Enforcement Priority-Setting. It was found that 55% of Michigan residents 
thought the “government” should do “more” to combat product-counterfeiting and 71% of 
the overall sample did not support increased taxes to cover the additional activity. Also, of 
the 55% that thought the government should do more, 82% of them did not support divert-
ing resources from other crime-fighting activity and 76% of them did not support increased 
prison time if it meant other types of prisoners would be released.”
Additional insight on law enforcement priority setting can be gained from a 
November 2015 New York Times article on cyberstalking. “[The lead detective] 
knew that [the criminal] was causing real harm, but he didn’t seem to have good 
options. “The ordeal [of one incident] cost the taxpayers of Ontario [California, 
USA] $6,500, yet it was sometimes difficult for the Ontario detective assigned the 
case to justify spending time on it. ‘I have felony cases sitting on my laptop,’ he 
says. ‘Why would I take this cyber case, tracking all these records, trying to find a 
guy who’s in another country?’” To note, the criminal pleaded guilty to 23 counts 
and sentenced to 16 months in youth jail and will be released in 8 months at age 18.
DOJ Priorities
To review all food fraud, product counterfeiting, and this collectibles case in more 
detail, it is important to consider the overall DOJ priorities set by Congress. The 
publically stated—and US Congress approved—DOJ priorities for US law enforce-
ment. For 2014 these were:
• Priority Goal 1, National Security: Protect Americans from terrorism and other 
threats to national security, including cybersecurity threats.
• Priority Goal 2, Violent Crime: Protect our communities by reducing gun vio-
lence using smart prevention and investigative strategies in order to prevent vio-
lent acts from occurring.
• Priority Goal 3, Financial and Healthcare Fraud: Reduce financial and healthcare 
fraud.
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• Priority Goal 4, Vulnerable People: Protect vulnerable populations by increasing 
the number of investigations and litigation matters concerning child exploitation, 
human trafficking, and noncompliant sex offenders and by improving programs 
to prevent victimization, identify victims, and provide services. This includes 
goals to open investigations concerning noncompliant sex offenders, sexual 
exploitation of children, and human trafficking.
Collectables and rare wine, or even intellectual property rights counterfeiting, 
were not on this priority goal list. The victims did not fall under the definition of 
“vulnerable people.”
Overall Review
The future support for this type of problem (IP-related crimes for food such as col-
lectible wines) investigation is challenging for many reasons:
• No health threat (and no public safety or violence threat).
• The crime classification was collectibles/art.
• There were few victims.
• Victims were not a “vulnerable people.”
• This was a complex case especially compared to a felony drug or weapon charge.
• The type of evidence was novel for the courts, complex to explain, and vulnera-
ble to be dismissed.
• The nature of the evidence and case led to an actual trial and appeal—fewer than 
10% of federal cases go to a trial, so this was an unusually and inefficiently high 
resource commitment for DOJ (to consider the BATNA and opportunity cost, 
what other case or cases could the prosecutor, investigator, and courts addressed?).
• There are already limited resources for collectibles/art or even for product coun-
terfeiting cases. DOJ prosecuted 28 intellectual property cases nationwide in 
2015.
• Not a “Priority Goal” area for DOJ.
It is always interesting to review details of food fraud cases that make it to court 
and that results in a criminal prosecution. It is important to review these details to 
understand how enforcement and prosecution can contribute to prevention. Law 
enforcement and the courts are under tremendous pressure, with constrained 
resources, and they need to be diligent in their focus on the priorities set by the 
Congress, which is national security, violent crime, financial and healthcare fraud, 
and vulnerable people—specifically, sexual exploitation and human trafficking. 
This is an important insight that underscores the importance of companies focusing 
on prevention. Law enforcement and prosecution play a critical role in combating 
food fraud, but the most efficient and effective countermeasures and control sys-
tems—for companies or countries—are prevention. MSU-FFI.
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Review of Governmental Reports 
that Address Product Fraud
This section reviews several US government reports that address product fraud or 
food fraud. These provide insight into the broad understanding of the problem and 
the governmental approaches. The official reports are important because they are 
often used as formal references or official resources by government agencies in both 
priority setting and by legislators for policy-making.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Government Accountability Office reports are official government critiques 
of about the efficiency of government response to problems.
• (2) Congressional Research Reports are asked by the legislators and provide 
information or policy-making.
• (3) Other government-funded reports that will include “Crime Analysis for 
Problem- Solvers in 60 Easy Steps.
 GAO Expanding from IPR and Economic Adulteration to Food 
Fraud
Before getting to the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), several other 
important US Government reports will be reviewed. Since the food fraud/EMA 
laws and regulations are still in development, insight to Congressional thinking 
can be found in related reports. For example, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on intellec-
tual property rights or other food issues. The role of GAO is to review how agen-
cies are responding to a specific law and to recommend changes. The role of CRS 
is to provide the US Congress with background information on hot topics that are 
presumably being considered for new legislation. Typically, agencies respond to 
GAO recommendations.
GAO-Intellectual Property (2007, 2010) In October 2007, the GAO published 
“Intellectual Property  – Risk and Enforcement Challenges” and “Better Data 
Analysis and Integration Could Help U.S. Customs and Border Protection Improve 
Border Enforcement Efforts” (GAO 2007). This was followed in April 2010 by a 
significant deeper review in “Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic 
Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods” (note: the acknowledgment includes 
“Individuals or organizations that we met with for these structured interviews are 
listed below: […] John Spink, Michigan State University”) (GAO 2010). These 
were in a series of intellectual property rights themed of GAO reports (e.g., 2001, 
2002, 2007, 2010, 2016, 2018, and others). The general conclusions are that there 
should be “more” coordination between agencies. One result from the formal ques-
tioning and recommendation for more coordination was the Prioritizing Resources 
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and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act) established the 
US Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC). It is important to note 
that IPEC is assigned to focus only on intellectual property rights counterfeiting and 
not focus on all types of fraud. Also, the focus is on enforcement and not broader 
prevention concepts. This group coordinates IP enforcement across all agencies. 
This added to the work on the National Intellectual Property Rights Center (IPR 
Center) that is working with 19+ US and international agencies.
GAO-Seafood Fraud (2009) In February 2009, the GAO published a “seafood 
fraud” report (GAO 2009). The report identified seafood fraud as a concern, an issue 
that agencies must deal with based on a law. Also, GAO identified the opportunity 
for more collaboration between agencies specifically, FDA, Customs, and National 
Maritime Fisheries Service (NMFS). There was a general emphasis on prevention 
but no guidance or vision for the holistic or all-encompassing theory or resource 
allocation. The comments included recommendations for more coordination and 
reduction of overlapping activities: “The federal agencies that share responsibility 
for detecting and preventing seafood fraud—CBP, NMFS, and FDA— … do not 
effectively collaborate with each other. Specifically, they have not identified a com-
mon goal, established joint strategies, or agreed on roles and responsibilities.” The 
phrase “detect and prevent” was mentioned throughout the report.
GAO-Fruit Juice Adulteration (1996) The GAO focus on this area goes back to 
1996, and the publication of “Fruit Juice Adulteration – Detection Is Difficult, and 
Enchanted Efforts Would be Costly” (GAO 1995). The term “economic adultera-
tion” was used, and there was an emphasis on “…they pose little threat to the pub-
lic’s health and safety.” It is interesting to note that there was also such an emphasis 
on the resource requirement there was the reference to the high cost in the title.
CRS-Seafood Fraud (2010, 2013) In 2008, 2010, and 2015, the CRS published 
reports on seafood fraud (CRS 2007, 2010, 2015). There have been several efforts 
to bring forth legislation in this area. A key quote was “Congress is facing questions 
of whether the U.S. law applicable to fraudulent seafood sales and marketing is 
clear and enforceable, whether agency enforcement efforts targeting seafood fraud 
are adequate, and whether the penalties for seafood fraud are a deterrent.”
GAO-EMA (2011) In October 2011, the GAO published “Better Coordination 
Could Enhance Efforts to Address Economically Motivated Adulteration and Protect 
the Public Health” (GAO 2011). The key recommendations were to create a formal 
definition of EMA, create guidance, and coordinate activities between FDA centers. 
FDA did respond directly to these recommendations which included the creation of 
the Workgroup on Economically Motivated Adulteration. FDA did confirm they 
were using the EMA definition from the Federal Register notice of the Public 
Meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration.”
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CRS-Food Fraud and EMA (2014) In January 2014, the CRS published “Food 
Fraud and Economically Motivated Adulteration” (CRS 2014). CRS noted that con-
gress has “not addressed from fraud in a comprehensive manner.” Also, this report 
noted that “no single federal agency or US law directly addresses food fraud.” This 
report noted many of the global activities such as the UK Elliott Review and the EU 
referendum on food fraud. To note, the FDA has solicited comments on EMA in the 
past and current draft rulemaking. FDA has stated that after the comments are 
received, they will formulate their plan on how and where EMA is addressed. FDA 
stated that EMA is addressed in the FSMA Preventive Controls Rule and is consid-
ered by the guidance based on the level of a health hazard. All types of food fraud 
have been illegal since at least since the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938.
It is important to review that there has been many past and current US govern-
ment activities around food fraud and EMA. There are some common themes and 
frames for the activities including a broader focus on all fraud and a systems-based 
approach to prevention.
Sidebar: GAO Seafood Fraud Recommendations—“Coordinate More”
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is tasked with reviewing 
the US government activities related to a wide range of topics. In 2009, the 
GAO published “Seafood Fraud: FDA Program Changes and Better 
Collaboration among Key Federal Agencies Could Improve Detection and 
Prevention” (GAO 2009). The report states that seafood fraud is not a primary 
priority or responsibility for the agencies mentioned which were FDA, US 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Department of Commerce’s National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
• GAO Identified Agency Roles:
• CBP—monitors imported product with a focus on “paying the appropriate 
customs duties as seafood products enter the USA.
• NMFS—manages a “voluntary, fee-for-service inspection program” that 
focuses on proper weight and species identification.
• FDA—focuses on public health hazards and examines only about 2% of 
imported seafood annually, and the “primary seafood oversight program 
does not address economic fraud risks, which limits its ability to detect 
fraud.
No one group has the “accountability” for prevention of seafood fraud. No 
one group has the authority or statutory requirement to address all seafood 
fraud. Thus, the GAO report identifies the gap. It is interesting to note that the 
Department of Justice (prosecution) and FBI (investigation) were not included 
in the study and not assigned any responsibility or activity.
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The GAO final recommendation was:
• “What GAO Recommends” (from Highlights Cover Page)
• “GAO is making recommendations to CBP, NMFS, and FDA that are intended 
to help reduce the prevalence of seafood fraud, increase interagency collabora-
tion, improve information sharing, and reduce overlaps. In commenting on a 
draft of this report, CBP, NMFS, and FDA generally agreed with the 
recommendations.”
The GAO report identified several types of seafood fraud that demonstrate 
the wide range of types of fraud (Table 8.2) (Spink and Moyer 2011). The 
wide range of types of fraud emphasizes the complexity of an integrated, cen-
tral seafood fraud vulnerability assessment and seafood fraud prevention 
strategy.
Table 8.2 GAO seafood fraud report: types of food fraud and potential public health risk
GAO seafood fraud report detail (1) New comment (2)
Fraud type Description Cause and 
motivation
Potential public health food 
risk
Transshipment Transferring cargo 
among different 
transports and countries
Avoid tariffs or 
antidumping 
duties
Compromised storage, 
handling, and traceability (in 
the event of a product recall)
Overtreating Adding more ice or 
water than allowed by 
regulation
Increase profits 
by including 
more weight for 
ice than fish
Water may include pathogens 
or chemicals (i.e., if ice was 
made from pond water)
Species substitution Substituting less costly 
species and 
misrepresenting them 
as more expensive 
species
Increase profits 
due to the cost 
differential
Misrepresented species may 
be toxic or cause allergic 
reactions
Short weighting Package labels state 
weights higher than 
packaged contents
Increase profits 
due to weight 
differential
None
Other mislabeling 
or 
misrepresentation
Misrepresenting 
country of origin, 
ingredients, etc.
Generally, avoid 
costs and 
maximize profits
Undeclared allergens, toxins 
from banned locals (e.g., 
ciguatoxin-prone reefs), 
weight increased added 
through other unknown 
materials, etc.
Adapted from GAO (2009) and Spink and Moyer (2011)
Note: In each case, fraudsters may not be following Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAPs), or Good Hygiene Practices (GHPs)
(1) These columns are directly from the GAO seafood fraud report
(2) This column was not included in the GAO seafood report and was developed for this report
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The longer recommendation is:
• “We are recommending that CBP, NMFS, and FDA collaborate to:
• ‘(1) develop goals, strategies, and mechanisms to efficiently and effectively 
share information and resources related to seafood fraud detection and preven-
tion across agency boundaries and
• ‘(2) create a federal agency-wide library of seafood species standards. In com-
menting on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce, representing 
NOAA; the Department of Health and Human Services, representing FDA; and 
the Department of Homeland Security, representing CBP, generally agreed with 
our recommendations. Appendixes II, III, and IV contain reprints of the depart-
ments’ letters, respectively.”
and then:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
• “Propose amendments to FDA’s seafood HACCP regulations to include require-
ments that covered facilities include control points that can be used to identify 
and mitigate economic fraud risks”
 – “Provide the opportunity for stakeholder comments prior to formalizing any 
changes to the Seafood List not required by law or regulation and routinely 
update the public version of the list whenever FDA makes any changes.”
 – “Update the Fish and Fisheries Products Hazards and controls guidance to 
reflect the seafood labeling requirements of the Food Allergen Labeling and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2004.
• “To maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of each agency’s efforts to detect 
and prevent seafood fraud and to increase interagency collaboration, improve 
information sharing, and reduce overlaps, we recommend that the Commissioner 
of Customs and Border Protection, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans 
and Atmosphere, and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration 
take the following two actions:
 – “Develop goals, strategies, and mechanisms to share information and 
resources related to seafood fraud detection and prevention across agency 
boundaries and
 – “Create a federal agency-wide library of seafood species standards.”
Expanding on the resource allocation discussions above:
• Where should human and economic resources be reallocated?
• Since no additional allocations were recommended or offered, more collabora-
tion and improved information sharing are useful for addressing seafood fraud 
and also for every activity.
• GAO did not provide recommendations for what collaboration should be 
increased or how the seafood fraud vulnerability would be reduced.
A question to consider, if a new “$30 million” per year was donated to combat 
seafood fraud—so this is a new allocation not cannibalizing another budget or activ-
ity—what would be the specific recommendation? Specifically, hire more inspectors? 
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Where would you put them, what equipment would you purchase for them, what 
would you have them do, how would bad guys invest in circumventing those actions, 
and how would it all not only catch but prevent seafood fraud? Really, what do you 
recommend? This is a straightforward and practical question that is very difficult 
and complex to answer.
US CRS Report on Food Fraud and Economically Motivated 
Adulteration of Foods (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: CRS Report on Food Fraud and Economically Motivated Adulteration 
of Food
By John Spink • January 19, 2014 • Blog
There has been an increased focus on food fraud, and now the US Congress 
is taking notice. On January 10 the Congressional Research Service (CRS) – a 
research provider to the US Congress – published this report on food fraud 
and Economically Motivated Adulteration of Food. As with many of the other 
recent related US and international reports, we are pleased that several of our 
research articles were referenced and contributed to the discussion. While we 
will continue to seek out research questions for review later, we will provide 
an overview below.
There were several fundamental concepts either in the report or regarding 
the CRS review of food fraud:
CRS and GAO
There have been reports regarding food fraud and Economically Motivated 
Adulteration (EMA) by both the CRS and GAO. CRS and GAO are two dis-
tinct organizations with different missions. The Congressional Research 
Service conducts research exclusively for the US Congress and is within the 
US Library of Congress. CRS provides policy and legal analysis for questions 
received directly from Congressional Committees or Members – there must 
have been a request for them to address food fraud. The CRS reports are over-
views or briefs on topics, whereas the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) focuses more on how the US Government is operating. GAO is under 
Congress and led by the Comptroller of the US. CRS and GAO are very dif-
ferent in their goals and objectives.
CRS food fraud Report
The report is a comprehensive and quite exhaustive overview of food fraud 
(FF) and economically motivated adulteration (EMA) of food. They defined 
the focus as “food fraud and ‘economically motivated adulteration’ or EMA, 
a category within food fraud.”
• They reinforce that there is no US statutory definition of FF and EMA. Also, 
that Congress has “not addressed food fraud in a comprehensive manner.” 
Also, that “no single federal agency or U.S. law directly addresses food 
fraud [or EMA].”
(continued)
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• The food fraud risks are presented using our Food Protection Risk Matrix 
from our 2011 Journal of Food Science Article. The risks include food 
quality, food safety, food fraud, and food defense.
• They very clearly explain the content and value of the FF/EMA databases. 
The CRS report clearly defined the value of each of the databases and 
CRS – this is important for the Congress evaluating the scope and scale of 
the issue because the database results have frequently been misinterpreted. 
For example “This further reinforces the idea that a possible limitation of 
either database is that the available information may at times be more 
reflective of where research is being conducted or where resources have 
been dedicated to detecting fraud.” Whether for addressing food fraud, 
Product Fraud, or other related attacks by intelligent human adversaries, 
such as with intellectual property rights counterfeiting, there is an underly-
ing challenge of quantifying or evaluating the probability of an incident. 
The CRS states, however, that most researchers acknowledge that the full 
scale of food fraud “may be unknown or even possibly unknowable” 
(which is a quote from our article with Lev Fejes on “A review of the eco-
nomic impact of counterfeiting and piracy methodologies and assessment 
of currently utilized estimates.”).
• There was some international focus, mentioning the European Parliament, 
though it appears the UK Elliott Interim Report came out too late to be 
included here (see our previous blog post on the EU report, and we will 
soon publish a review of the UK report).
• The report begins to address marketing fraud (unsupported and often 
deceptive statements about products) versus product fraud (a physical act 
of deception that is clearly defined as illegal). We identified this as a 
research gap and have started working on this research question.
Potential Role of the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA): The 
FSMA law in the U.S. Code (USC) – not the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR)– directly addresses intentional acts in: “FSMA section 106 (Protection 
Against Intentional Adulteration).” This is an especially important CRS sec-
tion to review since, on December 23, 2013, FDA just released their draft 
rulemaking on FSMA “Intentional Adulteration” (see our previous blog post 
on FSMA). The CRS report was published without including the new FDA 
FSMA insights.
• The CRS report recognizes that FDA did respond to the GAO report on 
FDA/EMA by creating the WEMA, and FDA did clarify the working defi-
nitions of EMA. Food fraud is not addressed yet by the FDA.
• There is an interesting and strong statement about food fraud countermea-
sures and control systems by industry and the role of FDA: “Having such 
controls in place would also allow companies to consider their responsi-
bility regarding potentially adulterated foods involving the ‘absence, 
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 Review of “Crime Analysis for Problem-Solvers in 60 Small 
Steps”
One of the most influential and practical guides to crime prevention is “Crime 
Analysis for Problem- Solvers in 60 Small Steps” (Clarke and Eck 2005). This is an 
influential work since it is written by Ronald V. Clarke and John E. Eck who are two 
of the criminology science thought leaders, and it was published by the respected 
and widely adopted Problem-Oriented Policing Center (POP or POP Center). The 
POP is supported and reinforced by the US Department of Justice funded Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).
substitution, or addition of constituents.’ … Since FDA could not possibly 
enforce every instance of food adulteration, such industry controls will be 
instrumental in helping to combat future adulteration before it ever 
reaches the marketplace.”
• As has been mentioned throughout FSMA and related reports or state-
ments, the CRS report does clearly mention industry or commercial 
actions: “FSMA also recognizes ‘third party’ audits or certifications, and 
several such entities have already started to address food fraud both in 
terms of identifying terms or assessing implementation actions such as 
vulnerability assessments [104]” ((The citation is to one of our previous 
articles coauthored with Christopher Elliott of Queen’s University Belfast, 
and Kevin Swoffer, who is a frequent contributor to GFSI activities).
U.S. Congressional Actions regarding Food Fraud: This section of the 
CRS report is a summary of previous actions and the most direct statement 
was: “Congress has introduced a number of bills intended to address concerns 
about food fraud, mostly with respect to concerns about a particular food or 
food ingredient, but has not introduced legislation that would specifically 
address fraud in a comprehensive manner.”
Collaboration and Engagement: food fraud research has been odd in that 
the researchers have been collaborating on establishing a theoretical founda-
tion and harmonized definitions before the laws and regulations are finished – 
actually, a range of global researchers have been quoted or referenced in most 
of the new laws and regulations. Beyond our MSU-authored scholarly journal 
articles, several of our non-scholarly, non-funded extra efforts have been valu-
able. Our Food Fraud Overview MOOC (free, massive open online course) 
and Food Fraud Initiative blog posts were each quoted and referenced several 
times. Several non-scholarly articles were also quoted and referenced to con-
tribute unique points in the discussion. The CRS report also mentions our 
Food Fraud Initiative efforts in working with the National Center for Food 
Protection and Defense (NCFPD) and the US Pharmacopeia/ Food Chemicals 
Codex (USP/FCC). MSU-FFI
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There are several of the “60 Small Steps” that are most applicable to food fraud 
prevention (Clarke and Eck 2005):
• “Be very crime specific (#6): “Your department will sometimes mount a crack-
down on a particular crime such as auto crime or burglary, and you might be 
asked to map these offenses or provide other data to support the operation. But 
these categories are too broad for problem-oriented policing. They include too 
many different kinds of crimes, all of which need to be separately analyzed. […] 
You can see these crimes are committed for a variety of motives, by different 
offenders, with varying degrees of organization, knowledge, and skills.”
• “Use the CHEERS test when defining problems (#14): “A problem is a recur-
ring set of related harmful events in a community that members of the public 
expect the police to address. This definition draws attention to the six required 
elements of a problem: Community; Harm; Expectation; Events; Recurring; and 
Similarity. These elements are captured by the acronym CHEERS.”
Especially applicable to food fraud prevention from step #14 is:
“Similarity: The recurring events must have something in common. They may be commit-
ted by the same person, happen to the same type of victim, occur in the same types of loca-
tions, take place in similar circumstances, involve the same type of weapon, or have one or 
more other factors in common. Without common features, you have an arbitrary collection 
of events, not a problem. Common crime classifications  - such as used by the Uniform 
Crime Reports - are not helpful. Vehicle theft, for example, includes joyriding, thefts for 
chop shops, thefts for export to other countries, thefts for use in other crimes, and a host of 
other dissimilar events. So a cluster of vehicle thefts may not be a single problem. More 
information is needed.”
The other CHEERS concepts are included here:
• Community: “Members of the public must experience the harmful events.” 
Note: “community” can be broadly interpreted to include food consumers, regu-
lators, or others.
• Harmful: “People or institutions must suffer harm. The harm can involve prop-
erty loss or damage, injury or death, serious mental anguish, or undermining the 
capacity of the police. Illegality is not a defining characteristic of problems.”
• Expectation: “Some members of the community must expect the police to 
address the causes of the harm. Expectation should never be presumed, but must 
be evident through processes such as citizen calls, community meetings, press 
reports, or other means.” Again, the “community” could be a few influential and 
amplified members.
• Events: “You must be able to describe the type of event that makes up the prob-
lem. Problems are made up of discrete events.”
• Recurring: “These events must recur. Recurrence may be symptomatic of acute 
troubles or a chronic problem. Acute troubles suddenly appear, as in the case of 
a neighborhood with few vehicle break-ins suddenly having many such break- 
ins. Some acute troubles dissipate quickly, even if nothing is done. Others can 
become chronic problems if not addressed. […] Chronic problems persist for a 
long time, as in the case of a prostitution stroll that has been located along one 
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street for many years. Unless something is done, the events from chronic 
problems will continue to occur.”
• Similarity: (See above)”
For data collection or review of incidents, this concept of “similarity” is funda-
mental. The incidents—and use of the data—must be a consideration when evaluat-
ing the utility or value of a data set. That said, even an “arbitrary collection of 
events” has value.
• “Know what kind of problem you have (#15): Because local police have to 
deal with a wide range of problems that meet the CHEERS definition (Step 14 
above), we have developed a classification for these problems. This classification 
scheme can help you precisely define the problem. It helps separate superficially 
similar problems that are really [actually different and] distinct. It also allows 
you to compare your problem to similar problems that have already been 
addressed, and it helps identify important features for examination. […] The 
classification scheme is based on two criteria:
 – Classification Scheme:
 – The environments within which problems arise
 – The behaviors of the participants
Also, regarding the environment—or the place of the crime—there are 11 dis-
tinct types:
Distinctions for the place of the crime:
 1. Residential: Locations where people dwell.
 2. Recreational: Places where people go to have a good time.
 3. Offices: Locations of white-collar work where there is little face-to-face inter-
action between the workers and the general public.
 4. Retail: Places for walk-in or drive-up customer traffic involving monetary 
transactions.
 5. Industrial: Locations for processing of goods.
 6. Agricultural: Locations for growing crops and raising animals.
 7. Education: Places of learning or study.
 8. Human services: Places where people go when something is wrong.
 9. Public ways: Routes connecting all other environments.
 10. Transport: Locations for the mass movement of people.
 11. Open/transitional: Areas without consistent or regular designated uses.
Regarding the behavior, there are six types:
Distinctions for Behavior of the Crime:
 1. Predatory: The offender is clearly distinct from the victim, and the victim objects 
to the offender’s actions.
 2. Consensual: The parties involved knowingly and willingly interact.
 3. Conflicts: Violent interactions involving roughly coequal people who have some 
pre-existing relationship
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 4. Incivilities: Offenders are distinguishable from victims, but the victims are 
spread over a number of individuals, and the harms are not serious.
 5. Endangerment: The offender and the victim are the same person, or the offender 
had no intent to harm the victim.
 6. Misuse of police: A category reserved for unwarranted demands on the police 
service.
These classifications help to further understand and define the nature of the prob-
lem so optimal countermeasures or control systems can be selected.
• “Know how Hot Spots Develop (#17)”: “To expand from just considering the 
geographical location and place where crime occurs, there is more insight to gain 
when considering three kinds of hotspots:”
 1. Crime generators: “places to which large numbers of people are attracted 
for reasons unrelated to criminal motivation. Providing large numbers of 
opportunities for offenders and targets to come together in time and place 
produces crime or disorder.”
 2. Crime attractors: “places affording many criminal opportunities that are 
well known to offenders. People with criminal motivation are drawn to such 
locales.”
 3. Crime enablers: “occur when there is little regulation of behavior at places: 
rules of conduct are absent or are not enforced.”
• “Learn if the 80-20 rule applies (#18): “A very important principle of crime 
prevention is that crime is highly concentrated on particular people, places, and 
things. This suggests that focusing resources where crime is concentrated will 
yield the greatest preventive benefits. These concentrations (dealt with in more 
detail in later steps) have attracted labels that are becoming well known to most 
crime analysts:
• ‘(1) Repeat Offenders
• ‘(2) Repeat Victims: Note, “according to the British Crime Survey, repeat 
victims (just over 4 percent of all victims) endure 40 percent of the crimes 
reported in the survey (see Step 29).”
• “Research your problem (#19): “Other police agencies might already have 
dealt with the problem you are tackling, or researchers might have studied it. You 
could save a lot of time by finding out how they analyzed it and what they did, in 
particular, which responses seemed to be effective and which were not. Studying 
the efforts of others can provide you with useful hypotheses to test your problem 
(Step 20).” Two concepts are important:
• Much of the Criminology literature may not be practical or applied enough to 
help with food fraud prevention: “Most criminologists are more interested in 
crime and delinquency in general than in specific forms of crime. They are also 
more interested in distant causes of crime, such as social disadvantage and dys-
functional families, than the near causes of a problem, such as poor security or 
lack of surveillance. So even when you find academic articles dealing with your 
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problem, you might find the causes they identify help little in developing an 
effective response.”
• While it is important to seek the lessons from others, do not be surprised if you 
do not find any applicable research: “Unless your problem is very common, do 
not expect to find many relevant police projects. Be skeptical about claims of 
success unless supported by evaluative data. […] Be warned also that a response 
that worked in a particular town or neighborhood might not work in yours 
because of specific circumstances that make your situation different.”
• “Be sure to answer the five “W“ (and one “H“) questions (#36): “When you 
have completed your analysis using the concepts discussed in the previous steps, 
you should ask whether it meets the test of a good newspaper story. Does it 
adequately answer the 5 W and one H questions: what, where, when, who, why, 
and how?”
 – What happened?
 – Where did it happen?
 – When did it happen?
 – Who was involved?
 – Why did they act as they did?
 – How did the offender carry out the crime?
• “Find the owner of the problem (#44): “First, for any problem, you need to 
answer three ownership questions:
 – Who owns the problem?
 – Why has the owner allowed the problem to develop?
 – What is required to get the owner to undertake prevention?
• “Choose responses likely to be implemented (#55): “Finding a suitable 
response can be a troublesome process. You may repeatedly be disappointed 
when promising interventions are vetoed because of expense or difficulty, or 
because of lack of cooperation. But there is more than one way to solve a prob-
lem. So, eventually your team will agree on a response that meets some basic 
requirements:
 – It is not too ambitious or costly.
 – It focuses on near, direct causes rather than on distant, more indirect ones, 
which gives it a good chance of making an immediate impact.
 – The mechanism through which each response should impact the problem has 
been clearly articulated.”
• “Tell a clear story (#54): “The purpose of your work is to help people make 
better decisions. To assist decision-makers, you must tell a clear story that leads 
to an important question to possible answers and then to effective actions.
This is the end of the review of the 60 Steps report. For food fraud prevention, 
note the constant criminology focus on reducing the opportunity for a crime to 
occur and also measuring success regarding the contribution to prevention.
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 Key Learning Objective 3: Additional Insights on Prevention
This section reviews additional insights on a wide range of criminology theories 
that apply to food fraud prevention. Law enforcement, of course, has a critical role, 
but it is only part of the overall strategy. These examples and discussions provide 
insight into the overall public-private-partnership approach.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) The role of enforcement in prevention
• (2) Food Science taking a back seat to social science
• (3) Special applications such as addressing Organized Retail Theft (ORT)
Can’t We Just Arrest the Bad Guys? No. (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Can’t We Just Detect and Arrest Fraudsters? Sorry, But No.
By John Spink • October 3, 2013 • Blog
We won’t arrest our way to food safety, but eliminate research on authen-
ticity testing and detection? Forget enforcement? Ignore investigation? Of 
course not… but you can’t increase the safety of the food supply if you’re 
only running around chasing “bad guys.” Prevention is by far the most effi-
cient policy. To focus on prevention before developing detection methods will 
provide insight into the precise technical detection needs. A focus on preven-
tion can help Food Science and Food Authenticity research to be more 
efficient.
I recently guest-lectured for MSU Food Science and Human Nutrition pro-
fessor Dr. Gale Strasburg’s course FSC 455 FOOD AND NUTRITION. This 
is a class for mostly undergraduate seniors. Even though my guest lecture 
material covers content that isn’t always included on the test… I usually find 
a pretty engaged audience. If the only thing accomplished is introducing food 
fraud prevention to the next wave of future industry leaders then it was time 
well spent. I’m even starting to get calls from the alumni as a result of my past 
guest lectures. The ideas are sticking and becoming part of the formal or 
informal curriculum.
The food fraud concepts were new to this group of students, so I used my 
typical Defining Food Fraud and the Role of Prevention presentation. Actually, 
to demonstrate the timeliness and impact of the concepts I used the exact deck 
that I presented the week before in Russia at the Moscow State University for 
Food Protection (MSUFP) and at the Association of Food and Drug Officials 
(AFDO). MSUFP is leading many Russian and regional initiatives in this 
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area. AFDO is the professional association for the US Federal, State, and 
Local regulators.
Even though this was the third time, I presented the same PowerPoint over 
the last few weeks… I keep finding new insights. The students and attendees 
in every case helped advance the science. The AFDO insights were covered in 
a previous post, and I’ll have several following up from my trip to Russia. In 
presenting to the MSU students – the food scientists and chemists – I went 
through my usual “detect, deter, and prevent” concepts. Our discussion led me 
to really focus on the connection between “detect” and “prevent,” skipping 
over “deter.”
To review, “detect” is like an alarm sounding in your house, alerting you 
that there is a burglar inside. “Deter” is like the police arresting the burglar as 
he is breaking in (in Situational Crime Prevention and the Crime Triangle this 
is the “guardian” factor), or like bars on the inside of your windows (barriers 
or hurdles). And “prevent” is like having lights on, doors and windows locked, 
an alarm on, and a dog barking – the burglar now has no interest in breaking 
into your house. Clearly, you’d rather have the “bad guy” pass right by rather 
than break your window or be in your house!
For food, we need to focus on the “detect” function – and we need to keep 
developing more precise and targeted tests and equipment. As we’ve covered 
before, there are a near-infinite number of types of fraud, and they keep evolv-
ing, so we need to keep evolving. The specification of the “detect” innovations 
must be determined by the ability to support the ultimate goal, which is the 
“prevent” function. The focus must first be on “prevent” before we take any 
other steps.
The “deter” component is also critical… but I’d rather leave that dangerous 
function of tackling burglars to the brave and committed law enforcement 
professionals in that field. Facing potentially dangerous or violent situations 
is way out of the scope of the curriculum for food science, packaging, supply 
chain management, or public health. Hopefully, with the increase in the “pre-
vent” and “detect” efficiency we decrease the need – and cost – of the “deter” 
function.
Whether you are a big or small company, a manufacturer or retailer, indus-
try or government, just understanding the “detect” and “prevent” functions 
can help increase the efficiency of time and money.
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 Several Applied Examples Are Included Below
Sidebar: Food Fraud Prevention Is More Like Fighting Purse 
Counterfeiters Than Controlling Microbes (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: Food Fraud Prevention Is More Like Fighting Purse Counterfeiters 
Than Controlling Microbes
By John Spink • April 14, 2013 • Blog
“E. coli does not surf FDA.gov to find more efficient ways to get on prod-
ucts… counterfeiters do.” I frequently start my presentations with this state-
ment, and it usually gets a chuckle…then a nervous laugh. All the research 
publications and sharing of best practices that help protect the food supply 
from food safety risks, if applied to food fraud, would actually give a roadmap 
to the bad guys. Combating food fraud requires a fundamentally different 
approach than the traditional expertise in food safety management systems.
There is a difference between “experience” and “expertise.” A bank man-
ager who has been robbed a hundred times has “experience” in being robbed 
but, obviously, not “expertise” in avoiding being robbed. Food fraud preven-
tion expertise requires an interdisciplinary approach from experts outside 
Food Safety, including Supply Chain and Logistics Science, Corporate 
Security, Intelligence Analysis, Packaging, and now Enterprise Risk 
Management.
There is a growing awareness not only of the public health (and economic) 
threat of food fraud but also that there will need to be new disciplines engaged 
to enable the shift to fraud prevention. Specifically, this was identified in two 
key US government reports. A 2011 GAO report specifically quoted an FDA 
official who stated that the FDA “does not have the range of expertise… with 
a background in intelligence gathering or law enforcement.” Also, the Food 
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) draft rulemaking documents reiterate the 
complexity. The report stated, “FDA tentatively concludes that intentional 
hazards [Economically Motivated Adulteration and food fraud], which are not 
addressed in traditional HACCP or other food safety systems, likely will 
require different kinds of controls and would be best addressed in a separate 
rulemaking.”
Combating food fraud is different from food safety because the human 
fraudsters are clandestine, stealthy, intelligent, resilient, often well-funded, 
actively seek to avoid detection…and they are often very patient. I saw a need 
for a scholarly reference to define that the bad guys are very different from the 
traditional bad actors in the food supply chain, so I authored The Challenges 
of Intellectual Property Enforcement in Agriculture which was published in 
the Journal of Intellectual Property Rights in March 2011 (note: this is an 
open source article and free to download). This article includes five fascinat-
ing case studies that include a terrorist “weapons procurement officer,” 
$40 million dollar tax-avoidance honey smuggling ring (referred to as Honey 
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Organized Retail Theft (ORT)– Sometimes We Cannot Test Our Way to 
Safety (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Organized Retail Theft (ORT) – Sometimes We Cannot Test Our Way to 
Safety
By John Spink • July 6, 2013 • Blog
Organized Retail Theft (ORT) is mass shoplifting and is a type of food 
fraud that results in a public health vulnerability that costs businesses billions 
and erodes consumer confidence. Since it involves authentic packaging and 
genuine product […], we cannot test our way to safety. This is an immense 
fraud opportunity that requires a holistic, all-encompassing preventative 
approach.
Organized Retail Theft (ORT): For the lawyers, ORT is defined in Federal 
Law as shoplifting more product than for personal use. The broader Organized 
Retail Crime (ORC) includes cargo theft, warranty fraud and other forms of 
retail fraud-related activities. ORT is a primary concern for the industry since 
it costs billions in lost product and lost sales from a product not being on the 
shelves, and there is a public health vulnerability to the stolen goods. In 2011, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Organized Retail 
Theft noted of the “billions” of dollars of genuine product stolen and reintro-
duced to commerce… though more precise estimates are hard to come by, as 
with other fraud and counterfeiting activities. ORT is perpetrated by profes-
sional shoplifters or boosters, and the act is referred to as boosting. The stolen 
goods are sold to a person referred to as a “fence,” and when sold online this 
is called e-fencing. In many cases, the fences provide a shopping list for the 
boosters to steal. The GAO report specifically identified infant formula as a 
primary target but any products that are high value – especially high value and 
Laundering), a $500 + million product quality fraud scheme, a business per-
son who bribed a Belizean judge to get released from jail then fled to the 
Mexican jungle, and a counterfeiter who is still openly operating due to a 
nuance in an extradition treaty. These will clearly define some of the chal-
lenges of trying to stop the bad guys or of even trying to conduct legal discov-
ery in a court case.
Prevention and deterrence are more similar to forensic accounting than 
microbiology. You will not arrest (or sue) your way to safety. This discussion 
emphasizes the need to focus on reducing the fraud opportunity and the 
importance of a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. By the way, in MSU’s free 
Food Fraud Overview MOOC next month we will be introducing this con-
cept. MSU-FFI.
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small size – are targets. Think of small, reasonably expensive food or bever-
ages you see at a corner gas station market. Food products are definitely ORT 
targets.
How it Works: The fences ask boosters to shoplift specific items. The 
boosters are paid pennies on the dollar for the product that they stole. The 
fences are connected to some retail outlet or scam that sells the product. In 
some cases, they sell this through traditional fencing venues such as flea mar-
kets, pawn shops, or privately owned stores (at 30% of market price). In other 
cases, they sell it through online sales sites (at 70% of market price). They can 
also conduct return fraud to the retailers (100% market value plus tax!). 
Generally, returned food products are not returned to store shelves by the 
retailers, so that product is either written off as a loss or, at best, counted 
against a return or damaged-goods allowance. In some sophisticated opera-
tions, the product is “cleaned” (retail markings removed, such as date codes, 
lot numbers, and store price tags – also referred to as de-coded) and the prod-
uct is re-packaged to re-enter the wholesale market.
Why It’s a Public Health Vulnerability: The GAO ORT report mentioned, 
“However, it is not currently known if the second-hand sale of these goods has 
actually resulted in a public health problem.” It also stated, “As a result [of the 
shoplifting], there is limited assurance that these products were lawfully 
acquired and are stored and handled according to the manufacturer’s recom-
mendations.” The key point is that we do not know how that product has been 
handled. The genuine product may have been swapped out with counterfeits. 
In many instances, the date and lot codes could have been changed, which 
would make traceability impossible. Even worse, fraudulent lot codes could 
be added, which could result in the recall of the wrong products! All this leads 
to a wide range of public health vulnerabilities and, if allowed to fester, can 
erode consumer confidence – and sales along with it.
The bottom line for a legitimate company is that this stolen product is a 
violation of the FDCA Adulterated Foods section  – and probably also 
Misbranded Foods section – and thus, is illegal, unfit for commerce, and could 
be the subject of a product recall.
Consumer confidence is really a key to any countermeasure: Product pro-
tection needs to be conveyed in a way that enables that confidence. I am just 
returning from a trip where I presented at the GFSI China Focus Day. There 
has been a wide range of incidents in China related to infant formula that have 
eroded consumer confidence. I read about infant formula now being sold in 
pharmacies to benefit from the more regulated and secure supply chains there. 
Infant formula is still allowed to be sold in other retail outlets, but it will be 
interesting to watch how consumers in China respond to this drastic step. This 
effort is not only to increase the security of the supply chain but to increase 
consumer confidence.
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Regardless of how ORT is legally classified or prosecuted by FDA, FBI, or 
others, ORT is a food fraud public health threat that requires a non-traditional 
food fraud prevention approach. Seek out insight from a wide range of disci-
plines that can provide best practices. Keep focused on reducing your overall 
fraud opportunity.
Additional definitions that apply to this section:
• Boosting/ Booster/ Boost: stealing an item to illegally re-sell
• Shoplifting: stealing a product from a store while acting as a legitimate 
customer
• Fencing/ Fence: someone who sells stolen goods
• E-Fencing: someone who sells stolen goods on an electronic commerce 
marketplace
• Warranty fraud: intentional deception to achieve an economic gain from 
misapplying guarantees such as replacement, repair, or refund of defective 
products.
• Return fraud: intentional deception to achieve economic gain from mis-
applying purchase privileges such as returning a product other than was 
purchased, returning stolen or counterfeit goods for credit, or using an old 
receipt to return a product from within the store.
• Shrink/ Shrinkage: the loss of inventory due to goods that are stolen, not 
actually received into inventory, accidentally not charged to a customer, or 
discarded but not recorded inventory.
Sidebar: Reflections on Food Fraud Prevention in Russia – Trip 
Summary (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Reflections on Food Fraud Prevention in Russia – Trip Summary
By John Spink • September 25, 2013 • Blog (Fig. 8.2)
There is probably no better partner for our food fraud research than our 
Moscow State University for Food Production (MSUFP) colleagues. We 
engaged as scientists and worked together as friends. We are now collaborat-
ing on projects from a conventional perspective. We will build a firm founda-
tion of education and harmonization to advance food fraud prevention. 
Reflecting on the trip, I am very encouraged by the growing working relation-
ship between the US and Russia – including expanding to our mutual Korea 
colleagues.
I just returned from an incredible week in Russia at MSUFP. This partner-
ship came about from a chance encounter while the University President 
(Dmitry Edelev) and Vice-Rector (Victor Fersht) were presenting at a confer-
ence in China last June. We immediately found that we had many similar 
research interests in food protection and food counterfeiting/ food fraud. We 
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also met with another Vice-Rector (Natalia Mayorova) the next day at the 
Global Food Safety Initiative meeting. I also had a great translator in MSUFP 
English Professor Marina Kosycheva, who really helped me with the interpre-
tation of both their words and mine. Our discussions continued, and they 
invited me to their Food Safety Problems conference this last week in Moscow.
I am especially grateful to the Fulbright Foundation, the US Embassy 
Russia, and the International Institute for Education, which were the sponsors 
of last week’s conference. An unexpected additional link was with our col-
leagues in Korea, as their representatives, who are connected with my research 
colleague from Yong In University, Dr. Hyeonho Park, were also in atten-
dance. Participating in the conference was an excellent way for MSUFP and 
our MSU Food Fraud Initiative (MSUFFI) to demonstrate international col-
laboration in action.
For any of you chess players, world champion Anatoly Karpov – and now 
a member of the Russian Duma/ Parliament – is the keynote speaker at the end 
of the clip. He is a leader at MSUFP, and on what we could call our Board of 
Trustees. He is the chair of a Duma Committee that covers issues including 
food fraud prevention.
The key points I presented were:
• Defining Food Fraud: There is a foundation of ideas that define the threat, 
aspects of the incidents, and the crime science theories of Situational 
Crime Prevention.
Fig. 8.2 September 2013, Moscow – John Spink with Russian Duma Member Anatoly Karpov 
(who is also a world chess champion) and Fulbright Russia Director Joel Ericson
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• A Public Health Focus: The focus on improved public health, not just 
catching “bad guys,” was well received. We must continue to shift the 
focus to public health first.
• Prevention is Efficient: I emphasized the efficiency (time and money) of 
focusing on prevention. For product fraud and related areas, the “bad guys” 
are so sneaky that herculean efforts are often required even just to find 
where they are hiding.
• Translate and Interpret: Defining the critical need to collaborate on termi-
nology. That is, to go beyond the word (e.g., “adulteration”) to expand the 
definitions, and to then not only translate the word but to also interpret the 
meaning. We really need to study if there is a more useful word to use in 
other languages, such as Russian or Korean. This is a project that has 
already started and is based on the paper that I published in their confer-
ence proceedings publication.
• Exchange of Students and Scholars: I cannot even begin to explain how 
important it was for me to stay this long and spend so much time – profes-
sionally and personally – with my colleagues. Students and scholars need 
to spend time with each other and in the other’s environments. I can imag-
ine how the science of food fraud prevention will advance when we bring 
more of our students together. Also, we realized that we had a very engaged 
and capable set of prospective researchers in the Fulbright scholars who 
attended the conference.
The rich experiences and insights of this trip are too many to list. We had 
already started collaborating, and this conference allowed us to create even 
more impactful projects. We will continue our discussions next month in 
Dublin, where I will be presenting with my Russian colleagues at Interpol’s 
2013 International Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference. Stay tuned here 
for more insight on our expanding partnership. MSU-FFI.
The Role of Law Enforcement in Food Fraud Prevention (Fig. 8.3) 
(MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: The Impact of Prevention Defines the Value of Enforcement and 
Prosecution
By John Spink, October 17, 2013, Blog (Fig. 8.3)
Title: Reflections on My Week Here at the Interpol 2013 International Law 
Enforcement Intellectual Crime Conference, Dublin, Ireland.
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Food fraud is a focus of Interpol (International Criminal Police 
Organization), and the next big food crime. Operation Opson already has 32 
countries participating. The increasing impact on public health is being felt, 
which is providing a significant opportunity to understand food crime 
further.
The Interpol Trafficking in Illicit Goods and Counterfeit Sub-Directorate is 
leading the enforcement of food crime law with the third Operation Opson. 
The two lead investigators from INTERPOL (DiMeo) and Europol (Dreno) 
co-presented to us earlier this year at the Global Food Safety Initiative confer-
ence (GFSI). Their involvement with GFSI made a significant impression on 
the food industry and demonstrated the significance of the threat and risk – we 
couldn’t remember a time previous to this when Interpol presented at a food 
conference.
Fig. 8.3 MSU FFI blog post: the impact of prevention defines the value of enforcement and pros-
ecution – insert: interpol assistant director Michael Ellis, interpol inspector Simone DiMeo, under-
writers laboratories VP of anti-counterfeiting Brian Monks, and Dr. John Spink. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) (MSU-FFI 2018)
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For Interpol here in Dublin, Ireland, I was invited to present “Defining 
Food Fraud & the Role of Prevention,” where I discussed the deterrence effect 
of investigation and enforcement as a key part of reducing the fraud opportu-
nity. The focus of the food-related sessions this week was on how enforce-
ment and prosecution can more effectively contribute to prevention.
Another aspect of prevention is training and education. I am especially 
thankful for the encouragement and ideas from Mr. Michael Ellis, Mr. Silvio 
DiMeo, and Mr. Brian Monks. Specifically, Mr. Monks and Underwriters 
Laboratories have been a big supporter of the Interpol training programs and 
this IP Crime Conference series. We see the opportunity to create a range of 
products that can serve a variety of needs, including operational training 
through our free Food Fraud Overview MOOC programs, and through MSU’s 
Graduate Certificate in Food Fraud Prevention.
The role of universities is an important part of the bigger prevention pic-
ture, and Interpol has also been supportive of other outreach activities, such as 
with our colleagues from Moscow State University for Food Production. The 
Russian Federation had a large delegation here this week, which demonstrated 
their commitment to Interpol and food fraud prevention. Their commitment is 
so significant that Russian Duma member Mr. Anatoly Karpov presented a 
keynote address – he mentioned their interaction with our MSU Food Fraud 
Initiative as a demonstration of their focus on food fraud prevention.
These types of meetings are always an incredible opportunity to connect or 
reconnect with colleagues from around the world and across many functions. 
For example, I was surprised and pleased to see in attendance our researcher 
colleague Director Momodu-Segiru Momodu of the Nigerian National 
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC). This 
meeting provided an opportunity for us to discuss the new topics and conceive 
our next research project.
While we had a good time visiting, there were many serious discussions 
about how to coordinate all our wide range of activities. The role and effec-
tiveness of enforcement and prosecution must be judged by the impact on 
prevention. A question from my presentation that resonated was “are we dis-
rupting the chemistry of the crime?” – do the bad guys wake up the next day 
and decide not to attack your product? For food crime, Interpol is leading the 
charge to answer this question. Follow INTERPOL-Europol and look for an 
opportunity to participate in Operation Opson. MSU-FFI.
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 Conclusion
The previous chapter on Business Decision-Making and ERM presented the 
resource-allocation decision-making method. That method is the final decision on 
“how much is enough” for countermeasures and control systems. This chapter Part 
1 and Part 2 on criminology theories focused on the other end of the problem which 
is the root cause. The first conclusion is criminology theory is the key to under-
standing the root cause which is a human adversary that is conducting a criminal 
act. The academic discipline of criminology is based on applying the scientific 
method and an evidence-based approach to crime prevention. Without a focus on 
the social sciences and criminology, then any selection of countermeasure or control 
systems are nothing more than a guess. The second conclusion is that the most 
simple and directly applicable criminology theory is situational crime prevention. 
This theory focuses on the physical space of crime and includes practical concepts 
of where criminals spend their time (Routine Activities Theory) and how they per-
ceive they can successfully commit the crime (Rational Choice Theory). These 
theories focus on controlling the physical space which helps a company to be a 
“hard target.” The fraud opportunity reduction is clear and also in direct control of 
the company which is the victim. The final conclusion is that while there are many 
considerations such as the nature of the criminals, the offender organizations, law-
suits, and international law enforcement, the most important and efficient focus is 
on the “fraud opportunity.” “It is all about the fraud opportunity.” The overall 
criminology- based root-cause analysis is focused on understanding the root cause 
and reducing the risk of conducting the crime. Criminology theory is not new but 
has not been widely applied to food fraud prevention. It is novel to focus on the 
crime prevention theories that focus on the physical space of crime in relation to 
how fraudster perceives opportunities. With a holistic and all-encompassing crimi-
nology perspective, then the focus shifts from “catching bad guys or bad products” 
to “preventing fraud from occurring in the first place.” There is a saying:
It’s all about the fraud opportunity.
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Criminology Application
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
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Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all There are many examples of excellent and efficient fraud opportunity 
reducing criminology-based measures, and the recommendation is to start at 
the enterprise-wide level and with very simple initial approaches
Quality team While the food safety risk assessments and authenticity detection tests are 
critical, the goal is not to catch bad guys but to prevent food fraud from 
occurring in the first place
Auditors An efficient crime prevention strategy will have a significant focus on 
communicating to the criminal first through obvious and overt vulnerability 
reducing countermeasures and control systems
Management A strong program will consider the science and technology long after there 
has been an understanding of the system weaknesses and how the human 
adversary can be dissuaded from attacking you
Corp. 
decision-makers
The root cause is a human adversary, and this process leverages the state-of- 
the-art criminology research and theories to reduce your vulnerabilities
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) If the goal is not to catch bad guys or bad products then what is the goal?
 (b) How does the Crime Triangle help understand and explain the fraud 
opportunity?
 (c) What is the role of law enforcement officer (and their organizations) in food 
fraud prevention?
 2. Key Learning Objective1
 (a) What is a “macro” versus “micro” motivation?
 (b) Explain “Education is a Weapon.”
 (c) Why is prevention only activated when the criminals know of the 
countermeasures?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What are the GAO and CRS?
 (b) What concrete prevention recommendations were in the GAO and CRS 
reports?
 (c) What is the role of FSMA in food fraud prevention?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is “Crime Analysis for Problem-Solvers in 60 Small Steps”?
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 (b) How does “Know What Kind of Problem You Have” apply to FF 
prevention?
 (c) Why is “Food Fraud Prevention is More like Fighting Purse Counterfeiters 
than Controlling Microbes”?
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Chapter 9
Supply Chain Management (Part 1 of 2): 
Fundamentals
Summary
This chapter presents the discipline of Supply Chain Management—both the func-
tions of product moving in the proprietary supply chain from manufacturing to the 
consumer and also the science of logistics, operations, and procurment supply chain 
management. This chapter will introduce the foundational concepts as well as gen-
eral applications, review key issues such as globalization and an ever more digital 
supply chain (positives and negatives), and then the role in food fraud prevention.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) Supply Chain Management Introduction: Understand the science of sup-
ply chain management.
• (2) Supply Chain Characteristics: Review the application of supply chain 
management to food fraud prevention.
• (3) Business Continuity Planning and Crisis Management: Review of the 
management function with specific food fraud prevention examples.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoreti-
cal foundation concepts related to supply chain management in “(A) Academic 
Disciplines” (Fig. 9.1).
 Introduction
Supply chain management (SCM) is a crucial discipline in food fraud prevention 
because, naturally, the material goods must be delivered and managed through a 
supply chain to a customer and consumer (Voss et al. 2009; Speier et al. 2011). As 
commerce has become both more complex and complicated, supply chain manage-
ment provides methods to manage the complexity as well as the associated risk and 
uncertainty. Product fraud and food fraud are problems that are escalating due to the 
emerging fraud opportunity created by more products moving farther and faster 
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around the world. The foundation of supply chain management is vital to under-
stand both to find ways to leverage the systems but also to assist in a more produc-
tive supply chain.
In general, the discipline of supply chain management is essential for food fraud 
prevention because:
• Supply chains are vulnerable to food fraud, and the threat is currently misunder-
stood and often underestimated.
• Current internal controls and visibility of the product help reduce the fraud 
opportunity.
• Supply chain management is a separate business discipline, and a basic under-
standing is important to seek efficiencies.
This chapter will present the supply chain management concepts and then expand 
to consider the application to food fraud prevention.
 Key Learning Objective 1: Supply Chain Management 
Introduction
This section will cover an overview of supply chain management (SCM) including 
that this is a specific area of academic research and study.
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
(B) Fundamental Concepts
Traceability
Investigation
or Audit
Testing
Fig. 9.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—Where this chapter applies to the overall concept “(A) 
Academic Disciplines”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Introduction to the academic discipline of supply chain management
• (2) Review of the complexity of supply chain management
• (3) The role of procurement in business management and vulnerability 
reduction
 Theoretical Foundation
Supply chain management (SCM) is the science of “multiple firms collaborating to 
leverage strategic positioning and to improve operating efficiency” (Bowersox et al. 
2002). It is also defined as “a network of organizations that are involved, through 
upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that 
produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the end user or 
consumers” (Christopher 2016). Generally, this is a collaboration and coordination 
of product flowing through from the manufacturing, distribution, storage, and pre-
sentation of the product to the customer (Bowersox et al. 2002). In the 1950s there 
was a specific focus on logistics which is the management and control within a 
company’s proprietary supply chain and essentially the “work required to move and 
geographically position inventory” (Bowersox et al. 2002). With growing comput-
ing power and globalization, there was a need to expand the focus from logistics to 
the overall supply chain. The modern science of Supply Chain Management has 
expanded to include Procurement (purchasing), Operations Management (quality 
control, inventory, and scheduling), and Logistics (transportation). 
Since the 1970s, supply chain management has been an autonomous academic 
discipline. In the USA there are over 100 universities that offer a bachelor’s degree 
and over 30  that offer a Ph.D. in Supply chain management. This is often a separate 
department within a business school.
A foundational concept is the generalized supply chain model which is presented 
here (Fig. 9.2). Each step includes a complex web or network of participants and 
Materials Supply Network
Integrated Enterprise:
-Procurement
-Customer Relationship 
Management
-Manufacturing
Market 
Distribution 
Network
Customer
Investment of $$$ Return from SalesInvestment of Time
Fig. 9.2 Adaptation of the generalized supply chain model. (Adapted from (Bowersox et al. 2002))
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processes. “The integrated supply chain perspective shifts traditional channel 
arrangements from loosely linked groups of independent businesses that buy and 
sell inventory to each other toward a managerially coordinated initiative to increase 
market impact, overall efficiency, continuous improvement, and competitiveness” 
(Bowersox et al. 2002).
For food fraud prevention, at each step in the supply chain fraud can occur and 
disrupt the system. As the supply chain becomes more complex and more auto-
mated, the fraud opportunity shifts and evolves. A lack of consideration of the fraud 
opportunity has been catastrophic for the supply chain of a product, company, or 
industry. Fortunately, the collaboration and coordination that is effective in supply 
chain management can evolve to consider and combat product fraud.
 Supply Chain Complexity
The supply chains are getting more complicated and complex. They are compli-
cated since more products are moving farther and faster around the world. They are 
more complicated because of the multiple hand-offs with more requirements for the 
transaction information. Three main factors reported have accelerated the develop-
ment of supply chain management that includes (Black's 2014):
“(1) Information and communication technology (ITC)
(2) Global competition and expansion
(3) Integration and interrelationships.”
The globalization is a great opportunity for the industry to expand markets and 
also for governments to expand their economies.
While globalization and electronic communication have increased the speed and 
efficiency of commerce, it also has some unintended side effects. With more prod-
ucts moving around the world farther and faster, the minimum economic scale of 
manufacturing has grown (Porter 1980). A manufacturing plant often produces a 
product that is used—literally—around the world. There are considerable economic 
and quality control efficiencies with bigger, fewer providers but also narrowing of 
supply through key nodes. With fewer and bigger suppliers, one quality control or 
production disruption can literally have global ramifications.
The expanding global supply chains also sometimes create uncertainty since 
there is often less transparency of the transactions, sometimes less control at each 
step, and generally more variables in the entire process. The uncertainty is in 
 addition to usual risks—uncertainty is the inability to know in advance the exact 
likelihood of future events. Risk and uncertainty are two key variables that are a 
focus of the Enterprise Risk Management system implemented by COSO (2013):
• Risk (ERM/COSO): “The possibility that an event will occur and adversely 
affect the achievement of objectives” (COSO 2011).
• Uncertainty (ERM/COSO): “The inabilities to know in advance the exact likeli-
hood of future events” (COSO 2011).
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One complexity is that there is possibly a global network of direct suppliers (Tier 
1) who also could be buying from a global network of suppliers (Tier 2) who then, 
in turn, could be buying from a global network of suppliers (Tier 3). There are usu-
ally strong relationships and oversight of the Tier 1 suppliers but less and less deep 
into the supply chain. A traditional tiered supplier structure is that one supplier buys 
from many, and there is the safety of many suppliers able to support the needs. The 
lack of supply chain transparency could inadvertently create a dangerous supply 
situation where many Tier 1 suppliers actually buy from few Tier 2 suppliers who, 
in turn, may actually be from only a handful or a single Tier 3 supplier. The danger 
is a lack of awareness that a company’s supply chain—or even an industry-wide 
supply chain—could be impacted by supply variability at one, single supplier.
Tiered Supplier Structure—Traditional: Many-to-One While there can be visibility 
and management of Tier 1 suppliers (first supplier selling directly to a manufac-
turer), there is less transparency for Tier 2 (they sell to the first supplier who in turns 
sells to the manufacturer) and even less for Tier 3 (they sell to the Tier 2 suppliers) 
(Fig. 9.3). This is a concern for quality management but also for supply continuity. 
Usually, but not always, Tier 1 supplier buys from many Tier 2 suppliers who, in 
turn, buy from many Tier 3 suppliers. In practice, this is a dangerous assumption. In 
some cases, a key component could be produced by one company for wide-scale use 
across the entire supply chain.
Tiered Supplier Structure—Dangerous: One-to-Many: If there are only a few—
or one—Tier 3 suppliers for the Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers, then a problem at the 
Tier 3 suppliers can cripple a supply chain and entire industries (Fig. 9.4).
The lack of risk awareness in nontransparent, multitiered supply chain could add 
an additional variable of a lack of communication of standards or food safety 
requirements. The Tier 2 or Tier 3 suppliers may not understand the end customer 
Supplier
Supplier, Supplier, Supplier
Supplier, Supplier, Supplier, Supplier, 
Supplier, Supplier, Supplier, Supplier, 
Supplier, Supplier
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Manufacturer
Fig. 9.3 Traditional tiered supply chain structure—traditional: many-to-one
 Key Learning Objective 1: Supply Chain Management Introduction
312
specifications or needs. The Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers may not even know who the 
manufacturer is. It is possible that the Tier 2 supplier does not correctly specify the 
product from the Tier 3 supplier, and the fraud opportunity is that the Tier 3 supplier 
can intentionally—but possibly not illegally—provide a different product than 
specified.
This is not only a plausible example; this is an actual incident where several 
automobile manufacturing plants were shut down due to the Japanese Fukushima 
Daiichi Tsunami incident. Several Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers all relied on the mate-
rial from the Tier 3 supplier who was shut down during the tsunami (MacKenzie 
et al. 2012; Reuters 2016). For a specific example from this incident, the closure of 
one manufacturing plant that produced the material used to manufacture an 18″ fuel 
tube for many auto manufacturers’ led to worldwide automobile production shut-
downs (Massey 2011). This is not a one-time anomaly since another time a fire at a 
local Michigan automobile parts supplier shut down several automobile manufac-
turing plants due to a lack of supply (Howard 2018).
 Important Concepts and Focus Areas
To control for the uncertainty and risks inherent in business or government activi-
ties, there are many systems or programs that have been developed and refined such 
as quality management.
Total quality management (TQM) is a coordinated effort to identify and address 
the root causes of anomalies that negatively impact the final product or the opera-
tions (Boyer 1996; Jayjock et  al. 1997). The overall focus shifted from Juran in 
1951 focusing on controls in the Quality Control Handbook then Feigenbaum in 
Suppiler, Supplier, Supplier, Supplier, 
Supplier
Supplier, Supplier
Supplier
Manufacturer:
Buying from three 
separate Tier 1 suppliers 
provides reduced risk. 
This is even the case if 
they buy from two Tier2 
suppliers. Without full 
visibility, the enre supply 
could actually be at the 
control of only one 
supplier
Tier 3
Tier 2
Tier 1
Manufacturer
Fig. 9.4 Supply chain example of a dangerously tiered distribution network including Tier 1, Tier 
2, and Tier 3
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1956 shifted along the control spectrum to “total quality control” (TQC). In 1987 
Gavin, among others such as Deming, Crosby, and Kaizen, further broadened the 
focus to “strategic quality management” or eventually the hybrid of TQM. The evo-
lution was from controls and catching bad product to designing flaws or anomalies 
out of systems. For the food industry, quality assurance or quality management are 
familiar function titles.
There are eight dimensions of quality. These also possibly apply to the broader 
food concept of food integrity (Garvin 1987):
• Performance: how the product performs compared to expectations or 
specification
• Reliability: likelihood that the product will perform as intended
• Durability: likelihood that the product will perform over an expected period of 
time
• Conformance: meeting a specific description or attribute as designed
• Features: number of functions it is intended to perform
• Aesthetics: style, material, etc.
• Serviceability: ease of repairing or fixing compared to expectation
• Perceived quality: value judgment
One TQM program is Six Sigma—or a zero defects focus—program and pro-
cesses that are widely adopted. For food fraud prevention, it is efficient to use TQM 
and Six Sigma concepts not only for the familiarity but due to the utility of the 
programs. The basic management of Six Sigma is five phases for of product or pro-
cess development of define, measure, analyze, design, and verify (DMADV) or 
ongoing monitoring including stages of define, measure, analyze, improve, and con-
trol (DMAIC). These are basic concepts of plan-do-check-act (PDCA) that are the 
base for more general analysis management such as in ISO 31000 and applied 
assessments such as in the criminology scanning, analysis, response, and assess-
ment method (SARA).
To prioritize the risk treatments, the basic quality management methods require 
an assessment of the overall problem (how can you say you’re addressing the most 
critical problem if you haven’t assessed the entire system) and also some factors that 
can be measured (define success metrics that can actually be measured and that 
realistically reduced the fraud opportunity).
The fraud opportunity can be deconstructed into measurable component root 
causes that are critical control points. While addressing food safety in a HACCP 
(hazard analysis) program is very different from addressing food defense in a 
VACCP program (vulnerability assessment)—or food defense in a TACCP program 
(threat assessment)—the underlying method applies (GFSI 2018). The underlying 
quality management principles are to identify the root cause, change operations to 
reduce the chance for the anomaly to occur, and then continually review the system 
remains in compliance.
“In the recent years, the Six Sigma program for quality and process improvement 
has been adopted by many of the larger firms in the United States and around the 
world” (Bowersox et al. 2002). The core of Six Sigma is based on the concept of a 
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statistical standard of deviation where the standard of deviation (one sigma) would 
result in 68% of the production meeting specification. To be a successful business, 
the Six Sigma system expands the goal to six standards of deviation (six sigma) or 
99.99966% of the production meeting specification (3.4 defects per 1 million units 
produced) (NIST; ISO 2011a, b). As a raw percentage that may seem like an unre-
alistically low number but the errors can compound, the costs of just one nonconfor-
mance can be a global product recall costing hundreds of millions of dollars. A 
“defect” is something that is outside the customer specification—the customer 
specification should be clearly defined and expressed in a measurable factor.
There are four TQM types of costs (Jayjock et al. 1997):
• Appraisal (audit): the cost of inspections to assess quality levels
• Internal failure: costs of failures before the product is shipped
• External failure: costs of failure after shipped including recall, settlements, lost 
sales, rework, etc.
• Preventive (countermeasures or control systems): efforts to control quality or to 
mitigate failure costs
For food fraud prevention, without conducting a vulnerability assessment, the 
impact on the firm is not—and, thus, cannot be—evaluated. In most cases, the vul-
nerability is very low and does not lead to a risk that is so dangerous or costly that 
it must be mitigated. Often, when evaluating the vulnerability in relation to quality, 
there are many very simple, low-cost, efficient, and effective countermeasures and 
control systems.
Sidebar: HACCP as a Total Quality Management System
While the primary systems are based on quality management, food scientists 
often scoff at the idea that HACCP is a quality management system rather 
than a public health assessment. HACCP is focused on public health threats 
and the use of rigorous and methodical control systems to focus on and reduce 
the hazards. To review, the US FDA defines HACCP as:
• “HACCP is a management system in which food safety is addressed through 
the analysis and control of biological, chemical, and physical hazards from 
raw material production, procurement, and handling, to manufacturing, 
distribution, and consumption of the finished product”(FDA 2017).
HACCP is the application of a total quality management system to foods, 
and they both are aligned with international standards. One of the most widely 
adopted quality management systems is ISO 9000 Quality Management 
which was updated in 2015 and reportedly has over 1.1 million certificates 
issued worldwide (e.g., companies or locations that are certified to have met 
the requirements of the standard) (ISO 2015).
The International Standards Organization (ISO) with the most widely 
adopted and original quality system of ISO 9000 series is “A quality 
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 management system is a set of policies, processes, and procedures required 
for planning and execution (production/development/service) in the core busi-
ness area of an organization” (ISO 2015). The ISO 9000 section “8.3 Control 
of Non-conforming Products” does state “customers seeking confidence in an 
organization’s ability to consistently provide products and services conforming 
to their requirements.” So considering the definitions of HACCP and qual-
ity management, HACCP is a quality management system that focuses on the 
management and control of a specific set of nonconformances that, if not con-
trolled, could lead to public health hazards. The refinements in HACCP plan 
are a way to apply a specific method for the hazard identification and hazard 
analysis (the “HA” in “HACCP”) then identifying the root causes of the non-
conformances by identifying and managing critical control points (the “CCP” 
in “HACCP”). For HACCP, a CCP might be controlling and monitoring the 
temperature of a refrigerator. The HACCP principles are built upon basic qual-
ity management principles. It is logical to also base food fraud prevention 
concepts on a quality management system, to apply a specific method for the 
vulnerability assessment (the “VA” in VACCP), and then to identify the root 
causes of nonconformances by identifying and managing critical control points 
(the “CCP” in VACCP). A food fraud “CCP” might be to occasionally conduct 
and document a species test to confirm a supplier certificate of analysis.
Sidebar: ISO 9000 Key Terms
While reviewing quality management, it is good to review the key concepts 
and their definition. From ISO 9000 (with ISO 9000 section references) (ISO 
2015):
Quality policy: policy (3.5.8) related to quality (3.6.2); Note 1 to entry: 
Generally the quality policy is consistent with the overall policy of the 
organization (3.2.1), can be aligned with the organization’s vision (3.5.10) 
and mission (3.5.11), and provides a framework for the setting of quality 
objectives (3.7.2).
Quality objective: objective (3.7.1) related to quality (3.6.2); Note 1 to entry: 
Quality objectives are generally based on the organization’s (3.2.1) quality 
policy (3.5.9); Note 2 to entry: Quality objectives are generally specified 
for relevant functions, levels, and processes (3.4.1) in the organization 
(3.2.1).
Quality planning: part of quality management (3.3.4) focused on setting 
quality objectives (3.7.2) and specifying necessary operational processes 
(3.4.1) and related resources to achieve the quality objectives; Note 1 to 
entry: Establishing quality plans (3.8.9) can be part of quality planning.
(continued)
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Quality assurance: part of quality management (3.3.4) focused on providing 
confidence that quality requirements (3.6.5) will be fulfilled.
Quality control: part of quality management (3.3.4) focused on fulfilling 
quality requirements (3.6.5).
Quality improvement: part of quality management (3.3.4) focused on 
increasing the ability to fulfill quality requirements (3.6.5); Note 1 to entry: 
The quality requirements can be related to any aspect such as effectiveness 
(3.7.11), efficiency (3.7.10), or traceability (3.6.13).
Combining these quality management principles, there is an overall goal of 
product quality through management (Fig. 9.5).
There are several more terms in those definitions include:
Quality: degree to which a set of inherent characteristics (3.10.1) of an object 
(3.6.1) fulfills requirements (3.6.4); Note 1 to entry: The term “quality” can 
be used with adjectives such as poor, good, or excellent; Note 2 to entry: 
“Inherent,” as opposed to “assigned,” means existing in the object (3.6.1).
Management: coordinated activities to direct and control an organization 
(3.2.1); Note 1 to entry: Management can include establishing policies 
(3.5.8) and objectives (3.7.1) and processes (3.4.1) to achieve these objec-
tives; Note 2 to entry: The word “management” sometimes refers to peo-
ple, i.e., a person or group of people with authority and responsibility for 
the conduct and control of an organization. When “management” is used in 
this sense, it should always be used with some form of qualifier to avoid 
confusion with the concept of “management” as a set of activities defined 
above. For example, “management shall…” is deprecated, whereas “top 
GOAL: Product Quality through Management 
Quality Policies
Quality Objecves
Quality Planning
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Quality Improvement
Fig. 9.5 ISO 9000 GOAL: Product quality through management
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 The Role and Responsibility of the Procurement Function
The procurement objectives are to purchase the specified product at the lowest cost 
and with high reliability of the quality of the product in conjunction with a continu-
ous supply. It is too simplistic to vilify purchasing managers as only focusing on 
“lowest cost product.” While “No one wants to pay a higher price than necessary,” 
the focus is the “lowest total cost of ownership” (Bowersox et al. 2002). The firm 
must define the specifications for the procurement. The specifications include the 
“risk appetite” of the enterprise which manages all risks or vulnerabilities. That 
said, “What gets measured gets better” would have an opposite idea of “what 
doesn’t get measured doesn’t get better” or maybe “what doesn’t get measured can 
kill a company.”
Procurement objectives are (Bowersox et al. 2002):
• Continuous supply
• Minimize inventory investment (on-hand inventory)
• Quality improvement
• Supplier development
• Access technology and innovation
• Lowest total cost of ownership (low cost per unit plus all related costs)
For food fraud prevention, the vulnerabilities should be plotted on the corporate 
risk map to be able to consider and evaluate the fraud opportunity of the suppliers 
and supply chains. If a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy is implemented, then there 
can be a robust evaluation of the fraud opportunity and the benefits of purchasing 
management (3.1.1) shall…” is acceptable. Otherwise different words 
should be adopted to convey the concept when related to people, e.g., man-
agerial or managers.
Policy: (organization) intentions and direction of an organization (3.2.1) as 
formally expressed by its top management (3.1.1); Note 1 to entry: This 
constitutes one of the common terms and core definitions for ISO manage-
ment system standards given in Annex SL of the Consolidated ISO 
Supplement to the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1.
Strategy: plan to achieve a long-term or overall objective (3.7.1).
Objective: result to be achieved; Note 1 to entry: An objective can be strate-
gic, tactical, or operational.
The concepts of “strategy” and “strategic” were not fully defined in ISO 
9000, so other ISO standards were considered, specifically ISO/IEC TR 
33014:2013 which addresses process improvement on three levels (ISO 2013).
Strategic: what goals to achieve, the motivation, and direction
Tactical: how to achieve the goals of process improvement
Operational: how to perform the process improvement
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from a higher-quality supplier, conducting additional authenticity tests in-house, 
entirely avoiding a type of product such as by changing a recipe, discontinue 
 producing a vulnerable product group, or to define what the current or commodity 
purchases are within the risk appetite.
Sidebar: Purchasing Higher-Priced Truck Engines for Lower Fuel 
Consumption Costs
At the start of the Wal-mart corporate environmental sustainability initiatives 
around 2007, their corporate leadership considered the changing market con-
ditions and the uncertain financial impact on the business. The Wal-mart cor-
porate environmental sustainability initiatives were conceived in then CEO 
Lee Scott’s “21st Century Leadership Speech” (Scott 2005). Diesel fuel prices 
were projected to increase significantly over a number of years to a level that 
the overall profitability of the business could be threatened. The current pur-
chasing specifications did not prioritize the higher-priced engines with higher 
fuel efficiency. It is not the purchasing department’s role to increase the cor-
porate spend.
Although it was never mentioned during the Wal-mart initiatives or since, 
when reviewing the decisions through an Enterprise Risk Management lens, 
the Wal-mart Board of Directors could have identified the increasing fuel 
costs as an enterprise-wide risk. If this risk was perceived to be above the risk 
tolerance, then risk treatments would be considered. One option would be to 
ignore the risk. Another option would be to seek longer-term fuel futures con-
tracts. Then subsequently, an option that was selected was to implement a 
corporate- wide effort to reduce fuel consumption and related costs.
Wal-mart considered the total cost of ownership and then increased the 
specification of the truck engines they were procuring. The purchasing func-
tion received a bigger budget to pay for the higher-priced engines, and the 
fleet operations had their fuel budget reduced a similar amount. The costs 
were incurred in one operation (purchasing), and the benefits were incurred in 
a different business operation (fleet operations). Purchasing and fleet opera-
tions were connected in a joint operation where collaboration led to enterprise- 
wide success.
It is reported that over a multi-year period, diesel fuel prices did go up 
25%, but due in part to the sustainability projects, the Wal-mart fuel consump-
tion costs stayed the same or decreased. A key is that even at a break-even 
return on investment, Wal-mart benefited because it was estimated their com-
petitors’ fuel prices went up the full 25%. Wal-mart received other benefits of 
a reduced number of shipments needed to support the same amount of busi-
ness. At a public meeting, a Wal-mart Supply Chain Logistics Senior Manager 
jokingly complained that the massive increase in efficiency caused a problem 
of them having to find a place to store all the empty and idle company-owned 
trailers.
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 Supply Chain Documentation
For food fraud prevention, there are several key supply chain documents and pri-
mary concepts.
• Bill of lading or uniform bill of lading: “is the basic document utilized in pur-
chasing transport services. It serves as a receipt and documents the products and 
quantities shipped. […] The information contained on the bill of lading deter-
mines all responsibilities related to timing and ownership [including when the 
invoice is to be paid” (Bowersox et al. 2002).
• Order notified export: “It provides that delivery not is made unless the original 
bill of lading is surrendered to the carrier. … Upon customer payment for the 
product, the credit institution [third party] releases the bill of lading [and owner-
ship of the product]” (Bowersox et al. 2002).
• Freight bill: “is a carrier’s method of charging for transportation services per-
formed [such as delivering a truckload of product]. … The freight bill may be 
either prepaid [paid by sender] or collect [paid by receiver]” (Bowersox et al. 
2002).
• Shipment manifests: “lists individual stops or consignees when multiple ship-
ments are placed on a single vehicle” (Bowersox et al. 2002).
There are other documents which are specific to food or food safety (Fenoff and 
Spink 2016). A survey of food fraud industry experts found 35 different documents 
they deal with to conduct their operations. For food fraud prevention, these docu-
ments are statements of legal export/import, a statement about the product origin, a 
clarification of where ownership was transferred to the recipient, declaration of the 
specifications, declaration of the authenticity, and other tax or reporting 
requirements.
The five most common supply chain documents related to food fraud are listed 
below (Fenoff and Spink 2016):
• Certificate of analysis: A certificate of analysis is a statement of the test results 
for the product or sample provided, including the test results, methods used, test-
ing lab, as well as the date of the test and in the identification of the original batch 
(WHO 2002).
For food fraud prevention, there may not be an as direct and quantifiable 
benefit in a traditional “ROI” sense, but total quality management analysis can 
be applied to focus on the critical control points that have a much lower “fraud 
opportunity.” Food fraud should be considered in an enterprise risk assess-
ment and the vulnerability judged in relation to the risk tolerance. If food 
fraud is not a single identified problem above the risk tolerance, it probably 
contributes to other issues of concern such as food safety incidents, maintain-
ing brand equity, and the ability to implement new products successfully.
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 – “The certificate lists the results and includes a final evaluation and the conclu-
sions of the examination of one or more samples.” “In accordance with [Good 
Manufacturing Practice regulations], the certificate can be used in lieu of test-
ing by the manufacturer (except for the identification tests as a minimum 
requirement), provided that the reliability of the supplier’s analysis is estab-
lished by the periodic validation of the test results by appropriate means and, 
if feasible, by on-site audits of the supplier’s capabilities.”
• Credence attribute statements or certifications: A credence attribute statement 
is defined as confirmation or declaration of an attribute that a valuable aspect of 
the product that cannot be readily detected or evaluated such as organic, country 
of origin, fair trade, sustainably harvested, processing such as kosher or halal, or 
others.
• Bill of lading: These are described above.
• Laboratory analysis test results: These are the reports from specifically defined 
tests.
• Import and export documents: These are described above.
 – For food fraud prevention, they are a statement of legal export/import, a 
statement about the product origin, a clarification of where ownership was 
transferred to the recipient, and other tax or reporting requirements.
Other related and essential concepts include:
• Force majeure: These are “circumstances beyond anyone’s control, such as nat-
ural disasters” (Bowersox et al. 2002).
 – For food fraud prevention, supply agreements could be written to expand 
“force majeure” to a product that is determined to be illegal and seized by 
governments. In this case, the supply agreement could nullify the purchase 
and the requirement for the buyer to pay for the product. If the buyer corpo-
rate policy states suspected illegal product must be reported to the govern-
ment, there might be a major reduction in the “fraud opportunity.” This is due 
to the situation that if the product must be reported to the government, then 
the fraudster risks losing the costs to produce the entire shipment after a sei-
zure, the fraudster would become publically identified during court proceed-
ings as criminals, and this could also lead all their global shipments to be 
suspicious and subject to additional government scrutiny.
• Freight on board (FOB): this can either be paid by the buyer (FOB origin) or 
paid by the seller (FOB destination).
 – For food fraud prevention, there is a lower fraud opportunity if the purchaser 
takes possession of the product at FOB origin since there is more control of 
the supply movement and traceability.
There are other customs or financial documents that meet other details or needs.
For food fraud prevention, there should be an awareness of how and where 
fraudulent documents can allow fraudulent products to enter the supply chain.
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Supply Chain Characteristics
This section will cover the complexity of supply chain management and systems to 
organize, manage, and protect the flow of material goods.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Understand the impact and risks of the globalization of commerce.
• (2) Explore traceability, electronic transactions, and e-commerce.
• (3) Implement food fraud prevention in the supply chain.
 Globalization
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines globalization as “…the increased 
interconnectedness and interdependence of peoples and countries, is generally 
understood to include two inter-related elements: the opening of international bor-
ders to increasingly fast flows of goods, services, finance, people and ideas; and the 
changes in institutions and policies at national and international levels that facilitate 
or promote such flows. Globalization has the potential for both positive and negative 
effects on economic development and health” (WHO 2018).
To consider the supply chain management complexity, it is estimated that 90% of 
global demand for goods are not covered by local supply (Bowersox et al. 2002). 
There are many reasons for globalization including the enabling of more efficient 
production being shifted to areas with optimal natural and human resources. 
Globalization enables a bigger economic scale of manufacturing which also lowers 
costs due to being near raw materials supply, low-cost labor, and reduced manufac-
turing costs due to high-volume production. Production can be concentrated because 
the output can be moved farther and faster around the world. Each economy relies 
on the products being able to move quickly across borders. “In addition to the sales 
potential, involvement in global business is being driven by significant opportuni-
ties to increase operating efficiency.” The efficiencies include being able to strategi-
cally source raw materials, labor cost advantages in developing nations, and 
favorable tax laws for value-added operations (Bowersox et al. 2002).
From Bowersox, Closs, and Cooper (2013), the “logistics of internationaliza-
tion” involve four considerations “plus one” (the term logistics is referring to chal-
lenges of organizing not the process of managing products through a supply chain) 
(Bowersox et al. 2002):
Logistics (Challenges) of Internationalization:
 (1) Distance: how far the product moves from production to user.
 (2) Documentation: more complex coordination of the record of the transactions.
 (3) Diversity: differences in the work practices, cultural norms, laws and regula-
tions, and general operating environment.
 (4) Demand: differences in product preferences in different markets.
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 (5) Defense (“plus one”): an additional consideration is defined as security and 
specifically here to address terrorism. This could expand to include all types of 
intentional acts including those such as terrorism that has intent to harm but 
expand to others such as disgruntled employees, malicious tampering, and sab-
otage. Another intentional act is product fraud conducted for economic gain—
while there may not be an immediate incident, an entire supply chain could be 
infiltrated and compromised.
For each of the four plus one considerations, there is an increased “fraud oppor-
tunity” which has examples noted here.
 (1) Distance fraud opportunity: there are more transfers of products and less of a 
direct relationship from the manufacturer to the user.
 (2) Documentation fraud opportunity: there is more of a reliance on the state-
ments about the product rather than direct control to the point that many trans-
actions are only digital.
 (3) Diversity fraud opportunity: there are regional, industry, social, or socioeco-
nomic norms that differ around the world—a practice that is commonplace and 
accepted in one market may not be understood or even be unknown in another. 
This difference in understanding of the norms can create confusion or 
problems.
 (4) Demand fraud opportunity: there are regional, industry, social, or socioeco-
nomic norms that differ around the world—a practice that could lead to a mis-
understanding of terms, specifications, or what makes “common sense.”
 (5) Defense fraud opportunity: this is a specific awareness and understanding of 
the range of security issues that could lead to a disrupted or compromised sup-
ply chain from intentional illegal acts.
Globalization is an essential driver of economic growth. The changing and 
expanding volume of the movement of goods also presents emerging and evolving 
risks such as product fraud. A key point is to understand how the supply chain is 
changing and consider the shifting fraud opportunity. When there is an understand-
ing of the shifting vulnerabilities, then efficient and effective countermeasures and 
controls systems can be implemented.
 E-Commerce
A new and rapidly evolving supply chain innovation is electronic commerce or 
e-commerce. E-commerce is the use of the Internet, or electronic methods, to con-
duct sales transactions. The number of mobile phone technology users is booming 
worldwide, which—when combined with the use of electronic currency (e- currency; 
e.g., PayPal, ApplePay, SamsungPay, WeChat, QQ, and Bitcoin) and mobile phone 
application software or “APPs”—leads consumers to benefit from the efficiency of 
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ordering online. Whether the APP is an online order from a physical retail store or 
a direct-to-consumer retailer, the consumer is getting more and more product deliv-
ered to them rather than picking up the product at a retailer. Depending on the prod-
uct and the geographic location, the product can be delivered by traditional parcel 
delivery services (e.g., United Parcel Service UPS, government mail systems, or 
other rapid delivery such as FedEx or DHL) or local couriers (e.g., bicycle or motor-
cycle delivery or other more local options). In places like Beijing, China, companies 
like Amazon.com have their own fleet of delivery vehicles such as trucks, tuk-tuks, 
motorcycles, and bicycles. In places such as New York City, companies such as 
Peapod have their own truck fleets.
Once consumers get setup and familiar with an e-commerce company or system, 
the convenience is easy and can even be addicting. Online shopping for clothes or 
consumer products has boomed as “Black Friday” shopping sales have expanded to 
include “Cyber Monday.” Another example, why get up from your desk and walk to 
a coffee shop when one-click on an APP can have a latte delivered hot to your desk 
or your park bench. Also, the online ride-ordering services such as Uber and Lyft are 
providing many new mobile phone features such as being able to see a map of the 
drivers in your area and to see the wait time until pickup (which is easier than stand-
ing curbside waiting to hail a traditional taxi cab but not as easy as walking right up 
to a waiting taxi), there is a safety factor of your location and driver being monitored 
and recorded, and the transaction is cashless and even physical- interaction- less. So, 
consumers are becoming more and more confident and reliant on e-commerce. This 
has benefits but also significant drawbacks for food fraud prevention.
Some food fraud prevention concerns with e-commerce include (Spink 2016, 
2017):
Food Fraud E-Commerce-Related Challenges:
• Not knowing exactly where the product is coming from (which could include a 
continuum from a national delivery service to a local courier).
• Not knowing how the product was handled or mishandled (such as a continuous 
cold chain or other contaminants).
• Not being able to sample or assess products before purchase.
• There is a lack of clarity on when the product—and legal responsibility—trans-
fer to the end user (is the courier in contract with the end user or the seller? Is a 
trading platform such as Amazon.com, BestBuy.com when facilitating a nonpro-
prietary marketplace transaction, or E-Bay, a participant in the transaction with 
legal responsibility?).
• There is a possible lack of supply chain and handling transparency across the 
different delivery options (you may order from one e-retailer, and the delivery 
may be conducted by multiple companies).
E-commerce is an immense opportunity for the marketplace, companies, and 
consumers, but there will need to be a tremendous amount of research to become 
aware of the evolving “fraud opportunity.”
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Sidebar: “Do you Think that Is Why Those Brokers Stopped Bidding on 
Our Business?”
Consider a hypothetical—but realistic—example where a company’s pur-
chasing volume required them to purchase through brokers, and during the 
implementation of their Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, the number of bro-
kers bidding on their business decreased. While the exact reason could not be 
determined, it is possible that the increased awareness and discussion of food 
fraud—such as in the request for proposal RFP documentation and recom-
mended training programs—scared fraudsters away. It is possible that the new 
food fraud prevention requirements led to fraudulent suppliers to decide not 
to bid on the proposal since they would risk getting caught.
For the company in this example, they bought a commodity ingredient and 
then adjusted their own operations to achieve a flavor profile. Whether they 
bought a fraudulent product or not, they were impacted by their cost of goods. 
On the other hand, if they labeled their product with details of the raw mate-
rial (e.g., “Made in Michigan” when the ingredient was actually “Made in 
Illinois”), then not only would they be financially cheated but their finished 
good would be unintentional food fraud. Another misbranding problem would 
be if they made claims about the percentage or weight of honey in their prod-
uct. Their finished goods would be illegal and subject to a product recall.
A primary concern by the company was that the procurement costs would 
increase due to fewer suppliers bidding on their business (Fig. 9.6). A state-
ment from management was that “If we eliminate these suppliers then our 
costs will go up.” This took a while for us to think about. There were two 
issues with a first concern about limiting their procurement options but then 
second a lack of awareness that their own product may be a violation of the 
Legal
$1.1/pound
Needs 22 pounds per 
batch
Total: $24.20
Illegal
$1/pound
Need 25 pounds per 
batch
Total: $25
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e
Illegal and Im
pure
Fig. 9.6 Example of the impact of reducing the fraud opportunity on the cost of goods
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FDCA Adulterated Foods or the Misbranded Foods Sections. Later, when 
reviewing the process in detail, since they were buying the commodity for 
the attribute, not just the weight, their total cost of goods should usually be the 
same with a reduced fraud opportunity and reduced overall enterprise-wide 
risk. For example, if they previously paid $1000 per 1000 pounds ($1/pound) 
and the product was diluted by 10%, they were really paying $1.11/pound of 
pure product. Also, they had an attribute quality specification in their own 
product (e.g., an amount of flavor), so purchasing the higher-priced pure prod-
uct—which had a more intense flavor—also led them to use fewer pounds. 
While the previous operation may have needed to use 25 pounds of raw mate-
rial per batch, to achieve the same flavor specification, they now only needed 
to use 22 pounds.
This example demonstrates the complicated and nontraditional thought 
process when dealing with food fraud. For most of the commerce, “laws are 
for the lawful,” and generally, companies are trying to do the right thing. For 
food fraud prevention, the fraudsters intend to deceive and actively seek to 
avoid detection.
Sidebar: Early Supplier Involvement (ESI)
A supply chain management concept is “early supplier involvement” (ESI) 
(Zsidsin 2007). “ESI is a form of collaboration in which purchasing firms 
involve suppliers at an early stage in the product development cycle, often 
during the need recognition and description phases of the [supplier develop-
ment procurement] acquisition process” (Zsidsin 2007). The relationship 
deepens when “Involvement becomes more significant as the supplier takes 
an active part in development processes by activities such as executing 
detailed drawings based on rough sketches provided by the purchasing orga-
nization” (Zsidsin 2007). While the major enterprise benefit is efficient opera-
tions and reduced operating or handling costs and a proactive focus, there can 
be benefits for food fraud prevention. An early focus on “total quality” can 
include systems and processes to reduce food fraud throughout the entire sup-
ply chain.
During the longer and more in-depth relationship building during the ESI 
process, the supplier and entire upstream supply chain will come under more 
scrutiny, and more efficient processes will be identified, implemented, and 
then refined.
By reviewing the “managerial implications,” the additional benefits of ESI 
are identified (Zsidsin 2007):
• Forming strong relationships: This creates stronger relationships during 
the supplier selection process which increases the ability to “determine 
(continued)
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which suppliers will best be able to meet the specified outcomes in terms 
of quality, delivery, and cost and timeline goals.” The early engagement 
can encourage suppliers to adopt more rigorous or efficient quality man-
agement programs such as fraud prevention.
 – For food fraud prevention, this could include sharing of Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessments and Food Fraud Prevention Strategy plans.
• Avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard: The longer and deeper 
involvement in the ESI process creates a more thorough vetting of suppli-
ers. “Moral hazard is reduced by having suppliers that either cannot meet 
up-front or are not willing to put forth the required effort to meet demand 
requirements are eliminated from further consideration early within the 
process” (for more on moral hazard, see the section on Dr. Kenneth Arrow).
 – For food fraud prevention, an example is that suppliers who know—or 
suspect—their raw materials are fraudulent would most likely drop out 
of the program.
• Transferring risk to suppliers: Since the ESI process includes locking in 
agreements early, the buyer has some possible additional supply and price 
consistency. There is an increased benefit for the supplier to avoid budget 
overruns that often just get passed to the customer.
 – For food fraud prevention, the risk of sloppy purchasing practices, or 
the cost of procuring fraudulent product, would be transferring the risk 
to suppliers. This transfer of risk to the supplier would reduce the fraud 
opportunity.
• Developing supply chains: With the increased involvement, there is an 
increased long-term business engagement, so marginal companies may 
evolve into “world-class” suppliers. The longer-term agreements could 
increase the confidence of a supplier to invest in training, methods, or 
equipment. This is a benefit to both the purchaser and supplier.
 – For food fraud prevention, the longer and deeper relationship—com-
bined with the thorough supply chain transparency—would reduce the 
willingness to commit fraud. An example would be suppliers who are 
encouraged and supported through higher-level standards and certifica-
tions such as the Global Food Safety Initiative. An example is the GFSI 
Global Markets Program which educates and trains small- and medium- 
sized enterprises.
In summary, adding fraud prevention to the early supplier involvement is 
efficient for the business and advances the overall benefits to both purchaser 
and supplier. The food fraud prevention tasks and benefits are secondary to 
the full relationship but can add value.
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 Key Learning Objective 3: Continuity Planning and Crisis 
Management
This section reviews the focus on keeping the operations going through continuity 
planning and crisis management.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Overview of internal controls for SCM
• (2) Continuity planning and crisis management
• (3) The presentation of the Food Fraud Tabletop Exercise (FFTTX)
 Internal Controls for Supply Chain Management
With the more complicated and complex supply chains, there is a need for more 
robust internal controls and an integrated framework (MSU-FFI 2017; MSU FFI 
2017). Internal controls are defined as standardized methods or systems to monitor 
and manage operations (COSO 2013).
It is important to emphasize that “Enterprise Risk Management” is not an infor-
mal or general term. ERM is a concept defined in financial or managerial accounting 
regulations. The statement that an assessment is “Enterprise Risk Management” or 
“ERM” could be inadvertently making a legal or regulatory statement (COSO 2011). 
An informal risk aggregation—or “gathering a bunch of food risks”—is not ERM.
From ERM/COSO, the specific definition and scope that apply to the SCM ques-
tions (COSO 2013):
• Internal controls are defined as “A process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
effective and efficiency of operations, reliability in financial reporting, and com-
pliance with applicable laws and regulations. An internal control system is a 
synonym for internal controls applied in an entity.” This is “An effective system 
of internal control reduces, to an acceptable level, the risk of not achieving an 
objective relating to one, two, or all three categories of objectives.”
• Integrated frameworks are defined as interconnectivity of internal controls to 
coordinate operations as well as provide an overall monitoring and calibrating 
system.
Supply chain management provides a vital role in the efficient management of a 
business. Information about supply, work-in-progress, sales, returns, and other 
inventory matters can be digital and can be automatically fed into an enterprise- 
wide system such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). The automatic, digital 
monitoring of the supply chain can be leveraged and also expanded to carry and 
analyze information about food fraud.
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As food fraud prevention becomes a compliance requirement for food safety, 
such as for the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) or the US Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA), there is a more formal activity that will undoubt-
edly expand to ERM. Product fraud—including food fraud—is an enterprise-wide 
responsibility that can impact revenue and brand equity. Overall—including for 
the GFSI, related standards, and even regulation such as the US Food Drug and 
Cosmetics Act and the US Food Safety Modernization Act—addressing food fraud 
is not optional, so there will be more formalized analysis and reporting that can 
provide a clearer understanding of the extent of ERM/COSO compliance. This 
harmonized activity will also enable efficiency from the sharing of best practices 
and benchmark against conventional systems. Food fraud is being defined and 
researched as a specific type of enterprise risk. Food fraud prevention countermea-
sures and control systems are being analyzed in relation to ERM and presented on 
a corporate risk map.
Reviewing food fraud does not create a new risk. Food fraud is an ERM/COSO 
defined “inherent risk.”
• An inherent risk is defined as “An effective system of internal control that 
reduces, to an acceptable level, the risk of not achieving an objective relating to 
one, two, or all three categories of objectives” (COSO 2013).
From a previous MSU Food Fraud Initiative Report (MSU-FFI 2017):
The Options for Addressing Food Fraud:
• (1) Ignore the risk and “hope for the best.”
• (2) Implement Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
• “Not being proactive can destroy a company and be a felony crime” (MSU-FFI 
2017).
The Board of Directors—in addition to Sarbanes-Oxley Act reporting require-
ments—hold the C-suite accountable and responsible for addressing all risks 
whether they are currently known or not. The accountability and responsibility for 
inherent risk are one of the main drivers for implementing a food fraud prevention 
system that applies to all types of fraud, to all types of products, and that integrates 
into the enterprise-wide assessment system.
 Business Continuity Planning and Incident Management
Business continuity planning (BCP) is a critical part of business controls including 
how to respond to an incident. BCP is a more positive term for “crisis management.” 
This can be reviewed or practiced in a mock incident review or tabletop exercise 
(Brindley 2017).
Business Continuity Planning (BCP) Components:
• (1) Create system awareness.
• (2) Prevent supply chain disruptions.
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• (3) Remediate supply interruptions.
• (4) Manage knowledge.
In BCP, there is a focus on understanding and embracing the “uncertainty of sup-
ply,” especially with regard to events that could not have been foreseen. However, 
there may be circumstances where risk can be identified a priori [“theoretical deduc-
tion not from empirical evidence” (Black's 2014)] (Brindley 2017). In food fraud 
prevention terms, this would be identifying and addressing vulnerabilities (that have 
not occurred… yet) in addition to risks (have occurred, known).
For food fraud prevention, one way to increase the awareness and concern 
regarding food fraud is to propose a BCP Mock Incident. There are several actual 
incidents that have a lot of public details about the event and the costs including 
legal or regulatory penalties. Several incidents should address different types of 
food fraud that had supply chain-stopping power, for example, horsemeat in beef 
(an adulterant substance of high quality and safety but illegal mislabeling), date- 
code tampering (initially a McDonald’s alleged incident in China but now also 
the widely publicized “2 Sisters” incident in the UK), stolen goods (either the 
stolen goods reentered into commerce or the remainder of the lot), or mislabeled 
product donated to a nonprofit but reentered into commerce (labeling error then 
the product philanthropic donation for export but some of the product reentered 
the US market).
Continuing the focus on BCP, food fraud is one type of “supply disruption.” “It 
is impossible to eliminate the risk of supply chain disruption totally; however, it is 
critical to have a plan in place to deal with the disruptions when they occur” 
(Brindley 2017). The most basic supply disaster recovery planning includes ques-
tions such as (Brindley 2017):
 1. “Is there an emergency disaster/business recovery/business continuity plan 
established in the supplier company?” [Then, does it include food fraud?]
 2. “Is the plan deployed according to all existing sites?”
 3. “In the case of disaster are there procedures to restart minimum service levels 
and to organize transport to a backup site?”
The recovery plan is as important as the prevention focus since subsequent inci-
dents or product recalls can occur from well-meaning individuals who creatively try 
to address the crisis. There should be clear standard operating procedures and 
approvals for any variation in the food production or handling.
 Mock Exercise: Food Fraud Tabletop Exercise (FFTTX)
There is often debate whether food fraud prevention and incident response are 
addressed in existing methods or programs. One way to test this is to conduct a 
mock incident response or mock product recall. If the methods and programs are 
 Key Learning Objective 3: Continuity Planning and Crisis Management
330
successful, then this is evidence of a working system. More times than not, address-
ing food fraud is very different from other incidents or product recalls, and the 
tabletop exercise defines the need to modify the management and business continu-
ation plan (BCP).
Before conducting a tabletop exercise, it is essential to get an agreement on the 
scope of all food fraud which can be based on FSMA, GFSI, or other regulations or 
standards. After the scope is defined, it is recommended to start with previous, pub-
lically known incidents such as melamine in skim milk powder, horsemeat in beef, 
and peanut allergen shells in cumin. In addition it is good to choose several inci-
dents that do not have a public health threat, but that undoubtedly could lead to a 
product recall such as country of origin labeling fraud (e.g., incorrect country of 
origin on the label), credence attribute (e.g., kosher or organic), and stolen goods 
(e.g., that have been reintroduced into commerce by the criminals so without confir-
mation of following Good Manufacturing Practices).
An example of a Food Fraud Tabletop Exercise (FFTTX) is the “Something’s 
Fishy” project that was funded by the US Food and Drug Administration to the 
Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) in collabo-
ration with the Michigan State University’s Food Fraud Initiative (MSU-FFI 2015). 
The FDA FREE-B program provides training for food defense-focused themes 
(FDA 2015). “The Food Related Emergency Exercise Bundle (FREE-B) is a com-
pilation of scenarios based on both intentional and unintentional food contamina-
tion events (FDA 2015). It is designed with the intention of assisting government 
regulatory and public health agencies in assessing existing food emergency response 
plans, protocols and procedures that may be in place, or that they are in the process 
of revising or even developing” (FDA 2015). When originally funded by the FDA, 
the “intentional contamination” subject of economically motivated adulteration or 
food fraud was still within the scope. Later, the FSMA Intentional Adulteration 
Final Rule narrowed their focus to “wide-scale human health harm” (21 CFR 121; 
FSMA 2016). Thus, the current FREE-B website does not include the links to the 
“Something’s Fishy” exercise.
An example of the value of the mock exercise is that it is based on real incidents 
and then provides some unexpected insight. Questions include:
• Is there a threat of violence against inspectors?
• When should law enforcement officers be involved?
• What was learned from the series of suspicious activity reports?
• What is the best practice for gathering information on food fraud?
One of the biggest surprises for the participants was the question of “At what 
point is the food inspector risking physical violence? There was a realization that 
we’re not combating a microbe and the adversary is a human criminal.”
9 Supply Chain Management (Part 1 of 2): Fundamentals
331
Sidebar: Blog—Food Fraud Tabletop Exercise (FFTTX), “Something’s 
Fishy” (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: Grant Deliverable for FDA’s Innovative Food Defense Program (IFDP)
By John Spink • March 1, 2018 • Blog
Attached you will find our “Something’s Fishy” free and public Food 
Fraud Tabletop Exercise (FFTTX) that was the final deliverable for our 2013 
FDA’s Innovative Food Defense Program (IFDP) grant. Feel free to use the 
content as you see fit. The grant deliverables included submitting materials 
ready to be posted online in the FDA FREE-B program Food Related 
Emergency Exercise Bundle (FREE-B).
Project Update Report:
• December 2015: The FFTTX grant project was completed in September 
2013. In 2015 the USA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) 
“Intentional Adulteration” draft rule (FSMA-IA) defined the scope only to 
“catastrophic events.” This covers terrorism and traditional FDA food 
defense scope as defined by HSPD-7 and -9. Specifically, FSMA-IA 
defined this section – and “food defense” – to cover only the very impor-
tant and extremely complex concept of “catastrophic events” such as ter-
rorism. FSMA-IA stated that “economically motivated adulteration,” and 
thus food fraud, would be covered under the FSMA Preventative Controls 
rule (FSMA-PC), which is the traditional “food safety” type of hazard. 
Thus, food fraud/EMA is no longer under “food defense” and thus outside 
the scope of the “Innovative Food Defense Program.” It is two years since 
we submitted the final report to FDA and we are not sure where – or if – it 
will be officially posted on FDA.gov. MSU and FDA are public institu-
tions, and the FFTTX is subject to distribution via the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). Thus we published the content on www.
FoodFraudPrevention.com.
The Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MDARD) and MSU partnered to propose and deliver this grant. The Principal 
Investigator was Brad Deacon from MDARD. Michigan State University was 
a subcontractor with Principal Investigator John Spink and Researcher Doug 
Moyer. The goal of the grant was to improve the understanding of food fraud 
and the roles and legal authorities of participants in a state’s food emergency 
management plan.
From the grant proposal:
• Development and Implementation of Food Defense Tabletop Workshop 
Exposing and Mitigating the Vulnerability of Economically Motivated 
Adulteration and food fraud Incidents (PAR-12-116)
(continued)
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• The development of the content and the tabletop exercise project is 
relevant to public health and counterterrorism since increasing the 
awareness of economically motivated adulteration and food fraud, is, 
itself, a public health benefit, but also would reduce future opportunities 
for malicious attacks. This project leverages theory leadership and strong 
relationships between the Michigan Department of Agriculture (PI: 
Deacon) and Michigan State University (PI: Spink with co-PI: Moyer). 
Furthermore, this will leverage current relationships and credibility with 
a broad range of stakeholders including GMA, IFT, IAFP, AFDO, Great 
Lakes Border Health Initiative, Michigan State Police, FDA, FBI, US 
Customs, and the GCC/SCC. The project will include the development 
of a Free-B exercise.
Live Tabletop Exercise: Pilot Event, States of Michigan & Minnesota, 
2013
The development of the research project culminated in a June 2013 live 
tabletop exercise held in East Lansing, Michigan. There was a wide range of 
participants from multiple federal, state, and local agencies representing agri-
culture, food, public health, and law enforcement, as well as industry repre-
sentatives. In addition to the more than 65 participants in Michigan, the 
exercise created a multi-State scenario by connecting on the phone in real 
time to public health officials in the State of Minnesota.
To create a realistic complexity the scenario involved product that was 
produced and transported between Michigan and Minnesota. Participants 
from the Minnesota Department of Agriculture and the FDA Minneapolis 
District Office worked in tandem with the Michigan team to produce an inci-
dent plan. This work included reviews of how the incident would be addressed 
by FDA’s Rapid Response Team program.
The scenario included:
• “Bad Fish” found at a convenience store in Michigan
• Product distributed from a warehouse nearby in Michigan
• The product was Whitefish packaged in Minnesota
From the research, the key questions addressed were:
 (1) Is there a threat of violence against inspectors?
 (2) When should law enforcement officers be involved?
 (3) What was learned from the series of suspicious activity reports?
 (4) What is the best practice for gathering information on food fraud?
 (5) For a food fraud suspicious activity or incident
 (6) What would happen?
 (7) What should happen?
 (8) How can that be enabled?
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One of the biggest surprises for the participants was the question of:
• “At what point is the food inspector risking physical violence? There was 
a realization that we’re not combating a microbe and the adversary is a 
human criminal.
Live Tabletop Exercise: NEHA Convention, Nevada, 2014
Principal Investigator and MDARD Emergency Management Coordinator, 
Brad Deacon, received high praise when he conducted the FFTTX at the July 
2014 National Environmental Health Association (NEHA) Convention. There 
were reportedly over 150 attendees.
This FFTTX scenario was intended to be a free and public document. 
Please feel free to use it as you see fit. Also, please let us know if you would 
like additional support or updated insight on food fraud. FFI
Course Materials with Links to Video Presentation Version:
Note: these are free, open, and available for anyone to use in any setting. 
The content is copyrighted which just means it does need to be correctly 
referenced.
Course Materials:
• Situation Manual (Instructor Guide): http://foodfraud.msu.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/03/FFttx-situation.pdf
• Evaluator Form (Post Event Review): http://foodfraud.msu.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/03/ffttx-evaluator.docx
• Presentation PowerPoint: http://foodfraud.msu.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/FFTTX2-basic.pdf
• Videos (link to YouTube content – (contact us if your network does not 
allow access to YouTube.com):
 – Title (6 minutes): https://youtu.be/0WDDOvyg-9A
 – Grant Detail (12 minutes): https://youtu.be/nmCSlunDUlU
 – Food Fraud Overview (16 minutes): https://youtu.be/JaU9DOaUgZk
 – Law Overview (9 minutes): https://youtu.be/woXbKrXfFOk
 – Module1 Pre-Incident (5 minutes): https://youtu.be/syibQHfLm1o
 – Module2 Early-Incident (4 minutes): https://youtu.be/8eqGA-2hbX0
 – Module3 Late-Incident (4 minutes): https://youtu.be/mGP8NXKygsM
 – Module4 Aftermath (3 minutes): https://youtu.be/baJjcxL6K8Y
 – Closing Remarks and Next Steps (9  minutes): https://youtu.
be/3Uc0I976oYE
 – Appendix: Industry Activities and Direction (12 minutes): https://youtu.
be/1acuPA1TJ9o
 – Appendix: Marketing Notice Overview (8  minutes): https://youtu.
be/1ziUS9_FX3k
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 Conclusion
Addressing food fraud is based on the goal to reduce often unknown and unquanti-
fied—and possibly unquantifiable—possible future costs. Supply chain manage-
ment has evolved to include data analytics that addresses these types of problems 
including to identify and quantify very minute nuances that result directly in mil-
lions of dollars of savings. The first conclusion is that Supply Chain Management 
is a thorough and robust field of study that provides vital tools and strategies to man-
age and reduce the fraud opportunity. The range of SCM topics expands from iden-
tifying the structure and the documentation, but also to the management of those 
systems. The second conclusion is that food fraud prevention is a unique and com-
plex Supply Chain Management consideration. The emerging study of food fraud 
prevention—and more broadly on all product fraud—is consistent with the SCM 
principles of quality management, data organization, and the general business prac-
tices such as ERM/COSO. The final conclusion is that there is an opportunity for 
further collaboration or integration of food fraud prevention with concepts SCM. The 
further collaboration will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of reducing the 
fraud opportunity which will also increase the supply chain efficiency.
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Supply Chain Management 
Fundamentals
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional 
group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all SCM is a valuable and thorough science that provides critical insight and 
support of a robust Food Fraud Prevention Strategy
Quality team SCM is a science that can be leveraged to increase the understanding and 
transparency for the supply chain, while both are utilizing current 
transactional relationships but also to coordinate a reduction of the fraud 
opportunity
Auditors The SCM concepts provide indirect “supply chain controls” that can vastly 
reduce the fraud opportunity— – though once set up, the time and effort 
required should be very low
Management To optimize enterprise-wide risk reduction efforts, it is critical to integrate 
SCM and quality management programs and activities. SCM and QA should 
be interacting both in the incident response activities but also highly integrated 
for strategic risk reduction and control
Corp. 
decision-makers
Project proposals should include insight and coordination between many 
business functions including SCM
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 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) Why is “supply chain management” a separate business area of study?
 (b) Why has it been a challenge for SCM to prioritize and address FF?
 (c) How does “business continuing planning” and “crisis management” address 
FF?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is “supply chain management” science?
 (b) How does supply chain management relate to all other business 
disciplines?
 (c) What are examples of strategic, tactical, and operational FF prevention?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is globalization?
 (b) What are the challenges for FF prevention presented by globalization?
 (c) How does ESI inherently reduce the fraud opportunity and how could it 
sometimes be dangerous?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is “business continuity planning”?
 (b) Why is food fraud an “inherent risk” and not just a “new risk”?
 (c) When addressing food fraud, at what point is there a threat of violence 
against auditors or inspectors?
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Chapter 10
Supply Chain Management (Part 2 of 2): 
Application Applied to Food Fraud 
Prevention
Summary
This chapter presents the application of supply chain management practices to food 
fraud prevention. There are SCM systems that are created to address current con-
cerns and also to comply with laws, regulations, certifications, standards, and com-
mon practices. This chapter will expand on the previous review of the SCM 
fundamentals and address several key application challenges as well as the presen-
tation of some specific studies. Since food fraud prevention is currently being devel-
oped and implemented, it is opportune to review the broader business application as 
well as specific insight from other industries.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) Supply chain management application to food fraud prevention: How 
this discipline applies to food fraud prevention practices.
• (2) Traceability and electronic transactions: Explore key concepts and stan-
dards related to traceability, transparency, and the opportunity for new enhanced 
traceability technologies.
• (3) Review of previous enhanced traceability efforts: Then to review details of 
several supply chain traceability projects or initiatives.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoretical 
foundation concepts related to supply chain management in “(A) Academic 
Disciplines” (Fig. 10.1).
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 Introduction
Supply chain management developed as a separate business school research disci-
pline after there were examples of added value and explanation of an unmet need. 
As the terminology and value became clearer, the discipline kept evolving and ris-
ing in importance. Food fraud may be undergoing that type of evolution as a sepa-
rate research discipline including with the direct application to supply chain 
management. Beyond the fundaments – of both food fraud and supply chain man-
agement – the value is explained through the application and synthesis of the aca-
demic disciplines. This chapter builds upon the previous food fraud prevention 
concepts and the preceding supply chain management fundamentals chapter to 
explain the application.
 Key Learning Objective 1: Supply Chain Management 
Application to Food Fraud Prevention
This section reviews the food fraud prevention communication and integration into 
a supply chain management operation.
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
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Fig. 10.1 Position on the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle: Where this chapter applies to the overall 
concept “(A) academic disciplines”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et  al. 
2019)
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Understanding the current internal controls
• (2) Exploring the specific laws and regulations that apply to supply chain 
controls
• (3) Then reviewing the role and opportunity from enhanced traceability
 Supply Chain Laws and Regulations
Laws or regulations are formal requirements, and they are supported by a range of 
programs or collaborations including standards.
The laws that govern the food supply chain are based on the food regulations (the 
production and consumption of the product) or supply chain-related regulations (the 
movement of the goods). The food laws in the USA include the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). In addi-
tion, there are broader laws that cover smuggling, the safe transit of products, driver, 
and equipment requirements, as well as addressing stolen goods. For example, an 
FDA-administered law for drugs is the US Drug Supply Chain Security Act 
(DSCSA) which provides guidelines for compliance and consequences for the sto-
len product including considering the entire batch or lot unfit for commerce until the 
suspect product is identified and removed.
There are programs or collaborations from many governments, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO), nonprofit organizations (NPO), nonprofit corporations (NPC), 
or industry initiatives (IRS 2018) (see Table 10.1). All programs provide additional 
transparency of the supply chain even though they often do not prioritize food or 
non-terrorism activities. In some cases, the focus on terrorism or public health 
issues shifts resources or focus from general activities and could actually create a 
new “fraud opportunity” for food fraud prevention.
• For food fraud prevention, an intense focus on pharmaceuticals, high-volume 
product counterfeiting, and weapons of mass destruction leads to fewer resources 
or prioritization of incidents such as nonpublic health-related food fraud.
There are a range of standards created and adopted including from industry orga-
nizations or international nongovernmental organizations (see Table  10.2) (for 
more, see chapter appendix).
Next, there is a range of ISO activities in security management and product fraud 
that apply to the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (Table 10.3).
A key to all the laws and regulations is an expected level of supply chain trace-
ability and the ability for transparency. Frequently there is even an assumption that 
traceability and transparency are a “given.”
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Table 10.1 Review of US and global supply chain security programs
Title Authority Focus Goal
Application to 
food fraud
Customs-Trade 
Partnership 
Against 
Terrorism 
(C-TPAT)
US Customs Protecting the US 
market from 
terrorism and 
specific products 
imported to 
conduct the act
To increase the 
efficiency of 
identifying 
opportunities and to 
target inspection 
resources. Approved 
vendors can have more 
rapid border crossings
Additional 
transparency of 
the supply chain
Standards to 
Secure and 
Facilitate 
Global Trade 
(SAFE 
Framework)
World Customs 
Organization 
(WCO) 
(created within 
what would 
become the 
OECD)
Same as C-TPAT 
but global focus
To connect 
international trade 
communication to 
disrupt terrorist 
shipments
Same as 
C-TPAT. Note: 
the “SAFE 
framework” is 
different from 
the food-related 
“SSAFE 
Organization”
Partnership in 
Protection (PIP)
Canadian 
Border 
Services 
Agency
Combating 
terrorism but also 
organized crime, 
contraband, and 
other smuggling
Increase inspection 
effectiveness through 
voluntary 
collaboration. Similar 
requirements at 
C-TPAT
Food fraud 
would be one of 
the focus areas 
under smuggling, 
contraband, and 
counterfeiting
FAST (Free and 
Secure Trade)
US Customs 
(CBP) and 
Canada Border 
Services 
Agency 
(CBSA)
Facilitate 
US-Canada trade 
and inspections.
Increase inspection 
effectiveness through 
voluntary 
collaboration. Similar 
requirements as 
C-TPAT
Food fraud 
would be one of 
the focus areas 
under smuggling, 
contraband, and 
counterfeiting
AEO 
(Authorized 
Economic 
Operator)
European 
Community 
Customs Code 
(Regulation 
[EC] 648/2005)
Facilitate and 
streamline 
commerce across 
borders
Faster border 
crossings
Transparency of 
harmonized 
information 
exchange
CCSP (Certified 
Cargo 
Screening 
Program)
US 
Transportation 
Security 
Administration 
(TSA)
Explosives on 
airplanes
Protect against 
terrorist attacks
Some additional 
transparency. 
Resources could 
monitor for 
fraudulent 
activity
PCSC 
(Pharmaceutical 
Cargo Security 
Coalition)
NGO, similar 
membership as 
RX-360 and 
Pharmaceutical 
Security 
Institute (PSI)
Shared 
intelligence 
activity to secure 
products in the 
supply chain and 
especially large 
shipments such 
as container 
loads
Focus on 
pharmaceutical stolen 
goods, specifically full 
container (truckloads, 
shipping containers, 
etc.)
No direct 
application 
except insight on 
best practices
(continued)
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Table 10.1 (continued)
Title Authority Focus Goal
Application to 
food fraud
TAPA 
(Transportation 
Asset 
Protection 
Association)
An NGO 
organized by 
industry
Increase supply 
chain security of 
high-tech 
material and 
goods
A focus is on 
pharmaceuticals
Transparency of 
the entire supply 
chain. Resources 
could monitor 
fraudulent 
activity
Adapted in part from Arway (2016)
Table 10.2 Review of standards that apply to food fraud or related products
Title∗ Authority∗ Focus Goal
Application to 
food fraud
ISO 9000 
Quality 
Management
International 
Standards 
Organization 
(ISO), Technical 
Committee 76 
Quality 
management and 
quality 
assurance, 
Sub-committee 
1 Concepts and 
terminology 
(SO/TC 176/SC 
1)
General business 
practices that 
streamline operations 
and reduce product 
specification 
anomalies. As ISO 
22000 is the base for 
food safety 
management systems, 
ISO 9000 is the base 
for quality 
management systems
Increase the quality 
of the product 
produced and 
distributed
Food fraud is a 
component of 
product quality
ISO 28000 
Supply Chain 
Security
International 
Standards 
Organization 
(ISO), Technical 
Committee (TC) 
292 Security and 
resilience
Specifies security 
management of the 
products as they move 
through the supply 
chain, including 
control facilities and 
in route
“a) establish, 
implement, 
maintain and 
improve a security 
management 
system;
b) assure 
conformance with 
stated security 
management policy;
c) demonstrate such 
conformance to 
others;
d) seek certification/
registration of its 
security 
management system 
by an Accredited 
third-party 
Certification Body; 
or”
This supports 
control of the 
products as 
they move into, 
through, and 
out of the 
controlled 
legitimate 
supply chain. 
The ISO 28000 
practices can 
reduce or 
increase the 
fraud 
opportunity
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Table 10.2 (continued)
Title∗ Authority∗ Focus Goal
Application to 
food fraud
ISO 27000 
Information 
Security
International 
Standards 
Organization 
(ISO), Joint 
Technical 
Committee JTC) 
1 Information 
technology, 
Sub-Committee 
27 IT Security 
techniques (ISO/
JTC1/WC27)
Protect information 
from attack or 
unauthorized access
Reduce risk from 
attacks and the 
potential illegal 
accidental 
disclosure of 
information
Protects the 
integrity of 
traceability and 
authenticity 
databases
ISO 22000 Food 
Safety 
Management
International 
Standards 
Organization, 
Technical 
Committee 34 
Food products, 
Sub-Committee 
34 Management 
systems for food 
safety (ISO/TC 
34/SC 17)
Health hazards from 
food safety incidents
Reduce health 
hazards and 
increase the 
methodology to 
reduce the 
possibility of 
incidents
Focuses on 
health hazards, 
new food fraud 
requirements in 
2018
ISO 22380: 
2018 (previously 
ISO 19564) 
Product Fraud: 
Product fraud 
countermeasures 
and control – 
General 
principles
ISO TC292/
WG4, focused 
on product fraud 
prevention 
management 
methods and 
systems.
Broadly addressing 
product fraud for all 
material goods and 
presenting basic 
principles and 
terminology
Enable 
harmonization and 
sharing of best 
practices by 
establishing a 
common 
terminology and 
basic prevention 
focused principles
Specifically 
addresses 
product fraud 
and food fraud. 
Includes 
methods to 
assess and 
address
ISO 12931:2012 
Performance 
criteria for 
authentication 
solutions used to 
combat 
counterfeiting of 
material goods
International 
Standards 
Organization 
(ISO), Technical 
Committee (TC) 
292 Security 
Management 
and Resilience 
(ISO TC 292/
WG4)
Management of 
authentication features 
to detect or prevent 
fraud acts
Offer common and 
optimized 
countermeasures to 
provide holistic 
industry response
This provides 
insight and best 
practices from 
other material 
goods as well 
as provides a 
common 
terminology 
and methods 
for foods
ISO 22380: 
2018, Section 
4.5.1 Profiling 
product fraud
ISO 22380, 
section on the 
organization of 
incident 
information
Specifically, this 
adapts and synthesizes 
other best practices to 
present a simple and 
codified method for 
organizing incident 
information (see the 
PCICT section)
Same as ISO 22380
(continued)
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Table 10.2 (continued)
Title∗ Authority∗ Focus Goal
Application to 
food fraud
ISO 22380: 
2018, Section 
4.5.2 Risk 
assessment
ISO 22380, 
section presents 
a method to plot 
risks on a heat 
map (similar to 
ERM/COSO)
To enable calibrating 
a new product fraud 
risk with all 
enterprise-wide risks, 
this presents a method 
to create a single heat 
map
Same as ISO 22380
GFSI (Global 
Food Safety 
Initiative)
Member 
organizations 
under the 
Consumer 
Goods Forum.
Defines expectations 
of a food safety 
management system
Reduce the 
opportunity for food 
safety issues 
including explicitly 
addressing the root 
cause of food fraud
There are direct 
requirements 
including a 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
prevention 
strategy
Business 
Alliance for 
Secure 
Commerce 
(BASIC)
An NGO 
organized by 
industry.
Create standards and 
common business 
practices
Increase the 
efficiency of 
transactions 
including 
information 
technology 
interoperability
Transparency 
of harmonized 
information 
exchange
Excluding the standards that are not supply chain specific such as the ISO product fraud and 
authentication noted above
Table 10.3 Review of ISO product fraud and related standards (ISO 2017)
Published
ISO 12931:2012 Product fraud: Performance criteria for authentication solutions used to 
combat counterfeiting of material goods
ISO 16678:2014 Product fraud: Guidelines for interoperable object identification and 
related authentication systems to deter counterfeiting and illicit trade
ISO 22300: 2018 Security and resilience: Terminology (not to be confused with the ISO 
22000 Food Safety Management series) (developed in parallel with other 
material goods product fraud standards ISO 22380, ISO 12931, and ISO 
16678))
ISO 22380:2018 
(formerly ISO/CD 
19564)
Product fraud: Security and resilience (authenticity, integrity, and trust 
for products and documents)—general principles for product fraud risk 
and countermeasures
ISO 28001:2007 Security management systems for the supply chain: Best practices for 
implementing supply chain security, assessments, and plans—
requirements and guidance
ISO 28002:2011 Security management systems for the supply chain: Development of 
resilience in the supply chain—requirements with guidance for use
ISO 28003:2007 Security management systems for the supply chain: Requirements for 
bodies providing audit and certification of supply chain security 
management systems
ISO 28004-1:2007 Security management systems for the supply chain: Guidelines for the 
implementation of ISO 28000 (Part 1: General principles)
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Sidebar: The Role of the “Brand Protection Manager” in Food Fraud 
Prevention
Expanding on the Brand Protection Manager concept and their role in food 
fraud prevention, an excerpt from (MSU FFI 2017):
Food fraud sounds like a responsibility for food scientists or purchasing agents. 
Brand Protection managers – usually focused on finished goods activities such as 
Published
ISO 28004-3:2014 Security management systems for the supply chain: Guidelines for the 
implementation of ISO 28000 (Part 3: Additional specific guidance for 
adopting ISO 28000 for use by medium and small businesses) (other than 
marine ports)
ISO 28004-4:2014 Security management systems for the supply chain: Guidelines for the 
implementation of ISO 28000 (Part 4: Additional specific guidance on 
implementing ISO 28000 if compliance with ISO 28001 is a management 
objective)
Underdevelopment
ISO/DIS 34001.4 Product fraud: Security management system for organizations assuring 
authenticity, integrity, and trust for products and documents
ISO/NP 22383 Product fraud: Security and resilience (authenticity, integrity, and trust 
for products and documents)—performance criteria for authentication 
solutions used to ensure genuineness and integrity of material goods
ISO/WD 22384 Product fraud: Security and resilience (authenticity, integrity, and trust 
for products and documents)—guidelines to establish and monitor a 
protection plan and its implementation
Not TC292 but related
ISO/IEC 
27000:2016
Information technology: Security techniques (information security 
management systems, overview, and vocabulary)
ISO/IEC 
27001:2013
Information technology: Security techniques (information security 
management systems, requirements)
ISO/IEC 
27002:2013
Information technology: Security techniques (code of practice for 
information security controls)
Table 10.3 (continued)
Sidebar: The Assumption of Traceability and Transparency as a 
“Given”
The assumption of supply chain traceability and transparency is a new and 
evolving concept that is challenging. It appears that the ability to monitor and 
identify the location of products is accepted as a “given.” The concept of 
monitoring for the rogue product—e.g., “and to prevent the introduction to 
the supply chain of unauthorized contraband” which is different than “autho-
rized contraband”—is only mentioned as an odd or future consideration. 
(Product counterfeiting and other related activities are currently considered to 
be under the management of corporate security or brand protection.)
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Traceability and Digital 
Transactions
This section reviews the traceability fundamentals and related electronic transaction 
products and services. A strategic approach considers the basic specification of the 
requirements in relation to what can be expected.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) The role of traceability in food fraud prevention
• (2) The importance and benefits of supply chain transparency
• (3) Review of several application examples
 Traceability and Electronic Transactions
Supply chain management has advanced as a discipline in part due to the ability to 
gather a tremendous amount of data, more real-time insight on buying and transpor-
tation of products, computing power such as global positioning, web and mobile 
communication, and the massive power of the computers themselves. With more 
information, there is more opportunity for more visibility of the entire supply chain 
including traceability, track and trace, and transparency.
• Traceability (ISO) is defined as where the product is, where it is going, and 
where it has been. A similar phrase track and trace is defined by ISO 12931 as a 
“means of identifying every individual material good or lot(s) or batch in order 
to know where it has been (track) and where it is (trace) in the supply chain” 
(Note: ISO 12931 states “Track and Trace technology when used alone is not 
considered to be an authentication solution” (ISO 2011)).
 – Track (ISO): where a product has been
 – Trace (ISO): where a product is going
diversion, illegal re-packaging, expired or sub-standard product, and counterfeit-
ing – often are not responsible for ingredients or more operational problems. Due to 
the nature of fraud that does not include ingredients or adulterant-substance, in many 
cases, the Brand Protection manager may be the first one to identify the threat as 
product fraud. They will probably be the first to recognize preventative controls that 
should be applied by their accountable corporate CEO but probably not responsible 
in their own workgroup. Brand Protection managers have a unique skill set and 
experience that is critical to identifying, describing, and to help prevent or mitigate 
food fraud. Beyond FSMA, FDA has an expanding scope that covers cosmetics, 
personal care products, pet and animal food, tobacco, and alcohol so many “con-
sumer products” Brand Protection managers are accountable for food fraud… 
whether they know it or like it.
 Key Learning Objective 2: Traceability and Digital Transactions
348
The GS1 standards provide a similar but alternate set of definitions (GS1 2018a, b):
• Trace/tracing (tracing back) (GS1): “The ability to identify the origin, attri-
butes, or history of a particular traceable item located within the supply chain by 
reference to records held” (GS1 2018a, b).
• Track/tracking (tracking forward) (GS1): “The ability to follow the path of a 
traceable item through the supply chain as it moves between parties” (GS1 
2018a, b).
• Traceability (GS1 references ISO 9001): “is the ability to trace the history, 
application or location of that which is under consideration” (GS1 2018a, b).
When reviewing these concepts, there is a realization that there is a higher goal 
which is visibility of the entire set of all transactions:
• Transparency (GS1) is “defined as visibility of products and transactions 
throughout the supply chain” (GS1 2007). A similar concept supply chain visibil-
ity is defined as “location and status of supply chain inventory and resources” 
(Bowersox et al. 2002).
There are many ways that a company tracks or monitors products such as elec-
tronic invoices or interacts with consumers such as frequent shopper rewards. Any 
and all monitoring of the product increases the visibility of the flow as well as 
increases transparency. The electronic invoices already carry a lot of information 
about many aspects of the shipment and product as well as offering very high reli-
ability and quickly accessible information. A receiving company monitors and con-
firms the physical shipment before accepting—and then paying—the invoice.
For food fraud prevention, the application is that two of the most intensely 
scrutinized supply chain handoffs are when there is a financial exchange (e.g., pay-
ing an invoice). This intense scrutiny is an opportunity for either inspecting or 
authenticating product as well as for electronically interacting with the pallet or 
case as well as the actual final consumer package. Barcode readers or scanners 
could provide additional functions such as to authenticate the product (actually this 
type of authentication confirms the label is correct, and it is assumed that the prod-
uct inside the package is genuine).
The data security and information validity requirements are less stringent for 
supply chain management (trying to move product around to fill store shelves) than 
for food safety (stopping shipments before consumers ingest dangerous product) 
and for food fraud prevention management (providing assurance that the prod-
uct is still genuine and has not been tampered with). For food fraud prevention, 
some criminals would benefit from hacking into the databases. Illegal and unau-
thorized access to databases could enable the uploading of fraudulent codes that 
would be then confirmed to be authentic, to the unauthorized release of products 
such as inventory, confirm that tax payments have been made, establishing that 
refunds should be paid, or confirming that shipments have already been inspected, 
or others.
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The supply chain management focus is making sure the right product is in the 
right location to allow for a sale, while the food safety focus is finding the product 
to stop shipment or product recall. For food fraud prevention, there is an additional 
value or requirement to track the product once it enters the supply chain (assuming 
or checking authenticity at that entry point) and then monitoring the product through 
often many handoffs until delivering to the buyer or user.
Sidebar: Does Traceability Really Help Fight Fraudsters? (MSU FFI 
2018)
Title: Does Traceability Really Help Fight Fraudsters?
By John Spink • May 29, 2013 • Blog
Traceability – finding where the product has been, where it is going, or 
where it is right now – is increasing in importance for the food industry for a 
number of reasons. Authentication – proving the product genuine or proving 
it fake  – is also increasing in importance, especially when combined with 
traceability within the supply chain, which reduces the fraud opportunity. 
Together traceability and authentication provide transparency. When there is 
improved transparency, the Food Safety, Food Defense, and food fraud risks 
can be minimized.
Traceability initiatives have different benefits for different objectives:
• Food Safety  – Minimizing Consumption of Suspicious Product. There 
have been calls from agencies and industry for improving traceability of 
the food supply chain. This is reiterated and defined further in the Food 
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, the law itself) that was passed in 
January 2011 and is supported by draft rulemaking (how FDA will imple-
ment the law).
• Food Defense – Stolen Goods. The FDA has released a response to cargo 
theft that includes mandates for companies to be able to identify specific 
stock-keeping-units that have been stolen. If the company cannot identify 
the specific product that was stolen – and out of their control – then the 
company will need to recall all product in the smallest lot identifiable. For 
example, if three batches of products are in a load of stolen goods, then all 
of those lots will need to be recalled. To my knowledge this has not been 
implemented…but it could.
• Food Defense – Attack for Harm. The attack on the supply chain, specifi-
cally adulterating a food product with a contaminant that causes harm, is 
of particular interest to FDA. The FDA Food Defense directives leverage 
the transparency provided by the other food safety-related regulations.
• Food fraud – Identifying Suspicious Product. Food fraud is deceptive use 
of food for economic gain which is illegal in the US under the Adulterated 
Foods and Misbranded Foods sections in the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act. 
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The fraud opportunity is significantly reduced with increased transparency 
of ingredients moving through a long supply chain. As mentioned, the 
transparency is created by traceability and authentication.
These concepts are supported by the Institute of Food Technologists, the 
Global Food Safety Initiative, the Produce Marketing Association, and the 
International Association for Food Protection.
The concept of food traceability contributing to food fraud prevention is 
something that I included in the MSU-FFI public comments at an FDA public 
meeting in 2009. The MSU-FFI public comments were:
• Include food fraud considerations in the FDA traceability initiative as you 
include both food safety and food defense.
• Consider traceability programs integrated across all FDA regulated prod-
ucts including drug, medical device, food, cosmetics, and then all con-
sumer products.
• It is my opinion that retailers and retail inventory management systems are 
a crucial supply chain node since this is the last transaction – scanning at 
checkout – before the product leaves the distribution system and is trans-
ferred to the consumer.
So, traceability is not a single magic bullet to stop fraud, but it is a critical 
part of the food fraud prevention system. Traceability and authentication pro-
vide transparency within the supply chain which reduces the fraud opportu-
nity. If you review the MSU-FFI past blog posts, you’ll see examples of how 
bad guys not only circumvent our protection systems but in some cases, even 
use them against us. Whether it is more active tracking of lot numbers, or 
expanding to unit-level serialization, traceability has a vital role in increasing 
transparency and in product protection. What you need to do is consider how 
a tactical program to track your products can become a strategic deterrence 
countermeasure. MSU-FFI.
Sidebar: Will Supply Chain Transparency Reduce Food Fraud? Sure, 
They Must, Don’t They?
There is a saying:
General countermeasures generally help; specific countermeasures specifically 
help.
Unless there is a regulatory requirement, a specific proposal is required for 
financial or human resource expenditure. To review the value of a countermea-
sure or control system, a very specific question must be identified. Many sup-
ply chain transparency or anti-counterfeiting proposals stall because the final 
resource allocation decision-maker either can’t prioritize or justify this specific 
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expenditure. A basic ROI would compare this allocation versus all other ROI 
proposals including examples such as hire a new sales representative, spend 
more on advertising, fix a piece of manufacturing equipment that is leaking, 
conduct discretionary maintenance, purchase a new piece of food safety testing 
equipment, or even address other risks. Even a specific ROI for a regulatory 
requirement—now only comparing proposals to address this risk—requires a 
level of confidence in the success of the proposal to meet the goals efficiently.
The Max Bazerman concept of “best alternative to a negotiated agree-
ment” (BATNA) may be to “do nothing” (Bazerman 2001). For new technolo-
gies, it is often a better decision to be a “fast follower” than an “early adopter” 
(Porter 1985; Makadok 1998; Dietrich et al. 2006; BRIDGE 2007; Voss et al. 
2009; Anthony 2012). “Manufacturers and distributors wanted to avoid being 
the early adopter, preferring to be a ‘fast follower’ with EPC/RFID [Electronic 
Product Code-based Radio Frequency Identification for brand protection and 
anti-counterfeiting]” (HDMA 2004).
To provide an example of the preference of being a “fast follower,” interop-
erable enhanced traceability has been a holy grail for solution providers. 
Interoperable refers to the ability for systems to interact and share informa-
tion freely such as all supply chain partners using the same coding system 
such as the GS1 Global Trade Item Number (GTIN), universal product codes 
(UPC), or others (Bix et al. 2007; ISO 2017; GS1 2018a, b). “Enhanced” in 
this example refers to more standard and more capable systems. Finally, 
traceability is being able to track or trace product which could include where 
it is, where it has been, and where it is going, among others (ISO 2005)). 
Together the interoperable enhanced traceability is a more robust product 
tracking system that includes a lot of information that is shared quickly and 
easily (we did not say “freely” because each activity usually includes fees 
such as for the use of the codes, storage, and retrieval of the data, analysis of 
the data, use of patented algorithms or computer programs, and the ongoing 
information technology computer support).
Sidebar: Enhanced Traceability Systems such as Barcodes, Mass 
Serialization, Pedigree, RFID, Transaction Security, Encryption, and 
Others
Whether the traceability enabler is one-dimensional barcoding (1-D), two- 
dimensional barcoding (2-D including QR codes), mass serialization, radio- 
frequency identification device (RFID) or automatic identification (Auto-ID), 
transaction security, and so on, there is a long list of magic bullet ideas. To 
consider the practical and pragmatic value of a new technology, there are 
some possible questions to consider:
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Sidebar: New Enhanced Traceability Technology and the Horsemeat 
Food Fraud Incident
The horsemeat food fraud incident has been reviewed and analyzed widely. 
Essentially the brand owner made their routine order to replenish packaged 
product from their manufacturer. A series of bids and proposals worked their 
way to a meat producer. The meat producer shipped the blocks of frozen raw 
meat to the manufacture, and the lasagna was made, packaged, shipped to the 
original customer, and then placed on the retail shelves in the UK. The meat 
was monitored for quality and food safety. Records were reviewed, kept, and 
all passed inspection. No one was assigned to check for the correct species.
This is a very specific food fraud incident that provides valuable insight 
into assessing and judging countermeasures and control systems. This is one 
type of food fraud, so it is an excellent case study to review the value of 
enhanced traceability technology.
 1. Is more traceability good? Sure.
 2. Does more traceability improve transparency of the supply chain? 
Absolutely.
 3. How soon will it be implemented to 95%—or even 50%—of a company’s 
entire supply chain? To be determined.
 4. How much will it cost to implement? This could include preparing current 
IT systems to communicate with the new program, to enable the proprie-
tary supply chain to interact, and to encourage and enable the upstream and 
downstream supply chain to interact any ongoing cost for the use of the 
codes, data storage, data retrieval, data analysis, and then ongoing manage-
ment. To be determined. Millions? Tens of millions? Hundreds of 
millions?
 5. How much will the interoperable enhanced traceability contribute to the 
bottom line? To be determined.
 6. How does this interoperable enhanced traceability specifically reduce a 
unique type of fraud opportunity? Unknown.
 7. “If one aspirin is good then ten is better? Right?” Not necessarily and usu-
ally “no.”
 8. So far the interoperable enhanced traceability sounds promising, but there 
has not been a very compelling—or any—business case… at least not yet.
Often the recommendation or justification for adoption explains the “fea-
tures” of the technology or system (e.g., the difficulty of a security product 
copied) with details of the severity of the overall problem (e.g., food safety 
product recalls create health hazards) but little on the exact “benefit” of how 
the specific fraud opportunity will be specifically reduced.
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 Key Learning Objective 3: Reviews of Past Traceability 
Efforts Including the California Drug Pedigree and RFID
This section reviews several past traceability efforts related to radio-frequency iden-
tification devices (RFID) and drug pedigree laws. There are many best practices and 
lessons learned from many past effort that were successful… and maybe even more 
value from closely reviewing the efforts that did not.
The meat producer was a recognized and approved supplier, so they were 
considered a trusted and verified supply chain partner. The seller and pur-
chaser are very formally and visibly connected through the invoice, inventory 
management, and accounts payable systems. The meat supplier in many cases 
has been audited by a certification body or even by the brand owner itself. 
This point of trust—human intervention—is where the fraud occurred.
So, considering that an approved, trusted, and verified supplier is a point of 
trust is actually a vulnerability, this is a specific point in the supply chain to 
consider that an additional specific countermeasure and control system can be 
considered. One type of risk treatment would be traceability or transparency. 
With enhanced traceability technology, the transactions and documents passed 
along are not able to be altered but only updated with a record of what was 
changed and by whom (assuming additional identity theft has not occurred—
see your email spam folder for fraudulent emails from the URL of “your 
bank”). There would be less of a fraud opportunity to enter falsified claims if 
there is a check further down the supply chain. For example, the lasagna man-
ufacturer or brand owner could occasionally conduct a species authenticity 
test and enter that into the traceability system. This would both identify the 
food fraud incident and reduce the fraud opportunity since the fraudster would 
know there is a higher chance their crime would be caught (assuming there is 
no fraud or bribery occurring at the brand owner itself).
When considering the overall countermeasures and control systems, it is 
logical that species authenticity tests should be conducted. If the new tests are 
publicized in a way that the fraudsters can be aware of the change, then there 
will be a decreased fraud opportunity. (If the fraudsters don’t know about your 
new test, then you will just catch more fraud and not achieve the real goal to 
prevent it from occurring in the first place.) It would be logical that the fraud-
sters will consider how to adapt their operations such as to change fraudulent 
methods, attack someone else, or stop conducting the crime (this is “crime 
displacement”). A question is whether the enhanced traceability technology 
system is—or how much more—valuable than the current tracking systems. 
To be determined. With this further review of a specific incident, there can be 
a specific assessment of enhanced traceability technology versus current or 
alternate systems.
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Information database security and accuracy
• (2) Review of an RFID project
• (3) Review of drug pedigree and specifically the California efforts
 Information and Database Security: Hackers Adding Fake 
Codes
Databases are only as good as the data in the system. There is a saying “garbage in, 
garbage out” which means that if the information being entered is not accurate, 
precise, or certain, then the results or conclusions will also be problematic. Another 
concept is that data systems have a tendency to gravitate toward chaos. A data set 
should be expected to develop problems or inconsistencies. An important concept is 
how to reconcile or correct errors, mistakes, or flaws. The idea that a data set could 
be imperfect is a point not understood when considering anti-counterfeiting systems 
such as validating the code on a medicine package in the surgical suite before (try-
ing to) restart someone’s heart. In that setting, if reading the code to confirm authen-
ticity, then the acceptable reliability of the data set is far below 1% or maybe 
probably below 0.1%. An important consideration is that most data sets are proba-
bly not accurate below 1% (if not much less accurate).
If a traceability or authentication system is used as the definitive method to rec-
ognize or approve products, then there is a tremendous fraud opportunity incentive 
for hackers to disrupt, corrupt, or co-opt the database. For example, if fake, dupli-
cate, or nonsensical codes were entered, then the confidence in the entire database 
would be undermined. Also, there would be an incentive for hackers to upload coun-
terfeit codes, so future authentication queries would confirm the counterfeit code 
and product to be “genuine.”
Another consideration is that fraudsters could flood the database with nonsensi-
cal codes, so the number of errors requiring correction would be so high (e.g., hun-
dreds, thousands, more?) that reconciliation and correction would be impractical. 
The flooding of a database with nonsensical codes could undermine the value of the 
database, itself. Although not a database, there are examples of entire systems being 
undermined by errors. In 2005, the entire US supply of the very popular cholesterol 
drug Lipitor was recalled—sales were halted—since the unapproved product had 
been comingled and could not be immediately un-comingled. It would seem it was 
less risky for the supplier to recall the entire US supply of product rather than trying 
to sort which product was good or bad.
Also, during discussions about the US Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 
(PDMA)—still not fully implemented in 2017—and the California State Bill 1976 
(SB-1476) California E-Pedigree Law, there were later discussions that possibly the 
credit card industry had database security that would apply (CSBP 2007, 2012, 
2013). It was not mentioned that the credit card industry databases are frequently 
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hacked and there is an allowance for stolen or corrupt credit card numbers. (Note: 
Remember that credit card companies encourage consumers to review their credit 
card statements for fraudulent or incorrect transactions that are usually instantly 
credited.) While a 3% error or fraud rate for a credit card may be acceptable to the 
credit card industry or credit card users, a 3% uncertainty for medicine is far from 
the Six Sigma focus of accuracy levels of 99.99966%. There is an exponentially 
higher consequence of a fraudulent adrenaline injection restarting a heart after open 
heart surgery. While food fraud usually does not have a public health threat—and 
other than allergens, often never has an emergency, acute consequence—this is an 
example of data security considerations.
 Review of Past Traceability Initiatives (RFID or Auto- 
identification): Cost $282 Million Per Company
The philosopher Georgy Santayana reportedly said, “Those who cannot remember 
the past are condemned to repeat it.” For traceability the example may be a review 
of the RFID/Auto-ID initiatives from around the end of the dot-com rush in 2002; 
there were big statements of the benefits but few reports of the actual realized ben-
efits. As with current interoperable enhanced traceability—essentially a more recent 
version of the same thing—the RFID/Auto-ID concepts were very promising.
• RFID is a radio-frequency identification which is a way that computers identify 
a package by sending radio waves to a label that has an antenna loaded with a 
code.
• Auto-ID is an automatic identification which is the ability to determine a product 
identity without an active process.
• Non-line-of-sight refers to the ability to identify a package or label without being 
able to actually physically “see” the label. For example, a label could be read on 
a package that is in the middle of a pallet, covered in an overwrap, or in a bag or 
shopping cart.
A consulting report that was published in the RFID Journal estimated “the theo-
retical retailer would gain approximately $78 million from increased sales and labor 
savings across all 800 stores by implementing the Auto-ID Center’s technology for 
tracking cases. It could achieve benefits of nearly $150 million from tracking 
 individual units” (RFID Journal 2002). These were reportedly “used moderately to 
conservative numbers when assessing the benefits that could accrue from such a 
system” (RFID Journal 2002).
Those benefits would require an investment of 
“$465,000 to track cases at the first store and an average of $62,000 per store for the entire 
system and $827,000 for the first distribution center and $353,000 per center for the entire 
system. That’s an investment of $282 million for all 800 stores (RFID Journal 2002).”
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The benefits were reported as “reduce labor costs, improve accuracy and boost 
throughput” (RFID Journal 2002).
That’s a lot of labor, a lot of capital invested for on-hand inventory, and an 
assumption of very high costs of inaccurate stock picking. There were no specific 
details on how the benefits would be received whether reduced carrying costs of 
inventory on hand, reduction of lost or stolen goods, fewer rush delivery charges, 
opportunity cost benefits of reducing lost sales due to stock-outs, or others.
The 2002 article ended with “When will that happen? We don’t know. The tech-
nology is still being worked through”(RFID Journal 2002). As of 2018, there did not 
seem to be any published specific results or case studies based on real projects.
Thus, while there was very high confidence the financial benefits when it came 
down to predicting how soon the benefits would be expected, the public statements 
were very cautious—the statements emphasized the technology was not ready for 
implementation and was still being developed.
Shifting to focus a bit on the underlying assumptions, from a basic ROI set of 
questions:
• Cost: A $282 million initial investment and the annual upkeep are undefined but 
could be 5% or $14 million per year. For the sake of argument, possibly use 1% 
or $2.8 million.
• Return on investment: Not revenue but decreased costs. So the benefit is not 
increased sales or increased valuation but the reduction in losses of $228 million 
(coincidence or not, this is very close to their estimated cost of 
implementation).
• Time until return is realized: Possibly 1 year after the system is fully function-
ing (the $282 million cost offset by the $228 million savings) and then at least 
6  months for the benefits to be fully realized (e.g., actually experiencing the 
reduced costs of laid-off staff, losses avoided, inventory reduced, etc.). Note that 
the report stated that the system was still being developed so there was an unde-
termined time until return would start.
• Confidence in the rate of return: Undefined and not mentioned in the 
proposal.
• Rate of return (at 2 years after investment): 0.4 ($228M–$128M/$228M) or 
about 2.5  years to break even on the investment. This is after the 2-year 
ramp-up.
• Rate of return (at the start of full investment): So add 2+ years to the 2.5 year 
ROI until the project value is realized.
• BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement), the value of spending 
the funds elsewhere: Undefined. The value of this individual project is not 
judged in and of itself (e.g., spend the money or not) since there are other uses 
for the funds (e.g., what is the best return on the investment across the entire 
enterprise). Due to the lack of details or specificity, the systems were not ready 
for an actual financial investment, so the current BATNA is the investment of 
time and energy thinking about the project.
So, from the data provided here, the ideal situation seems to be to listen and be a 
“fast follower.”
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 Summary of CA-SB1476 (and then Why It Didn’t Get 
Implemented)
Published by the California State Board of Pharmacy is a report on “Background 
and Summary of the California ePedigree Law.” From that report that appears to be 
published in December 2017, several key sections are presented:
• “Problem: there is an increasing prevalence of counterfeit prescription drugs 
showing up in the US, intermingled [co-mingled] with the legitimate drug sup-
ply. Counterfeit prescription drugs are a worldwide problem, reaching as high as 
30 percent of the supply in some countries. The World Health Organization esti-
mates that in developed countries, counterfeit drugs are less than 1 percent of the 
market.”
• “To put this in perspective: 3.4 billion prescriptions were dispensed in the US in 
2006. If 1 percent of this supply is counterfeit, this would mean that perhaps 34 
million of these US prescriptions were filled with counterfeit medicine. In 
California, we have roughly 9 percent of the US prescription drug market, so this 
would indicate that perhaps 3 million prescriptions were filled and dispensed 
with counterfeit medicine in 2006.”
• “In an attempt to prevent counterfeit medicine from entering the legitimate sup-
ply chain in California, in 2004 the state legislature passed anti-counterfeiting 
and anti-diversion legislation (SB 1307), including provisions pertaining to the 
licensure and qualifications of wholesalers, restrictions on furnishing, and the 
requirement of an electronic pedigree to accompany/validate drug distributions. 
Portions of the legislation were implemented in 2005 and 2006. In 2006, subse-
quent legislation (SB 1476) [or CA-SB-1476] sponsored by the board moved the 
implementation date for the electronic pedigree component until 2009; the same 
legislation also augmented and clarified portions of the electronic pedigree 
requirements.”
• “Under current law, as of 1/1/2009, no wholesaler or pharmacy may sell, trade or 
transfer a prescription drug at wholesale without providing, and no wholesaler or 
pharmacy may acquire any prescription drug without receiving, a pedigree. The 
pedigree is a record in electronic form containing information regarding each 
transaction resulting in a change of ownership of the given prescription drug, 
including returns. The law specifies the particular data elements pertaining to the 
drug and to each of the ownership links in the chain of distribution that must be 
included in this record and requires that the pedigree track each drug at the small-
est package or immediate container (saleable unit). To implement this unit-level 
tracking requirement in an interoperable electronic system, requirements include 
a unique identifier (serialization number) placed on the smallest container sale-
able to a pharmacy, by the pharmaceutical manufacturer. Likewise, the manufac-
turer will also initiate the pedigree and pass that pedigree with the initial 
distribution; thereafter, the electronic pedigree will at all times accompany that 
particular container, appended by each successive owner to document each 
change of ownership of that particular container.”
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• “Simply put, the goal is for any owner/possessor of a prescription drug located at 
a licensed wholesaler, repackager, reverse distributor, or pharmacy in California, 
upon request, to have and keep electronic records that show the lineage of the 
drug from the manufacturer through to the current point in the drug distribu-
tion channel (wholesaler, repackager, pharmacy). The electronic pedigree must 
contain specific information required by statute and must be made and passed 
in an ‘interoperable electronic system,’ an electronic track and trace system 
based on unique identification numbers (serialization) affixed at the point of 
manufacture.”
• “The unique identifier or unique serialized number on each saleable container of 
prescription drugs will most likely be carried either on a 2-D barcode or an RFID 
chip placed on the saleable unit by the manufacturer. The California Legislature 
has not mandated these specific technologies, but they are the two methods that 
have been identified that could meet the requirements of the legislation. The 
number on the serialized container could then be utilized to access the specific 
electronic pedigree for that individual container of a prescription drug.”
• “Industry participants have engaged in standards-setting work to develop indus-
try standards necessary to interoperability and sharing of pedigree data and 
records. The primary standards-setting body for the industry that has been 
engaged in this work with industry participants has been EPCglobal, the same 
entity that developed the standards for the UPC barcode.”
Requirements:
• “Pedigree: means a record, in electronic form containing information regarding 
each transaction resulting in a change of ownership of a given dangerous drug, 
from sale by a manufacturer, through acquisition and sale by one or more whole-
salers, manufacturers, or pharmacies, until final sale to a pharmacy or other per-
son furnishing, administering or dispensing the dangerous drugs. The pedigree 
shall be created and maintained in an interoperable electronic system, ensuring 
compatibility throughout all stages of distribution. (California Business and 
Professions Code section 4034(a)).”
• “Interoperability: this is one of the augmentations to the legislation in 2006. 
With input from industry, we determined for this pedigree concept to work effec-
tively, all parties at all levels of the supply chain needed to be able to access the 
pedigree information without having to purchase numerous types of hardware, 
software, and middleware to be able to read whatever format a particular manu-
facturer chooses for their electronic pedigree. This will discourage companies 
from developing their own incompatible proprietary systems of electronic pedi-
grees, preventing the proliferation of systems and making it complex to read the 
pedigree by entities downstream (e.g., wholesalers and pharmacies). In January 
2007, EPCglobal ratified a document-based pedigree messaging standard. 
Nearing finalization is a second EPCglobal standard, the EPCIS standard. The 
EPCIS standard would also allow the creation or appending of a pedigree, com-
bined with a data storage and management system. This should be completed in 
several months.”
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• “Interoperable electronic system: As used in this chapter means an electronic 
track and trace system for dangerous drugs that use a unique identification num-
ber, established at the point of manufacture, contained within a standardized 
nonproprietary data format and architecture, that is uniformly used by manufac-
turers, wholesalers, and pharmacies for the pedigree of a dangerous drug. 
(California Business and Professions Code section 4034(i)).”
• “Serialization at the unit level: this is the key to being able to enter, for instance, 
a pharmacy or wholesaler, to distinguish one container of prescription drugs 
from another, and to access the pedigree for each individual container. In addi-
tion, as long as the original container is available, the entire history of ownership 
for that specific container may be accessed. Specifically: “The pedigree shall 
track each dangerous drug at the smallest package or immediate container dis-
tributed by the manufacturer, received and distributed by the wholesaler and 
received by the pharmacy or another person furnishing administering or dispens-
ing the dangerous drug” (California Business and Professions Code section 
4034(d)).”
 – “With the California system, two containers of the same drug, same strength, 
same lot number, and same expiration date, can be differentiated from each 
other. They each may have traveled very different supply chain routes to arrive 
at the same location. Only with the California serialized product can you tell 
each change of ownership for each container. The California process allows 
regulators to determine the origin of a container and be much more likely to 
identify when or if a product has been tampered with or if a counterfeit prod-
uct has entered the supply chain.”
• “Repackaging: This must be tracked on a single pedigree tracing back to the 
original manufacturer. Specifically: ‘a single pedigree shall include every change 
of ownership of a given dangerous drug from its initial manufacture through to 
its final transactions to a pharmacy or other person for furnishing, administering 
or dispensing the drug, regardless of repackaging or assignment of another 
National Drug Code (NDC) Directory number’ (California Business and 
Professions Code section 4034(c)).”
• “Returns: These must also be tracked on a single pedigree. ‘Any return of a 
dangerous drug to a wholesaler or manufacturer shall be documented on the 
same pedigree as the transaction that resulted in the receipt of the drug by the 
party returning it’ (California Business and Professions Code section 4034(e)).”
“The pedigree must contain (data elements):
 1) The source of the dangerous drug, including the name, federal manufacturer’s 
registration number or a state license number as determined by the board, and 
principal address of the source.
 2) The trade or generic name of the drug, the quantity of the dangerous drug, its 
dosage form, and strength, the date of the transaction, the sales invoice number, 
the container size, and the number of containers, the expiration dates, and the lot 
numbers.
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 3) The business name, address and the federal manufacturer’s registration number 
or a state license number as determined by the board, of each owner of the dan-
gerous drug, and the dangerous drug shipping information including the name 
and address of each person certifying delivery or receipt of the dangerous drug.
 4) A certification under penalty of perjury from a responsible party of the source 
of the dangerous drug that the information contained in the pedigree is true and 
accurate.”
California law also requires that pharmacies may not act as wholesalers, and “A 
pharmacy may furnish dangerous drugs only to the following:
 1) A wholesaler owned or under common control by the wholesaler from whom the 
dangerous drug was acquired.
 2) The pharmaceutical manufacturer from whom the dangerous drug was acquired.
 3) A licensed wholesaler is acting as a reverse distributor.
 4) Another pharmacy or wholesaler to alleviate a temporary shortage of a danger-
ous drug that could result in the denial of health care. A pharmacy furnishing 
dangerous drugs pursuant to this paragraph may only furnish a quantity suffi-
cient to alleviate the temporary shortage.
 5) A patient or to another pharmacy pursuant to a prescription or as otherwise 
authorized by law.
 6) A health care provider that is not a pharmacy, but that is authorized to purchase 
dangerous drugs
 7) To another pharmacy under common control.” (California Business and 
Professions Code section 4126.5)
An important final set of considerations focuses on the compliance and 
implementation:
• “Sanctions: In addition to other possible sanctions for non-compliance with 
pedigree requirements up to and including civil or criminal prosecutions, the 
board may cite and fine $5000 per occurrence (each saleable unit) or take formal 
discipline. Wholesalers must post a $100,000 bond with the board as a condition 
of licensure, which provides a source to pay any fines assessed.”
• “Reporting to the board: a manufacturer, wholesaler or pharmacy with reason-
able cause to believe a prescription medicine in or having been in its possession 
is counterfeit or subject of a fraudulent transaction shall notify the California 
Board of Pharmacy in writing within 72 hours of obtaining knowledge (only for 
drugs sold or distributed through California).”
• “Implementation Delay: the board can delay these requirements until 1/1/2011 
if it determines, consistent with its public protection mandate, that manufacturers 
or wholesalers require additional time to implement electronic technologies to 
track the distribution of dangerous drugs within the state.”
In many previous anti-counterfeiting or enhanced traceability programs or 
efforts, there were key challenges that were either difficult to overcome or that were 
insurmountable. Often the same problems keep derailing projects since history 
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wasn’t reviewed. For food fraud prevention, there are important lessons to be 
learned from previous related programs and efforts. These lessons can both provide 
insight on how challenges were overcome and if they were insurmountable then to 
figure out sooner rather than later of what cannot be done.
Sidebar: California’s E-Pedigree Law Preempted by Federal Regulation
Due to concerns about the slow adoption of the US Prescription Drug 
Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA), the State of California passed a drug elec-
tronic pedigree law (Public Law 100-293 1988). Before the California 
e- pedigree law could take effect, in November 2013, federal “Public Law 
113-54” was signed (CA-SB-1476 2006; Public Law 113-54 2011; DCA 
2013). Details of the federal law include (DCA 2013):
• “This law contains provisions for a national track and trace system for 
prescription medication. Included within this law are provisions that pre-
empt California’s e-pedigree requirements. These provisions are in addi-
tion to those in the California Business and Professions Code that also 
preempt California’s provisions should federal legislation in this area be 
enacted.”
• “The [California State Board of Pharmacy] board is required to post a mes-
sage about the inactivation of California’s e-pedigree provisions. This 
notice is provided below; it also will be published in the California 
Regulatory Notice Register and posted on our website. Also this year the 
board will sponsor legislation to repeal the e-pedigree provisions that are 
now inactive provisions in California law.”
• “The board thanks to the many individuals from pharmaceutical supply 
chain companies, computer and technology firms, policymakers, the staff 
of the California delegation and the many others who worked with the 
board over the last 10 years to develop e-pedigree provisions and imple-
ment a system to strengthen the integrity of the US drug supply.”
• “We especially thank the early adopters and those who worked on pilot 
projects to ensure California’s provisions would be implemented by the 
coming deadlines. It was a large endeavor, and we trust that what was 
learned to ‘get ready for California’ will be transferable to the national 
system that is now under development. We are grateful to have played a 
role in this important area of public safety and health.”
• “Public Notice: Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 
4034.1, which provides in pertinent part that ‘[upon] the effective date of 
the federal legislation. .. addressing pedigree or serialization measures for 
dangerous drugs, Sections 4034, 4163(c) – (g), 4163.1, 4163.2, 4163.4, 
and 4163.5 shall become inoperative,’ and which requires that within 
(continued)
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 Conclusion
This chapter covered a follow-up on the previous chapter on supply chain manage-
ment fundamentals with applications such as laws, regulations, standards, and certi-
fications as well as traceability and transparency. The fraud opportunity is complex 
and based on issues that are created by a web of interactions and gaps. The first con-
clusion is that there are wide ranges of applicable laws, regulations, standards, and 
certifications. Earlier food industry efforts can add value to understand the current 
needs as well as a range of activities by other industries. It should be expected that 
others—either within the food or in other industries—have pursued protecting the 
supply chain. It should also be assumed that there are many lessons learned by very 
smart people who worked very intelligently to try to address very similar questions. 
There is a saying, “fraud prevention activities are twice as complex and complicated 
as you think it is and you know half as much as you think you know.” The second 
conclusion is that traceability is complex and very specific needs should be the first 
focus of the project. “More” traceability is good, of course, but the exact value is 
undefined without an explanation of exactly how it addresses very specific prob-
lems. For example, regardless of the low-cost or easy, quick implementation, the 
new technology could be addressing a problem that is not above the risk tolerance. 
Also, it should be assumed that there are many very complex aspects of the system 
that could reduce the value of the result or even that could be a mission- critical issue 
that negates all value. The final conclusion is that the overall focus is on the trans-
parency of the supply chain, transactions, and supply chain partners. With more 
transparency, there is a greater awareness of where the gaps or fraud opportunities 
occur and more specific insight on where and how suspicious product may be enter-
ing the supply chain. With more transparency, the fraud opportunity is reduced.
90 days of the enactment of such legislation the board publish a notice 
regarding the invalidation of these statutes, the California State Board of 
Pharmacy is hereby publishing notice that federal legislation meeting the 
requirements of section 4034.1 has been enacted, and that Business and 
Professions Code sections 4034, 4163, 4163.1, 4163.2, 4163.4, and 4163.5 
became inoperative as of November 27, 2013.”
Efficient application of supply chain management theories includes the 
consideration of laws and regulations as well as systems for traceability and 
transparency. As the supply chain management principles may be new for 
food scientists, the compliance and application requirements are even more 
novel. Food fraud prevention is a problem based on a complex fraud opportu-
nity and efficient and effective countermeasures, and control systems must 
consider an interdisciplinary approach based on lessons learned from previ-
ous efforts.
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Supply Chain Management 
Application
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM There are a range of SCM systems and processes that increase transparency 
and traceability which reduce the fraud opportunity
Quality team This application will tighten the control of inbound products and ingredients 
with respect to the fraud opportunity
Auditors There will be some SCM-focused activities related to proof of product and 
ingredient authenticity as well as general transparency
Management Suppliers need additional scrutiny which may seem like a lot of new 
overhead and controls, but that will actually increase purchasing flexibility to 
buy from a wider range of low-price suppliers
Corp. 
decision-makers
The purchasing group needs to support SCM assessments and controls to 
increase the buyer flexibility while operating under your risk tolerance
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter.
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) What is the role of “supply chain management” in FF prevention?
 (b) How does traceability increase supply chain transparency and reduce the 
fraud opportunity?
 (c) What are the attributes of traceability systems that were inefficient or that 
did not realize their ultimate potential?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What are ISO and ISO 9000?
 (b) Why is thorough and reliable traceability difficult to manage and expected to 
be a “given”?
 (c) What is the role of a brand protection manager in FF prevention?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) Regarding traceability, what is “pedigree”?
 (b) What is “track” versus “trace” and why is there a need for both?
 (c) What are “inherent risks” of enhanced traceability systems?
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 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is the “PDMA”?
 (b) What challenges hindered industry-wide—or overarching regulatory—
requirements for e-traceability efforts?
 (c) What are some lessons learned from RFID initiatives?
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Chapter 11
Standards and Certifications (Part 1 of 2): 
The Role of the Public-Private Partnership
Summary
This chapter presents an overview of the standards and certifications which are dif-
ferent from, but support, laws and regulations that apply to food fraud. This is not 
intended to be a deep dive into the exact specifications but to provide an overview 
of the organizations, their missions, their scopes, and the general concepts they 
address. There will be a deeper dive into the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) 
requirements since they provide broad direction and foundation setting.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are:
• (1) NGOs: The role of nongovernmental organizations in food fraud 
prevention.
• (2) Public-Private Partnership: The overall public-private partnership roles.
• (3) International Collaboration: This will review key international collabora-
tor activities such as by INTERPOL, Europol, WHO, FAO, and others.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the stan-
dards and certifications that are addressed on the figure a “(A) Theoretical 
Foundation” (Fig. 11.1).
 Introduction
To support the definition and harmonized focus on prevention, there are key roles 
for laws, regulations, standards, and certifications. The optimal and most efficient 
situation is a combination of public-private partnership (PPP) activities including 
governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, either aligned by trade 
groups or international or national activities), industry (actually implementing the 
compliance requirements), and academics. Laws state the intended objectives and 
provide statutory authority for agencies to implement regulations. Regulations are 
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the application of laws where agencies explain the compliance requirements and 
explain the methods for:
(1) Inspection (assessing that methods and processes businesses implement to meet 
the law)
(2) Investigation (how nonconformances will be reviewed and the types of penalties 
to apply)
The concept of “inspection” versus “investigation” will be continually reviewed 
in this book. Laws and regulations are governed by—and within the scope—of 
governments.
Standards and certifications have a different function that operates in a benefi-
cial relationship with national laws (creating efficiencies of best practices and com-
mon methods within a country) or globally (creating common practices that support 
multiple countries). Standards are a set of agreed-upon practices and objectives 
codified and shared. Certifications are a demonstration of meeting a set of agreed- 
upon standards.
It is most efficient if governments in the public sector and industry in the private 
sector work together. Public-private partnerships (PPP)—including the private 
certifications and food safety audits—have had officially recognized value by the 
governments including the FDA. For example, even before the publication of the 
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Fig. 11.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
Fundamental Concepts”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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FSMA Accredited Third-Party Final Rule (FDA 2014), FDA stated “So, one of the 
most important questions we are grappling with at FDA is how we can enhance our 
role in verification and strengthen our public and private partnerships to better 
assure consumers that our food safety systems are working.” This was expanded to 
state “First, in our domestic inspection and compliance program, our focus will be 
on achieving and verifying that private food safety management systems are work-
ing effectively to prevent problems.” Then “Second, private verification and audit 
activities already play a central role in food safety systems” (FDA 2014).
 Overview of Standards
Based on the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) (itself a group repre-
senting the standards-setting bodies of 34 European nations which also coordinates 
with ISO per the Vienna Agreement) summary, standards are categorized by four 
types (CEN 2018).
• Fundamental standards: which concern terminology, conventions, signs, sym-
bols, etc.
• Test methods and analysis standards: which measure characteristics such as 
temperature and chemical composition.
• Specification standards: which define characteristics of a product (product 
standards) or a service (service activities standards) and their performance 
thresholds such as fitness for use, interface, and interoperability, health and 
safety, environmental protection, etc.
• Organization standards: which describe the functions and relationships of a 
company, as well as elements such as quality management and assurance, main-
tenance, value analysis, logistics, project, or system management, production 
management, etc.
Another summary is provided by ASTM which includes a statement that “Other 
categories of standards can be employed as necessary” (BSI 2018).
• Test method: A definitive procedure that produces a test result
• Specification: An explicit set of requirements to be satisfied by a material, prod-
uct, system, or service
• Classification: A systematic arrangement or division of materials, products, sys-
tems, or services into groups based on similar characteristics such as origin, 
composition, properties, or use
• Practice: A definitive set of instructions for performing one or more specific 
operation that does not include a test result
• Guide: A compendium of information or a series of options that does not recom-
mend a specific course of action
• Terminology: A document comprising definitions of terms, explanations of 
symbols, abbreviations, or acronyms
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An expanded detail on “Categories of Standards” (BSI 2018):
• Categories of standards: “Most standards can be categorized according to the 
function they need to perform. The most common is the Specification, which is 
a highly prescriptive standard setting out detailed absolute requirements. It is 
commonly used for product safety purposes or for other applications, where a 
high degree of certainty and assurance is required by its user community.”
Types of standards include:
• Codes of practice: “recommend the sound good practice, as currently under-
taken by competent and conscientious practitioners. They are drafted to incorpo-
rate a degree of flexibility in the application while offering reliable indicative 
benchmarks. They are commonly used in the construction and civil engineering 
industries.”
• Methods: “are also highly prescriptive, a setting out an agreed way of measuring, 
testing or specifying what is reliably repeatable in different circumstances and 
places, wherever it needs to be applied.”
• Vocabulary: “is a set of terms and definitions to help harmonize the use of lan-
guage in a particular subject or discipline.”
• Guides (standards): “are published to give less prescriptive advice which reflects 
the current thinking and practice among experts in a particular subject.”
When most efficient, there is a commonality across the activities that both 
increase the protection of the food supply chain and also provide efficiency for gov-
ernment and agency activities. For food fraud prevention—and building upon very 
important and robust food safety activities—a very efficient system is envisioned 
and is currently being implemented.
It cannot be stressed enough that food fraud is in the very early stages of public- 
private partnership development since laws, regulations, standards, and certifica-
tions are just being developed (Spink et al. 2019b). Great care and coordination will 
be needed to implement an efficient and effective system. Since there is a holistic, 
all-encompassing, and theoretically sound focus on the broad prevention efforts—
focusing on the root cause of the entire problem and on proactive prevention—there 
is a tremendous opportunity for every financially efficient and programmatically 
effective implementation. There are numerous examples of other risks where the 
scope was either defined to be too narrow (e.g., medicines focusing on intellectual 
property rights counterfeiting rather than all fraud) and too tactical (e.g., a single 
government agency focus on enforcement and prosecution not a government-wide 
focus on prevention).
The current international and public-private partnership collaborations are very 
promising. Also, the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle provides a broad and strategic 
theoretical foundation.
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Role of Key Nongovernmental 
Organizations (NGOs)
This section covers the role of the nongovernmental organizations—here this does 
not yet include industry or trade associations—in creating and managing standards 
and certifications. Each organization has a mission, vision, scope, and focus on 
products and services. Taking a holistic view of the organizations helps to refine the 
specific roles and also to identify gaps. For food fraud prevention, several key NGOs 
include Codex Alimentarius (CODEX) and parent organizations of World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), International Standards Organization (ISO), INTERPOL and Europol, 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), and other specification or quality manage-
ment systems (e.g., US Pharmacopeia (USP), National Sanitation Foundation (NSF, 
not the National Science Foundation), American Organization of Analytical 
Chemists (AOAC), International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), American Botanical 
Council (ABC), Natural Products Association (NPA)/Supplement Safety and 
Compliance Initiative (SSCI), International Aloe Science Council (IASC), and 
others).
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) The role of nongovernmental organizations in food fraud prevention
• (2) The NGO mission, actions, and method to develop and implement standards
• (3) The NGO challenge of addressing food fraud prevention
 NGOs: How and Whom They Help—ISO, ISO, GFSI, 
and Others
The nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have different members, stakeholders, 
and contribution to the general food fraud prevention activities.
ISO: Two main activities within ISO apply to food fraud prevention:
• (1) ISO TC292 Security Management and Resilience/WG04 Product Fraud 
Countermeasures and Controls
• (2) ISO TC34/SC17 Food Management/WG04 Food Safety Management (ISO 
2017a, d)
Other ISO management systems standards provide a foundation such as ISO 
31000 Risk Management and ISO 28000 Specification for security management 
systems for the supply chain. TC292 includes several approved ISO standards that 
provide a framework for addressing all product fraud including ISO 22380:2018 
Product Fraud: Product fraud countermeasures and control—General principles; 
ISO 12931:2012 Product Fraud: Performance criteria for authentication solutions 
used to combat counterfeiting of material goods; and ISO 16678:2014 Product 
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Fraud: Guidelines for interoperable object identification and related authentication 
systems to deter counterfeiting and illicit trade. TC34 has published ISO 22000 
which is a foundation for GFSI and general food safety practices. As of June 2017, 
ISO 22000 is being updated to include food fraud and also food defense 
specifically.
ISO has provided clear statements regarding product fraud prevention, focusing 
on vulnerabilities, and addressing fraudsters. The ISO 22380:2018 standard 
includes a table on “Types of Product Fraud” including counterfeiting, IP rights 
infringement, adulterant substance, tampering, substitution, simulation, diversion, 
theft, and overrun (ISO 2018b).
Understanding product fraud opportunities from ISO 22380 Section 4.1.1
• “The organization should base its fraud control strategies on proper understand-
ing of the intentions, motives, nature, and types of the fraud and the fraudster. 
The organization should consider all the three elements (Fraudster, Victim/target, 
and poor Guardian) essential in crime occurrence for its basis of applied crime 
prevention. Crime occurs when a motivated fraudster and suitable target come 
together in time and place, without a capable guardian present. Product fraud-
sters commit fraud crime when perceiving that a specific fraud target is vulner-
able, and there is sufficient rewards from the fraud attacks, and there is no or 
weak guardianship and countermeasures by deterring, delaying, hindering, stop-
ping their attacks. The vulnerability is referred to as a fraud opportunity. 
Particularly this should be based upon criminological theory ‘rational choice’ 
that people commit a crime when the risk of offending is low, and the rewards are 
high from their point of view.”
 – Organization: “person or group of people that has its own functions with 
responsibilities, authorities and relationships to achieve its objectives; Note 1 
to entry: The concept of organization includes, but is not limited to sole- 
trader, company, corporation, firm, enterprise, authority, partnership, charity 
or institution, or part or combination thereof, whether incorporated or not, 
public or private” (ISO 2017d).
There are two key TCs that address the underlying risk management and quality 
management system standards which are based on ISO 31000 and ISO 9000.
• ISO/TC 262 Risk management: The scope is standardization in the field of risk 
management (ISO 2017c). The major contribution is the management series 
based on ISO 31000 Risk Management.
• ISO/TC 176 Quality management and quality assurance: The scope is 
“Standardization in the field of quality management (generic quality manage-
ment systems and supporting technologies), as well as quality management stan-
dardization in specific sectors at the request of the affected sector and the ISO 
Technical Management Board” (ISO 2017b). The major contribution is the man-
agement series based on ISO 9000:2015 Quality management systems—
Fundamentals and vocabulary.
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For food fraud prevention, the application is that ISO TC292 Security 
Management has many standards, though with limited adoption, which addresses 
the broad scope of product fraud and focus on prevention. ISO TC34 manages the 
widely adopted ISO 22000 Food Safety Management principles which expanded 
scope in 2018 to include food fraud and food defense. It would be logical for ISO 
22000 to align with the broad food fraud scope and focus on prevention from TC292 
and GFSI.
CODEX: CODEX has addressed specific authenticity specifications for products 
such as honey and olive oil (CODEX 2001, 2015). In May 2017 the CCFICS (Codex 
Alimentarius Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 
Systems) reviewed a Discussion Paper on Food Integrity and Food Authenticity 
(food fraud) and approved the creation of an Electronic Work Group (EWG). To 
note, MSU’s Food Fraud Initiative responded to a public request for comments from 
the US CODEX delegation that recommended the creation of an EWG. MSU-FFI 
had continued to support the US CODEX delegation and the overall CCFICS 
(CODEX CCFICS 2017). The direction of the CCFICS was for the EWG to present 
definitions of key terms (including agreement that food fraud and EMA are not the 
same and that food fraud is the preferred term), conduct a gap analysis of other 
CODEX standards, and to focus holistically on prevention rather than detection (see 
MSU-FFI meeting summary blog report).
For food fraud prevention, the application is that CODEX has defined their 
direction addressing the broad scope of food fraud and to focus on prevention which 
is in a development process that would lead to a global CODEX standard in 2022–
2025. This may seem a long way off—which it is—but is an indication of future 
CODEX alignment with current definitions, scopes, and focus on prevention 
activities.
GFSI: The food fraud incidents were usually addressed within the Food Safety 
Management System and public health responses. It was logical for Food Safety 
Management Systems to review food fraud. GFSI—and essentially HACCP, itself—
is an adaptation of quality management principles to the unique problem and coun-
termeasure of food safety. Thus, after GFSI defined food fraud prevention to be 
within their mission—not responding to incidents but preventing root causes that 
could lead to food safety incidents—they followed the advice of their GFSI Food 
Fraud Think Tank and published their direction in the “GFSI Position on Mitigating 
the Public Health Risk of Food Fraud” (GFSI position paper on food fraud) (GFSI 
2014) (Note: Dr. Spink represented MSU as one of six members of the GFSI Food 
Fraud Think Tank.) Compliance was required on January 1, 2018. GFSI updated 
their Guidance Document in February 2017 to include food fraud requirements of:
 (1) Conduct and document a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment
 (2) Implement and document a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy
 (3) Cover the “relevant GFSI scope” which includes all types of fraud (e.g., not just 
adulteration substances) and all products (e.g., raw materials and finished goods 
in the marketplace).
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For food fraud prevention, the application is that GFSI has provided specific 
guidance on addressing the broad scope of food fraud and focusing on prevention 
which will be required by January 2018.
Each NGO has a different mission, focus, and membership needs. For food fraud 
prevention, there is an important task of reviewing, coordinating, and optimizing 
activities. Each has the opportunity to play a significant role in food fraud 
prevention.
 Missions, Actions, and Resources
There impetus and motivations of the key NGOs provide insight into their role and 
future contribution to food fraud prevention. Key topics addressed will be mission, 
actions, deliverables, resources, and projects.
ISO: Their mission is similar to CODEX but focused on all products, all indus-
tries, and all processes. The actions are an extensive technical committee and sub- 
committee work by volunteers who create standards (e.g., ISO 22000 Food Safety 
Management). The deliverable is the published ISO standard. The standard is avail-
able for purchase.
ISO has limited resources and a varying degree of commitment from the mem-
ber states and the individuals on the country-level Technical Advisory Group (TAG). 
The actions are to advance topics or activities that arise from the TAG and TC activ-
ity. The projects move forward as there are interest and support by the committees 
or work groups which is often a small group of individuals who have very specific 
interest areas.
GFSI: Their mission is to strengthen the Food Safety Management System for 
companies and the entire industry. The harmonized Guidance Document helps cre-
ate one central document or system that meets multiple compliance requirements 
such as for different countries. The actions focus on harmonizing and strengthening 
Food Safety Management practices. Volunteer member companies provide the 
resources from manufacturing, retail, as well as suppliers, academics, and consul-
tants. The deliverable is the Food Safety Management System Guidance Document 
and approving compliance by standards development companies known as scheme 
owners or Certification Program Organizations (CPOs). The GFSI Guidance 
Document is available free on their website, and the standards are accessed through 
separate standards companies such as FSSC 22000, BRC, IFS, and others. The stan-
dards are audited and certified by Certification Bodies (CBs) that are approved and 
recognized by the CPOs.
GFSI has limited resources which include an active volunteer Board of Directors, 
volunteer Technical Working Groups that refine the Guidance Document, and a 
small paid administrative staff. GFSI relies on research funded by other NGOs 
(such as the SSAFE organization, the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), 
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the MSU Food Fraud Initiative, and others) or the member companies. The actions 
are to continue to refine the base expectations in the Guidance Document and to 
facilitate the adoption or acceptance. Acceptance outreach included meeting with 
the US FDA (which led to the update of Version 7 to Version 7.1 within 2 months 
and then 7.2 in December) and recognized “equivalence” by China FDA (meaning 
that GFSI compliance meets the Chinese food safety laws). The projects move for-
ward with approval from the Board of Directors.
CODEX: Their mission is similar to ISO but focused on a harmonized and 
holistic food code or standard that can be widely adopted by countries. The process 
is very thorough, intense, detailed, and can typically take 5–8 years. The actions 
are publishing guidelines or standards published in the Codex Alimentarius proce-
dural manual and separate standards. The deliverable is the food code that can be 
referenced or the source of a country food law. Codex is not a food law but is 
sometimes adopted by countries as their law. The publications are available free on 
their website.
CODEX has limited resources, itself, but significant commitment from their 
member states. CODEX provides standard setting and food code guidance for a 
wide range of related topics. CODEX does have a paid staff that facilitates and 
advances the activities. The actions include updating and expanding the standards 
as directed by the member states. The CCFICS activity on food fraud is an example 
(CODEX 2017). The projects move forward as recommended by the widely 
attended and supported committees (e.g., the May 2017 CCFICS committee meet-
ing was typical with over 300 attendees from over 70 countries).
A summary table is provided of the organizations, governance, mission, and 
product or service (Table 11.1).
Table 11.1 Review of key NGOs that contribute standards and certifications to food fraud 
prevention
Organization Governance Mission Product or service
Global Food 
Safety Initiative 
(GFSI) Note: 
including endorsed 
standards
Industry producer, 
manufacturer, and 
retailer managed to 
stakeholders including 
suppliers, academics, 
and governments
To harmonize and 
refine a central Food 
Safety Management 
System that is widely 
adopted and 
benchmarked
Membership and 
conference registration 
fees lead to publishing a 
“Guidance Document” 
that is used by others to 
develop standards
Codex 
Alimentarius 
(CODEX)
Member countries 
managed by WHO and 
FAO
To increase the health 
of global citizens 
through safer food 
while maintaining 
equitable trade 
practices
Creates the “world food 
code” of common 
practices which is often 
adopted as national laws
International 
Standards 
Organization 
(ISO)
Member countries 
managed by national 
standards bodies
To increase the 
harmonized practices 
and methods of 
conducting activities
Provides fee for access 
to the standards
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Review: CODEX CCFICS23 Meeting Summary—Action to Define Food 
Fraud and Related Terms (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Review – CODEX CCFICS23 Meeting Summary
By John Spink • May 5, 2017 • Blog
Friday, May 5, 2017 -- Earlier today, Codex Alimentarius (CODEX, the 
world food code) took a major food fraud commitment by proposing an 
Electronic Working Group (EWG) to review other CODEX texts and to create 
a definition and scope for Food Fraud/Food Integrity/food authenticity/related 
terms. The recommendations of CCFICS will be submitted upwards to the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) for final approval. The Draft 
Discussion paper was widely supported at this conference during the formal 
open discussion by the member countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran is 
leading the EWG with co-Chairs from Canada and the European Union. We 
were pleased to have attended the Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food 
Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems (CCFICS) meeting 
as part of the US Delegation.
• CCFICS  – Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food Import and 
Export Inspection and Certification Systems: This “…was created to 
address a range of emerging issues related to exports, inspection, and cer-
tification (CODEX CCFICS 2017). The main focus is “(a) to develop prin-
ciples and guidelines for food import and export inspection and certification 
systems with a view to harmonizing methods and procedures which protect 
the health of consumers, ensure fair trading practices and facilitate interna-
tional trade in foodstuffs;….”
The first step of the EWG will be to review and present definitions. For 
example, what are food integrity, food authenticity, and Food Fraud? There 
are other unanswered possible questions such as: What is an ‘adulterant’ and 
how is it different from a CODEX defined ‘contaminant’? Does Food Fraud 
only cover adulterant-substances? Are intellectual property rights counterfeit-
ing included? Does counterfeiting include trademark, patent, copyright and 
trade secrets? Is Food Fraud the same thing as food integrity or food authen-
ticity? Is it only a CODEX matter if there is a public health threat? Where else 
in CODEX are some aspects of Food Fraud covered? Is it completely cov-
ered? How much or how little?
The CCFICS -approved final report presents the direction for the Food 
Fraud EWG:
• “Support and agreement to create an Electronic Working Group (EWG).
• Review CODEX definitions of similar or related terms such as contami-
nant, etc.
• Consider gap analysis of where Food Fraud is or isn’t covered in other 
parts of CODEX.
• Define Food Fraud/food integrity/food authenticity/and others.”
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CODEX intentionally follows a very formal and methodical process since 
this essentially, and literally, will change the way forward for the world. 
Creating the EWG is a very formal activity for CODEX that will start the 
review of it – and then how – Food Fraud will be incorporated into the formal 
Codex Alimentarius (world food code). If agreed to and it progresses forward, 
it will be a four to six-year process until Food Fraud would be in the formal 
CODEX texts. Once a topic is fully implemented in CODEX, it is widely 
adopted and becomes a requirement for conducting business in many coun-
tries essentially. CODEX is often the reference for food laws in many 
countries.
The Committee discussion was based on a Discussion Draft led by Iran 
and co-chaired by Canada and The Netherlands. That Discussion Paper 
included a working definition of Food Fraud (that will be reviewed by the 
EWG):
From the CODEX EWG document: “Food fraud, it is an emerging international 
issue that includes adulteration, deliberate and intentional substitution, dilution, 
simulation, tampering, counterfeiting, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredi-
ents, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements made about a product for 
economic gain.4” (Note 4: This quote cites the Elliott Review which includes cita-
tion “4” which is Spink and Moyer, Journal of Food Science, 2011)
The Discussion Draft authors specifically thanked four resources:
• “US Pharmacopeia and the (USP) Food Fraud Database” (USP is based in 
Rockville, Maryland, USA)
• “MSU and Dr. John Spink” (MSU is based in East Lansing, Michigan, 
USA; Dr. Spink attended the event as part of the US delegation)
• “The Food Fraud Network (FFN) administered by the European 
Commission (EC)”
• “The Elliott Review of Food Crime and Food Fraud” (the UK, DEFRA led 
by Dr. Christopher Elliott, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
UK)
Comments from the CCFICS Open Discussion are included here, and the 
details are especially significant since they do not necessarily become part of 
the full published meeting summary:
Australia
• “[Creating a definition] is an important first step to understanding what 
we’re talking about.”
• “[The activity is useful] so that we’re clear on the definition of food fraud.”
China
• “Regarding usage of EMA and FF terms – the Discussion Draft flips back 
and forth… [it is recommended to] replace EMA with FF.”
(continued)
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SSAFE (an NGO with CODEX Observer Status)
• “Does agree that it is a complex problem but should not dissuade CCFICS 
or Codex from addressing.”
• “We believe it is necessary because the authenticity of food is critical.”
• “SSAFE believes the scope will be determined on the definition of the 
terms that CCFICS [future work or project] provides.”
• “EMA is not exactly equivalent to FF.”
European Union (EU)
• “This FF is of increasing importance and certainly an issue that we should 
not avoid discussing. It is certainly complex, but it should not prevent 
CCFICS from working on it.”
• “We can agree on the proposed way forward. This is really the very first 
step. It is such a complex matter it cannot be solved in one activity.”
United States (USA)
• The USA did not comment.
The CCFICS Chair then concluded, and summary statements are:
• “Start with defining FF/FI/FA/EMA – everything in that bucket – and then 
the EWG can reduce the scope if needed.
• This would create a foundation for CODEX and for global food 
regulation.
• This effort would help provide clarity for everyone.
• If we don’t address this properly now, then we’ll continue to get more pro-
posals because we’ve missed something.”
From the CCFICS final report:
• “Conclusion  – 29.” “The Committee agreed to establish an [Electronic 
Working Group], chaired by the Islamic Republic of Iran and co-chaired 
by Canada and European Union, working in English only, with the follow-
ing terms of reference:
 – “a.” clarify the definitions of food integrity, food authenticity, food 
fraud and [economically motivated adulteration] and delineate the 
scope for the preliminary assessment of CCFICS texts;
 – “b.” based on those definitions, undertake a preliminary assessment of 
existing CCFICS texts to identify possible gaps and the impact, whether 
positive or negative, of those texts in mitigating potential problems; and
 – “c.” prepare a discussion paper presenting the findings of that assess-
ment and any need for potential new work.”
In many different forums, managed my many different stakeholders, there 
has been a debate about whether Food Fraud should be included in CODEX 
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or even in other international food safety programs. The CCFICS committee 
and attendees clearly feel Food Fraud should be included. Comments from the 
final report include:
• “Underscoring the complex implications of this area and the crosscutting 
nature of concerns involved, the Committee agreed that, while CCFICS 
undoubtedly had a role to play given the international trade-related impli-
cations, an integrated approach was required across all Codex.”
This is a significant point that emphasizes that efforts should be across 
CODEX and the response was not in individual commodity standards. From 
later in the final report:
• “CCFICS may be better positioned to provide general higher-level guid-
ance, it would be difficult for any single committee to address such diverse 
concerns through a single document, and measures should not be limited 
to fraud detection but also seek to achieve mitigation.”
This is an important statement since it recognizes the effort should be on 
interdisciplinary prevention and not just detection or analytical test methods.
The CODEX CCFICS next steps are aligned with our previous MSU-FFI 
recommendations in the requirement for CODEX public comments. Our rec-
ommendations were consistent with the CCFICS conclusion: Food Fraud is 
now a ‘thing,’ so CODEX should address or at least provide a definition of 
‘Food Fraud’ and ‘adulterant.’ The next step is just to develop a definition 
and scope and NOT yet the role of CODEX. When considering the recom-
mendations and the way forward, it is important to remember that the scope of 
CODEX is public health AND trade. Throughout the discussions at this meet-
ing, there is a growing consensus that Food Fraud is “too big” of a problem for 
CODEX to ignore. Engage through your country or trade organizations to con-
tinue to shape the direction of laws, regulations, standards, and certifications.
 Key Learning Objective 2: Public-Private Partnerships 
Considering NGOs and NPOs
This section reviews the public-private partnerships specifically for nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) that are identified as a not-for-profit, nonprofit, or tax- 
exempt. The NGOs play a key role in supporting food fraud prevention including: 
US Pharmacopeia (USP), National Sanitation Foundation (NSF), American 
Organization of Analytical Chemists (AOAC), International Life Sciences Institute 
(ILSI), Global Standards One (GS1), and others. Specific stakeholders have differ-
ent capabilities and capacities that are invaluable for protecting the food supply 
chain. This section will review the structure of the organizations, the roles different 
stakeholders play, and an overview of some of the organizations.
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The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Identify and introduce the various public-private partners including NGO 
(nongovernmental organizations) and NPO (nonprofit organizations).
• (2) Review the overall public-private partnership and key interrelationships.
• (3) Examine the stages of public policy development.
 Summary of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and Nonprofit Organization/Not-for-Profit Organization (NPOs)
All nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are not the same. A nonprofit organiza-
tion (NPO)—often referred to as a “501C3” based on US law code section—can be 
very competitive and operate as a for-profit company; while a corporation may be 
nonprofit, it does not necessarily “operate at a loss,” and many of the employees 
could be highly compensated or rewarded. A “nonprofit” organization can be 
defined as that the “residual revenue” is distributed at the end of the year before it is 
classified as “profit”—thus “nonprofit” or “not-for-profit.” Also, NGOs that are not 
purely volunteer organizations must find operating revenue through member fees, 
grants, or gifts or through user fees such as certifications or access to documents. In 
this case then, the more products and services, the more fees and the more revenue. 
Some NGOs can be multimillion-dollar enterprises.
From Title 26 of the US Code (USC), exemption from tax on corporations, certain 
trusts, etc., then section “c” is “list of exempt organizations, and finally part “3” is a 
list of exempt organizations. The US Internal Revenue Service defines a tax- exempt 
(nonprofit) as a “501(c)(3)” company (emphasis added): (26 USC 501 2012):
“To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization 
must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)
(3), and none of its earnings may inure [become an advantage]to any private shareholder or 
individual. In addition, it may not be an action organization, i.e., it may not attempt to influ-
ence legislation as a substantial part of its activities, and it may not participate in any cam-
paign activity for or against political candidates. […] The organization must not be 
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, and no part of a section 501(c)(3) 
organization’s net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual” (IRS 2018).
Also, from the US Internal Revenue Service, “Nonprofits are organizations 
designed to forward ideas, beliefs, and initiatives as opposed to one individual, or a 
group of individuals. This is in stark contrast to corporations or many business enti-
ties, which transfer a percentage of profits to shareholders or private ownership. […] 
Section 501(c) of the IRS Tax Code outlines the requirements for non-profits, regu-
lating how they interact with the IRS. Each subsection guides a non-profit type. […] 
501(c)(3) serves as a reference for charitable organizations, including religious, 
educational, and medical organizations.”
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According to the IRS Publication 557, in the Organization Reference Chart 
section, the following is an exact list of 501(c) organization types and their corre-
sponding descriptions.[1][a]
• 501(c)(1)—Corporations Organized Under Act of Congress (including Federal 
Credit Unions)
• 501(c)(2)—Title-holding Corporations for Exempt Organizations
• 501(c)(3)—Religious, Educational, Charitable, Scientific, Literary, Testing for 
Public Safety, to Foster National or International Amateur Sports Competition, 
or Prevention of Cruelty to Children or Animals Organizations
• 501(c)(4)—Civic Leagues, Social Welfare Organizations, and Local Associations 
of Employees
• 501(c)(5)—Labor, Agricultural and Horticultural Organizations
• 501(c)(6)—Business Leagues, Chambers of Commerce, Real Estate Boards, etc.
• 501(c)(7)—Social and Recreational Clubs
• And others…
Some NPOs play an essential role in food fraud prevention, and to better under-
stand their contribution—if there is any bias—these details such as the management 
structure and compensation motivation are essential to understanding (see the 
Bazerman section on “How (un-)Biased Are You?”).
 The Challenge for NGOs and Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) Addressing 
Food Fraud
Food fraud is an emerging topic, and many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
or nonprofit organizations (NPOs) see an opportunity to expand or to capitalize on 
unmet needs. Some “food” groups or “fraud” groups see an opportunity and build 
upon their current capacity and capabilities. What has been missing is an overarch-
ing leadership position that considers the entire fraud opportunity and a priority on 
prevention. This is a scope to consider all types of fraud and for all products. Without 
the overarching prevention strategy, then it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify 
exactly what is the unmet need. Also, it is logical for science and technology- 
focused research to continue down the path of faster and deeper.
Specifically, an NGO or NPO builds upon their current activities and do not usu-
ally expand to consider the entire “fraud opportunity” and to “connect everything to 
everything.” As an example, a team of senior-level analytical chemists will naturally 
focus on their area of analytical chemistry. While this can be excellent for developing 
new and more robust food authenticity species tests, the actions do not help to com-
bat stolen goods tax-avoidance smuggling or label country of origin fraud claims.
These challenges emphasize the efficiency and need of considering the whole 
fraud opportunity and the overarching Food Fraud Prevention Strategy before defin-
ing what is exactly needed to meet what specific unmet need. “If one aspirin is good 
then is ten better?” The role of science and technology—as well as investigation and 
prosecution—should be judged by the contribution to prevention. If there is not a 
 Key Learning Objective 2: Public-Private Partnerships Considering NGOs and NPOs
382
defined fraud opportunity or an overall vulnerability assessment, then the counter-
measures and controls systems are no more than a guess. This would be an edu-
cated, intellectual best guess but a guess nonetheless.
 The NGOs Supporting Role to and from Laws, Regulations, 
Standards, and Certifications
It is important to review the entire set of stakeholders to understand the optimal 
roles and the contribution to the public-private partnership. Different stakeholders 
have unique capabilities and capacity. The entire public-private partnership should 
be considered as well as the specific contribution to food fraud prevention. A broad 
focus will help create efficiencies for the overall group as well as help individual 
stakeholders identify their unique and optimal contribution.
There is an important relationship between different entities (Fig. 11.2):
Industry 
(General)
Industry 
(Companies)
Trade 
Associaons
Professional 
Associaons
Non-Governmental 
"Organizaons (NGO)
Non-Profit 
Organizaons (NPO)
Government 
Agencies
Government Enforcement 
and Prosecuon
Academics/ Universies
Standards and 
Cerficaons
Fig. 11.2 Public-private partnership (PPP) for food fraud prevention
Sidebar: The NGOs in the Optimal Activity for a Government—Require 
“a” Process Not Prescribe Compliance
In addition, other NGOs such as GFSI create a foundation that enables govern-
ments—through regulations, enforcement, and prosecution—to position for 
an optimal role. The optimal role of a government is to require “a process” 
for specifically addressing food fraud but do not include too many prescribed 
requirements. The figure below incorporates the role of regulations and a gov-
ernment requirement in the industry standards cycle (Fig. 11.3). The first efforts 
started with expanded regulations which led to the food industry creating GFSI 
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to harmonize practices, which was followed by the creation of standards, the 
implementation, and certification, which can then be reinforced by the govern-
ment regulation. The government regulation meets the original goal to protect 
the food supply chain. The emphasis on requiring “a process” will lead the 
industry to collaborate and develop harmonized programs and benchmark-
ing. The encouragement of the collaboration will meet the government goal 
of efficiently and effectively—and economically—protecting the food supply 
chain. Occasionally governments will identify when “not enough” is being 
done and then follow with enforcement and prosecution. That new govern-
ment focus would be new incidents or information that is identified in the Food 
Fraud Prevention Cycle as “new information” for “public policy” or “incident 
review.” If there is a strong public-private partnership, then that level of what is 
“acceptable” or “unacceptable” will be identified and met early in the process. 
When considering the overall system, it is interesting to note that laws, regula-
tions, investigations, and prosecutions have a critical but generally reactionary 
role in prevention—they are important but most efficient when encouraging 
crime prevention activities by the stakeholders rather than catching the bad 
guys. As long as the goal is to reduce the overall fraud opportunity—and not to 
just catch more bad guys or more ad product—then the public-private partner-
ship can speed effective, efficient, and optimal food fraud prevention.
Fig. 11.3 GFSI Implementation hierarchy including the role of governments. (Copyright Use 
Approved) (Copyright Permission Granted) (GFSI FFTT 2013)
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 Stages of Policy Development: The Need for Clear and Formal 
Definitions
Food fraud is emerging and evolving as an area of study and for standardized methods 
of complying with or addressing prevention. To more clearly understand what will 
help food fraud prevention become more thoroughly and efficiently implemented, 
it is important to understand the current status and based on a routine method of 
public policy development (Cadieux et al. 2019). This research aim utilized a widely 
adopted and implemented Dye’s process model (Dye 2012) and more generally Dye’s 
insights (Dye 1976; Dye 2001; MacManus and Dye 2002; Dye and Gaddie 2013).
In the research project “Application of Public Policy Theory to the Emerging 
Food Fraud Risk: Next Steps,” a summary from the working paper is included here 
(Spink et al. 2019b):
“Scope and Approach: There is a need to assess the food fraud public policy development 
to understand the current state and to identify additional research to assist the efficient and 
successful implementation. A way to systematically review the food fraud concept was 
conducted using a public policy development “Process Model.” Process Model steps 
reviewed include: Problem Identification (Foundation Setting and Definition & Formation), 
Agenda Setting, Alternate Approaches, Legitimation, Implementation, and Evaluation.”
“Key Findings and Conclusions: The global food fraud policy-making is advancing 
through Agenda Setting, Alternate Approaches, and Legitimation. The key steps for a har-
monized global food fraud public-policy are:
• ‘(1) Establish the definition and scope,
• ‘(2) Define food fraud as a “food” agency issue,
• ‘(3) Publish an official government statement focused on prevention (e.g., law, regu-
lation, rule, guidance, etc.),
• ‘(4) Support and fund the policy, and
• ‘(5) Continue to evaluate and adjust the response.”
“There is a unique opportunity to take a holistic and all-encompassing approach to food 
fraud prevention that will be efficient and effective in protecting the food supply” (Spink 
et al. 2019b).
Dye’s process model was applied to the food fraud issue including identifying 
the state of development for guardians including the USA, the UK, the European 
Commission, China, and then GSFI (Spink et al. 2019b) (Fig. 11.4).
By conducting a methodical review of the stages of policy development, the key 
activities or milestones needed for food fraud can be identified. It was evident that 
a fundamental concept was still critical which was just establishing common and 
formal definitions and scope of work.
 Key Learning Objective 3: International Collaboration
This section reviews the international collaboration that has occurred as well as 
what should lead to a coordination-based decrease in the global food “fraud oppor-
tunity.” Severity and frequency are leading to responses. Prevention is an integrated 
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and proactive approach that requires harmonization of terms and actions. The coun-
termeasures and control systems are often very simple, and with coordination, they 
can be low-cost and low-effort.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) WHO and FAO activity through Codex Alimentarius and INFOSAN, then 
ISO in Food Safety Management, and also Security Management
• (2) Law enforcement efforts led by INTERPOL and Europol
• (3) Industry standards and certification specifically led by GFSI
 WHO, FAO (UN), and ISO
There are several major international organizations that oversee the food fraud top-
ics including the Codex Alimentarius (CODEX, overseen by the World Health 
Organization [WHO] and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations [FAO]) and the International Standards Organization (ISO). Other related 
groups include the WHO/FAO-led “International Food Safety Authorities Network 
(INFOSAN)” (INFOSAN 2017; CODEX 2018).
Fig. 11.4 Application For food fraud prevention of the process model of public policy-making 
stages as of October 2017. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink et al. 2019b)
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 Codex Alimentarius (Codex) and INFOSAN (WHO/FAO)
CODEX: Codex is the world food code, and although not a law or regulation 
through CODEX states, “In many countries, most food legislation is already consis-
tent with Codex” (CODEX 2014). There are 187 CODEX member countries. The 
CODEX mission is: “The Codex Alimentarius international food standards, guide-
lines, and codes of practice contribute to the safety, quality, and fairness of this 
international food trade. Consumers can trust the safety and quality of the food 
products they purchase and importers can trust that the food they ordered will be in 
accordance with their specifications.” The emphasis is on a balance of food safety, 
food security (the supply of food), and a balance with equitable trade practice 
(unfair trade practices) (CODEX 2014).
There are 24 CODEX committees that cover topics such as general subject, com-
modity, and coordinating activities. Some cover technical specifications, while oth-
ers (“Methods and Analysis”) such as a specification for honey and others cover 
process or activities such as “Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 
(CCFICS)” which includes food fraud (CODEX 2017; CODEX CCFICS 2017).
CODEX has an excellent, thorough, and clear definition of “contaminant” that 
clearly does NOT apply to food fraud:
• Contaminant (CODEX): “Any substance not intentionally added to food, which 
is present in such food as a result of the production (including operations carried 
out in crop husbandry, animal husbandry and veterinary medicine), manufacture, 
processing, preparation, treatment, packing, packaging, transport or holding of 
such food or as a result of environmental contamination. The term does not include 
insect fragments, rodent hairs, and other extraneous matter” (CODEX 2014).
• Adulterant: Not defined by Codex.
During the 2017 CCFICS meeting, a “DISCUSSION PAPER ON FOOD 
INTEGRITY AND FOOD AUTHENTICITY [Food Fraud]” was presented, and it 
was recommended to advance for further work to an Electronic Working Group 
(EWG) (CODEX 2017). The working definition of food fraud is:
“[The working definition of food fraud] it is an emerging international issue that includes 
adulteration, deliberate and intentional substitution, dilution, simulation, tampering, coun-
terfeiting, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging; or false or 
misleading statements made about a product for economic gain.4” (Note 4: Citing the 
Elliott Review which directly quotes Spink and Moyer, Journal of Food Science, 2011 
(DEFRA 2014), Ref. (Spink and Moyer 2011)).
The CCFICS-approved final report presents the direction for the Food Fraud 
EWG (CODEX CCFICS 2017):
 1. Support and agreement to create an electronic working group (EWG).
 2. Review CODEX definitions of similar or related terms such as contaminant, etc.
 3. Consider gap analysis of where food fraud is or isn’t covered in other parts of 
CODEX.
 4. Define food fraud/food integrity/food authenticity.
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It appears the CCFICS activity will address this unmet need for CODEX 
guidance on food fraud and to publish definitions of food fraud, food integrity, food 
authenticity, food adulteration, adulteration, or adulterant. While there are still 
5–8 years from the start of an EWG to a final adopted CODEX standard, it is signifi-
cant that the process has started and that the scope is on all types of fraud and the 
focus is on prevention.
 WHO/FAO Activity by INFOSAN
The Codex Alimentarius addresses the world food code, and WHO and FAO 
have other more direct support activities such as the International Food Safety 
Authorities Network (INFOSAN): INFOSAN is a global group of national food 
safety authorities, managed jointly by FAO and WHO with the secretariat in 
WHO.  National authorities of 186 member states are part of the network. The 
INFOSAN goal is to address the idea that “Increasing globalization of food trade 
increases the risk of contaminated food spreading quickly around the globe” 
(INFOSAN 2017). And in a primary activity, they “…assist Member States in 
managing food safety risks, ensuring rapid sharing of information during food 
safety emergencies to stop the spread of contaminated food from one country to 
another. INFOSAN also facilitates the sharing experiences and tested solutions 
in and between countries in order to optimize future interventions to protect the 
health of consumers.” Their 2016 annual conference included food fraud as one of 
the four topics (INFOSAN 2016).
From an INFOSAN Food Fraud Survey, it is clear that INFOSAN members are 
concerned with food fraud and looking for support in understanding the topic and 
managing incidents. A 2017 survey led by INFOSAN and MSU-FFI revealed that 
food fraud was a major concern for member states and there was a need for leader-
ship support and coordination (Spink et al. 2019a).
Some of the key points from the published peer-reviewed article (Spink et al. 
2019a):
• “As a deliverable from the (INFOSAN 2016) Singapore meeting, a survey on 
food fraud was developed and presented to more than 450 INFOSAN members 
around the world. The development of this online, anonymous food fraud survey 
was led by the INFOSAN Secretariat at WHO and was administered and ana-
lyzed by the Michigan State University Food Fraud Initiative (MSU-FFI). There 
were 175 respondents upon distribution to 453 INFOSAN members from 166 
WHO the Member States, six areas/territories of WHO the Member States and 
two associate members.”
• “The survey found that many INFOSAN members engage in food fraud 
 prevention (70%) or are responsible for food fraud incident response (74%). The 
scope of food fraud covered in the survey comprised the full range of fraudulent 
activities, including the addition of adulterant-substances, tampering (including 
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 mislabeling), theft, smuggling, gray market or diversion, and counterfeiting. The 
respondents do not generally conduct vulnerability assessments (84% replied 
“No” or “Don’t know”).”
• “Authority to manage fraud related events is often not designated within a food 
safety agency (55% say “No” or “Don’t know”) despite food fraud being over-
whelmingly considered a food safety issue by respondents (93%).”
• “Most respondents indicate that INFOSAN plays an important role with respect 
to food fraud (75% “Yes” to 14% “No”) and suggest that they would share infor-
mation through the network on fraud-related events (69% “Yes” to 4% “No” with 
more ambiguity of 20% “Don’t know”).”
• “Nearly all respondents acknowledged a desire for more guidance and informa-
tion on best practices in managing “food safety events involving food fraud” 
(97%), but also for prevention of such events (97%), indicating a need to provide 
technical support beyond acute incident response.”
• “Key needs identified from respondents’ comments included:
 – 1) Capacity-building/education,
 – 2) A platform for information sharing, and
 – 3) Utilization of INFOSAN as an interagency/intergovernmental collabora-
tion point.”
• “Potential next steps may include:
 – 1) Development of a food fraud fact sheet and subsequent dissemination to 
INFOSAN members;
 – 2) Presentation of food fraud resources for education and capacity-building to 
INFOSAN members; and
 – 3) Development and administration of a more detailed and targeted survey to 
better understand the issue at the individual country level.”
An important step is that INFOSAN is seeking feedback directly from their 
member states on very specific food fraud definition, scope, and resource needs.
There are important WHO/FAO activities due to the Codex work on definitions, 
the INFOSAN statement of addressing food fraud, and the outcomes from the 
INFOSAN survey.
Review: FAO’s Overview of Food Fraud in the Fisheries Sector Report 
(MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Review – FAO’s Overview of Food Fraud in the Fisheries Sector Report
By John Spink, May 28, 2018 • Blog
A new 2018 FAO report, “Overview of Food Fraud in the Fisheries Sector,” 
presents a foundation and direction for the prevention of this type of food 
fraud. The report acknowledges the public health threat, negative impact on 
consumer confidence, and the enforcement challenge for governments. Key 
recommendations begin with a food fraud vulnerability assessment at the 
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product/country/industry level to create a foundation for selecting mitigation 
plans. This assessment will help identify gaps in laws and regulations. Also, 
this will help focus countermeasures and control systems that include authen-
ticity testing, identity standards, traceability, and codifying the requirements 
such as in Codex Alimentarius.
This new report focuses on food fraud, which is also a focus of several mis-
sions by The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), INFOSAN (a WHO/FAO group 
Food Safety Information Sharing Network), and Codex Alimentarius 
(CODEX – co-led by FAO and WHO). FAO has a core mission to focus on 
“international efforts to defeat hunger.” A specific aim of FAO is “Developing 
Inclusive and Efficient Value Chains” which focuses on “increasing demand 
for high-value products in international and domestic food markets that is an 
opportunity for developing countries to generate economic growth and gain-
ful employment.” It was noted that this new FAO Fish Fraud report also sup-
ports “The FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2016).”
The new FAO Fish Fraud report presents several key references:
• Definition: “Food fraud: is committed when food is illegally placed on the 
market with the intention of deceiving the customer, usually for financial 
gain.”
• Scope – General: “This involves criminal activity that can include food 
mislabeling, substitution, counterfeiting, misbranding, dilution, and 
adulteration.”
• Scope – Detail: “Some of the most common forms of fish fraud involve:
 – “Species substitution…;
 – Mislabeling of fish to conceal the geographical origin of illegally har-
vested species [including stolen or smuggled goods];
 – Marketing of counterfeit products…;
 – Undeclared use of food additives…;
 – Illegal use of food additives…;
 – Addition of glaze water to frozen products to increase weight; [and] 
mislabeling of ingredients….”
The “Overview of Food Fraud in the Fisheries Sector” report includes the 
following observations regarding food fraud:
• A real Public Health threat: While the primary goal is an economic gain, 
there is often also a public health threat to both the consumer and those 
producing the food [such as employees being exposed to toxins].
• A Negative impact on Consumer Confidence: There is potential for loss of 
consumer confidence both in the local market and also for exported goods. 
(continued)
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This lack of confidence can even impact the effectiveness of food control 
aid programs.
• Increase Product Authenticity and Traceability: To both identify species 
and also assess the source, expanded application of technology means that 
“…the possibility exists for far greater transparency in the fish marketing 
chain.”
• Harmonize Common Names: There are many practices in the marketing of 
seafood.
• “One of the principal challenges in tackling fish fraud is establishing an 
agreed list of common names that are linked to scientific nomenclature. 
This is an essential first step for national governments in introducing offi-
cial fish fraud control programmes.”
• Coordinate Government Activity: There is a complex web of food laws or 
regulations that are often the responsibility of several agencies, which cre-
ates an opportunity for better coordination.
• “Greater cooperation between food control authorities and law enforce-
ment agencies is required in order to combat the criminal activities involved 
in fish fraud.”
 – FFI Comment: This is a frequent conclusion of reviews where the idea 
is simple, but the implementation is very complex. In some instances, 
there are constraints on what information an agency can share with the 
public or even within the government. In other instances, the greater 
cooperation could lead to one agency taking on or giving up a specific 
responsibility. With changing responsibilities, there are additional 
approvals for shifting budgets or human resources. Regardless of the 
challenges of the changing or shifting activities, the most efficient first 
step is for the government to conduct a country-wide food fraud vulner-
ability assessment.
• “Food regulations need to be strengthened and penalties made proportion-
ate to criminal infringements.”
 – FFI Comment: There are three points here, with one being strengthened 
food regulations and then proportionate penalties.
First, all types of food fraud are usually already illegal but under a wide 
range of laws. Often there isn’t a need for new regulations but really an effort 
to clarify what regulations do apply and then which agencies are accountable 
for enforcement.
Second, there is an ongoing challenge considering the level of penalties and 
the actual deterrent effect. To start, a challenge is implementing deterrent pen-
alties where the “act” is usually a commercial violation with the lower types 
of penalties. Thus, while the unintentional result could be a death, the penal-
ties for the commercial activities may be considered legally “proportionate.”
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Third, the consideration of a “deterrent penalty” for an act where criminals 
think they won’t get caught and where there is a very high potential economic 
benefit. This has been a challenging question even back to 1994 and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. TRIPS includes Section 5: 
criminal procedures, Article 61, “Remedies available shall include imprison-
ment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with 
the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.”
Define New Regulations and Expanded Government Activities: Addressing 
food fraud includes a new or different government response.
“There is a need to strengthen official national food control programmes 
by:
• Developing new regulations to combat fish fraud;
• Enhancing enforcement activities prohibiting landings and market access 
for products from illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; introducing 
monitoring and surveillance programmes for assessing the degree of com-
pliance with fish labeling regulations; and,
• Upgrading laboratory detection methods based on DNA barcoding.”
Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessments that are harmonized, standardized, 
and codified: There is a need to first assess the vulnerability before selecting 
countermeasures and control systems.
“Food safety management systems need to be expanded to include vulnerability and 
threat assessments to analyse risks and to put control and prevention strategies in 
place.”
Food Fraud Control Measures (Prevention Strategies) that are harmonized 
standardized and codified: Following the assessment should be a coordinated 
prevention plan.
“The industry needs to develop and implement systems … to prioritize control mea-
sures to minimize the risk of receiving fraudulent or adulterated raw materials or 
ingredients.”
CODEX as an International Harmonization Point: A logical coordinating 
body is CODEX.
“The Codex Alimentarius Commission, in association with its member countries, 
should develop international principles and guidelines designed to identify, manage 
and mitigate fraudulent practices in food trade and to develop guidelines to standard-
ize food safety management systems for fish fraud vulnerability assessment.”
It is interesting and important to consider new research and recommenda-
tions that address food fraud prevention. There is a refined focus on basic 
concepts such as: the general definition and scope of food fraud, that food 
fraud is a public health threat, and that efficient and effective control plans 
(continued)
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 International Standards Organization (ISO)
The International Standards Organization (ISO) “…is an independent, non- 
governmental international organization with a membership of 163 national stan-
dards bodies” (ISO 2008). Through authority from the US Department of Commerce, 
the USA is represented by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) (ANSI 
2018). ANSI manages the US activities including forming and overseeing the US 
delegations to the ISO Technical Committees (TCs). Through an open, consensus- 
based process, ISO developed internationally recognized standards for “[ISO cre-
ates] documents that provide requirements, specifications, guidelines or 
characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, pro-
cesses, and services are fit for their purpose” (ISO 2008). Several ISO TCs that 
apply to food fraud are:
• ISO/TC292 Security management and resiliency: The scope is “Standardization 
in the field of security to enhance the safety and resilience of society” (ISO 
2018c). A major contribution to food fraud prevention is Work Group 4 (WG 04) 
Authenticity, integrity, and trust for products and documents. An applicable stan-
dard is ISO 12931:2012 Performance criteria for authentication solutions used to 
combat counterfeiting of material goods. This was followed with ISO 16678:2014 
Product Fraud: Guidelines for interoperable object identification and related 
authentication systems to deter counterfeiting and illicit trade. Next was ISO 
22380:2018 Security and resilience—Authenticity, integrity, and trust for prod-
ucts and documents—General principles for product fraud risk and countermea-
sures (ISO 2018b). This includes definitions of product fraud, definitions of 
types of fraud, authenticity, and others. This standard codifies the Product- 
Counterfeiting Incident Clustering Tool (PCICT) which is from a previous MSU- 
FFI published journal article (Spink et al. 2014).
• ISO/TC 34 Food products: The scope is “Standardization in the field of human 
and animal foodstuffs, covering the food chain from primary production to con-
sumption, as well as animal and vegetable propagation materials, in particular, 
but not limited to, terminology, sampling, methods of test and analysis, product 
specifications, food and feed safety and quality management and requirements 
for packaging, storage and transportation.” A major contribution is  Sub- committee 
17 (SC17) Management systems for food safety (ISO 2017a). An applicable 
start with a product/ country/ industry-level vulnerability assessment. This 
starting point will help refine and optimize the control plans, which include 
product authenticity testing, identify standards, traceability, coordinated gov-
ernment activity, and focus on consumer confidence. It is logical that CODEX 
is identified as an international harmonization point which would support 
other activity by industry or other standards bodies such as ISO. A key is that 
food fraud research and recommendations are continuing to include a focus 
on definitions, scope, and prevention.
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standard is ISO 22000:2005 Food Safety Management Systems—Requirements 
for any organization in the food chain. The new ISO 22000:2018 revision was 
published in June 2018 (ISO 2005). (See appendix for the full list of all working 
groups and food products directly addressed.)
• ISO/TC 262 Risk management (product fraud was formerly in TC 247): The 
scope is “Standardization in the field of risk management” (ISO 2017c). The 
major contribution in this standard is the management series based on ISO 31000 
Risk Management. Key points include definitions of risk and vulnerability as 
well as a method for risk analysis. (For more on ISO 31000 regarding the 
 management system, see the chapter on food fraud prevention, and for the fun-
damental concepts, see the chapter on Risk Analysis.)
• ISO/TC 176 Quality management and quality assurance: The scope is 
“Standardization in the field of quality management (generic quality manage-
ment systems and supporting technologies), as well as quality management stan-
dardization in specific sectors at the request of the affected sector and the ISO 
Technical Management Board” (ISO 2017b). The major contribution is the man-
agement series based on ISO 9000:2015 Quality management systems—
Fundamentals and vocabulary.
Several ISO activities will be reviewed in more detail.
ISO/TC 292/WG 4 Authenticity, integrity, and trust for products and docu-
ments: This WG was originally created as TC247 Fraud Countermeasures and 
Controls before being merged into TC292. Several key definitions in ISO12931:2012 
“Performance criteria for authentication solutions used to combat counterfeiting of 
material goods” are: (ISO 2011)
• “3.2” Authentic material good: material good produced under the control of the 
legitimate manufacturer, the originator of the good, or holder of intellectual 
property rights.
• “3.3” Authentication: act of establishing whether a material good is genuine or 
not
• “3.3.1” Authentication element: tangible object, visual feature, or information 
associated with a material good that is used as part of an authentication 
solution.
• “4.2” Authentication process: The typical authentication solution is shown in 
Fig.  11.1 and reveals the interrelationship between the material good to be 
authenticated and typical components of the authentication solution. They 
together yield a true or false verdict or provide information that will enable to 
detect the authenticity of the material good.
The TC292 has continued to evolve from application steps to the broader man-
agement system. These provide value and support for the Food Safety Management 
Systems.
ISO/TC34/SC17/WG8—Management Systems for Food Safety (ISO 22000): 
Specifically the main focus is ISO 22000 which was published in 2005 and updated 
in 2018 (ISO 2005, 2018a). New topics include food fraud and separately food 
defense. The revised standard is still based on Total Quality Management principles 
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such as Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA), the HACCP-type actions, and directs a Food 
Safety Management System (FSMS). The standard clearly includes food fraud 
where it is stated [emphasis added] “Understanding the context can be facilitated by 
considering external and internal issues including but not limited to legal, techno-
logical, competitive, market, cultural, social, economic environments, cybersecu-
rity, and food fraud, food defence and intentional contamination, knowledge, and 
performance of the organization, whether international, national, regional or 
local.…” (ISO 2005). (See chapter appendix for more ISO defined food safety terms 
that apply to food fraud.)
While ISO is not required but often is a starting, harmonization center point. If 
and when there can be ISO consensus on terms and focus, then many innovations 
can be developed and implemented more quickly.
 Conclusion
The role of standards and certifications are vital to creating a harmonized and com-
mon starting point for any activity. This is especially important—and opportune—
for food fraud prevention because it is at the start of the awareness building and of 
the development of requirements. It is essential since creating a common starting 
point will support harmonized terminology and efficient sharing of best practices. It 
is opportune since the first reviews are being conducted which are leading to the first 
holistic, all-encompassing requirements. From the UK Elliott Review to the Trinidad 
and Tobago Parliamentary Review of food fraud, there is a growing governmental 
awareness and formal statement of the problem. From ISO and Codex to GFSI, 
there is an emerging body of compliance requirements. The first conclusion is for 
standards and certification development and implementation, that there is a definite 
role in the public-private partnership for international nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) supported by nonprofit organizations (NPOs). The NGO groups such 
as ISO, CODEX, and GFSI provide a key overarching coordination role building 
both consensuses based and common codes of practice. There is a great benefit if the 
NGOs only create common definitions and management system goals that focus on 
overall prevention. The second conclusion is that it is critical to gather a wide range 
of interdisciplinary experts to provide insight and practical recommendations for 
starting the process but also considering the challenges through to implementation. 
While it is easy to identify the current state (“point A”) and the ultimate goal (“point 
B”), the most challenging part is to “just get started” and then completing the jour-
ney (“getting from point A to point B”). The final conclusion is that it is efficient 
first to consider what activities are already being conducted and to build upon stan-
dard operating procedures. Key and active systems for food fraud prevention are 
being implemented by industry to address GFSI compliance. The overall food fraud 
prevention strategy standards and certifications help support laws and regulations 
since the industry is working to protect the supply chain. There is a saying:
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If laws and regulations require “a” process  – rather than very specific, prescribed 
actions – then the result will be further momentum for the standards and certifications.
 Appendix: Glossary of Addition Terms and Definition
Selected key ISO definitions related to audits and certifications:
• Audit: systematic, independent, and documented process for obtaining audit evi-
dence and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which the audit 
criteria are fulfilled; SOURCE: ISO 22300:2018.
• Audit, first party: internal audit; Note 3 to entry: An internal audit is conducted 
by the organization or by an external party on its behalf. Internal audit can be for 
management review and other internal purposes and can form the basis for an 
organization’s declaration of conformity. Independence can be demonstrated by 
the freedom from responsibility for the activity being audited; [ISO BCP]
• Audit, second party, or third party: external audit; Note 4 to entry: External 
audits include those generally called second- and third-party audits. Second- 
party audits are conducted by parties having an interest in the organization, such 
as customers, or by other persons on their behalf. Third-party audits are con-
ducted by external, independent auditing organizations such as those providing 
certification/registration of conformity or government agencies; [ISO BCP]
• Documented information (documentation, documented): information required 
to be controlled and maintained by an organization and the medium on which it 
is contained; Note 1 to entry: Documented information can be in any format and 
on any media from any source. [ISO BCP]
• Interested party: stakeholder, person, or organization that can affect, be affected 
by, or perceive themselves to be affected by a decision or activity; SOURCE: 
ISO 22300:2018, 3.124.
• Management: coordinated activities to direct and control an organization, 
SOURCE: ISO 9000:2015, 3.3.
• Management system: set of interrelated or interacting elements of an organiza-
tion to establish policies and objectives and processes to achieve those objec-
tives; Note 1 to entry: A management system can address a single discipline or 
several disciplines, e.g., quality management, financial management, or environ-
mental management. The scope of a management system can include the whole 
of the organization, specific and identified functions of the organization, specific 
and identified sections of the organization, or one or more functions across a 
group of organizations; SOURCE: ISO 9000:2015, 3.5.3.
• Organization: person or group of people that has its own functions with respon-
sibilities, authorities, and relationships to achieve its objectives; for organiza-
tions with more than one operating unit, a single operating unit can be defined as 
an organization; SOURCE: ISO 9000:2015, 3.2.1.
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• Policy: intentions and direction of an organization as formally expressed by its 
top management [ISO BCP]
• Prioritized activity: activity to which priority is given to mitigate impacts follow-
ing a disruptive incident [or a new awareness of a vulnerability]; terms com-
monly used to describe these activities include critical, essential, vital, urgent, 
and key; SOURCE: ISO 22300:2018, 3.176.
• Top management: person or group of people who directs and controls an organi-
zation at the highest level; Note 1 to entry: Top management has the power to 
delegate authority and provide resources within the organization; SOURCE: ISO 
9000.
• Verification: confirmation, through the provision of evidence, that specified 
requirements have been fulfilled; SOURCE: ISO 9000:2015, 3.8.12.
 Appendix: ISO 22000 Food Safety Terms Applicable to Food 
Fraud
The overall scope of ISO 22000:2018 is presented in the “4.1 Understanding the 
organization and its context” where it is stated (ISO 2005):
“The organization shall determine external and internal issues that are relevant to its pur-
pose and that affect its ability to achieve the intended results of its food safety management 
system. The organization shall identify, review and update information related to these 
external and internal issues.”
Then Section 4.1, Note 1 clearly defines food fraud within the scope of the 
standard:
“Understanding the context can be facilitated by considering external and internal issues 
including but not limited to legal, technological, competitive, market, cultural, social, eco-
nomic environments, cybersecurity, and food fraud, food defence and intentional contami-
nation, knowledge, and performance of the organization, whether international, national, 
regional or local.”
From ISO 22000:2018, selected definitions of terms that apply to food fraud 
prevention:
• 3.1 Acceptable level—level of a food safety hazard (3.22) not to be exceeded 
in the end product (3.15) provided by the organization (3.31)
• 3.2 Action criterion—measurable or observable specification for the monitor-
ing (3.27) of an OPRP (3.30)
 – Note 1 to entry: An action criterion is established to determine whether an 
OPRP remains in control and distinguishes between what is acceptable (crite-
rion met or achieved means the OPRP is operating as intended) and unaccept-
able (criterion not met nor achieved means the OPRP is not operating as 
intended).
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• 3.6 Contamination—introduction or occurrence of a contaminant including a 
food safety hazard (3.22) in a product (3.37) or processing environment
• 3.7 Continual improvement—recurring activity to enhance performance 
(3.33)
• 3.8 Control measure—action or activity that is essential to prevent a significant 
food safety hazard (3.22) or reduce it to an acceptable level (3.1)
 – Note 1 to entry: See also significant food safety hazard (3.40).
 – Note 2 to entry: Control measure(s) is (are) identified by hazard analysis.
• 3.11 Critical control point (CCP)—step in the process (3.36) at which control 
measure(s) (3.8) is (are) applied to prevent or reduce a significant food safety 
hazard(3.40) to an acceptable level, and defined critical limit(s) (3.12) and 
measurement (3.26) enable the application of corrections (3.9)
• 3.12 Critical limit—measurable value which separates acceptability from 
unacceptability
 – Note 1: Critical limits are established to determine whether a CCP (3.11) 
remains in control. If a critical limit is exceeded or not met, the products 
affected are to be handled as potentially unsafe products.[SOURCE: CAC/
RCP 1–1969, modified—The definition has been modified, and Note 1 to 
entry has been added.]
• 3.14 Effectiveness—extent to which planned activities are realized, and planned 
results achieved
• 3.15 End product—product (3.37) that will undergo no further processing or 
transformation by the organization (3.31)
 – Note 1 to entry: A product that undergoes further processing or transforma-
tion by another organization is an end product in the context of the first orga-
nization and a raw material or an ingredient in the context of the second 
organization.
• 3.21 Food safety—assurance that food will not cause an adverse health effect for 
the consumer when it is prepared and/or consumed in accordance with its 
intended use
 – Note 1 to entry: Food safety is related to the occurrence of food safety haz-
ards (3.22) in end products (3.15) and does not include other health aspects 
related to, for example, malnutrition.
 – Note 2 to entry: It is not to be confused with the availability of, and access to, 
food (“food security”).
 – Note 3 to entry: This includes feed and animal food. [SOURCE: CAC/RCP 
1–1969, modified—The word “harm” has been changed to “adverse health 
effect,” and notes to entry have been added.]
• 3.22 Food safety hazard—biological, chemical, or physical agent in food (3.18) 
with the potential to cause an adverse health effect
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 – Note 1 to entry: The term “hazard” is not to be confused with the term “risk” 
(3.39) which, in the context of food safety, means a function of the probability 
of an adverse health effect (e.g., becoming diseased) and the severity of that 
effect (e.g., death, hospitalization) when exposed to a specified hazard.
 – Note 2 to entry: Food safety hazards include allergens and radiological 
substances.
 – Note 3 to entry: In the context of feed and feed ingredients, relevant food 
safety hazards are those that can be present in and/or on feed and feed ingre-
dients and that can through animal consumption of feed be transferred to food 
and can thus have the potential to cause an adverse health effect for the animal 
or the human consumer. In the context of operations other than those directly 
handling feed and food (e.g., producers of packaging materials, disinfectants), 
relevant food safety hazards are those hazards that can be directly or indi-
rectly transferred to food when used as intended (see 8.5.1.4).
 – Note 4 to entry: In the context of animal food, relevant food safety hazards are 
those that are hazardous to the animal species for which the food is intended. 
[SOURCE: CAC/RCP 1–1969, modified—The phrase “or condition of” has 
been deleted from the definition, and notes to entry have been added.]
• 3.27 Monitoring—Determining the status of a system, a process (3.36), or an 
activity
 – Note 1 to entry: To determine the status, there may be a need to check, super-
vise, or critically observe.
 – Note 2 to entry: In the context of food safety, monitoring is conducting a 
planned sequence of observations or measurements to assess whether a pro-
cess is operating as intended.
 – Note 3 to entry: Distinctions are made in this document between the terms 
validation (3.44), monitoring (3.27), and verification (3.45):
• Validation is applied prior to an activity and provides information about 
the capability to deliver intended results.
• Monitoring is applied during an activity and provides information for 
action within a specified time frame.
• Verification is applied after an activity and provides information for confir-
mation of conformity.
• 3.37 Product—output that is a result of a process (3.36)
 – Note 1 to entry: A product can be a service.
• 3.40 Significant food safety hazard—food safety hazard (3.22), identified 
through the hazard assessment, which needs to be controlled by control mea-
sures (3.8)
• 3.42 Traceability—ability to follow the history, application, movement, and 
location of an object through specified stage(s) of production, processing, and 
distribution
 – Note 1 to entry: Movement can relate to the origin of the materials, processing 
history, or distribution of the food (3.18).
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 – Note 2 to entry: An object can be a product (3.37), a material, a unit, equip-
ment, a service, etc. [SOURCE: CAC/GL 60–2006, modified—Notes to entry 
have been added.]
• 3.44 Validation—(food safety) obtaining evidence that a control measure (3.8) 
(or combination of control measures) will be capable of effectively controlling 
the significant food safety hazard (3.40)
 – Note 1 to entry: Validation is performed at the time a control measure combi-
nation is designed or whenever changes are made to the implemented control 
measures.
 – Note 2 to entry: Distinctions are made in this document between the terms 
validation (3.44), monitoring (3.27), and verification (3.45):
• Validation is applied prior to an activity and provides information about 
the capability to deliver intended results.
• Monitoring is applied during an activity and provides information for 
action within a specified time frame.
• Verification is applied after an activity and provides information for confir-
mation of conformity.
• 3.45 Verification—confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, 
that specified requirements (3.38) have been fulfilled
 – Note 1 to entry: Distinctions are made in this document between the terms 
validation (3.44), monitoring (3.27), and verification (3.45):
• Validation is applied prior to an activity and provides information about 
the capability to deliver intended results.
• Monitoring is applied during an activity and provides information for 
action within a specified time frame.
• Verification is applied after an activity and provides information for confir-
mation of conformity.
 Appendix: ISO 22000 Family of Standards
“The ISO 22000 family contains a number of standards each focusing on different 
aspects of food safety management.
• ISO 22000:2005 contains the overall guidelines for food safety management.
• ISO 22004:2014 provides generic advice on the application of ISO 22000
• ISO 22005:2007 focuses on traceability in the feed and food chain
• ISO/TS 22002–1:2009 contains specific prerequisites for food manufacturing
• ISO/TS 22002–2:2013 contains specific prerequisites for catering
• ISO/TS 22002–3:2011 contains specific prerequisites for farming
• ISO/TS 22002–4:2013 contains specific prerequisites for food packaging 
manufacturing
• ISO/TS 22003:2013 provide guidelines for audit and certification bodies.”
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Subcommittee/Working Group structure:
ISO/TC 34/CAG Chairmen 
Advisory group
ISO/TC 34/WG 13 Royal 
jelly
ISO/TC 34/WG 14 Vitamins, 
carotenoids, and other nutrients
ISO/TC 34/WG 16 Animal 
welfare
ISO/TC 34/WG 17 Water 
activity
ISO/TC 34/WG 18 Natural food 
ingredients
ISO/TC 34/WG 20 Aflatoxins ISO/TC 34/WG 21 Social 
responsibility/sustainability
ISO/TC 34/SC 2 Oleaginous 
seeds and fruits and oilseed 
meals
ISO/TC 34/SC 3 Fruits and 
vegetables and their derived 
products
ISO/TC 34/SC 4 Cereals 
and pulses
ISO/TC 34/SC 5 Milk and milk 
products
ISO/TC 34/SC 6 Meat, poultry, 
fish, eggs, and their products
ISO/TC 34/SC 7 Spices, 
culinary herbs, and 
condiments
ISO/TC 34/SC 8 Tea
ISO/TC 34/SC 9 Microbiology ISO/TC 34/SC 10  Animal 
feeding stuffs
ISO/TC 34/SC 11  Animal and 
vegetable fats and oils
ISO/TC 34/SC 12 Sensory 
analysis
ISO/TC 34/SC 15 Coffee ISO/TC 34/SC 16 Horizontal 
methods for molecular 
biomarker analysis
ISO/TC 34/SC 17 Management 
systems for food safety
ISO/TC 34/SC 18 Cocoa
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Standards and Certification 
Overview
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all There are many groups working in and around food fraud, and there will be 
many opportunities to learn and expand best practices
Quality team There are many NGOs, NPOs, and other groups that can help in the public- 
private partnership as colleagues and collaborators—but define your needs 
and don’t just join every group or committee
Auditors The FFPS may refer to organizations that you have not seen before
Management While there should not be a high-resource requirement, there will probably be 
a need to connect your team to new resources, support groups, and 
international organizations
Corp. 
decision-makers
The team may seem to be wildly expanding into new and irrelevant 
disciplines, but the connections should not be too resource-intensive and will 
actually increase the efficiency from an interdisciplinary and international 
approach
11 Standards and Certifications (Part 1 of 2): The Role of the Public-Private Partnership
401
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) What is the relationship between laws, regulations, standards, and 
certifications?
 (b) What are examples of PPPs in the food sector?
 (c) What is the optimal role of the PPP in FF prevention?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is the difference between “inspection” and “investigation?
 (b) How does ISO 22380 Product Authenticity apply to FF prevention?
 (c) What is the impact of CODEX on food laws?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is an “NGO”?
 (b) What are the differences between NGO, NPO, and NPC?
 (c) Why is it recommended that governments require “a” process not prescribe 
in a specific approach?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is PDCA?
 (b) What is authentic versus authentication?
 (c) What is the relationship between CODEX, ISO, GFSI, and FAO/WHO?
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Chapter 12
Standards and Certifications (Part 2 of 2): 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)
Summary
This chapter presents the GFSI food fraud compliance requirements that build on 
the basics presented in other chapters. This more detailed chapter includes the 
assessments, prevention strategies, and the overall scope of the certification. The 
GFSI requirements build ISO 22000 Food Safety Management and require a Food 
Safety Management System (FSMS). GFSI is a benchmark that is endorsed by food 
safety standards such as FSSC 22000, SQF, BRC, and IFS, and others. As of January 
2018, the GFSI requirement now includes specific and separate activities to address 
food safety, food defense, and food fraud. These requirements are an essential con-
sideration for food fraud prevention.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) The Overall Food Safety Management System (FSMS)
• (2) HACCP and TACCP: The specific concepts addressing food safety in a 
hazard analysis or HACCP plan and food defense in a threat assessment or 
TACCP plan
• (3) VACCP: Finally, addressing food fraud in a vulnerability assessment or 
VACCP plan
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoreti-
cal foundation concepts related to criminology and the fraudster “(B) Fundamental 
Concepts” (Fig. 12.1).
 Introduction
GFSI has been identified as a key stakeholder since they were the first industry 
group or NGO to holistically address the broad scope of food fraud and focus on 
prevention. GFSI is a unique NGO since they are comprised of the stakeholders 
who have the most influence in implementation and whom both have the financial 
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and human resource capacity but can make compliance a requirement to do busi-
ness. Thus, a deeper dive into the standards and certification of GFSI is provided.
 Key Learning Objective 1: The GFSI Food Safety 
Management System
This section reviews the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) and specifically the 
Food Safety Management System (FSMS—not to be confused with FSMA which is 
the US Food Safety Modernization Act).
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) International industry collaboration
• (2) Food industry priority setting
• (3) Introduction to the GFSI and the Food Safety Management System (FSMS)
(2) Fraud
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Fig. 12.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
Fundamental Concepts” (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014, Spink et al. 2019)
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 International Industry Collaboration Including GFSI
There are many global activities conducted by industry. For example, the American 
Spice Trading Association (ASTA) represents the spice industry, and the National 
Honey Board (NHB) is managed by the USDA to support the honey industry in the 
USA (ASTA 2018; NHB 2018). The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) is an 
organization focused across the food industry and focuses on the overall concept of 
food safety (GFSI 2017).
GSFI has members from across the food industry and was created and is admin-
istered by the Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) (CGF 2017). CGF is an association 
led by the chief executive officers of companies across the product scope including 
food, consumer-packaged goods, consumer electronics, apparel, etc. (CGF 2018).
In 2002 GFSI was created to try to consolidate and harmonize a Food Safety 
Management System to meet a dizzying array of country codes of practice and laws 
(Fig. 12.2). GFSI creates a “benchmark” or expectation of a food safety standard. 
Standards are developed by Certification Program Organizations (CPOs or previ-
ously referred to as scheme owners). The companies then implement the standards 
which are confirmed by certification bodies (CBs). The goal is that the system and 
certification support government regulatory compliance.
Fig. 12.2 GFSI system hierarchy including guidance document, standard, implementation, and 
certification (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2013)
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The GFSI food fraud-related requirements will be covered in more detail later 
written requirements are provided here (emphasis added) (GFSI 2017):
• FSM AI 21 Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment
 – The standard shall require that the organization has a documented Food 
Fraud Vulnerability Assessment procedure in place to identify potential vul-
nerability and prioritize food fraud mitigation measures.
• FSM AI 22.1 Food Fraud Mitigation Plan
 – The standard shall require that the organization has a documented plan in 
place that specifies the measures the organization has implemented to miti-
gate the public health risks from the identified food fraud vulnerabilities.
• FSM AI 22.2 Food Fraud Mitigation Plan
 – The standard shall require that the organization’s food fraud mitigation plan 
shall cover the relevant GFSI scope [as defined in the GFSI position paper] 
and shall be supported by the organization’s Food Safety Management 
System.
The GFSI requirements are significant because they will require “some” action. 
The first steps will be just to create a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment and then 
publish a holistic, all-encompassing Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. The program 
requirements and audit breadth will continue to expand over time as there are pro-
cess improvement and sharing of best practices.
 GFSI and Industry Priority Setting
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) is uniquely positioned in the food fraud 
landscape since it is a Food Safety Management System that is broadly required and 
includes a certification system. The impact is significant and efficient for govern-
ments to leverage or at least consider since the supply chain participants can create 
essentially mandatory requirements. Many retailers have a requirement that their 
new suppliers are GFSI certified or are on the way to the certification. The retail-
ers—either directly or through groups of companies such as the MSU Food Fraud 
Think Tank or the SSAFE Organization—provide training, education, and support 
for suppliers of all sizes.
GFSI first addressed food fraud when their Board of Directors requested in 2012 
that at “Food Fraud Think Tank” review what is food fraud, how should it be 
addressed, and what—if any—is the role of GFSI. Food fraud was a key topic in the 
keynote presentation at several of the GFSI annual conferences.
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A Summary of the 2013 Conference Is Included Here (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: GFSI Update #2 – Food Fraud a Hot Topic
By John Spink • March 13, 2013 • Blog
This is the second post regarding the GFSI conference. This includes 
insight from the pre-conference GFSI stakeholder meetings on Wednesday 
and also from the conference closing remarks on Friday.
Pre-Conference GFSI Meeting
GFSI Vice-Chair Frank Yiannas (VP Food Safety, Wal-mart) led the meet-
ing that included a set of electronic survey questions that solicited live 
responses from the 300+ session attendees. Two survey questions, in particu-
lar, addressed “Food Fraud/ Economically Motivated Adulteration” 
concerns:
1. “What critical area should GFSI focus on over the next 3 years?”
• Auditor competence: 18%.
• Driving common acceptance of GFSI recognition: 21%.
• Support for small suppliers: 18%.
• Regulatory acceptance of private schemes: 21%.
• Food safety culture: 15%.
• Economically Motivated Adulteration/ Food Fraud: 7%.
2. “What is the top food safety issue within your business?”
• Ingredient suppliers: 34%.
• Pathogens: 15%.
• Auditor competence: 10%.
• Training and education: 26%.
• Product labeling: 7%.
• Economically Motivated Adulteration/ Food Fraud: 8%.
I agree that food fraud is a very important topic and a critical emerging 
risk. Considering the traditional food safety challenges facing the food indus-
try, I am surprised food fraud has risen to such importance in such a short 
period of time. Two years ago food fraud wasn’t even on the GFSI conference 
agenda.
Throughout the conference, food fraud was a topic of conversation. In the 
food fraud session, GFSI Chair Yves Rey said: “the prevention of adulteration 
is a clear goal of GFSI and of Interpol.” The role of GFSI in the bigger global 
setting was reiterated by the FDA. Michael Taylor, FDA Deputy Commissioner 
for Foods, Office of Foods stated: “public-private partnership [such as with 
GFSI] is utterly critical to the implementation of the Food Safety Modernization 
Act.”
Conference Closing Remarks
In the closing session presentation on “Beyond Benchmarking  – The 
Future of GFSI,” Board Member Hugo Byrnes (VP Product Integrity, Royal 
(continued)
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Ahold) identified food fraud as one of six top challenges for GFSI, along with 
the likes of globalization, complex supply chains, transparency in supply 
chains, increased technology to detect low levels of contamination, and gene 
typing that identifies sources of outbreaks. He stated that to prevent food 
safety incidents the industry must focus on new, broad concepts such as food 
fraud. He expressed the need to look beyond the usual concepts of “product 
risk” and “supplier risk” to broader “vulnerabilities.” GFSI strategic thinkers 
are making a statement that they are broadening their vision. (A risk is some-
thing that has occurred and will unfortunately probably occur again. The 
objective is to reduce risks. A vulnerability may never have, and might not 
ever, occur, but it could. A vulnerability can be eliminated.)
Mr. Byrnes made a very important statement about food fraud that I had 
not explicitly considered:
“Fortunately it is not [the food industry] responsibility to define what is illegal.”
Of course, the food industry and regulators will be dealing with this emerging 
risk no matter who defines whether or not an incident is technically “illegal.” 
MSU-FFI.
Appendix: Further China Insights – Wal-mart and the Chinese Shopper.
Paul Gallemore, Chief Compliance Officer for Wal-mart China, discussed 
a range of their Food Safety initiatives including Food Fraud. Their Food 
Safety Team addresses related concepts along the continuum of Food Safety, 
Food Fraud, and Food Defense. While this is a continuum, each concept is 
addressed with a unique focus. When addressing Food Fraud prevention, he 
stated: “We’re concerned with more than just adulteration.” Commenting on 
the complexity of the issue, he stated “That’s the reason why we need to work 
together. We need to work together to figure out how to reduce the fraud 
opportunity as an entire industry.” As part of that collaborative approach, we 
were pleased he had a slide that mentioned their sponsorship of our Mandarin 
language MSU Food Fraud MOOC. The focus on Food Fraud prevention is so 
intense because it is so important to consumers. He presented the top 5 most 
important shopping experience factors for Chinese shoppers:
 1. No Fake Products = 81.4%.
 2. Has Product Safety Guarantee = 79.4%.
 3. Fresh Foods Smell Fresh = 78.3%.
 4. Honest Pricing = 78.2%.
 5. Has Product Quality Guarantee = 77.4%.
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 The GFSI Food Safety Management System (FSMS)
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) defined that a Food Safety Management 
System (FSMS)—presented in their Guidance Document—includes requirements 
to specifically and separately address food safety, food fraud, and food defense. 
Food safety is addressed in hazard analysis and critical control point plans (HACCP). 
When the GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank was reviewing the food fraud topic, a hier-
archy was developed to address food fraud in a Vulnerability Assessment and 
Critical Control Point plan (VACCP) and food defense in a Threat Assessment and 
Critical Control Point plan (TACCP). The GFSI umbrella is presented below 
(Fig. 12.3).
The GFSI position paper on food fraud was their first formal review of the topic 
(GFSI 2014a, b). Later more details were available in the SSAFE Organization 
Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment guidance and tool where it was stated that 
“The GFSI Board of Directors endorses the SSAFE activities related to food fraud 
[referring to the SSAFE Food Fraud Mitigation Guide and Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment Tool”] (SSAFE 2015). Finally, the requirements were published in the 
GFSI Guidance Document (GFSI 2017). More compliance details about the stan-
dards are presented by the Certification Program Organizations (CPOs).
Fig. 12.3 GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank Presentation of the Food Safety Management System 
umbrella including the concepts of HACCP, TACCP, and VACCP assigned? (Copyright Permission 
Granted) (Spink 2013, GFSI 2014a, b)
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Conducting three separate assessments—one for HACCP, another for TACCP, 
and then one for VACCP—is actually more efficient than expanding HACCP into 
one complex, interdisciplinary method. The root causes that apply to TACCP and 
VACCP are fundamentally different than for HACCP.  Conducting three assess-
ments does not triple the work; it actually is easier and more efficient. Further, it 
could actually also be efficient to conduct separate more focused assessments for 
each specific types of fraud. It might be simpler to conduct more specific assess-
ments since the root cause for different types of theft is (e.g., cargo theft, employee 
theft, shoplifting, return fraud, warranty fraud, etc.) so different.
Next, the separate concepts will be reviewed in more detail including HACCP, 
VACCP, and TACCP (Spink 2013).
Sidebar: Background GFSI First Addressing Food Fraud
In July 2012 the GFSI Board of Directors created a Food Fraud Think Tank 
(GFSI-FFTT) to review if—and possibly how—they should address food 
fraud. The project was spearheaded and championed by then GFSI Chair Yves 
Rey (Danone) and also co-GFSI Board Member sponsor Frank Yiannas 
(Wal-mart). The group was originally called the “Economic Adulteration” 
Think Tank. After considering the full range of risks, and specifically basing 
decisions on the previous work by ISO product fraud, the group changed the 
title and focus to food fraud. Early on the focus was clearly on “what” food 
fraud is and “if” it was something that should be addressed by GFSI.
During the early GFSI-FFTT work, the horsemeat incident occurred in 
September 2012. This new incident increased the sense of urgency and impor-
tance of the group. Food fraud evolved from a unique and rare event to some-
thing that could have a catastrophic impact on a product, brand, or even a 
company. In July 2014 the final recommendation was published by the GFSI 
Board of Directors in the “GFSI Position on Mitigating the Public Health Risk 
of Food Fraud” (GFSI 2014a, b).
Early on the GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank identified that prevention of 
food fraud required a fundamentally different approach than for food safety or 
food defense. The GFSI scope was to focus on prevention based on root cause 
analysis. While detecting fraud is important, the total quality management- 
based perspective is to change or modify the environmental characteristics 
that allow the anomaly, nonconformance, or defect to occur. This insight iden-
tified a necessary shift from HACCP and TACCP type approaches to focus on 
the “fraud opportunity” or “vulnerability.” Thus, this identified the need for a 
separate assessment that is referred to as VACCP.
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Sidebar: GFSI Releases Food Fraud Position Paper and GFSI Food 
Fraud Think Tank (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: GFSI Releases Food Fraud Position Paper & GFSI Food Fraud Think 
Tank
By John Spink • July 15, 2014 • Blog
Earlier tonight the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) Board released its 
position paper on food fraud prevention. The GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank 
(GFSI-FFTT), created in 2012, was identified as a key contributor to the 
development of their position. The GFSI-FFTT members included our MSU 
Food Fraud initiative, Danone, Eurofins, Inscatech, Royal Ahold, and Wal-mart. 
We are proud that our work was helpful, and they recognized us stating “…the 
Food Fraud Initiative at Michigan State University, leading the academic field 
of criminology with a special focus on food fraud.” Our MSU work is focused 
on a very rational approach to prevention.
The goal of our blog series is to review and address some of the timely and 
important food fraud concepts. The clear GFSI position in the position paper 
is extremely important because it formally states the official position of the 
GFSI Board and GFSI. This is a statement of what the GFSI Board expects to 
find in a thorough and competent Food Safety Management System. We will 
review some of the key points below.
GFSI Position on Mitigating the Public Health Risk of Food Fraud.
Broad Definition of Food Fraud: GFSI formally defined their broad defini-
tion of food fraud to include adulteration, but also all fraud – explicitly includ-
ing misbranding and stolen goods. Stolen goods present an especially complex 
challenge because authenticity testing would, of course, identify the product 
correctly as genuine. Stolen goods can present a public health threat since 
they may have been mishandled. Also, their date or lot codes could have been 
tampered.
• “Food fraud, including the subcategory of economically motivated adul-
teration, is of growing concern. It is deception of consumers using food 
products, ingredients and packaging for economic gain and includes sub-
stitution, unapproved enhancements, misbranding, counterfeiting, stolen 
goods or others” (GFSI 2014a, b).
• “The GFSI Board recognizes that the driver of a food fraud incident might 
be an economic gain, but if a public health threat arises from the effects of 
an adulterated product, this will lead to a food safety incident” (GFSI 
2014a, b) .
It should be emphasized that a holistic food fraud prevention plan addresses 
more than adulteration and expands beyond ingredients. These ingredients 
may be the most significant risk, but others can still lead to food safety inci-
dents. (A future blog post will address the confusing concept that the US 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act could be used to determine a product to be 
(continued)
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“Adulterated Foods” – unfit for commerce – but there doesn’t need to be an 
“adulterant.” A stolen good would be classified by the FDCA as “Adulterated 
Foods.”). The broad definition of food fraud is a key concept to help increase 
transparency in the supply chain.
Requires a Unique Prevention Approach  – Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment and a Food Fraud Control Plan: The paper frequently cites the 
work of the Food Fraud Think Tank specifically in the development of the 
foundational concepts. Those base concepts include emphasizing that a differ-
ent skill set is required than is used for mitigating food safety or food defense 
threats. The mitigation plan concepts are similar to HACCP or basic quality 
management systems: identify the vulnerabilities and have a control plan in 
place.
• “The GFSI Think Tank recommends that two fundamental steps be taken 
by the food industry to aid in the mitigation of food fraud:
 – “Firstly, to carry out a “food fraud vulnerability assessment” in which 
information is collected at the appropriate points along the supply chain 
(including raw materials, ingredients, [finished] products, packaging) 
and evaluated to identify and prioritize significant vulnerabilities for 
food fraud.”
 – “Secondly, ‘appropriate control measures shall be put in place to reduce 
the risks’ from these vulnerabilities. These control measures can include 
monitoring strategy, a testing strategy, origin verification, specification 
management, supplier audits, and anti-counterfeit technologies. A 
clearly documented control plan outlines when, where and how to miti-
gate fraudulent activities.”
Auditor Competence – Audit the Plan Does Not Find Bad Guys: GFSI is 
clear that the expectations are for the auditors to check for the presence of the 
assessment and the plan. They note this is similar to HACCP audits. Follow-up 
engagements may include consulting to help the company improve the control 
of their facility, but that is not specifically part of the HACCP “audit.” We 
included similar statements in our submission to the US FDA’s request for 
comments on the FSMA Intentional Adulteration (FSMA-IA) draft rule.
Implementation – Guidance Document Version 7 in 2016: This is a clear 
statement that food fraud prevention will be required for your company to be 
“GFSI Compliant.” Version 7 will be published in 2016, and there will also be 
an additional time period after that during which the GFSI-recognized 
schemes and audit strategies will be developed. However, there is no doubt 
that food fraud prevention requirements are coming. GFSI Compliance is 
required to sell the product to many companies. No GFSI certificate, no sale.
Global Laws and Regulations – Beyond GFSI: It is important to emphasize 
that while this is a GFSI position paper, governments around the world are 
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 Key Learning Objective 2: GFSI HACCP (Food Safety) 
and TACCP (Food Defense)
This section reviews the GFSI Food Safety Management System (FSMS) topics of 
food safety addressed through HACCP and food defense addressed through TACCP.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Food safety and HACCP
• (2) Food defense and TACCP
• (3) Other non-GFSI related to food safety and food defense requirements
 HACCP (Food Safety)
In addition to GFSI food fraud requirements that are addressed in VACCP, the two 
other pillars of the Food Safety Management System are for food safety in HACCP 
and for food defense in TACCP.
HACCP is a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point plan. It is a widely 
adopted system for addressing and preventing food safety incidents (FDA 2017).
From FDA.gov:
• HACCP: “A systematic approach to the identification, evaluation, and control of 
food safety” hazards.
working to address food fraud. Addressing food fraud will eventually be 
required for regulatory compliance.
While some people may think today’s press release will have huge rippled 
effects, it really wasn’t earth-shattering. It’s not a surprise to those who have 
been paying attention. Companies and countries have been rising to meet food 
fraud head-on. Regardless of the compliance requirements, every single day 
there are food fraud vulnerabilities that threaten the safety of the supply chain. 
Be proactive. Don’t just start going crazy trying to implement programs or 
countermeasures and control systems. Take the first step of getting familiar 
with reports like the GFSI Food Fraud position paper. Also, reach out to the 
many training and educational opportunities. For example, see our website for 
a range of educational programs. MSU-FFI.
[Note 2018: GFSI shifted from the term Scheme Owner and schemes to 
Certification Program Owner and standards. Regarding the term “scheme,” 
GFSI uses a more European definition of this term meaning a “plan for doing 
something” rather than the more American insinuation of “a crafty plot.” A 
“crafty plot” implies trickery, deception, or some type of cheating. Reference: 
Webster’s Dictionary (Merriam-Webster 2004).
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• HACCP Plan: “The written document which is based upon the principles of 
HACCP and which delineates the procedures to be followed.”
• HACCP System: “The result of the implementation of the HACCP Plan.”
• Hazard Analysis: “The process of collecting and evaluating information on haz-
ards associated with the food under consideration to decide which are significant 
and must be addressed in the HACCP plan.”
• Prerequisite Programs: “Procedures, including Good Manufacturing Practices, 
that address operational conditions providing the foundation for the HACCP 
system.”
The FDA “HACCP Principles & Application Guidelines” clearly separates pre-
requisite programs and HACCP:
“Prerequisite programs are established and managed separately from the HACCP plan.”
This separation of the prerequisite program and HACCP system seems trivial, but it 
is imperative for compliance. An important differentiation is where controls can be 
implemented and can be monitored to assure it does actually control or reduce the 
hazard. For food fraud prevention, many controls in a HACCP plan would only 
identify the problem and—other than removing the bad product, even if it is the 
entire inventory which would stop the production line—not provide a preventive 
measure or true corrective action. Consider the FDA HACCP definitions:
• Control: (a) To manage the conditions of an operation to maintain compliance 
with established criteria. (b) The state where correct procedures are being fol-
lowed and criteria are being met.
• Control Measure: Any action or activity that can be used to prevent, eliminate, 
or reduce a significant hazard.
• Control Point: Any step at which biological, chemical, or physical factors can 
be controlled.
• Corrective Action: Procedures followed when a deviation occurs.
• Critical Control Point (CCP): A step at which control can be applied and is 
essential to prevent or eliminate a food safety hazard or reduce it to an acceptable 
level.
To compare definitions, from ISO 9000 Quality Management:
• Preventive action: “action to eliminate the cause of a potential nonconformity 
(3.6.9) or other potential undesirable situation; Note 1 to entry: There can be 
more than one cause for a potential nonconformity; Note 2 to entry: Preventive 
action is taken to prevent occurrence whereas corrective action (3.12.2) is taken 
to prevent recurrence.”
• Corrective action: “action to eliminate the cause of a nonconformity (3.6.9) and 
to prevent recurrence; Note 1 to entry: There can be more than one cause for a 
nonconformity; Note 2 to entry: Corrective action is taken to prevent recurrence 
whereas preventive action (3.12.1) is taken to prevent occurrence; Note 3 to 
entry: This constitutes one of the common terms and core definitions for ISO 
management system standards given in Annex SL of the Consolidated ISO 
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Supplement to the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. The original definition has been 
modified by adding Notes 1 and 2 to entry.”
• Correction: “action to eliminate a detected nonconformity; Note 1 to entry: A 
correction can be made in advance of, in conjunction with or after a corrective 
action; Note 2 to entry: A correction can be, for example, rework or regrade.”
From the GMA HACCP Manual, there are specific differences between a prereq-
uisite program and the HACCP program (GMA 2006):
• “Prerequisite programs deal only indirectly with food safety issues, HACCP 
plans deals solely and directly with food safety issues.”
• “Prerequisite programs are more general and may be applicable throughout the 
plant, crossing multiple product lines, while HACCP plans are based on hazard 
analyses that are product and line-specific.”
• “Failures to meet a prerequisite program requirement seldom result in a food 
safety hazard or concern, while deviations from a HACCP plan critical limit 
typically result in action to prevent product from entering commercial distribu-
tion, at least until its safety has been evaluated.”
The application to the type of countermeasures and control systems for food fraud 
prevention consider “Prerequisite programs include objectives other than food 
safety and it may be difficult to associate performance of a prerequisite program 
element with specific production lots or batches. Thus, usually, it is more effective 
to manage prerequisite programs within a quality system rather than as part of a 
HACCP plan” (GMA 2006).
Finally, the GMA HACCP Manual states:
“In the US, however, both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA/FSIS) have acknowledged that HACCP should focus only on food 
safety hazards. Thus, quality and economic issues (not involving safety) should be excluded 
[from the HACCP scope].” And “Only those hazards that pose significant risk to the health 
of consumers are included in a HACCP plan.”
To summarize, a HACCP plan covers:
 1. An identified imminent food safety hazard that if not addressed will cause harm.
 2. Where countermeasures and control systems can be implemented within the 
facility to effectively reduce the hazard—if they cannot be controlled or pre-
vented during these operations, then they should be addressed before the HACCP 
system in a prerequisite program.
Food fraud is usually not in the scope of a HACCP plan for many reasons includ-
ing that the incident almost always does not have a health hazard and that the control 
measures are outside the facility operations. Considering that, even authenticity 
tests on incoming goods would be conducted by the facility laboratory which is 
technically a “prerequisite program” (PRP). The laboratory and incoming goods 
quality testing is not technically the manufacturing operation. There are so many 
high-priority food safety hazards that it is not efficient or wise to divert the HACCP 
attention to other issues such as food fraud or food defense. That said, standard 
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operating procedures can be added to regular facility tasks, but the focus and 
direction would formally be from outside the HACCP plan.
 TACCP (Food Defense)
TACCP is Threat Assessment and Critical Control Plan activities (Note: TACCP 
uses the term assessment, and HACCP uses analysis). When the GFSI Food Fraud 
Think Tank was conducting research in 2012, the UK Public Available Standard 96 
Food Defence (PAS 96:2010) had compliance requirements for the TACCP term, 
and the scope was initially been the traditional food defense (intentional acts with 
the goal of terror, economic, or public health harm) (PAS 96 2014). Later the PAS96 
scope expanded to include some aspects of “economically motivated adulteration” 
(PAS 96 2017).
The general definition of food defense is the intentional acts that have the intent 
to harm including health hazards, economic harm, or terror. It is confusing that after 
the publication of the FSMA Intentional Adulteration Final Rule, the FDA essen-
tially changed their definition of food defense only to cover “wide-scale human 
health harm” (FDA 2016). To note, “food terrorism” is defined by the WHO in 
2002, but is a term not usually used with only four results on their website. A chal-
lenge is that, in part, there is often a particular requirement that this act is conducted 
by someone classified as a “terrorist” or by a recognized “terrorist organization.”
Since there are various programs that address one type of an “intentional act with 
the intent to harm,” it is important to reiterate the GFSI definition and scope of food 
defense which is all types of acts which is broader than, but inclusive of, the 
FSMA-IA scope of “wide-scale human health harms”:
Food Defense (GFSI): “The process to ensure the security of food and drink and their sup-
ply chains from all forms of intentional malicious attack including ideologically motivated 
attack leading to contamination or supply failure” (GFSI 2012, 2017).
For GFSI compliance there must be three separate assessments and also that they 
are combined in the overall Food Safety Management System (FSMS)—the assess-
ments do not function as stand-alone, so there is efficient overall management. Thus 
the concepts of HACCP and TACCP are separate, and the Food Safety Management 
System is complete only when including a separate VACCP.
Sidebar: Review—Final Rule for FSMA Intentional Adulteration (Food 
Defense) Regarding Food Fraud and EMA (MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: Review – Final Rule for FSMA Intentional Adulteration (Food Defense) 
Regarding Food Fraud and EMA
By John Spink • June 22, 2016 • Blog
Continuing the review of the definition and scope of “intentional with the 
intent to harm” is a review of the US Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) 
Intentional Adulteration Final Rule (FSMA-IA):
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This is a detailed, 22-page review of the food fraud aspects or requirements 
of the recently published Food Safety Modernization Act Intentional 
Adulteration (food defense) Final Rule (FSMA-IA). In addition to regular 
contributors Spink & Moyer, we are pleased to add MSU’s Dr. Andrew Huff 
(College of Veterinary Medicine, MSU) and University of Auckland’s (NZ) 
Bradley Evans (Business School, Department of Management). While there 
are no new food fraud requirements, there are tremendous insights into related 
FSMA compliance.
This Intentional Adulteration Final Rule is the seventh and last that will be 
published by the FDA.
Yesterday FDA conducted their second public meeting (May 26, 2016, and 
June 21, 2016) to present and clarify the FSMA-IA requirements. The 
Appendix of our full report includes a summary of both of those meetings.
Overall:
• For food fraud prevention compliance (required in September 2017):
 – It appears that the current broad Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
and Food Fraud Prevention Plan activities will lead to compliance with 
FSMA-PC.
• For food defense compliance (required in at least 3 years in May 2019):
 – assess how (and if) the FDA requirements will change from current 
programs, wait for more details on what is a ‘significant vulnerability’ 
that must be mitigated, also seek clarity on what is a ‘credible threat’ 
that would trigger a re-evaluation of the food defense plan.
From our report, Final Rule for FSMA Intentional Adulteration (food 
defense) regarding food fraud and EMA:
• The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Intentional Adulteration 
Rule (FSMA-IA) draft was published in December 2013, public meetings 
started in February 2014, and the final rule was published May 27, 2016. 
The effective date is in 60 days but “[FDA] are providing for a longer time-
line for facilities to come into compliance” in at least 3 years, or May 2019.
• Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) – and food fraud (FF) – is in 
the FSMA law due to the text “…intentional adulteration, including acts of 
terrorism.” FDA announced their scope narrowed to “wide-scale [human] 
public health harms” and removed from this rule the concepts of EMA, 
disgruntled employees, tampering, etc. The FSMA compliance require-
ments for FF & EMA are in the Preventive Controls Rule (FSMA-PC).
• FSMA-IA also continually confirms many times that the Food, Drug & 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA) is still in effect, which includes all types of food 
fraud, even without a health hazard (“Adulterated Foods” and “Misbranded 
Foods”).
(continued)
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Even though food fraud (FF) and Economically Motivated Adulteration 
(EMA) is not a compliance requirement for FSMA-IA, this final rule provides 
essential insight into FSMA and assessments:
• Addressing all types of food fraud is a requirement – and subject to a prod-
uct recall – under the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA).
• FDA specifically reiterated the FDCA compliance requirement in sections 
on “Adulterated Foods” and “Misbranded Foods.”
• FSMA-IA stated that stolen goods (various types of theft) that lead to a 
public health hazard are clearly defined and expected to be covered under 
FSMA-PC.
 – Note: FDA has stated that “theft” is an act for economic gain where 
quoted in FSMA-IA: “With respect to the prevalence of theft of food 
during transport, such theft is economically motivated; the scope of this 
rule is limited to acts of intentional adulteration where the intent is to 
cause wide-scale public health harm” (FDA 2016).
• There were no more clarifications of key terms such as reasonably foresee-
able hazard, significant vulnerability, a rare occurrence, credible threat, or 
the threshold of acceptable or unacceptable.
The compliance requirement for food fraud prevention is addressed in 
FSMA-PC and not in this FSMA-IA. Other FSMA final rules provide some 
insight on FDA’s thinking regarding assessments, thresholds of acceptable /
unacceptable, and the compliance priorities (see appendix of the full report 
regarding the May 26, 2016, FDA public call).
Reviewing FSMA compliance is exhausting. There are seven long Final 
Rules that impact all aspects of a food company. There are minute details that 
can lead to a product recall or regulatory penalties. We have focused on the 
food fraud aspects – and tried to provide as brief and concise insight as pos-
sible – so hopefully this one part of FSMA you can quickly address. We have 
been continually adjusting our research focus to provide academic theory, in 
the form of scholarly publications, to support your countermeasures and con-
trol systems. Many resources are available for assisting your FSMA compli-
ance. Find trusted resources and rely on them. MSU-FFI.
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Sidebar: GFSI Compliance Requirements in Relation to US Laws and 
Regulations
Compliance timing for the various food fraud laws, regulations, industry stan-
dards, and certifications are complex and not necessarily aligned with each 
other. The following summarizes the compliance timing requirements 
(Table 12.1).
Table 12.1 Summary of compliance requirements regarding food fraud
Requirement
Effective 
date Scope
Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act—Section 
on “Adulterated Foods” 
and “Misbranded Foods”
1938 All type of food fraud is illegal and unfit for commerce, 
and regardless of the investigation or enforcement 
priority, they are subject to a product recall. Not 
addressing food fraud could be literally a criminal act
Requirement: Assess and address “hazards that require a 
preventive control”—They do not specifically mention 
or address food fraud
Consequence: Illegal product could be subject to 
product recall and financial penalties
Sarbanes-Oxley act 2002 All types of business fraud that could lead to a negative 
economic impact on revenue or equity; the annual 
report states that all risks are with the risk tolerance or 
reported; not reporting is a federal crime
Requirement: Address or disclose risks to revenue
Consequence: Not an enforcement priority but 
noncompliance could be a felony crime
FSMA preventive 
controls
September 
2016
All types of food fraud that lead to a “hazard that 
requires a preventive control” (to determine this 
requirement, all food fraud types must be assessed)
Requirement and consequence: See FDCA above
GFSI version 7 
(including certification 
programs such as FSSC, 
SQF, etc.)
January 
2018
All types of food fraud must be assessed and prevention 
plans implemented for health hazards
Requirement: Conduct and document annually a (1) 
food fraud vulnerability assessment and (2) food fraud 
prevention strategy and (3) address the GFSI scope. 
Note: FFVA—And food defense vulnerability 
assessment—Must be separate from the food safety 
assessment
Consequence: Noncompliance will lead to being 
decertified
GFSI Certification 
Programs Organizations 
(CPOs)
January 
2018
The core requirements are from GFSI, and each CPO 
has some additional requirements or details
Requirement and consequence: See GFSI above
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 Key Learning Objective 3: GFSI VACCP (Food Fraud) 
and Auditing
This section reviews the GFSI FSMA topics of food fraud addressed through 
VACCP defined in 2014. The 2018 GFSI food fraud requirements should have been 
no surprise to anyone since the specification and scope were clearly defined in 2014. 
That said, there were many misunderstandings or misinterpretations when practitio-
ners were addressing the definition, scope, or exact requirements. VACCP is the 
Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment and also the plan to select, implement, and 
manage the critical control points in the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) The overall food fraud and VACCP concept
• (2) Review of the GFSI-endorsed Certified Program Organizations (food safety 
standards)
• (3) The role of accredited third-party auditors in food fraud prevention.
 VACCP (Food Fraud)
VACCP is Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Point plan activities. (It is 
important to note that the term “vulnerability” is used on other contexts such as in 
FSMA where addressing a “food defense vulnerability” (FDA 2016)—it is a best 
practice to provide definitions of the terms you are addressing.) The VACCP con-
cept includes a vulnerability assessment (the “VA” in VACCP) through to identify-
ing system weaknesses that are critical control points (the “CCP” in VACCP) and 
then developing, implementing, and managing a plan or strategy.
The GFSI-FFTT focus on vulnerability was based on a realization that the under-
lying root cause was fundamentally different than for food safety (HACCP) or food 
defense (TACCP). The GFSI-FFTT recommendations were incorporated in the 
GSFSI position paper on food fraud which then was directly included in the GFSI 
Guidance Document.
From the GFSI Version 7.2 Guidance Document glossary (GFSI 2017):
• “Food Fraud (GFSI Glossary 7.2): A collective term encompassing the delib-
erate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering or misrepresentation of 
food, food ingredients or food packaging, labeling, product information or false 
or misleading statements made about a product for economic gain that could 
impact consumer health.”
• “Food Fraud Vulnerability assessment (GFSI Glossary 7.2): Susceptibility or 
exposure to a food fraud risk, which is regarded as a gap or deficiency that could 
place consumer health at risk if not addressed.”
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The GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document reiterates these requirements and 
further explains that the scope addresses all fraud and for all products:
• “Both definitions [GFSI 2014 and GFSI 2017] cover all types of fraud and all 
products and highlight that the motivation behind food fraud is intentional and 
economically driven, i.e., potentially linked to criminal activities and at least 
aiming to avoid detection” (GFSI 2014a, b, 2017).
Earlier, in December 2014, the GFSI position paper gave clear direction on the 
expectations. The recommendation was almost exactly the same as in the February 
2017 GFSI Guidance Document Version 7 requirements.
• “The below key elements were prepared by the Guidance Document Technical 
Working Group based on the recommendations of the Food Fraud Think Tank. 
The consultation will continue during the development of Version 7 of the 
Guidance Document.”
• “‘Food fraud vulnerability assessment’ requirements: The standard shall require 
that the organization have a documented food fraud vulnerability assessment in 
place to identify potential vulnerability and prioritize food fraud vulnerability 
control measures.”
• “‘Food fraud vulnerability control plan’ requirements: The standard shall require 
that the organization have a documented plan in place that specifies the control 
measures the organization has implemented to minimize the public health risks 
from the identified food fraud vulnerabilities.”
• “This plan shall cover the relevant GFSI scope and shall be supported by the 
organization’s Food Safety Management System.”
Later in the GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document, “the Organization” was defined 
in more detail:
• “The requirements refer to the “The Organization”: While the traditional 
HACCP-type food safety approach is applied at manufacturing facilities, 
these operate within the overall organization. The food fraud vulnerabilities 
are company- wide, and thus the food fraud scope is company-wide” (GFSI 
2018a, b).
• “This implies that any plans and activities to mitigate, prevent or even under-
stand the risks associated with food fraud should consider an entire company’s 
activities, including some that may not be within the traditional food safety or 
even HACCP scope, applying methods closer to criminal investigation” (GFSI 
2018a, b).
The “relevant GFSI scope” was defined in the position paper and then in the 
Guidance Document (GFSI 2017).
The definition from the GFSI position paper is (GFSI 2014a, b):
• “Food fraud, including the subcategory of economically motivated adulteration, 
is of growing concern. It is deception of consumers using food products, ingre-
dients and packaging for economic gain and includes substitution, unapproved 
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enhancements, misbranding, counterfeiting, stolen goods or others” (GFSI 
2014a, b).
GFSI presents two crucial points which are:
• Economically motivated adulteration is not the same as food fraud.
• The scope of food fraud includes all types of fraud (from adulterant-substances 
to stolen goods and counterfeits) and for all products (raw ingredients through 
finished packaged goods in the marketplace).
The GFSI requirements did come with some guidance or insight on how to meet 
compliance (GFSI 2014a, b):
• “The GFSI Board will support SSAFE’s initiative which aims to develop and 
publish practical guidelines for companies on ‘how’ to assess and control food 
fraud vulnerabilities within their organizations and supply chains.”
Sidebar: GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document, May 2018 (MSU-FFI 
2018)
Title: Review of GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document
By John Spink, • May 17, 2018 • Blog
Last week on May 9, 2018, the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) pub-
lished a Food Fraud Technical Document titled “Tackling Food Fraud Through 
Food Safety Management Systems,” which outlines the new compliance 
requirements (GFSI 2018a, b). Some requirements may be surprising or lead 
to audit non-conformances, but the basic principles are not new. In addition to 
this new document, there are many training and education resources, includ-
ing a few listed below. This new document is a key resource for confirming 
the definition, scope, starting point, and the expectation for these first compli-
ance requirements.
Excerpt from the MSU FFI Report:
Title: Review of GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document: Tackling Food 
Fraud through Food Safety Management Systems, MSU Food Fraud Initiative 
Report FFIR, May 16, 2018.
Summary
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) published the GFSI Food Fraud 
Technical Document titled “Tackling Food Fraud through Food Safety 
Management Systems” (GFSI 2018a, b). This publication supports the previ-
ous reports on the GFSI food fraud position paper (2014) and GFSI 
Benchmarking Document (2017) (Fig.  12.4) (GFSI 2012, 2017). This new 
document reinforces the previous GFSI statements and supports the efforts to 
“just get started.” This new document is a key for confirming the definition, 
scope, starting point, and the expectation for the first compliance require-
ments. While HACCP is 20+ years in development, the GFSI food fraud 
requirements have only been in effect for 20  weeks. The new food fraud 
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requirements help move the risk assessors from “point A” to just “point B” 
and not all the way to a full HACCP-type plan which would be “point Z.” 
While “Point Z” is the ultimate goal, we must get to “Point B” before moving 
to “Point C,” “Point D” and on. This new technical document reviews the 
previous statements and clarifies the near path forward.
Conclusion
The critical conclusion points from the GFSI Food Fraud Technical 
Document include:
• Holistic scope – all fraud and all products: The scope is all types of fraud 
(from adulterant-substances to counterfeits and stolen goods) and all prod-
ucts (from incoming goods through to product in the marketplace includ-
ing counterfeits.) All types of fraud and all products can cause health 
hazards and lead to economic harm.
• Just get started: There is continued emphasis on starting the process that 
will be supported by continuous improvement and sharing of best 
practices.
• Auditors are to confirm the process, not judge the plans: To begin the com-
pliance, the scope is to confirm the process is started.
GFSI emphasized several key points, and our FFI Insight is included here 
(selected sections):
• ‘(2) “While a Food Fraud Manager is “accountable” for the full compli-
ance, they may not be “responsible” for each of the individual tasks. For 
example, managing and monitoring stolen goods may already be con-
ducted by a supply chain logistics or corporate security staff.”
Fig. 12.4 GFSI series of documents that address Food Fraud: Position Paper 2014, Benchmarking 
Document 2017, and Technical Report 2018 (Copyright Permission Granted) (MSU-FFI 2018)
(continued)
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 – FFI Insight: The GFSI document provides more detailed insight into 
compliance by explaining some details of the implementation. A con-
cern by industry has been that a new food fraud task force would require 
many new staff members. This GFSI statement emphasizes that all the 
topics must be covered, but they could possibly be implemented by 
other current staff.
 – FFI Insight: It is significant that GFSI uses a non-traditional food safety 
example such as stolen goods that are not usually under the account-
ability of a food quality assurance team.
• ‘(3) “The requirements refer to “The Organization:” While the traditional 
HACCP-type food safety approach is applied at manufacturing facilities, 
these operate within the overall organization. The food fraud vulnerabili-
ties are company-wide, and thus the food fraud scope is company-wide.”
 – FFI Insight: GFSI is clear that the food fraud vulnerability assessment 
and prevention strategy is intended to cover the entire organization, not 
just the facility that may be the location of an audit. A traditional food 
safety audit focuses on HACCP so would focus on the operations of a 
facility or manufacturing location. For food fraud, the overall vulnera-
bility and control plans may be completely and competently addressed 
at the enterprise-wide level. Thus, a manufacturing site audit could rely 
on a company-wide assessment. Unless there is a unique operational 
activity, each manufacturing facility would usually not be required to 
conduct a separate review.
• ‘(8) “(B) Understand the difference between hazard (a potential source of 
harm), risk (the probability of loss or injury from a hazard) and vulnerabil-
ity (susceptibility to a risk): many hazards will have a low or very low 
likelihood and therefore not represent a risk; likewise, the susceptibility of 
a company or system to a risk is not only linked to the severity of this risk 
but more to the company’s awareness of their weakness and how they man-
age it.” … While an “all hazards” assessment approach is important, all 
vulnerabilities are not risks, all risks are not hazards, and all hazards are 
not hazards that require a preventive control. The final mitigation plan 
must focus on those vulnerabilities that require a preventive control as 
identified through a carefully and documented analysis of the risks, likeli-
hood and fraud opportunities.”
 – FFI Insight: GFSI calms an industry concern that each and every identi-
fied vulnerability would require a control plan. Thus, this all-hazards 
approach allows for a broad lens to monitor the possible root cause 
while including a clear method to narrow the focus to only the worst 
problems. The GFSI requirements are for “a” method to conduct this 
assessment with no prescribed or required approaches.
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• ‘(12) “With this in mind, there is an awareness that addressing food fraud 
is new and different for those being audited as well as for the auditors: 
“The auditor is not expected to detect fraud or affirm that an anti-fraud 
program is capable of “preventing fraud.” This approach is very much in 
line with the verification of a HACCP plan during the food safety audit.”
 – FFI Insight: GFSI includes a practical and pragmatic approach that 
emphasizes the auditors be “not expected to detect fraud or affirm the 
anti-fraud program.” The audit is intended to confirm that a food fraud 
vulnerability assessment is in place and that there is a food fraud pre-
vention strategy, and that it covers the relevant GFSI scope. Industry-
wide compliance with these first efforts will be a key advancement from 
“point A” to “point B.” As time goes on, there will be more advanced 
programs that will provide insight into more advanced audit 
requirements.
 – FFI Insight: To reinforce this point, the key and optimal first role of the 
auditor  – especially now only 20  weeks into the food fraud require-
ments – not 20 months or 20 years – is to confirm the requirements are 
being addressed, documented, and cover the relevant GFSI scope.
The new GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document reinforces the previous 
statements and supports the efforts to “just get started.” Next will be “how to 
start,” then “how much is enough.” The new GFSI Food Fraud Technical 
Document is very important since we now have a firm and clear starting point 
to address food fraud prevention. Use this as a spark for you to start or refine 
your food fraud prevention strategies. See the link to the GFSI document, our 
review, or the resources below. MSU-FFI.
Also, the GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document included:
• References
 – GFSI Position Paper (2014).
 – GFSI Benchmarking Document, V7.0 (2017).
 – GFSI Benchmarking Documents, V7.2 (2018).
 – GFSI, Global Food Safety Initiative (2014b). Food Fraud – Threats & 
Impact – an Industry Perspective, Presented by Neil Marshall for GFSI, 
EU Food Integrity Project -Food Authenticity Technology Conference, 
UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Development 
(DEFRA), York, England.
• Other Resources
 – Food Fraud Overview and History [includes the history of the GFSI 
Food Fraud Think Tank, Position Paper, and inclusion in the GFSI 
Benchmarking Document], Presented by John Spink, Food Fraud 
Session, GFSI Annual Conference, Tokyo, 2018,
(continued)
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 Comparison of GFSI Standards Related to Food Fraud
A comparison of GFSI standards presented the similarities in the standards and 
confirmed that all GFSI standards DO require addressing food fraud, and there are 
seven basic common requirements that will be presented below.
“Food fraud regulations and requirements are relatively new to food manufacturers and 
often are not consistent and clear. This was created to provide clarity around Certified 
Program Organizations’ expectations and to provide recommendations on harmonization of 
these standards. This report will be useful to food manufacturers seeking to create one food 
fraud plan that can satisfy multiple CPO’s requirements.”
The GFSI Guidance Document (the overall expectations but not actually written 
standards) that first included food fraud requirements was published on February 
26, 2017. The Certification Program Organizations (the actual written standards) 
are updated on a rolling schedule every few years that includes new GFSI require-
ments. GFSI does state when the new requirements are expected to be adopted 
which was 1 year after publishing so January 1, 2018 (Table 12.2).
Each of the standards includes separate documentation that is varied in the defi-
nition and scope of food fraud. Each standard broadly covered food fraud under 
general quality and label claim controls. To maintain their “GFSI Endorsement” 
over time, each standard has expanded or formalized how they address food fraud 
prevention (Table 12.3). The Certification Program Organizations is required to:
Summary of Food Fraud CPO Requirement to Attain and Maintain GFSI 
Endorsement
• (1) Address the full GFSI food fraud requirements for audits starting in January 
2017.
• (2) Auditors have been trained on food fraud.
• (3) Also have had an assessment on the concept.
To review the GFSI requirements of the CPO to the CBs (emphasis added):
• Competence is “The demonstrated ability to apply knowledge and skills to 
achieve intended results.”
 – URL (5-minutes): https://youtu.be/mg67m5c3lTE
 – Food Fraud Update and Terminology Survey, Presented by John Spink, 
GMA Science Forum 2018,
 – URL (21-minutes): https://youtu.be/lZNwilEz6fM
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• “The GFSI Auditor Exam: “Version 7.2 introduces the requirements for any audi-
tors of GFSI-recognised certification programmes to have passed an exam based 
on the content of the GFSI Benchmarking Requirements” (GFSI 2018a, b).
Also, it is important to note that GFSI also requires training and demonstration 
of competence by the brand owners and manufacturers:
“GMP D 16, EL 17 Training: The standard shall require that a system be in place to ensure 
that all employees are adequately trained, instructed and supervised in food safety princi-
ples and practices, commensurate with their activity.”
The CPO standards are based on or seeking to maintain GFSI endorsement, so 
they are consistent in their core starting point in addressing food fraud. Each 
 standard has additional requirements that are unique which build upon the base 
Guidance Document content.
An underlying principle of the GFSI Food Safety Management System is to cre-
ate a single, common, standardized scope that can meet a wide range of compliance 
requirements. The harmonized system will lead to efficiency using one system but 
also benefits from the sharing of best practices and benchmarking.
Table 12.2 From the source, documents noting the organization, document title, and document 
publication date (Dickenson et al. 2019)
Organization
Document 
type Document title (fees are noted)
Document publication 
date
GFSI Benchmarking GFSI Guidance Document v7.0 and 7.1 
(GFSI 2017)
February 2017 
(updated April 2017 
and December 2017)
BRC Standard BRC Global Standard Food Safety Issue 
8 (Sect. 5.4 Product authenticity, claims, 
and chain of custody) + (BRC 2018)
August 2018
BRC Guidance BRC Global Standard for Food Safety 
Issue 7 Understanding Vulnerability 
Assessment (BRC 2015)
January 2015
IFS Standard IFS Food: Standard for auditing quality 
and food safety of food products V6.1 
(4.21 Food Fraud) (IFS 2017)
November 2017
IFS Guidance IFS Product Fraud Guideline (IFS 2018) May 2018
SQF Standard SQF Code, eighth edition (Part B, section 
2.7) (Institute 2017)
October 2016
SQF Guidance Food Fraud Guidance for Sites and 
Auditors (SQF Institute 2018)
August 2018
FSCC 22000 Standard V 4.1 July 2017 (FSSC 2016) July 2017
FSSC 22000 Guidance Guidance on Food Fraud Mitigation 
(FSSC 2018)
April 2018
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Table 12.3 Summary of the source documents for definitions of food fraud and noted as from a 
glossary or from in-text (Dickenson et al. 2019)
Group
Document 
type Definitions—food fraud [1]
Definitions—Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment [1]
GFSI Benchmark A collective term encompassing 
the deliberate and intentional 
substitution, addition, tampering, 
or misrepresentation of food, food 
ingredients, or food packaging, 
labeling, product information, or 
false or misleading statements 
made about a product for 
economic gain that could impact 
consumer health
Susceptibility or exposure to a food 
fraud risk, which is regarded as a gap 
or deficiency that could place 
consumer health at risk if not 
addressed
BRC Standard [Note 2]: Fraudulent and 
intentional substitution, dilution or 
addition to a product or raw 
material, or misrepresentation of 
the product or material, for the 
purpose of financial gain, by 
increasing the apparent value of 
the product or reducing the cost of 
its production
Vulnerability assessment (implied 
FFVA): A risk assessment designed 
to examine processes and supply 
chains for potential food fraud
BRC Guidance Same as standard (In the text, no glossary): A 
vulnerability assessment is a search 
for potential weaknesses in the 
supply chain in order to prevent food 
fraud (i.e., to prevent the adulteration 
or substitution of raw materials 
before they arrive at the site). It is, 
therefore, a specialized form of risk 
assessment. It is important to note 
that the aim of the assessment is not 
to assess the potential for fraud at the 
site, but to examine the supply chain 
for potential concerns or weaknesses 
and therefore to identify those raw 
materials that are of particular risk of 
adulteration or substitution, so that 
appropriate controls can be put in 
place
(continued)
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Table 12.3 (continued)
Group
Document 
type Definitions—food fraud [1]
Definitions—Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment [1]
IFS Standard [Note 2]: The deliberate and 
intentional substitution, 
mislabeling, adulteration, or 
counterfeiting of food, raw 
materials, ingredients, or 
packaging placed upon the market 
for economic gain. This definition 
also applies to outsourced 
processes
A systematic documented form of 
risk assessment to identify the risk of 
possible food fraud activity within 
the supply chain (including all raw 
materials, ingredients, food, 
packaging, and outsourced 
processes). The method of risk 
assessment may vary from company 
to company; however, the systematic 
methodology for food fraud 
vulnerability assessment shall 
include as a minimum (details)
IFS Guidance Technically no definition [2]. The 
document does provide a definition 
of product fraud: The deliberate 
and intentional substitution, 
mislabeling, adulteration, or 
counterfeiting of food, raw 
materials, ingredients, or 
packaging placed upon the market 
for economic gain. This definition 
also applies to outsourced 
processes. (note: The only product 
fraud scope only covers foods)
Technically no definition. The Food 
Fraud Guidance Document does 
provide a definition of Product Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment which 
differs slightly from the FFVA 
definition in the IFS standard: A 
systematic documented form of risk 
assessment to identify the risk of 
possible product fraud activity within 
the supply chain (including all raw 
materials, ingredients, food, and 
packaging) until delivery to the 
customer. The method of risk 
assessment may vary from company 
to company; however, the systematic 
methodology for product fraud 
vulnerability assessment shall 
include as a minimum (details)
SQF Standard As defined by Michigan State 
University, a collective term used 
to encompass the deliberate and 
intentional substitution, addition, 
tampering, or misrepresentation of 
food, food ingredients, or food 
packaging, or false or misleading 
statements made about a product, 
for economic gain
No definition
(continued)
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Table 12.3 (continued)
Group
Document 
type Definitions—food fraud [1]
Definitions—Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment [1]
SQF Guidance (in the text, no glossary): Food 
fraud is often described as EMA, 
economically motivated 
adulteration. However, it is more 
than that. As well as adulteration, 
food fraud includes substitution, 
dilution, addition, 
misrepresentation, or tampering of 
food ingredients or food products. 
It is, in fact, illegal deception for 
economic gain
(In the text, no glossary): The food 
fraud strategy is similar to the 
HACCP methodology that the 
manufacturing sites are familiar 
with. In general terms, it is (1) 
identify the risks (vulnerabilities), 
(2) determine corrective and 
preventative actions (mitigation 
strategies), (3) review and verify, and 
(4) maintain records. The food fraud 
requirements talk about 
“vulnerabilities” rather than “risk.” A 
risk (ISO 31000 Risk Management) 
is something that has occurred 
frequently before and will occur 
again, and there is enough data to 
conduct a statistical assessment. The 
vulnerability is more a condition that 
could lead to an incident (Dr. John 
Spink, MSU). GFSI considers an 
“incident” to be a “consumer health 
risk if not addressed”
FSCC 
22,000
Standard Collective term encompassing the 
intentional substitution, addition, 
tampering, or misrepresentation of 
food/feed, food/feed ingredients, 
or food/feed packaging, labeling, 
product information, or false or 
misleading statements made about 
a product for economic gain that 
could impact consumer health 
(with a reference noted to GFSI 
BRv7:2017)
Technically no definition but a 
glossary entry for vulnerability: 
Susceptibility or exposure to all 
types of food fraud, which is 
regarded as a gap or deficiency that 
could impact consumer health if not 
addressed (GFSI BRv7:2017)
FSSC 
22,000
Guidance The definition that FSSC uses is 
based on the GFSI position paper 
issued in 2014 (same as in the 
standard). Includes appendix 1. 
Types of food fraud—Definition 
and examples
No specific definition but additional 
details such as the following: When 
conducting the FFVA, it is allowed 
to group materials to start with (e.g., 
similar raw materials or similar 
finished products). When significant 
risks are identified within a group, a 
more in-depth analysis may be 
required
[Note 1] note: In a glossary unless noted otherwise
[Note 2] note: This includes a deviation from the GFSI definition of food fraud
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 GFSI Food Fraud Auditor Expectations: Not to Be a Counter- 
Fraud Expert
The GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank—and later GFSI in the 2014 GFSI Food Fraud 
Position Paper and the 2018 GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document—recognized 
the challenges addressing a fundamentally different issue including expertise in 
criminology (GFSI FFTT 2013; GFSI 2014a, b). There was an awareness of the 
challenges for food safety or food quality teams being assigned the responsibility 
for assessing and managing food fraud prevention. Also, a critical component of the 
GFSI system is auditors that can assess compliance with the requirements. These 
were considered in the recommendations and later in the implementation including 
training materials.
The expectation was that the initial audits would confirm that the requirements 
are addressed including the full scope of the types of fraud.
• “During a food safety certification audit, conducted against GFSI recognized 
schemes, the auditor will review the documentation related to the vulnerability 
assessment process and confirm that a comprehensive control plan, as outlined in 
the Appendix [of the GFSI position paper], has been developed and implemented 
by the company (GFSI 2014a, b).”
Also, the position paper stated that “The auditor is not expected to detect fraud 
or affirm that an anti-fraud program is capable of ‘preventing fraud’ (GFSI 2014a, 
b).” From the GFSI Food Fraud Technical Document (GFSI 2018a, b):
• “‘During a food safety certification audit, conducted against GFSI recognised 
schemes, the auditor will review the documentation related to the vulnerability 
assessment process and confirm that a comprehensive control plan, as outlined in 
the [position paper] Appendix, has been developed and implemented by the 
company.’”
• “With this in mind, there is awareness that addressing food fraud is new and dif-
ferent for those being audited as well as the auditors:”
• “‘The auditor is not expected to detect fraud or affirm that an anti-fraud program 
is capable of “preventing fraud.” This approach is very much in line with the 
verification of a HACCP plan during the food safety audit.’2 ”.
• “GFSI is aware that the harmonization and best practices are just now being 
developed and refined. A new system that is less than a year old in  implementation 
cannot be expected to be as robust, thorough, or detailed as a system such as 
HACCP that has been implemented for more than 25 years. The most important 
step for the food industry is to start addressing food fraud, and for auditors to 
start asking the basic questions on how vulnerabilities were assessed and identi-
fied, and a strong mitigation plan thought through.”
The critical first step for an auditor is to confirm that an assessment and plan are 
in place. Over time the specific audit requirement will evolve as there is more clear 
insight on best practices and benchmarking.
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Sidebar: The Optimal Role of GFSI Requirements and Auditors—
“Push from Point A to Point B”
The accredited third-party auditors from the certification bodies (CBs) have a 
critical albeit seemingly very simplistic role in food fraud prevention. Their 
optimal role is to just help make sure the process starts. GFSI has been very 
clear—originally in their 2014 position paper and then in their 2018 Food 
Fraud Technical Document—that the first goal is to just get the process started 
of holistically addressing food fraud. GFSI clearly stated, repeatedly, that the 
first and most important role of the auditor is to just make sure a plan is in 
place, it covers the “relevant GFSI scope” (all fraud and for all products), and 
then it is implemented and followed. There is a saying: “We’re trying to get 
from point A to point B and not all the way to point Z… at least not yet.”
Thus, the most important role of the auditor is (1) confirm that the full 
scope of food fraud will be addressed in an audit, (2) audit against those 
requirements, and (3) clearly state exactly where a Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy may fall short.
The audit is optimal even if the auditor only asks “yes or no” questions to 
each of the CPO food safety standard requirements. There is often a criticism 
that some audits are just a checkbox—did it, check. While this is true, the 
implication for the company being audited goes beyond just stating “yes or 
no.” Usually, the company preparing for an audit will create documents and 
notes that are approved up through the corporation and possibly to the Chief 
Compliance Officer and General Counsel. This is a new, formal, audited doc-
ument, and usually, internal controls and integrated framework policy requires 
an executive to approve.
Thus, the auditor just asking simple “yes or no” questions is a critical spark 
to move the entire series of cogs in the machine forward (Fig. 12.5).
Document to 
Auditor
Create 
Document
Approval = 
ACTION
q: yes or no?
Fig. 12.5 Food fraud audit 
hierarchy of chain of 
events
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 Conclusion
The previous chapter presented standards and certification which helped frame 
these GFSI Food Safety Management System standards and related topics. The first 
conclusion is that the already implemented and widely adopted GFSI system is an 
adaptation and implementation of a wide range of best practices that have been 
adapted to meet global food safety requirements. These efforts are coordinated 
across the food industry and with close connection and calibration with govern-
ments, nongovernmental organizations, suppliers, researchers, and academics. The 
second conclusion is that there is often a lack of awareness of the breadth and depth 
of the GFSI system and the global GFSI adoption impact. The implementation of a 
Food Safety Management System is essentially a requirement to do business, and 
the benefits are for the very large multinational corporations to micro-sized busi-
nesses. The final conclusion is that while the food fraud requirements may seem 
very light and an afterthought for a holistic food safety program, these are require-
ments and not optional. The GFSI requirements are moving the entire industry to 
understand and value that addressing food fraud is not optional and is a key compo-
nent of a robust and thorough Food Safety Management System.
There is a saying:
We’re trying to get from point A to point B and not all the way to point Z… at least not 
yet. (Point A is the current state, and Point B is everyone at least implementing a common 
and basic holistic and all-encompassing VACCP - Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment 
and a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. Point Z is an ultimate future state.)
 Appendix: Side by Side FF GFSI Standards Requirements
This appendix provides a review of the food fraud sections of key Food Fraud 
Management System standards including FSSC 22000, SQF, BRC, and IFS:
FSSC 22000: Food Safety System Certification for ISO 22000
From the FSSC 22000 standard:
“Part II – Requirements for certification v4.1
2.1.4.4 Food Fraud prevention
2.1.4.4.1 Vulnerability assessment
1) The organization shall have a documented and implemented vulnerability assessment 
procedure in place that:
a) Identifies potential vulnerabilities,
b) Develops control measures, and c) prioritizes them against the identified 
vulnerabilities.
2) To identify the vulnerabilities, the organization shall assess the susceptibility of its 
products to potential food fraud acts.
2.1.4.4.2 Control measures: The organization shall put in place appropriate control mea-
sures to reduce or eliminate the identified vulnerabilities.”
2.1.4.4.3 Plan
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1) All policies, procedures, and records are included in a food fraud prevention plan 
supported by the organization’s Food Safety Management System for all its products.
2) The plan shall comply with applicable legislation.
SQF: Safe Quality Food (SQF) Institute
From the SQF standard:
“2.7.2 Food Fraud: What the SQF Code says
2.7.2.1 The methods, responsibility, and criteria for identifying the site's vulnerability to 
food fraud shall be documented, implemented and maintained. The food fraud vulnerability 
assessment shall include the site's susceptibility to product substitution, mislabeling, dilu-
tion, counterfeiting or stolen goods which may adversely impact food safety.
2.7.2.2 A food fraud mitigation plan shall be developed and implemented which speci-
fies the methods by which the identified food fraud vulnerabilities shall be controlled.
2.7.2.3 The food fraud vulnerability assessment and mitigation plan shall be reviewed 
and verified at least annually.
2.7.2.4 Records of reviews of the food fraud vulnerability assessment and mitigation 
plan shall be maintained.”
Also,
“2.4.4 Approved Supplier Program (Mandatory)
2.4.4.1 Raw materials and services that impact finished product safety shall meet the 
agreed specification (2.3.2) and be supplied by an approved supplier.
2.4.4.2 The receipt of raw materials received from non-approved suppliers shall be 
acceptable only in an emergency situation and provided they are inspected or analyzed 
before use.
2.4.4.3 The responsibility and procedure for selecting, evaluating, approving and moni-
toring an approved supplier shall be documented and implemented.
2.4.4.4 The site's food defense plan (refer to 2.7.1.1) shall include measures to secure 
incoming materials and protect them from deliberate act of sabotage or terrorist-like 
incidents.
2.4.4.5 The site's food fraud vulnerability assessment (refer to 2.7.2.1) shall include the 
site's susceptibility to raw material substitution, mislabeling, and counterfeiting which may 
adversely impact food packaging safety.
2.4.4.6 The food fraud mitigation plan (refer to 2.7.2.2) shall include methods by which 
the identified food packaging safety vulnerabilities from materials shall be controlled.”
And later,
“2.7.2 Food Fraud
2.7.2.1 The methods, responsibility, and criteria for identifying the site’s vulnerability 
to food fraud shall be documented, implemented and maintained. The food fraud vulnera-
bility assessment shall include the site’s susceptibility to product substitution, mislabeling 
and counterfeiting which may adversely impact the food safety of packaging product.
2.7.2.2 A food fraud mitigation plan shall be developed and implemented which speci-
fies the methods by which the identified food fraud vulnerabilities shall be controlled.
2.7.2.3 The food fraud vulnerability assessment and mitigation plan shall be reviewed 
and verified at least annually.
2.7.2.4 Records of reviews of the food fraud vulnerability assessment and mitigation 
plan shall be maintained.”
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BRC: BRC Global Standards
From the BRC standard:
Overall summary of key points:
1.1.6 The company must have a system for identifying new risks to the authenticity of raw 
materials.
3.5.1.1 The risk assessment of each raw material or group of raw materials must 
consider the potential for substitution or fraud.
5.4 The company must have systems in place to minimize the risk of purchasing fraudu-
lent or adulterated food raw materials.
5.4.1 The company must have access to information on historical and develop-
ing threats relating to the risk of adulteration or substitution of raw materials.
5.4.2 The company must have a documented vulnerability assessment of all 
food raw materials
5.4.3 Where a raw material is at risk of adulteration or substitution, appropriate 
assurance systems and/or testing must be in place to reduce the risk.
The later from several other sections:
3.4 Internal Audits
“3.4.1 There shall be a scheduled programme of internal audits.
At a minimum, the programme shall include at least four different audit dates spread 
throughout the year. The frequency at which each activity is audited shall be established in 
relation to the risk associated with the activity and previous audit performance. All activi-
ties shall be covered at least once each year. At a minimum, the scope of the internal audit 
programme shall include the:
• HACCP or food safety plan, including the activities to implement
• Prerequisite programmes
• Food defense and food fraud prevention plans
• Procedures to achieve the standard”
3.5 Supplier and Raw Material Approval and Performance Monitoring
“3.5.1.1 The company shall undertake a documented risk assessment of each raw mate-
rial or group of raw materials including primary packaging to identify potential risks to 
product safety, legality and quality. This shall take into account the potential for:
• Allergen contamination
• Foreign-body risks
• Microbiological contamination
• Chemical contamination
• Variety or species cross-contamination
• Substitution or fraud (see clause 5.4.2)
• Any risks associated with raw materials which are subject to legislative control”
5.4 Product Authenticity, Claims, and Chain of Custody
“5.4.1 The company shall have processes in place to access information on historical 
and developing threats to the supply chain which may present a risk of adulteration or sub-
stitution of raw materials (i.e., fraudulent raw materials). Such information may come from, 
for example: trade associations, government sources, private resource centers.”
“5.4.2 A documented vulnerability assessment shall be carried out on all food raw mate-
rials or groups of raw materials to assess the potential risk of adulteration or substitution. 
This shall take into account:
• Historical evidence of substitution or adulteration.
• Economic factors which may make adulteration or substitution more attractive.
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• Ease of access to raw materials through the supply chain.
• Sophistication of routine testing to identify adulterant.
• The nature of the raw material.”
“5.4.3 Where the raw materials are identified as being at particular risk of adulteration 
or substitution, the vulnerability assessment plan shall include appropriate assurance and/or 
testing processes to mitigate the identified risks.”
“5.4.4 Where products are labeled, or claims are made on finished packs which are 
dependent on the status of a raw material, the status of each batch of the raw material shall 
be verified. These claims include:
• Specific provenance or origin.
• Breed/ varietal claims.
• Assured status (e.g., GlobalG.A.P.)
• Genetically modified organism (GMO) status.
• Identity preserved.
• Named specific trademarked ingredients.
The facility shall maintain purchasing records, traceability of raw material usage and 
final product packing records to substantiate claims. The site shall undertake documented 
mass balance tests at a frequency to meet the particular scheme requirements or at least 
every 6 months in the absence of a scheme-specific requirement.”
“5.4.5 Where claims are made about the methods of production (e.g., organic, halal, 
kosher) the site shall maintain the necessary certification status in order to make such a 
claim.”
“5.4.6 The process flow for the production of products where claims are made shall be 
documented and potential areas for contamination or loss of identity identified. Appropriate 
controls shall be established to ensure the integrity of the product claims.”
IFS: International Featured Standards
From the IFS standard:
“4.21 Food Fraud
4.21.1 A documented food fraud vulnerability assessment shall be undertaken on all raw 
materials, ingredients, packaging and outsourced processes, to determine the risk of fraudu-
lent activity in relation to substitution, mislabelling, adulteration or counterfeiting. The 
criteria considered within the vulnerability assessment shall be defined.
4.21.2 A documented food fraud mitigation plan shall be developed, with reference to 
the vulnerability assessment, and implemented to control any identified risk. The methods 
of control and monitoring shall be defined and implemented.
4.21.3 In the event of increased risk, food fraud vulnerability assessment shall be 
reviewed.
Otherwise, all vulnerability assessments shall be reviewed at least annually.
Control and monitoring requirements of the food fraud mitigation plan shall be reviewed 
and amended when applicable.”
Then in “ANNEX 2: Compulsory fields to be completed by the auditor.”
“Food Fraud- for Section 4.21.1 – The auditor shall provide the following information: – 
Has the company identified fraud-susceptible raw material groups / product groups in the 
vulnerability assessment?  – If yes, which main fraud-susceptible raw material groups / 
product groups have been identified and for what reason?”
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Standards and Certification 
with GFSI
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional 
group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all The GFSI requirements are holistic and all-encompassing – be sure to review 
the entire set of requirements
Quality team The GFSI requirements for a food safety management system require 
addressing all types of fraud and for all products
Auditors You, as the auditor, are required – not optional – to fully address the GFSI 
food fraud compliance requirements, and to conduct a competent audit, you 
must ask the full set of questions that address all types of fraud, for all 
products, and across the entire organization
Management Closely review the GFSI FF requirements, and you can thoroughly conduct a 
gap analysis with the seven simple “yes or no” questions presented in the back 
matter chapter
Corp. 
decision- 
makers
Provide information to internal auditors to reinforce fully addressing this 
enterprise-wide risk that you are accountable for whether you know it or 
not – this is not a new risk; it is an inherent risk
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the key learning objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question.
 (a) Who created GFSI and why is GFSI such an impactful food sector partner?
 (b) How is GFSI related to Food Safety Management standards such as BRC, 
IFS, SQF, and FSSC?
 (c) How does a Food Safety Management System integrate HACCP, VACCP, 
and TACCP?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1.
 (a) What is a “Food Safety Management System”?
 (b) Why does GFSI consider food fraud to be critical in a Food Safety 
Management System?
 (c) Why is GFSI not that well known?
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 3. Key Learning Objective 2.
 (a) What is TACCP?
 (b) What is the full scope of TACCP beyond just an assessment?
 (c) How does TACCP differ from the US FDA/FSMA Intentional Adulteration 
Scope?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3.
 (a) What is VACCP?
 (b) What is the CCP in VACCP?
 (c) How does the “risk tolerance” compare for HACCP, VACCP, and TACCP?
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Chapter 13
International Public and Private Response
Summary
This chapter addresses the international responses of both the public (governments 
and nongovernmental organizations) and private (industry or trade associations) 
activities related to understanding and managing food fraud prevention. To review 
this scope, there is a very brief overview of incidents to understand the severity of 
the issue; this is followed by a summary of foundational and more applied activities 
and then some of the collaboration interactions. The focus includes the UK, EU, 
China, and the international entities such as WHO, FAO, INFOSAN, Codex 
Alimentarius, ISO, INTERPOL-Europol, GFSI, and others.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are:
• (1) Review of International Incidents: a review of key incidents and details that 
created the motivation for the activity
• (2) Severity and Frequency Leading to Responses: a review of more of the 
actions such as country-level reports or impact statements
• (3) Intragovernmental Collaboration: a review of efforts for harmonization of 
terms, scope, focus on prevention, or standards
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the theoreti-
cal foundation related to the overall application and implementation noted in “(Z) 
Application and Implementation: The Guardians” (Fig. 13.1).
 Introduction
This chapter will cover the global public and private responses to the food fraud 
problem. This chapter will start with a review of issues by region of the world and 
then examine those government or agency priority setting (Table 13.1). These new 
incidents did not always lead to new laws, new regulations, or the allocation to 
enforce and prosecute.
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For example, in the USA the FDA takes a public health risk-based approach, so 
their priority of response is set by incidents that involve deaths or illnesses. The 
melamine pet food fraud was one of the most impactful incidents in the USA. The 
range of other food fraud incidents seems to pale in comparison because—although 
there was an economic impact and a substantial vulnerability—food fraud incidents 
usually have very few public health threats. For another US example, the US 
Customs has focused on the tax avoidance smuggling of honey food fraud referred 
to as “honey laundering,” and the US FBI focuses on larger-scale crime (DOJ 2009; 
FBI 2018).
In the European Union, there is a focus on “food authenticity” or “food integrity” 
which is a broader impact than just public health to focus expanding to declarations 
about the product (previously presented in Figures 1–5). For example, the EU focus 
includes “protected designated origin” (PDO) such as Parmesan Cheese to be con-
firmed from the Parma region in Italy. To note, in the USA, the USDA specification 
for Parmesan Cheese is a “process method” not the “geographic origin.” In the USA 
a legal label is “Parmesan Cheese ‘Made in the USA’ with Wisconsin milk.” That 
label would be illegal in the EU.
Another example of an additional, nonpublic health threat impact of food fraud 
incidents is the UK countrywide horsemeat in the beef incident. The only product 
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Fig. 13.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle: where this chapter applies to the overall concept—“(C) 
Application, ‘The Guardian’ ”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 2019)
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Table 13.1 Incidents that led to activity or key events that significantly raised the awareness and 
actions by countries or NGOs. (With adapted from Ref. (DEFRA 2014))
Country/
region Trigger incident Years Notes
China Melamine infant formula 2007 “Nontraditional food safety incidents” now 
in the national “5-year plan” created Center 
for Food Safety Risk Assessment—CFSA, 
etc.
Codex 
Alimentarius
Grew from a country 
Focus to global
2017 Created Electronic Working Group (EWG) 
in 2017 to review definitions and gaps in 
Codex code and recommend the path 
forward generally focusing on prevention
Denmark Fraudulent meat scandal 
in 2005–2006
2006 The Flying Squad has a team that bases 
activity on investigations and tips as well as 
intelligence-led operations. High visibility 
results of sensitive consumer products have 
reinforced the authority and support of the 
activities
EU Ongoing protected 
designated origin but 
sparked by the horsemeat 
incident
2012 Allocated funding to the Food Integrity 
Project approved a resolution on food fraud 
and others
GFSI Melamine and then 
horsemeat and ongoing 
incidents
2007, 
2012, 
2017+
Created GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank in 
2012 to review; published food fraud 
position paper in 2014; and a commercial 
standard requirement in 2018
ISO Anti-counterfeiting 
coordination for material 
goods expanding to food; 
food safety expanding to 
all root causes including 
fraud
2009; 
2017
ISO TC 247 Product Fraud Countermeasures 
and Controls was formed in 2009 and then 
moved under TC 292 Security Management 
in 2016. In 2018, TC 34 Food products 
expanded ISO 22000 Food Safety 
Management added a statement that 
expanded the application “to include food 
fraud and food defense”
ISO/TC34/SC17/WG8–Management 
Systems for food safety expanded to confirm 
all root causes were covered including food 
fraud and food defense
Netherlands Ongoing focus on diary 
then the 2017 Fipronil in 
eggs
2007, 
2012, 
2017+
Active it the EU Food Integrity Project 
(FIP), creation and expansion of the Food 
Crime Unit, etc.
UK Ongoing but then 
horsemeat
2012 Active in the FIP; DEFRA funded “The 
Elliott Review” for food fraud; created the 
National Food Crime Unit
(continued)
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that was adulterated was beef—so only impacted the beef industry—but all food- 
related businesses experienced lost consumer confidence and a drop in sales. 
Furthermore, this incident even undermined the trust in the UK government.
In China, there is a need to keep consumer confidence high to support the massive 
economic growth which includes longer food supply chains. The growth is driven, in 
part, by consumers moving from rural to urban settings. Reportedly the urbanization 
of China is the largest migration of humans in history (Zwingle and Franklin 2002; 
Kirkby 2018). The 13th Five-Year Plan states “we will step up the pace of new urban-
ization,” and to provide a scale of magnitude, the plan is to “Make progress in grant-
ing urban residency to approximately 100 million former rural residents and other 
permanent urban residents without urban household registration” (this is equivalent 
to 1/3 of the entire US population) (CN-CPC 2016). The growth of the economy, 
combined with 50% of the population moving from near the agriculture production 
in rural, to long food supply chains in urban settings is occurring while there is an 
increase in consumer demand for premium proteins such as dairy and meat, has led 
to more complex  food safety logistics challenges as well as a new and emerging 
“fraud opportunity.” In China, there is an intense focus on consumer confidence and 
supporting “social harmony” (Spink et al. 2015, 2016; Wu et al. 2016, 2017).
The initial spark for governments or entities to act is usually a specific incident 
or an event that triggers an activity or instigates significant new efforts.
Table 13.1 (continued)
Country/
region Trigger incident Years Notes
USA Melamine and other meds 2007 Public meeting on Economically Motivated 
Adulteration in 2009, created Work Group 
on Economically Motivated Adulteration 
(WEMA), not mentioned in FSMA, covered 
under general food safety “preventive 
controls.” (See other sections on priority 
setting of FDA for high public health harms, 
FBI for violence or large-scale economic 
crimes, and DOJ for prosecution and 
incarceration resource constraints.)
Sidebar: Review of Trigger Incidents by Country and Year
There are trigger incidents that seem to be the spark to a country implement-
ing food fraud-related regulations or significant initiatives (Table 13.1).
A review of these trigger events helps explain the foundation for actions. 
After the incidents, there is often a project or report that further reviews the 
problem, examines root causes, considers recommended actions, and then 
explores possible countermeasures and control systems.
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Review of International Incidents
This section reviews the international incidents that reveal a global problem both 
regarding the source and impact of the incidents. Food fraud incidents are created 
in, and impact, every country. Events in the USA or Western Europe are often just 
as dangerous as incidents from elsewhere. Every country has a negative conse-
quence on their domestic food consumption, and also that negatively impacts the 
value of exports.
This section reviews some of the key incidents that created the start of many of 
the efforts and also reviewed some specific country-level reports or summaries.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) The Elliott Review of food fraud (UK)
• (2) Incident reports at country-level (EU, China)
• (3) Then more general global incidents
Sidebar: Review of the UK DEFRA Elliott Review of Food Fraud 
(MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Review of the UK Elliott Interim Report on Food Fraud
By John Spink • January 30, 2014 • Blog
The UK is taking a serious look at food fraud laws and regulations. It’s 
encouraging that many of the global agency and industry reports are focusing 
on the same broad concepts as well as having a distinct focus on prevention – 
from the start, we are harmonizing the terminology and approaches. This UK 
report was led by our colleague Professor Christopher Elliott of Queen’s 
University Belfast (QUB), and was funded by the UK’s Secretary of State for 
Health, and the UK Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural 
Development (DEFRA) to carry out an independent review of Britain’s food 
system regarding food fraud. This is a review of Professor Elliott’s December 
2013 Interim report. The final report is due spring 2014.
The UK Elliott Review – Interim Report
This report was conducted to provide guidance and actionable recommen-
dations to the UK government on combating food fraud. The report was 
sparked by the horsemeat food fraud scandal but expands to all branches of 
government and all types of food crimes. “The aim of the [UK Elliott] review 
is to advise the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
the Secretary of State for Health, and also industry on issues which impact 
upon consumer confidence in the authenticity of food products.”
Summary. This is probably the most comprehensive report written on a 
country’s food fraud threat in that it includes over 50 interviews from across 
agencies and industries. There are in-depth insights as well as case studies 
that provide extensive detail on the food fraud threat.
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There are forty-eight recommendations from across the food management 
system. Major recommendations reviewed below include: Customers First, 
Zero Tolerance, Intelligence Gathering, Laboratory Services, Audit, 
Government Support, Leadership, and Crisis Management. While many of 
the recommendations are already wholly or partially implemented by agen-
cies or industry, it is critical to reinforce that these activities do matter. There 
is also an important emphasis on how all the recommendations should work 
together. The report states that there is an efficiency gained by gathering food 
fraud intelligence and data that has already been gathered from food quality, 
food fraud, or food defense initiatives. The report reiterates the constant chal-
lenge experienced by agencies from around the world — of receiving and 
sustaining resources for enforcement and prosecution of financial fraud, prod-
uct fraud including intellectual property rights violations, and other food 
crimes. The report started with a focus on adulteration and detection and 
quickly broadened to food fraud and prevention. “The systems approach [that 
the report] have recommended is intended to provide a framework to allow the 
development of a national food crime prevention strategy.” Also, “Some of 
[The Elliott Review report recommendations] will require a change of culture 
within the industry and the UK Food Standards Agency so that they can work 
better together to protect consumers.”
Consumers First / Zero Tolerance. These sections stressed the impor-
tance of prioritizing the focus on public health, as well as confirming that the 
incidents should be prosecuted (Note: a review of “zero tolerance” concept 
will be addressed in the Criminology chapter). The report included an empha-
sis on:
• The importance of a systems approach and preventative measures – which 
is consistent with the EU draft resolution on food fraud, the USA FDA and 
the USA Congressional Research Service report.
• Shared investment between industry and government.
• A need for a “culture change.” There is an industry shift to embrace and 
engage with food fraud prevention, and reports such as this provide sus-
tained pressure. The report encourages opportunities for agencies to col-
laborate with industry and non-governmental associations. Although not 
directly mentioned in the report, those partner entities could include the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association (GMA), the US Pharmacopeia/ Food Chemicals Codex, and 
the Institute of Food Technologists (IFT). There are other broader activities 
focused on combating product fraud such as by the International Standards 
Organization’s Technical Committee 292 Security Management and 247 
on Fraud Countermeasures and Controls.
• Expanding the research focus from detection to collaborative prevention. 
There is an important research need in understanding the fraud opportunity 
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and beyond just gathering a list of incidents. This section emphasized 
expanding from the detection infrastructure of laboratories to deterrence 
and prevention, working with industry and law enforcement. The report 
states that “[The Elliott Review Interim Report] to date has identified a 
worrying lack of knowledge regarding the extent to which we are dealing 
with criminals infiltrating the food industry.”
Education. This section addressed the needs of educating a more exten-
sive range of stakeholders from across the public-private spectrum. A key 
recommendation was to provide education programs ranging from basic con-
cepts for general practitioners to in-depth courses to assist auditors and intel-
ligence analysis.
Intelligence Gathering. This section of the report focused on data collec-
tion and intelligence gathering. The report included an emphasis on:
• The intelligence-gathering recommendations recognize the tremendous 
challenges when dealing with commercially sensitive information that 
could also have a public health threat. Often, when there is a public health 
threat, a criminal investigation is delayed until the suspect product can be 
removed from the marketplace. This quick public health response reduces 
the number of illnesses or deaths but also reduces the effectiveness of a 
criminal investigation. Once the criminals become aware their crime has 
been found out, they can destroy evidence or evade investigators.
• As is consistent with many reports from around the world and from 
research, the report reiterates that food fraud is a unique threat that requires 
specific attention, and although distinctly different, the countermeasures 
and control systems should be integrated with food safety, food defense, 
and large-scale organized crimes.
Audits. This section identifies an important role of food audits conducted 
by the government in conjunction with private/ industry/ third-parties, com-
bined with a focus on engaging (and motivating) law enforcement. It men-
tions audit and certification “steps already being taken by industry.” Also, “I 
have found a great appetite within the industry to improve and expand upon 
the standard audits developed by organizations…” For example: “In July 
2013, Asda announced plans to introduce unannounced BRC audits for all of 
its Asda brand suppliers starting 1st October 2013.”
Laboratory Services. There is a thorough discussion of the laboratory 
services and capacity-building.
Government Support/ Leadership. This section emphasized the critical 
role of government support and leadership in food fraud prevention:
• The report recommended clearer coordination and support from within the 
food agencies, as well as across law enforcement groups. An additional 
missing link that was not covered in the report is prosecution and the courts 
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 Incidents in China
Over the centuries, China has shifted focus from “food security” (producing enough 
food) to “food safety” (food that is safe to eat) to now a combination of food safety 
and food fraud (confidence in the food they consume.) Now, most Chinese reviews 
of food safety have a focus on food fraud (Wu et  al. 2016, 2017). International 
Chinese presentations on the 2014 Chinese Food Safety Laws included “addressing 
food fraud” in the title, and books include a frequent mention of the issues (CFSA 
2015a, b). The Chinese government and agencies take a holistic approach to all food 
risks that include food quality, food safety, food fraud, and to a lesser extent food 
defense.
This section will review incidents in China including current issues and the his-
tory of incidents, and a later section will address the resulting focus by the food 
agencies.
Melamine, 2007
The major food fraud incident was the melamine incidents that started in 2007. 
This impacted a wide range of products consumed by the Chinese in China and for 
export. The major focus was melamine in infant formula and milk powder (Wu et al. 
2016, 2017). Due to the massive “minimum economic scale” of the manufacturing 
prioritizing these cases – or at least not discarding them out of hand before 
they are even considered. The education recommendation above should 
include information to the prosecutors and judges.
• The challenge for the government support and leadership is clarified when 
the report stated: “Food fraud is a complex issue and it is not always clear, 
particularly when first uncovered, whether or not a food fraud problem 
might also be a public health problem.”
Crisis Management. This section recommended specific crisis manage-
ment actions, including to basically be aware of food fraud incidents. The 
report emphasized the important and unique collaboration between the food 
agencies and law enforcement.
This UK Elliott Review Interim Report is another example of food fraud 
rising on the legislative and regulatory agenda. It’s encouraging that many of 
the global agency and industry reports are focusing on the same broad con-
cepts and that those initiatives have a distinct focus on prevention. From the 
start of food fraud becoming a global focus, the research and regulatory action 
we are taking are harmonizing the terminology, and the prevention approaches. 
With all these agencies and industry groups working – and working together – 
there is a great potential for a global, integrated, efficient, effective, food fraud 
prevention plan. Within your industry and within your country, stay aware of 
the activities and engage in the discussion. Be part of the solution. We will 
keep searching for and reviewing the latest food fraud reports and activities.
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facilities and global distribution of the goods, the incidents can have a massive and 
rapid impact (Porter 1980). “For example, according to a report by the Ministry of 
Health (MOH), the 2008 melamine-tainted infant formula incident in China caused 
294,000 infants and young children to be diagnosed with urinary tract stones, and 6 
deaths” (Wu et al. 2017).
Food Fraud from 1000 BCE to 1000 CE
There are more early historical references of food fraud in China in part because 
they were a developed civilization earlier and also had earlier recorded history. The 
Book of Rites was published during the Zhou Dynasty which lasted from 1046 to 
256 BCE and included a passaged “Grains not in-season, immature fruit, cannot be 
vended” (Wu et  al. 2017). Later in the Song Dynasty which lasted from 960 to 
1279 CE, the author Yuan Shi Fa described incidents such as “Chickens with sand 
in the body, inflated geese and sheep, salt mixed with ash, silk products with glue 
paste, rice and wheat with increased moisture, meat with irrigation water, medical 
herbs substituted by something else” (Wu et al. 2017). And there are others through 
the Ming Dynasty which lasted from 1368 to 1644 CE.
New Incidents, 2017+
As has happened around the world, the consumers continue to be alerted to new 
incidents. Reports of food fraud incidents are especially impactful due to the history 
of fraud, the high growth rate, the massive urbanization (people moving from close 
to the food in rural settings to cities), and the very active social media. “These inci-
dents may lead to public health or population-wide emergencies and can also cause 
social harmony issues (e.g., lowering consumer confidence in the food supply and 
the government” (Wu et al. 2017).
The food fraud incidents are widely reported publically and in social media, 
which increases the awareness and need for a direct response. “According to a report 
by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ), the media reported that 266 of 694 typical food safety incidents from 
2007 to 2013 were ‘non-food adulterant substances’ [a type of food fraud], and 128 
of them were ‘tampering’ [another type of food fraud]” (Wu et al. 2017).
The food fraud incidents in China have occurred over a long period of time, have 
been dangerous, and have impacted the Chinese consumer confidence. This concern 
has let the Chinese government to invest in people and resources to not only focus 
on detection but also shift focus on adjusting the regulations and then on to more 
holistic prevention.
Sidebar: Food Supply Chain Interdependence—Melamine and a 
Review of Sowing the Seeds Report (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Food Supply Chain Interdependence—A Review of the “Sowing The 
Seeds” Report
By John Spink • June 10, 2013 • Blog
Food moves around the world faster than ever – an orange can travel from 
halfway around the world and be in a US retailer in a single day. For some 
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highly integrated food manufacturing operations, such as seafood, the product 
can be harvested, processed, shipped, and retailed in two days. This is phe-
nomenal for improved product quality and to accelerate the global economy…
but it creates tremendous burdens and gaps for the food regulatory system. 
These regulatory and market dynamics contribute to the fraud opportunity for 
food. The burdens and gaps emphasize the need for global collaboration and 
an expanding public-private partnership.
A report that emphasizes this global collaboration is “Sowing The Seeds – 
Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation on Food Safety” by the US-based 
Woodrow Wilson Institute. This report provides incredible insight on food 
safety in China from both a food science and social science perspective. This 
interdisciplinary, holistic perspective is important because there are so many 
factors beyond just technological capabilities to assure food safety and food 
security – the safe, continuous, nutritious, and economically accessible sup-
ply of food.
Reports like Sowing the Seeds are important for us as researchers, if we 
look at them with a broad lens, to see future trends. While I found the amount 
of information that applied to food fraud and counterfeiting absolutely over-
whelming, in looking back over the four years since I first read the report, I 
realize that it helped shape my thinking. Some insights that predicted changes 
that did occur included:
• The Chinese version of the CDC emphasized a need for collaboration in 
the areas of risk assessment and data collection. Now Chinese government 
officials are participating in Expert Panels for the U.S.  Pharmacopeia 
(USP)/ Food Chemicals Codex, Chinese companies are members of the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), and others.
• The role of the media was discussed by another Chinese government offi-
cial who emphasized: “…the need to strengthen communication with the 
news media to prevent unscientific information from reaching the public, 
and to use the media as an integral part of emergency response.” They dis-
cussed reporters being “one of three pillars ensuring food safety at the 
local level.” Here in 2013, we just saw a food fraud-focused scientific and 
enforcement report published first to the media – the scientific information 
and data were reported openly, quickly, and with a lot of detail. You don’t 
have to consume too much media in the US to see that we still struggle 
with unscientific information (a carry-over trace contaminant versus a 
harmful level of an adulterant) or misinformation about what is actually 
fraudulent (some technologies, like irradiation, vastly improve product 
quality and safety (there has been a trend to refer to “electronic pasteuriza-
tion”). A sensational article here in the US regarding unfounded food 
safety issues has crippled industries and led to the economic collapse of 
companies.
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• The report continually emphasized the proactive steps that were started in 
China – as well as the economic and social drivers that indicated the pro-
grams would continue to be supported, as they were.
• One of the most impactful insights, which I frequently quote, is that there 
are over 450,000 food manufacturing facilities in China, 350,000 of which 
are on less than 2 acres of land each, with less than 10 employees (Wu et al. 
2017). Their products are consolidated before getting into commerce, so 
those farmers have no brand to protect… and they probably don’t even 
have traceability systems, let alone electricity to run computers. This is an 
amazing and huge number that defines the challenge of inspection and 
even traceability.
• As with the rest of the world, including the US, the “greatest food safety 
threat in China is still microbial contamination.”
Reports like Sowing the Seeds support what we think we know in tradi-
tional areas and they also open our eyes to other vulnerabilities. This report 
presented details in well-known areas such as general food safety, but we 
were also made aware of some very important issues in disciplines such as 
Veterinary Medicine. The animal populations are large, and include small ani-
mals as well as aquaculture such as fish – China is a huge exporter of fish to 
the US. The report details animal issues with drug residues or contamination 
including chloramphenicol, malachite green, furazolidone, nitrofuran, gen-
tian violet, fluoroquinolones. Beyond optimal application practices of medi-
cines, issues were highlighted including the impact of illegal or counterfeit 
veterinary medicines and feed. These food safety and Veterinary Medicine 
dangers are not always clearly understood, and the report stated that this 
information often does not make it to the regional or local level – highlighting 
an educational opportunity that would result in a great increase in public 
health and food security.
Reports like Sowing the Seeds emphasize that an integrated approach is 
critical across food security, food quality, food safety, food fraud, and food 
defense. If we approach “food” from all angles, we can reduce the overall 
risks and increase the production of the products we all need. Reports like 
Sowing the Seeds also emphasize that food protection responsibility is global 
and interdisciplinary in nature… emphasizing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of public-private partnerships. Prevention starts with education. Your educa-
tion should begin with a broad range of information sources that provide 
insight on broad policy implications, but then continue all the way down to the 
application in the field. Start by reading reports like Sowing the Seeds. 
(MSU-FFI).
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 Incidents in the European Union (Including the UK)
The European Union (EU) still has a primary focus on food safety (food that is safe 
to eat) and has intensified activity related to consumer concerns of food fraud (spe-
cialty characteristics of the food integrity and food authenticity such as organics or 
specialty origins). Also, the EU focus on food authenticity is critical to the econo-
mies that are elevated due to premium-priced specialty products such as Parmesan 
Cheese and Champagne. These both will be reviewed in more detail.
General Intellectual Property Concerns (IPR) Throughout history there has 
been an ongoing concern with Protected Geographic Origin (PDO) such as 
Champagne from the Champagne region of France (in the USA this type product is 
“sparkling wine” or “Champagne-method”) or Parmesan Cheese that is only from 
the Parma region of Italy. Even though the US product has a label identification as 
“sparkling wine” or “Champagne method” (Methode Champenoise), it may canni-
balize from the “French” “Champagne”—regardless of the official title, many 
Americans still consider the entire product category as “Champagne.” Also, an 
abundance of basic quality “Parmesan Cheese” “Made in the USA” may reduce the 
premium price of the Italian product. The EU has limited food production capacity, 
so they will never outproduce global competitors and, thus, must protect their pre-
mium designation.
Horsemeat in Beef The impact of the horsemeat in the beef incident cannot be 
underestimated. The intense consumer feeling of violation was extremely impactful 
on consumer confidence, the price of premium products, and the confidence not 
only in the food supply chain and food agencies but of all government. Soon after 
the incident, the EU conducted special inquiries, published the “EU Food Crisis 
Report on Food Fraud,” and quickly proposed EU-wide programs. The incident 
occurred when a rogue meat manufacturer substituted lower-priced 50-pound bags 
of frozen horsemeat for higher-priced pallets of frozen beef. The product slipped 
through inspections since the product was “safe” (no food safety issues), passed 
quality tests (actually reportedly in some cases, the illegal horsemeat blend was 
higher-“quality” cuts of meat than the beef that was ordered), and also passed taste 
specifications. The fraud opportunity was created by the lack of species tests being 
conducted. There was also another disconnect between the many procurement bid-
ding transactions (often an anonymous digital bidding process) and the shipment 
through a separate channel for the physical product.
A heightened awareness—combined with more direct food authenticity test-
ing—has led to a seemingly endless string of incidents. Consumer awareness is still 
very high, the government is still very focused on the issue, and the stakeholders are 
evolving to more preventative approaches.
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 Other Significant Global Incidents
There are a range of incidents that have had a major impact on the public health or 
economic state of many countries to the point of creating economic and social insta-
bility, as well as national security concerns. When there is a public health threat, 
before the exact cause can be identified, blanket import bans can be implemented. 
These additional global impacts are important since they help emphasize the incred-
ibly high impact incidents and the need to focus on vulnerabilities and prevention.
• Beef Mislabeling from Brazil (2017): A massive Brazilian food fraud incident 
includes widespread bribes to place “adulterated products” in the marketplace 
which included fake sanitary permits and loosened quality measurement over-
sight. The investigation was led by more than 1000 (!!!) officers in 194 raids 
covering 38 detention orders (Fonseca and Parra-Bernal 2017). This was reported 
as the Brazilian Federal Police’s largest search-and-raid operation ever. The inci-
dent led to an almost global block of all Brazilian beef imports.
• Cumin-Peanut Allergen Filler (2015): An incident of peanut shell filler that 
included the allergen in cumin was presented as “even more serious than the 
horsemeat crisis” (Bawden 2015; Sarda 2017). Reportedly a cumin harvest in 
India (and reportedly three-quarters of the world’s supply from just the state of 
Sidebar: Horsemeat Through the Ages—Book Review of “Taste of War”
There are incidents that can shape the intensity with which a region or country 
is concerned with food and the food supply. In Europe, there is both a broader, 
more general focus on food as a celebration and yet possibly an underlying 
extreme concern with basic supply needs. In the USA there is confidence—or 
lack of awareness of the vulnerability—of the consistent supply of food.
The book Taste of War reviewed the role of food and food supply in the 
expansion goals and needs of countries throughout history. Some countries 
have limited agricultural production due to severe weather or limited land that 
is suitable for agriculture (Collingham 2012). There are many examples 
throughout history that include the Vikings raiding the UK, Japan expanding 
to nearby countries, Germany expanding its border, and to Russia expanding 
eastward.
In the book, some specific examples of public policy shaped by food short-
ages included that of the 30 million Russians who died in World War II and 20 
million died of starvation. The memories and trauma would still be remem-
bered by the citizens now since the children who grew up during WWII who 
could remember that famine would be in their early 1980s in 2017.
Different countries experienced different levels of food shortages which, 
naturally, have impacted the short-term and long-term public policy-making. 
The US population—even during the Great Depression—has not experienced 
a total loss of food supply or mass starvations.
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Gujarat) that was half the typical harvest led to drastically increased global 
prices. The very high fraud opportunity, combined with the widespread incidents 
and suspicious ground spice fraud, leads this to be a least in part an intentional 
act. Since this included an extremely dangerous allergen—that is a very severe 
public health threat to a large population in very small doses—the product recalls 
were swift and broad. The blocking of imports increased the economic impact on 
the producing nations including Iran and others primarily in the Middle East.
• Milk/Milk Powder Food Safety Incident of WPC in New Zealand (2013): While 
not food fraud, this incident demonstrates the impact of import bans. A food 
safety concern with Whey Protein Concentrate (WPC) led to an almost instant 
block of all New Zealand milk and dairy products imported to their biggest mar-
ket of China. This food safety incident led to the swift and broad response pos-
sibly because it was just a few years after the 2008 melamine in milk incident. 
After a range of incidents, governments are encouraged to move quickly when a 
public health threat is suspected regardless of the source (Tajitsu 2013).
• Sunflower Oil Diluted with Mineral Oil from Ukraine (2008): A sunflower oil 
fraud incident in Ukraine included a product that was contaminated or adulter-
ated with more than 10% mineral oil. “The EC said it was no longer receiving 
any sunflower oil from Ukraine which had stopped the exports prior to the con-
tamination becoming public” (Patton 2008). The entire Ukrainian sunflower oil 
industry—and of some other edible oils—was halted, while the incident was 
sorted out. The minimum impact was a loss of cash flow from the immediate 
sales, and the worst impact would be missing the harvesting window or destroy-
ing the spoiled product.
At first, a food fraud incident can lead to an increased awareness and concern by 
a government’s customs import body. If a government or agency responds quickly 
and aggressively to a food fraud incident, the citizen support and positive reinforce-
ment may increase the amount and intensity of future actions. When there is another 
incident—or suspicious activity—there may be an increased speed and breadth of 
future product recalls or block of imports for products, brands, companies, or even 
for wide ranges of products coming from an entire country. This continued citizen 
support could lead to the motivation to support and create a new directive, new regu-
lations, or even a new law. While food fraud incidents are few and rarely a health 
hazard, they are a major consumer concern which leads to an intense focus by 
governments.
 Key Learning Objective 2: Severity and Frequency Leading 
to Responses
This section reviews the severity and frequency leading to responses. The emphasis 
is on why food fraud is so important to so many groups. This will present the 
responses as well as direction for a more harmonized, efficient, and coordinated 
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focus on prevention. This includes the interdisciplinary nature of prevention by 
considering how the fraud opportunity is created and the many academic disciplines 
that help understand the optimal countermeasures and control systems.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) China building capacity and capability base on their national Five-Year plans
• (2) EU (excluding the UK) starting with the resolution on food fraud
• (3) UK focusing on the National Food Crime Unit (UK NFCU)
 Chinese Response and Direction
This section will review the Chinese government food fraud prevention response 
and direction. China has probably the most complex set of challenges which has led 
to an acute awareness that food fraud must be addressed and prevented. China has 
been probably the most proactive and innovative food fraud prevention-focused 
government in the world. China has also been one of the most open for international 
collaboration and scholarly engagement. The motivation is driven by necessity.
The unique and massive complexity of the Chinese food fraud issue includes 
many factors such as the rapidly growing economy, long-term transformations and 
modernization of the business processes, a need to produce more food increasing 
population who also are seeking different foods (9% of the world farmland is in 
China to feed their citizens who are 21% of the world’s population), a transportation 
infrastructure that is also rapidly adapting to keep pace, longer supply chains as they 
experience massive migrations for urbanization, and rapidly innovating food pack-
aging and supply. All this complexity is combined with a highly stratified regulatory 
and law enforcement system of national, state, county, and local agencies. Oh, also, 
the population is over 1.3 billion compared to 0.3 billion in the USA. The growing 
Chinese middle class who is seeking safer and higher-quality food products is more 
than 0.5 billion or approaches twice the entire US population.
• Thirteenth, 5-Year Plan (2017): The Chinese government and economy are 
centrally managed by a “5-Year Plan” process where the twelfth created a food 
safety infrastructure and the food safety/food fraud aspects of the thirteenth are 
still fully reported (CN-CPC 2016). These are more like a business plan than a 
traditional Western government set of goals. The plans are pragmatic, practical, 
and unlike some Western laws or regulations that are fully funded. The Chinese 
delivery on the plan—they fully support the goals, and they hold people account-
able for failure. One key activity in the 2012 plan was the creation of the Chinese 
National Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (CFSA—pronounced “siff- 
suh”) (CFSA 2018). CFSA was fully funded and has continued to grow in activ-
ity and impact. One activity in the 5-year plan is the collaboration with 
international scholars such as coauthoring publications (see translated articles 
such as (Spink et al. 2015)).
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• Twelfth, 5-year Plan (2012): This five-year plan included the creation of the 
Chinese National Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment which includes a 
scope of work that includes food fraud and food authenticity testing (CN-CPC 
2011).
• New Food Safety Law 2009 and Updated 2013: A new Food Safety Law was 
implemented in 2009 and updated in 2013. The law increased the focus on all 
aspects of food safety with a focus on food fraud.
A major activity of CFSA was creating a food fraud “Negative List” (or “Black 
List”). This is a group of adulterant-substances that are considered the most danger-
ous for China, and there is a massive testing program. This program coordinates 
with the China CDC to evaluate and track public health outbreaks.
The Food Safety Laws are continually updated, and recently China FDA has 
been publishing a public request for comments on food fraud enforcement and pros-
ecution. The overall focus has a firm foundation in investigation and prosecution 
(building upon detection) and is shifting focus to prevention.
E-commerce is a unique problem for China because of the even more complex 
distribution network. There is a new focus on this based on process control and 
traceability but also the regulatory requirements on all the supply chain partners. 
Beyond the sales or auction e-commerce companies, the delivery companies are 
also included and held accountable for the safety of the product through to 
consumption.
 European Union Response and Direction
This section will review incidents in the European Union—still including the UK—
including current issues, the history of incidents, and the resulting focus by the food 
agencies. It is widely published that some of the very first Western laws were cre-
ated to address “food adulteration” which more broadly is food fraud.
When considering the history of the origin of European food laws, the book 
Swindled1 (Wilson 2008) references two stages with one being before the 1820 pub-
lication of Frederick Accum’s A Treatise on Adulterations of Food and Culinary 
Poisons and before. During that time, Wilson refers to “Reading British newspapers 
from this period, you often come across the view that, while adulteration was regret-
table, it was a natural consequence of the free trade that was necessary to power 
Britain’s commercial success” (Wilson 2008). Also, “To introduce new regulatory 
1 Author Bee Wilson’s other publications include: The Hive: The Story of the Honeybee and Us, 
John Murray, 2004; Swindled: From Poison Sweets to Counterfeit Coffee, John Murray and 
Princeton University Press, 2008; Sandwich: A Global History, Reaktion Books, 2010; Consider 
the Fork: A History of How We Cook and Eat, Basic Books, 2012 (history of kitchen technology, 
from fire to the AeroPress); and First Bite: How We Learn to Eat, Basic Books and Fourth 
Estate[18] comer, Turner, 2016.
13 International Public and Private Response
459
measures would have the undesirable effect of stifling the market. It was there for 
better to do nothing” (Wilson 2008).
Examples of Europe’s several of the first food fraud-related laws are:
• Enquiry Into Plants, Theophrastus (370–285 BCE)
• Natural History, Pliny the Elder (23–79 AD)
• Assize [a judicial edict] of Bread and Ale, King Henry III of England, 1266
• Beer purity law (Reinheitsgebot), Duke Wilhelm IV of Bavaria, 1516
• Adulteration of Tea and Coffee Act, 1724 (England)
• Adulteration of Tea Acts, 1730 (England)
More recently, the EU has a specific focus on consumer confidence both within 
Europe and also for exports to Europe.
In 2014 the EU adopted their resolution “on the food crisis, fraud in the food 
chain and the control thereof” (EC 2014). This included a “five-point plan to restore 
consumer confidence.” This stated that there was currently no commonly held 
European definition but included:
According to Spink and Moyer (1) ‘Food fraud is a collective term used to encompass the 
deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, 
food ingredients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements made about a prod-
uct for economic gain.’ Drawing on from this definition the key characteristics of food fraud 
are: (1) non-compliance with food law and/or misleading the consumer, (2) which is done 
intentionally and (3) for reasons of financial gain. (EC 2014)
Later the EU report provided a definition that stated “Food fraud: There is cur-
rently no EU definition of the term, but it is generally accepted that food fraud is an 
intentional action carried out for financial gain. Different types of food fraud include 
adulteration [adulterant-substances], counterfeiting [intellectual property rights 
violations], substitution and deliberate mislabeling of goods” (EC 2014).
In support of these efforts, the European Union began looking closer at food 
fraud and specifically food authenticity or food integrity. The EU funded a 12 mil-
lion euro ($14.5 million) Food Integrity Project led by the UK Food and Environment 
Research Agency (FERA) (EU FIP 2017). The Food Integrity Project defines food 
integrity as “the state of being whole, entire, or undiminished or in perfect condi-
tion” (FERA 2018). This assumes food safety and quality to include meeting the 
entire consumer expectation including correct labeling of the processing and origin. 
They further state “Providing assurance to consumers and other stakeholders about 
the safety, authenticity, and quality of European food (integrity) is of prime impor-
tance in adding value to the European Agri-food economy.” An emphasis has been 
on the economic contribution of the value-added European food products. Another 
outcome is the creation of a Food Fraud Network that includes key contacts from 28 
national contact points in the member states and includes representatives from 
Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland (EC 2018).
An important first step is that the EU officially addressed food fraud in a formal 
resolution. The next public policy development step will be to get agreement from 
the member states and then for the proposals or activities to start adding value. The 
real value will be a holistic and all-encompassing perspective on the problem and a 
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collective shift to prevention. A next step is to monitor the progress of the definition 
of food fraud expanding from the EU resolution to then be defined in EU regulations 
and then through national laws or regulations.
Sidebar: Review of EU Draft Resolution to Adopt a Definition of Food 
Fraud (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Review of EU Draft Resolution to Adopt a Definition of Food Fraud
By John Spink • November 8, 2013 • Blog
Get ready for government regulations addressing food fraud prevention. 
The EU is defining Food Fraud, with a focus on prevention. This is a broad, 
holistic frame that covers all types of fraud conducted using food. This focus 
on food fraud and on prevention is consistent with other groups such as ISO, 
Interpol, and the Global Food Safety Initiative. It’s fantastic that we’re honing 
in on a harmonized set of terms and concepts before we all finish writing laws 
or implementing industry best practices.
The European Parliament created a Draft Resolution outlining a five-point 
plan following the “horsemeat fraud” scandal: European Parliament (2013). 
Draft Report  – on the food crisis, fraud in the food chain and the control 
thereof, Rapporteur (Chair): Esther de Lange, Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety, (2013/2091(INI), October 10, 2013.
In this Draft Resolution, there is a very interesting, broad focus beyond 
adulteration and beyond just human food. They identify a wide range of activ-
ities including food and feed law, animal health, and plant health. They also 
discuss the specific roles of the disciplines of Food Safety and Food Law.
“…having regard to the proposal for a regulation on official controls and other offi-
cial activities performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on 
animal health and welfare, plant health, plant reproductive material [and] plant pro-
tection products.”
One of their recommendations is that the EU and the Member States adopt 
a common definition of food fraud.
“Notes that EU law does not currently provide a definition of food fraud and that the 
Member States adopt different approaches; considers a uniform definition to be 
essential for developing a European approach to combating food fraud; stresses the 
need rapidly to adopt a harmonized definition at EU level, including elements such 
as (1) non-compliance with food law and/or misleading the consumer, (2) intent and 
(3) financial gain;”
When they proposed a definition of food fraud they quote one of our peer- 
reviewed, academic articles:
“According to Spink and Moyer (1), ‘Food fraud is a collective term used to encom-
pass the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresen-
tation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements 
made about a product for economic gain.” [Note: “(1)” refers to the 2011 article 
Defining the Public Health Threat of Food Fraud.]
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Sidebar: Update—European Parliament Activity Final Report, Food 
Fraud Defined (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Update—European Parliament Activity Final Report, Food Fraud 
Defined
By John Spink • June 27, 2014 • Blog
The European Commission final report on food fraud was adopted back in 
January 2014. A 58-0 committee vote supported the broad definition of food 
fraud and an emphasis on prevention. The member states are beginning to 
implement countermeasures and control systems.
The report “On the food crisis, fraud in the food chain and the control 
thereof” provides excellent insight as to how the EU arrived at their position 
and established their next steps. I will review some of the key sections and 
quotes below.
Since food fraud was not previously defined in EU laws, there was, logi-
cally, not much previous focus.
“…whereas no statistics exist on the incidence of food fraud in the EU, and whereas 
the Commission has only recently identified food fraud as a new area of action;”
Later the report stated the need to gather data specifically on food fraud. 
This will help in understanding the extent of the problem and also support the 
ability to identify incidents. The final report:
“Underlines the need to gain further insight into the scale, incidence, and elements 
of cases of food fraud in the EU; calls on the Commission and the Member States to 
collect data systematically on fraud cases and to exchange best practices for identi-
fying and combating food fraud;”
“Notes that EU law does not currently provide a definition of food fraud and that the 
Member States adopt different methodologies in the definition thereof; considers a 
uniform definition to be essential for the development of a European approach to 
combating food fraud; stresses the need to adopt swiftly a harmonised definition at 
EU level, based on discussions with Member States, relevant stakeholders and 
experts, including elements such as non-compliance with food law and/or mislead-
ing the consumer (including the omission of product information), intent and poten-
tial financial gain and/or competitive advantage;”
The food fraud and prevention concepts are taking root around the world 
and in proposed laws. To increase public health – and not just assure compli-
ance — it is logical to take a holistic, all-encompassing approach to preven-
tion. It looks like food fraud laws and industry best practices are coming 
sooner rather than later. Fortunately, there is a harmonization of terms and 
focus. Also, fortunately, there are a wide range of resources available before 
organizations begin developing their strategies.
(continued)
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There was a proactive emphasis on prevention:
“Considers that official controls should focus not only on food safety issues but also 
on preventing fraud and the risk of consumers being misled;”
The report specifically mentions collaboration with global activities, such 
as with our MSU Food Fraud Initiative. We have made a lot of effort aligned 
with MSU’s Extension and Outreach Mission, and it is rewarding to see that 
we are adding value:
“Considers it valuable that, in addition to and not replacing the system of official 
controls for the food sector, the sector itself proactively develops and uses private- 
sector anti-fraud initiatives such as product integrity checks, self-monitoring, analy-
sis, product-tracing plans, audits and certification, and welcomes current initiatives 
such as the Global Food Safety Initiative and the Food Fraud Initiative at Michigan 
State University;”
As in the draft, they adopted the broad definition we presented in our 
Journal of Food Science article. Early in our research, we identified the value 
of establishing a theoretically sound definition. The potential to contribute to 
reports like this were exactly why we took the time and effort to publish that 
scholarly article (see above).
They establish the critical first step in coordinating activities… harmoniz-
ing the terminology and establishing common prevention-focused goals:
“Firstly it is necessary to define what constitutes food fraud: a clear and harmonised 
definition is essential as a basis for an effective national and EU approach.”
The additional “Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection” included:
“Considers that the reference to fraudulent practices in the General Food Law is 
inadequate and that it leaves out frauds that do not pose a food safety or a public 
health risk; calls on the Commission to provide a definition of fraud which includes 
the financial gain and the intention of fraudulent practices;”
The additional “Opinion of the Committee on the Agriculture and Rural 
Development” included:
“Points out that a clear, legally valid EU-wide definition of food fraud is essential in 
order to facilitate the effective combating of fraud in the food chain;”
So the EU and the Member States have established a common foundation 
for combating food fraud – a definition and stated focus on prevention. Now 
other activities such as the UK Elliott Review of food fraud/Food Crime will 
help define how the Member States will be implementing countermeasures 
and control systems. As the EC reported noted, organizations such as GFSI 
will also be a key to the Food Fraud Network.
Horsemeat: One Year Review
13 International Public and Private Response
463
In February 2014 the EC released the summary of their activities to combat 
specifically the horsemeat scandal but more broadly food fraud. They deliv-
ered a five-point plan that is on target, and almost all of the deliverables are 
completed. Specifically For food fraud prevention:
“1. Food fraud
• “To map existing tools and mechanisms to fight food fraud, with a view 
of developing synergies and contacts amongst competent authorities.” 
[Note June 2014: completed]
• “To promote the involvement of Europol in food fraud investigations 
where and as appropriate.” [Note June 2014: completed.)
• “To ensure a procedure for the rapid exchange of information and alerts 
in cases of violations which may constitute a fraud (similar to what the 
RASFF [EU wide Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed] does for seri-
ous risks).” [Note June 2014: ONGOING]
Since they’ve defined food fraud as a “thing,” they’re now able to focus and 
coordinate their countermeasures and control systems. Also, now that food 
fraud is defined, they include it as a “thing” in databases. More clearly record-
ing incidents will improve their ability to estimate the impact and improve 
rapid response. This is being managed by an “EU Food Fraud Network” 
which is national contact points – this is the start of an international task-force 
type network.
EU Research Grants
Now that food fraud is defined, the term is showing up in more reports such 
as EU grant solicitations. For example, a recent 500 k Euro ($680 k) grant on 
“Sustainable Food Security” includes a specific topic of “Authentication of 
Food Products.” Not only is food fraud mentioned, but there is also a focus on 
prevention: “Beyond improving fraud detection, activities should aim at bet-
ter anticipating and preventing frauds.”
Many countries in the EU have had a long-term focus on food integrity. 
The vulnerability of the food supply chain was heightened after the BSE scare 
in the UK in 2009. The horsemeat scandal further exposed the vulnerability 
and led to consumer outrage. The horsemeat scandal  – and the increased 
awareness that led to more fraud incidents being publicized — brought food 
fraud to the forefront. The EU and the Member States have taken a very pro-
active approach to establishing a common starting point and coordinating 
activities. There will always be resource limitations and challenges for every 
government activity but the firm foundation and focus on prevention is the 
start of a very efficient and effective system.
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 The UK
The UK has been one of the European Union leaders in addressing food fraud. The 
impact of leaving the European Union (Briton exit or “Brexit”) is still to be deter-
mined, so this section will review previous and current activities.
Some of the very first Western food laws were developed in the UK and specifi-
cally addressed food fraud or “food adulteration.” These issues have been a concern 
but—as happens around the world—there is always a challenge of changing priori-
ties once the incident passes and the reality of implementing the extremely interdis-
ciplinary nature of shifting from detection to prevention. The traditional food safety 
and food adulteration focus rely on process improvement of diligent parties as well 
as testing of microbial perpetrators that are not intelligent and do not evolve to 
evade detection. The UK is currently applying criminology resources and—as the 
UK Home Office led the world in shifting from crime catching to crime prevention 
(UK Home Office 2015)—will logically shift from “intervention and response” to 
“prevention.” A main priority for the Home Office Crime Prevention is to decentral-
ize priority setting from the central government (Whitehall) to the municipalities 
(Note: The UK National Food Crime Unit NFCU is with the Food Standards Agency 
which is an independent government department.).
The UK work was sparked by the horsemeat incident which led to several major 
funded project reviews including 2014 “The Elliott Review Elliott review into the 
integrity and assurance of food supply networks” (DEFRA 2014). This was funded 
by the UK Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). A 
series of eight major recommendations were presented including the recommenda-
tion of a dedicated UK National Food Crime Unit (NFCU).
• National Food Crime Unit (NFCU): The NFCU was created after the publica-
tion of the Elliott Review and is “a criminal intelligence function within the [UK 
Food Standards Agency]” (NFCU 2017). This is a coordination point for the UK 
food crime activities, and they have investigation authority and some funding. 
The concept of a single coordinating group for food fraud prevention is efficient 
and logical. It will be interesting to monitor the evolution of the group, the UK 
FSA activity, the support from the broader crime-fighting resources, and—the 
ultimate barometer of the impact and importance defined by the government—
the focus by prosecutors, judges, and the often very complex court cases. In a 
public presentation, the NFCU stated: “The way the NFCU operates at the 
moment is to develop an intelligence package that is then delivered to local 
authorities which can then pursue a prosecution.”
The NFCU is a stand-alone group with its own funding. That said, they operate 
with a bigger network that leverages resources and staffing from the UK Food 
Standards Agency and more generally from countrywide law enforcement under the 
UK Home Office. The UK, “the Home Office” is the lead government department 
for immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime, fire, counter-terrorism, and 
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police. It is useful to understand how food fraud fits into the priorities of partner 
agencies. Their publically stated goals for 2018 include (UK Home Office 2018):
UK Home Office Law Enforcement Priorities for 2018: Our Goals
 (a) “Cut crime and the harm it causes, including cyber-crime and serious and 
organised crime
 (b) Manage civil emergencies within the remit of the Home Office
 (c) Protect vulnerable people and communities
 (d) Reduce terrorism
 (e) Control migration: ‘Secure the border against threats from people and goods’ 
and others. [Note: other countries may use the term ‘immigration’ rather than 
‘migration.’]
 (f) Provide world-class public services and contribute to the prosperity
 (g) Maximise the benefits of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union.”
Through several reports or guidances, the UK has reinforced a focus on food 
fraud prevention that is developing and evolving to the complex problem faced with 
the challenge of limited funding. The challenge, opportunity, and necessity for the 
UK will be to optimize the resources to achieve the greatest impact on prevention—
optimizing all resource to reduce the “fraud opportunity.”
Sidebar: FDA Office of Criminal Investigation Priority and Examples
Within the FDA there is the Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI). OCI is a 
criminal law enforcement part of the FDA and has powers to criminally inves-
tigate and arrest perpetrators and bring cases to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution. “They have the authority to obtain and execute arrest and search 
warrants, carry firearms, and gather evidence to enforce U.S. criminal law.” 
The ability to arrest is a differentiator between a criminal and regulatory 
agency.
The OCI website stated priorities are [emphasis added]:
• FDA-OCI Priorities:
• “Breaches in the legitimate medical supply chain by individuals and orga-
nizations dealing in unapproved, counterfeit, and substandard medical 
products.”
• “Criminal violations in situations where the normal regulatory process has 
been unable to remedy the problem.”
• “Criminal violations where the risk of harm to the public health is particu-
larly significant and the only remedy appears to be through the criminal 
process.”
(continued)
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• “Criminal conduct that prevents the FDA from being able to properly regu-
late. This includes false statements to the FDA during the regulatory pro-
cess and obstruction of justice.”
The food and dietary supplement cases were presented by FDA-OCI:
• “Peanut Corporation of America: Two former officials of the Peanut 
Corporation of America (PCA) are sentenced to prison for their roles in a 
conspiracy to defraud their customers by shipping salmonella-positive 
peanut products. They also confess to falsifying microbiological test 
results. The tainted peanut butter leads to an outbreak with more than 700 
cases of salmonella poisoning in 46 states and nine deaths. PCA’s former 
president receives a sentence of 28 years in prison, the largest criminal 
sentence ever given in a food safety case.”
• “5-Hour Energy Drink: A federal jury convicts eight defendants for 
attempting to increase profits by selling mislabeled and counterfeit 5-Hour 
Energy drinks. The defendants remove the legitimate labels from more 
than 350,000 bottles of 5-Hour Energy and replace them with false labels. 
Eventually, they begin to produce counterfeit energy drinks. They sell the 
product for less than the standard market price. This case represents one of 
the largest domestic food counterfeiting cases prosecuted by the 
U.S.  Department of Justice. The owner was sentenced to 86 months in 
Federal prison; his wife was sentenced to 26 months’ prison.”
• “Raw Deal, Incorporated: The owner of a company that makes and markets 
dietary supplements tells his employees to add ‘fillers,’ including cocoa 
replacer and rice flours, to the company’s products and to certify that some 
of the company’s products are kosher or organic, even though they are not. 
During an earlier FDA inspection, he instructs employees to alter docu-
ments and not to let the FDA inspectors see ‘fillers’ being added to custom-
ers’ orders.” For selling diluted and adulterated dietary ingredients and 
supplements, he is sentenced to 40 months in prison.
• “Jensen Farms: Two cantaloupe farm owners plead guilty to charges of 
shipping their cantaloupe knowing that it is contaminated by a poisonous 
bacteria, Listeria monocytogenes (L. mono). The cantaloupes go to 28 
states, resulting in at least 147 hospitalizations and 33 deaths. One woman, 
pregnant at the time of her outbreak-related illness, has a miscarriage. Each 
of the two owners is sentenced to five years’ probation and is together 
required to pay a total of $150,000 in restitution.”
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 Key Learning Objective 3: Intragovernmental Efforts 
Including INTERPOL, Europol, and OECD
This section reviews the intragovernmental efforts including INTERPOL, Europol, 
and the OECD.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Review of the OECD report on the Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and 
Piracy
• (2) The deeper OECD review the food supply chain
• (3) Then, INTERPOL-Europol operation Opson
 OECD-Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy Report
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a group 
funded by 35 member countries including the USA since 1961 (OECD 2018). They 
expanded their 1997 report in 2008 on The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and 
Piracy (OECD 1998, 2007, 2008b). Their research found counterfeit product pro-
duced and consumed in virtually all countries. The scope of the report is crystal 
clear to only apply to violations of a trademark. In addition, it does not include other 
types of fraud including origin labeling, etc.
While the main body of the report did not provide an actual estimate of the eco-
nomic impact, it did state:
• Limitations on Estimates of the Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and 
Piracy.
• “The overall degree to which products are being counterfeited and pirated is 
unknown, and there do not appear to be any methodologies which could be 
employed to develop an acceptable overall estimate.”
• “The conclusions reached can therefore only be viewed as a crude indicator of 
the role of counterfeit and pirated products in international trade.”
• “Carrying out assessments of the factors (or drivers), even on a qualitative, non- 
empirical basis, can generate insights into the counterfeiting and piracy situation 
in different products and in different economies.”
One major variable in their assessment was that the report did provide a rough 
estimate of counterfeiting and piracy based on a seizure rate of 0.5% (based on 
anecdotal evidence and expert opinion) (OECD 2007). On the $3.7 trillion in world 
trade at the time of the report, 0.1% effort would result in a $3.7 billion swing in the 
estimate. Nevertheless, they did provide an appendix with estimates. The authors 
did admit this limitation: “Taking a number of known biases into account, this infor-
mation is then used to estimate a set of relative counterfeiting/ piracy propensities. 
This provides the foundation on which a ceiling of the phenomenon’s magnitude is 
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approximated” (OECD 2007). The report estimated a $200 billion in cross-border 
counterfeiting and piracy trade.
The application of the global estimate and country “propensity for counterfeit-
ing” was limited:
From the OECD graphs, with a 95% confidence interval, the propensity of importing a 
counterfeit product from the United States is from <1% to 40% with a baseline point esti-
mate of 12%, implying there is a 12% chance of any product from the United States being 
counterfeit. The propensity of importing a counterfeit product from China is between 60% 
and 99% with a baseline point estimate of 97%. (Spink and Levente Fejes 2012)
The food and drink sectors were covered in their Chap. 12. Regarding food, they 
state:
In the experience of the industry, products most subject to counterfeit action are those that 
are the simplest to replace with passable substitutes, and whose substitutes would not be 
readily detected by the consumer (and sometimes the wholesalers and retailers). Tea, rice 
and vodka were examples of such items provided by respondents to the OECD survey.
Further,
Several respondents noted that counterfeiting and infringement of trademarks in food are 
relatively low compared to other products, due to generally low-profit margins and the 
significant logistical challenges associated with the production, handling, transport, and 
distribution of food products. These characteristics would be further magnified for perish-
able products, which require even more sophisticated handling and distribution chains 
capable of handling these products efficiently.
 OECD and the Food Supply Chain
The OECD report then moved on to review food products and the supply chain. 
They reviewed factors that drive counterfeiting production and consumption. Their 
summary was:
Perhaps surprisingly, there seems to be a view within the food and drink sectors (although 
the actual extent of this is not clear) that the level of sophistication required to produce 
certain products, the difficulties associated with the handling and transport of food and 
drink products (especially those that are perishable), and the low-profit margins involved, 
would discourage many would be counterfeiters, and that therefore the levels of counterfeit-
ing experienced in the sector are comparatively low [compared to counterfeiting of other 
products].
Also,
Based on the appraisal of drivers in Table 11.1 (referred below as 
Table 13.2), it is suggested that the relative ease of deception, as well as the size 
of the market for well-known brand products, provide strong incentives for the 
counterfeiting of those goods. However, the generally low-profit margins, the chal-
lenges associated with transporting and distributing products and the potentially 
serious consequences of prosecution are also limiting factors.
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Regarding magnitude and scope estimates, the food industry seemed more con-
cerned with broader food safety or contamination issues rather that trademark viola-
tion. The OECD researchers were frustrated with so few incidents, but maybe they 
did not realize that the priority for investigation and enforcement is first on public 
health and then later on other violations. A key is that the OECD survey did not 
provide much insight into the food IPR violations where they stated:
Unfortunately, the survey has shed very little light on the actual magnitude and scope of 
[intellectual property rights trademark violation] counterfeiting in the food and drink sector. 
Part of the reason for this is that there seems to be genuine and widespread misunderstand-
ing in this sector of what is actually covered by counterfeiting.
Table 13.2 OECD report table on: Propensity to produce or consume counterfeited food and 
drink goods (referred to as Table 11.1 in the original text). (Adapted from Ref. (OECD 2008a))
Propensity to produce or consume counterfeited food and drink goods [Compared to all 
products including luxury goods, consumer electronics, pharmaceuticals, automobile parts, 
etc.]
For producers effect on propensities to produce
  Unit profitability: Generally low-profit margins
  Market size: Large, mass market
  Genuine brand power: High
Production, distribution, and technology
  Production investment: Moderate investment required
  Technology: Not a barrier
  Logistics: Are problematic
  Marketing and sale: Could be difficult
  Ability to deceive consumers: Easy to deceive consumers
Institutional characteristics
  Risk of detection: Low, but closely watched
  Enforcement: If detected, risk of prosecution probably high
  Penalties: Likely to be high
For consumers effect on propensities to consume non-deceptive items
Product characteristics
  Price: Cost savings relatively low
  Quality and nature of product: Outwardly close in appearance to originals
  Ability to conceal status: Image not a factor
Consumer characteristics
  Health concerns: Could be high and dangerous
  Safety risks: Not a significant factor
  Personal values: Not a factor
  Risk of detection: Low
  Risk of prosecution: Low
  Penalties: Low
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The OECD report did review government resources applied to the problem of 
possibly that IPR resources are applied more readily to other product groups:
An observation made by most respondents to the survey, and one which has been reflected 
in all other sectors covered by the OECD survey, is that government resources (police, 
investigators, prosecutors, court facilities, etc.) allocated to deal with counterfeiting are 
generally inadequate [undefined and possibly human resources or the challenge of the mar-
ketplace], and reflect the relatively low priority (if not necessarily low importance) attrib-
uted to counterfeiting when compared to other breaches of the law, such as drugs or the 
smuggling of weapons and people. The industry noted that this has been especially trouble-
some in cases when well-defined underlying laws apply, yet effective implementation has 
been difficult to achieve.
An extremely important insight is the limited effect of enforcement and prosecu-
tion on deterrence or prevention:
Associated with the above, is another point made by many respondents (in all sectors sur-
veyed): from their perspective, prosecution and other legal action against counterfeiting is 
difficult and expensive to carry out, and penalties and punishments are rarely sufficient to 
deter counterfeiters. This reflects a general view (that appears in virtually all industry 
responses to the OECD survey) that until the seriousness of the problems associated with 
counterfeiting are recognised, efforts to combat this growing phenomenon will always be 
inadequate ultimately.
The OECD concepts were summarized in tables that identified the propensity 
[“an inclination or natural tendency to behave in a particular way” (Merriam- 
Webster 2004)] to produce or counterfeit consumer products (Table 13.2).
While the OECD report did not identify the novel application of methods or 
processes, it did provide a very thorough and insightful review of “food counterfeit-
ing” in relation to other types of “product-counterfeiting.” The enforcement and 
prosecution are important, but due to the complex nature of the investigations, there 
is a further emphasis on prevention… on trying to prevent food fraud from occur-
ring in the first place.
 INTERPOL and Europol
INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization) and Europol (The 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation) presented a food fraud 
prevention interaction between NGOs at the first interaction with GFSI at the 2013 
GFSI annual conference. Once the prevention plan and processes are implemented, 
there is a significant additional role of INTERPOL to further enhance the linkages 
around the world, in Europe through Europol, and also to the US agencies. 
INTERPOL was aware of their optimal role as a communicator and connector 
(Figs. 13.2 and 13.3). It was understood that INTERPOL is an international law 
enforcement coordinating body, and it was interesting to see the stakeholders 
beyond prosecutors and judicial system, policy-makers, and law enforcement to add 
industry and academia.
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Fig. 13.2 INTERPOL-Europol presentation of their role in food fraud prevention connecting 
other stakeholders. (INTERPOL 2013)
Fig. 13.3 Cover page of the INTERPOL-Europol operation OPSON program 2013. (INTERPOL 
2013)
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From The Economist (Economist 2018):
It is not a police force in the traditional sense—its agents are not able to arrest criminals. 
Instead, it is more of an information-sharing network, providing a way for national police 
forces to co-operate effectively and tackle international crime ranging from human traffick-
ing and terrorism to money laundering and illegal art dealing. The organisation, based in 
France, operates centralised criminal databases that contain fingerprint records, DNA sam-
ples, and stolen documents: a treasure trove so valuable that police consulted it 146 times 
every second in 2017. Interpol’s other main function is to issue notices: alerts to member 
states for missing or wanted persons. The best-known of these is the “Red Notice,” a notifi-
cation that a member state would like someone arrested. States are not obliged to follow 
these notices, but will often treat them as a warrant for someone’s arrest and extradition. 
“Diffusions,” which can be issued with less bureaucracy, are another popular way of seek-
ing arrests through Interpol.
The role and resources of INTERPOL are often misunderstood since their actual 
mission and activities are different than portrayed in movies. INTERPOL is a law 
enforcement information sharing and coordinating body. Their budget is really very 
small and relies on the countries or other agencies for human resources. INTERPOL 
has no agents who are able to make arrests, but they help coordinate activities across 
national boundaries. EUROPOL is similar to INTERPOL-Europol but focuses 
within Europe (Europol 2018). One major joint engagement is Operation Opson 
that focuses on general food crimes and more specifically food fraud (INTERPOL 
2011, 2012, 2013).
Operation Opson “…seeks to evaluate the threat regarding food fraud on the 
basis of the results reported by the participating countries. It also elaborates recom-
mendations for the future of the initiative” (Note: the term economically motivated 
adulteration is not used). The sixth Operation Opson was concluded in 2016 which 
coordinated 61 countries and resulted in seizures of 9800 tonnes, over 26 million 
liters and 13 million items (INTERPOL 2017).
Operation Opson focuses on counterfeit food and beverages and substandard 
food and beverages:
• “Food products [INTERPOL]: are defined as any item or substance intended to 
be, or reasonably expected to be, ingested by humans or animals.”
• “Beverages [INTERPOL]: are defined as drinkable liquids, that is to say, liquids 
intended to be, or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans or animals.”
• “A counterfeit food product [INTERPOL]: is defined as a food product 
infringing an Intellectual Property Right. All intellectual property rights defined 
under the national and European law are included.”
• “A substandard food product [INTERPOL]: is defined as a product which 
does not meet the criteria required by European and national laws regarding its 
production, packaging, storage, and distribution. Generally speaking, it is a prod-
uct of a quality inferior to that which is legally required under European and 
national standards.”
The Operation Opson team has worked with the GFSI organization including the 
GFSI Food Fraud Think Tank. At the 2013 GFSI conference in Barcelona, the 
Operation Opson team presented their role in food fraud prevention. Specifically, 
they identified an optimal role as a facilitator between many stakeholders.
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Operation Opson meets the INTERPOL-Europol mission of coordinating law 
enforcement activities across international boundaries. As with the rest of the 
INTERPOL activities, there is an additional step of reaching beyond investigation 
and prosecution to prevention. There is an opportunity for a transnational focus on 
understanding the overall fraud opportunity to begin defining prevention policies 
and strategies. The goal is not to catch food fraud but to prevent it from occurring in 
the first place.
Sidebar: INTERPOL Opson—Shift from IP Counterfeit Emphasis to 
Food Fraud
For the food industry, IPR counterfeits are a concern and important to address, 
but the major focus of prevention and intervention is in other areas. The most 
important output or result from INTERPOL Operation Opson is the hard data 
and analysis of actual seizures. Over the years Opson has a shift from intel-
lectual property rights counterfeit violations to an emphasis more on the max-
imum economic impact while prioritizing severe public health threats. The 
public health focus is demonstrated by the member countries that have sent 
representatives from the public health or food safety agencies rather than law 
enforcement or customs.
A food agency would prioritize a focus on “food laws” (e.g., UK Food 
Safety Act), while a “law enforcement agency” may focus more on “laws that 
apply to food” (e.g., money laundering, smuggling, counterfeiting). Many 
Table 13.3 INTERPOL Operation opson seizure results from 2017: table of results
Crime
Deceiving consumer (DC), e.g., falsely labeled extra virgin olive oil DC 26%
Food safety (FS), e.g., infringement related to storage conditions of the goods FS 22%
Fiscal infringement (FI), e.g., alcohol duties FI 19%
Intellectual property rights (counterfeiting) (IPRI), e.g., all IPR, including 
appellations of origins
IPR  1%
DC
38%
FS
33%
IPR
1%
FI
28%
Fig. 13.4 INTERPOL 
Operation Opson seizure 
results from 2017: Pie 
chart of results
(continued)
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 Conclusion
This chapter covered the application of industry standards with a focus on the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). The previous chapter on standards and certi-
fications regarding the public-private-partnership provided a foundation regarding 
the current industry activities to address food fraud prevention. The actions are the 
new setting of standard operating procedures and are both influenced by and influ-
ence government and international responses. This chapter was built upon the previ-
ous concepts to explore the “why” and “how these responses lead—or are 
leading—to action. The first conclusion is that there are often food fraud incidents 
that create the call to action for the governments or nongovernmental organizations. 
These trigger incidents do not follow a standard scope or impact but somehow cre-
ate a response. For example, sometimes there is an underlying concern about food 
fraud, and as the focus grows to the point of major focus, an incident that may have 
previously gone unnoticed becomes the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s 
back. The second conclusion is that the growing focus on the food fraud problem 
has led to more rigorous and science-based reviews which will probably lead to a 
country—possibly a developing country—to create the most holistic, all- 
encompassing, integrated, efficient, and effective countrywide Food Fraud 
Prevention Strategy. That country could create a case study that becomes the tem-
plate for the rest of the world. A developing country has more at risk so can less 
afford to wait. Also, a developing country has more immediate and direct benefits 
from reducing the fraud opportunity in both increased consumer satisfaction and 
economic growth from the confidence of citizens that their extra effort will be 
rewarded. The final conclusion is that collaboration and integration of concepts 
have occurred and will continue to evolve the focus from reactionary intervention 
and response to proactive prevention that reduces the fraud opportunity. Naturally, 
the initial response is within an individual scholarly discipline or a single agency. 
For example, in the USA, melamine in foods was a food safety incident, treated as 
a routine contaminant, and the FDA-focused response was to intervention and 
response. These types of efforts do not naturally expand from one discipline to 
another from the “bottom up.” Without an interdisciplinary focus on prevention, an 
countries—and organizations including Europol and INTERPOL—have 
other operations that specifically focus only on intellectual property rights 
infringement. For example, Europol has operation “In Our Sites” (Europol 
2018). INTERPOL has a range of activities including an annual “IP Crime 
Investigators College (IIPCIC)” (INTERPOL 2007).
This public health focus is evidenced in that less than 1% of the total oper-
ation seizures were categorized at IPR counterfeiting (Table  13.3 and 
Fig. 13.4).
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incident occurs over and over again. The international public and private response 
are continuing to mature and evolve to an interdisciplinary, collaborative focus on 
reducing the fraud opportunity.
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on International Response
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional 
group
WIIFM all Foreign suppliers have same issue concerns, and the activities are based on 
some key issues that were presented—countries have had specific incidents 
that have led them to implement a wide variety of actions, and the specific 
problems help explain their priorities and sensitivities
Quality team Same
Auditors The FFPS may consider very global and very high-level issues and that is the 
most efficient and effective way to start—starting local is usually not the way 
to start
Management This is just background on how laws and regulations have become a focus for 
individual countries
Corp. 
decision-makers
Same
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question:
 (a) What are the characteristics of FF incidents that led governments to act (or 
not)?
 (b) What was the most significant global FF incident that sparked FF prevention 
efforts?
 (c) What is the level of international country-level collaboration on FF preven-
tion strategy?
 2. Key Learning Objective1
 (a) What is “the Elliott Review”?
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 (b) What were the key FF incidents that impacted the European Parliament 
action?
 (c) Explain “zero tolerance” and the challenges in the application?
 3. Key Learning Objective2:
 (a) What is the Chinese “Negative List”?
 (b) Explain if the PCA recall was a food fraud or food safety incident?
 (c) What agencies have a high government set priority for FF enforcement and 
prosecution?
 4. Key Learning Objective3:
 (a) What is Operation Opson?
 (b) What are the enforcement and prosecution powers of INTERPOL?
 (c) What are the key findings and results of Operation Opson?
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Chapter 14
Marketing, Competitive Strategy, 
and Competitive Intelligence
Summary
This chapter presents an overview of the marketing, competitive strategy, and com-
petitive intelligence concepts that apply to food fraud prevention. The fraudster 
should be considered a competitor alongside the traditional marketplace adversar-
ies. The fraudster is a business which makes business decisions, so they can be 
influenced or “dissuaded” from attacking a company, brand, or product. This chap-
ter will provide a review of marketing and corporate strategy concepts before laying 
the foundation for selecting food fraud prevention countermeasures and control 
systems.
The Key Learning Objectives of the chapter are
• (1) Competitor Analysis Overview: This is an introduction to the basics, termi-
nology, and the key theories. This is primarily based on Michael Porter’s work on 
corporate strategy.
• (2) The Basic Factors in the Marketplace: To begin to analyze the market and 
create a method for decision-making, this considers the attributes of the market-
place, consumers, and competitors.
• (3) Scenarios that Help Define Countermeasures: Reviews of the marketplace 
and consumer behavior can be understood by developing models of specific 
product and supply chain characteristics.
 Introduction
Marketing as a science has rapidly developed as brands become more recognized 
and preferred by consumers in all four corners of the world. Social media and the 
spread of mobile technology are accelerating the popularity of brands. The increase 
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in brand awareness and brand demand has also increased the “fraud opportunity.” 
The expanding marketing through digital media combined with e-commerce sales 
and distribution is rapidly evolving and morphing the “fraud opportunity.”
The foundations of marketing theory are essential to cover before considering:
• (1) The fraudster as a competitor
• (2) The application to competitor analysis
• (3) Competitor intelligence gathering for targeted countermeasures.
One of the most basic and holistic concepts is Kotler’s “5 Ps of Marketing” 
which include Product, Price, Place, and Promotion, and then he considered 
People to be the underlying foundation (Kotler 2012). A key to his theory is 
“control” which means understanding, preparing for, and responding to market 
conditions. The four Ps combine to consider the overall objective of product 
“positioning”—especially if there is an evolving fraud opportunity or awareness 
of counterfeits in the marketplace—then this would be a potential threat to suc-
cess. CFOs, general managers, and brand managers frequently understand “coun-
terfeiting is bad” and “we should do something,” but the concern is usually not 
put into an immediately actionable form. In essence, the raw information (“we 
have a counterfeit problem”) is not processed into “actionable intelligence” (e.g., 
implement task “a” with test sensitivity “b” at point “c” to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity to within the Enterprise Risk Management risk tolerance). So then the ques-
tions are:
• (1) How to understand the dynamics or factors of the fraudsters?
• (2) How to communicate in “marketing terms”?
• (3) Then how to evaluate “how much is enough”?
 Key Learning Objective 1: Competitor Analysis Overview
This section reviews an overview of Competitor Analysis based primarily on the 
books of Michael Porter including Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage 
(Porter 1980; Porter 1985). These are basic principles to understand the dynamics 
of how businesses compete to find ways to influence the marketplace which also 
applies to the “fraud opportunity.”
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Porter’s five forces analysis
• (2) The basic factors that drive the marketplace
• (3) The “decisional scope” for countermeasures or control systems
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 Five Forces Model Applied to Food Fraud Prevention
While it may seem counterintuitive to consider fraudsters as a competitor and to 
assess their threat within a competitor analysis, it is logical and very efficient in 
strategy development.
Michael Porter is considered the godfather of corporate strategy after publishing 
the “five forces analysis” in his book Competitive Strategy (Fig. 14.1) (Porter 1980). 
The five forces define the rivalry or aggressive marketing within the industry. The 
greater the rivalry or competition in the market, the lower the profit margins. Porter 
states “The goal of competitive strategy for a business unit in an industry is to find 
a position in the industry where the company can best defend itself against these 
competitive forces or can influence them in its favor.” So, understanding the mar-
ket—including the goal and role of fraudsters—is a fundamental component of the 
competitive strategy.
The five forces model includes the items below. These apply to a “competitor” 
whether it is another brand or a counterfeiter.
 1. Industry or market (“rivalry among existing firms”): For food fraud, this is the 
brand owner who is the producer, manufacturer, and retailer.
 2. Suppliers (“the bargaining power of suppliers”): For food fraud, these are the 
providers of incoming goods and outgoing goods.
 3. Buyers (“bargaining power of buyers”): For food fraud, these would be down-
stream manufacturers or retailers who would then sell to the end consumer.
 4. Potential entrants (“threat of new entrants”—new competitors): For food fraud, 
these are not only other legitimate company who produce similar products but 
also the fraudsters or counterfeiters who compete with genuine product sales. 
(Note: the “deceptive” and “non-deceptive” counterfeits are discussed in detail 
elsewhere in this book.)
 (a) Barrier to Entry: For food fraud, these would be challenges to produce 
products, such as (1) procuring the funding to begin the entire operation; (2) 
procure the acceptable raw materials; (3) development of a recipe or formu-
lation; (4) manufacturing and distribution; (5) insertion into the legitimate 
Industry 
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supply chain; and (6) supporting the continuing criminal enterprise. 
Generally, Porter refers to major barriers including (1) economies of scale, 
(2) product differentiation, (3) capital requirements, (4) switching costs, (5) 
access to distribution channels, (6) cost disadvantages independent of scale, 
and (7) government policy. A counterfeiter who is already in a similar or 
identical industry would have fewer challenges with these barriers.
 (i) For food fraud prevention: Sophisticated or unique product or process 
attributes may decrease the “counterfeit ability” or “counterfeit profit-
ability.” This is especially true of a product or process that is especially 
inexpensive for the brand owner to include. This is a key competitive 
intelligence insight that to add specific process steps that are easy or 
inexpensive for the brand owner may be a “countermeasure or control 
system” that decreases the business case for conducting fraud or attack-
ing your company.
 (b) Barrier to Exit: For food fraud, this would be the resistance to dismantle the 
probably capital-intensive fraudulent operation, which could include shift-
ing to genuine products (“going legit”).
 (i) For food fraud prevention, this is a key competitive intelligence insight 
into how to “dissuade” the fraudster from producing an illegal product 
and “encourage” them to “go legit.”
 (c) Competitors-Fraudsters: It is efficient to expand the same competitor anal-
ysis from the legitimate competitors to the fraudsters. The basic market con-
siderations are similar, though the countermeasures and control systems are 
often very different. Following another of Porter’s concepts is “Signal Your 
Intent” which is traditionally providing advance notice of expanding opera-
tions or manufacturing capacity, so other competitors do not also decide to 
add more capacity. When applied to fraudsters is a warning that they may get 
caught (reduced sales) and that there are better controls in place (increase 
their cost of producing the fraudulent product).
 (i) For food fraud prevention, as with legitimate competitors, fraudsters 
will respond to a shifting market. Specific countermeasures and control 
systems change the business opportunity for the fraudster. With effective 
communication, the fraudsters can be “dissuaded” from attacking your 
product.
 5. Substitutes (“threat of substitute products or services”): For food fraud, these 
are not only direct competitors of similar products but also alternatives. For 
transportation, a trucking company competitor would be another truck company 
and a substitute would be rail transportation.
14 Marketing, Competitive Strategy, and Competitive Intelligence
483
Sidebar: “Learning by Buyers” to Reduce the Fraud Opportunity
In Competitive Strategy Porter discusses “Learning by Buyers” in terms of a 
tendency of products to evolve from unique or differentiated to become com-
modities (Porter 1985). Over time, the buyers learn to adapt their specifica-
tions and purchasing goals. “A buyer’s learning tends to progress at different 
rates for different products, depending on how important the purchase is and 
the buyer’s technical expertise. Smart or interested buyers (because it is an 
important product) tend to learn faster.”
Porter identifies a weakness where differentiation (with a premium price) 
gives way to commoditization (with a lower price). For food fraud, if the 
overall vulnerability is communicated so that a buyer becomes aware of the 
value of a reduced “fraud opportunity,” then food fraud prevention may help 
shift a commodity to a differentiated product. In certain situations, an informed 
buyer may determine that a differentiated, higher-priced product is actually 
less costly than a commodity product when considering Enterprise Risk 
Management and total cost of ownership. For example, if a higher-priced fla-
vor is more intense or stable, this could result in fewer ounces of the ingredi-
ent being required in the recipe or for use in the manufacturing (see the 
Wal-mart sustainability examples).
Sidebar: Fraudster Decisions—Entry into New Businesses
Continuing with concepts from Competitive Strategy by Michael Porter, a 
fraudster is a business and subject to the business decision-making process. 
The fact that an action may be illegal is only one of many considerations for 
the fraudster. It is most efficient to consider the worst case that the fraudster is 
a criminal not concerned with breaking the law and a sociopath not concerned 
about cheating or possibly endangering consumers (if they intended harm, 
they would be a psychopath). Also, many fraudsters rationalize their actions 
with ideas such as “the consumers don’t notice anyway,” “the brands make 
some much money they’ll never miss this sale,” “our counterfeit product is 
just as good as theirs,” “our product has been and inspected, and “we’ve never 
been caught,” “they don’t look for counterfeits so they must not be concerned,” 
or others. The fact that the fraud is illegal is often just a minor consideration 
for the fraudster.
For food fraud, understanding these dynamics and decisions can help “dis-
suade” fraudsters from attacking a product or for even trying to attack an 
industry. “Some crucial economic principles identify businesses that are 
attractive targets for entry and help determine what company assets and skills 
will make an entry profitable” (note: this is an interesting opposite perspective 
but complementary prevention strategy to the criminology theories on hot 
products and hot spots that seek to reduce the attractiveness of a target) (Porter 
(continued)
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1985). Though the macroeconomic factors are significant, the final decision 
will be made on microeconomic factors unique to the fraudster. The fraudster 
operation is often exponentially smaller than the target brand or even the 
brand operating in a region.
With a focused strategy that considers the economic decisions made by the 
fraudster, there may be simple changes to the product, distribution, or con-
sumer sales that increase the risk of getting caught or the cost of conducting 
the crime. The fraudster may be able to be “hassled” out of the market.
The two key concerns are:
 1. Structural entry barrier.
 2. Expected retaliation of incumbent firms.
For food fraud prevention, the “structural entry barrier” would be the abil-
ity to produce a high-enough-quality product to deceive consumers and access 
to markets to sell the product. The “expected retaliation of incumbent firms” 
is more than just lawsuits and government enforcement. The “expected retali-
ation” includes proactive changes that increase the chance of getting caught 
and the cost of producing the product. The response includes changing prod-
ucts that are hard to duplicate, tightening markets controls, and shifting buyer 
or consumer concern. The entire product and sales life cycle should be 
reviewed for a defensive strategy to identify efficient and effective counter-
measures and control systems (e.g., consider the entire beef supply chain with 
a concern of horsemeat). For example, there may be one key new step that 
undermines the ability of the fraudster to succeed (e.g., build a lab and outfit 
with new equipment to implement a highly effective horse species test). Also, 
if this type of highly effective countermeasure is found, then it might be pro-
active to go ahead and implement this across all products (e.g., use contract 
labs to conduct random tests on incoming beef products).
For food fraud prevention, there is a unique balance of factors. Generally, 
the food industry is very concerned with “contaminants” (defined by Codex as 
unintentional ingredients at an unacceptable level) and “adulterants” (inten-
tional unauthorized ingredients), especially those that lead to health hazards 
or product recalls. Also, the threat of retaliation by the brand owners should 
be considered “very high.” Then, generally, it appears that many food fraud-
sters are already producing food, so they have low entry costs, access to mar-
kets, and expertise in identifying fraud opportunities. The threat to the 
fraudster of detection for certain and specific fraud acts could be “very low.” 
By conducting a methodical and holistic market analysis—including on the 
decisions for entering a new business—there are often low-cost and straight-
forward countermeasures and controls systems that can significantly reduce 
the “fraud opportunity.”
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 Competitor Analysis Factors
Competitor Analysis is a formal process or method to review other marketplace 
participants who challenge either the sales or margins of the product you sell. 
Competitor Intelligence is developing the analysis into actionable steps. Later, a 
corporate strategy is the system or cycle to review and manage the actions. 
Considering the “Food Fraud Prevention Cycle,” competitor analysis applies to the 
“scanning” step, and Competitor Intelligence applies in the “countermeasures” step. 
A competitor analysis—and there is no reason why it would not apply to a fraud-
ster—includes (Hussey and Jenster 1999):
• Marketplace Competitor Analysis Factors Applied to Food Fraud 
Prevention:
• Market share: For food fraud, the question is: is the counterfeit product “decep-
tive,” taking direct sales from the brand (the consumer intends to buy the genuine 
product)?
 – For food fraud prevention, some fraudulent product is “non-deceptive” and 
is sold to consumers who are actually seeking counterfeit products, e.g., coun-
terfeit luxury goods. These “non-deceptive” products would not offset a genu-
ine product sale and do not lower the market price of the genuine good.
• Price: For food fraud, is the product undercutting the market price (with a lower 
price) or cannibalizing sales (taking sales at the same price)?
• Brand positioning: For food fraud, is the fraudulent product of high quality (a 
desirable product) or positioned as lower grade “substandard” or “non- deceptive” 
counterfeits? A problem could be if “deceptive” counterfeits were of lower qual-
ity and reduced the consumer satisfaction.
• Advertising expenditure/customer acquisition: For food fraud, is the fraudster 
either selling direct to buyers or comingling counterfeits in the legitimate supply 
chain? The direct sales advertising spend would be in terms of online spam 
emails, selling through online e-commerce auction sites.
• Distribution coverage: For food fraud, this would generally be where the fraud-
ulent product is found in the marketplace.
• Product line breadth: For food fraud, whether fraud is occurring in only spe-
cific products or across the manufacturing steps.
• Organizational structure: For food fraud, are there large-scale fraudsters mak-
ing similar products or many small operations making a wide range of products? 
There also may be a web of small suppliers making separate components that are 
combined later into larger operations.
With an active and efficient Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, the fraudsters 
may be “hassled” out of the market—trying to counterfeit this product may 
just be “too much trouble” at least compared to other products.
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 – For food fraud prevention, the countermeasures are very different for differ-
ent types of fraudsters and different types of fraud acts in different markets 
and supply chains. General global testing of the counterfeit product in a mar-
ket will remove that product from the market and generally, incrementally, 
reduce the “fraud opportunity.” Specific testing on your receiving dock for a 
specific adulterant-substance—with a corporate policy to immediately report 
suspicious activity to US FDA, US FBI, and US Customs—will have a spe-
cific effect on your direct suppliers. General countermeasures generally help 
while specific countermeasures specifically help.
 – For food fraud prevention, to note, if the product is determined to be illegal 
and seized by the government, then it would be logical that the invoice is null- 
and- void… you are not liable for paying the invoice, and the fraudster loses 
the of the entire shipment.
• Manufacturing capacity and capability: For food fraud, is there enough vol-
ume and quality of the production? Often, the counterfeit product is manufac-
tured on legitimate manufacturing operations during a “fourth shift” or “ghost 
shift.” In other instances, a contract manufacturer may routinely cycle through 
the production of a wide range of brands so the local operations may not be 
aware the production is actually illegal.
• Quality and customer satisfaction: For food fraud, is the perception of quality 
and customer satisfaction lower for the fraudulent product? In some cases, the 
fraudulent product is of high quality—or at least at a quality level that does not 
lead to a reduction in customer satisfaction… for now.
 – For food fraud prevention, if a counterfeit branded product was recalled 
would it impact the entire brand or just one product line or sales in one region?
 – For food fraud prevention, to note, even though you did not make the coun-
terfeit product, never touched it, never had a chance to authenticate it, and 
probably would have very limited legal liability… still, your product is 
recalled. Your product is withdrawn from the market.
 Competitive Analysis: Scope of Response Decisions
Based on the urgency, there is a hierarchy of decision-making. These concepts can 
be integrated into a COSO-based Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/COSO) sys-
tem. The analyses are defined by the urgency of a countermeasure and the breadth 
of the impact. Different levels in an organization address the specific analysis.
When a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (FFPS) is in place, the different analyses 
provide valuable input across the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC).
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For food fraud, an incident or suspicious activity could quickly result in a 
product recall, so the analysis may often be much more urgent than for a typical 
competitor analysis. The “competitor analysis” could also be the same as an “inci-
dent review.”
The types of competitor analysis are included here, and readers will recognize 
similarities to the terms or concepts from Enterprise Risk Management (ERM/
COSO) (Hussey and Jenster 1999):
• Modes of Competitor Analysis Factors Applied to Food Fraud Prevention:
• Operational Competitor Analysis: For marketing, this is an immediate issue 
and impacts functional details such as manufacturing more products or rushing 
deliveries to meet a customer order. The response is within the control of the 
firm, and the impact is operational. For food fraud, this could be testing inventory 
and in-process products for an adulterant-substance that is reported to be in the 
marketplace, e.g., testing for nut allergens in cumin after an FDA alert.
• Tactical Competitor Analysis: For marketing, this is an emerging issue of a 
competitor lowering prices, increasing production, or changing their supply 
chain. The response does not need to be immediate but may have a longer-term 
negative impact if not addressed. The response requires a more detailed analysis 
of the competitor or the market, and the internal response is usually tactical. For 
food fraud, this could be an awareness of a shifting fraud opportunity that could 
become a suspicious activity, e.g., changing garlic market prices that could lead 
to more food fraud. A countermeasure may be to review how garlic is used in 
manufacturing, how it is authenticated or certified, reviewing the supplier net-
works, and considering new or expanded garlic authenticity tests or traceability.
• Strategic Competitor Analysis: For marketing, this could be an awareness that 
a new competitor may enter the market, a product innovation could be under- 
development, or a regulation could significantly impact the supply of a raw mate-
rial or finished good. The response would be a major corporate decision such as 
capital expenditure, and not responding could have a significant impact on the 
overall brand equity or even the viability of the firm. For food fraud, this could 
be conducting ongoing updates of the counterfeiter operations and products 
produced.
 – For food fraud prevention, for food fraud, it is important to address the urgent 
crisis but then to have a process for continuing to review the underlying root 
cause or system vulnerabilities. When there is new information, the first ques-
tion should be “does this new information fundamentally change the way we 
understand our fraud opportunity?” The second question is then whether the 
changing fraud opportunity changes the vulnerability assessment and the 
position of this issue on the corporate risk map—specifically if the new infor-
mation and updated vulnerability assessment shift the position of the issue to 
above with “risk tolerance.”
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 Key Learning Objective 2: The Basic Factors 
of the Marketplace
This section reviews the basic factors in the marketplace. These are factors that 
define the actions of the different players and how their influence is connected.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) A review of the competitor analysis theories
• (2) The potential responses to marketplace changes
• (3) Then a specific focus on defensive strategies that apply to food fraud 
prevention
 Competitor Intelligence Foundation: Review of Theories
As summarized in the book Competitor Intelligence, several key theories form the 
foundation of competitor analysis (Hussey and Jenster 1999). The previous section 
on Competitor Analysis focused on the marketplace and modes action, whereas 
Competitor Intelligence is focused on how to understand the adversaries that could 
include fraudsters. The researchers focus on “individual/micro view” versus “soci-
etal/macro view” and “natural selection” versus “managerial choice.” The micro/
macro view is consistent with food fraud prevention theory, where the fraudsters are 
impacted by macroeconomic factors, such as shifting market prices, but their final 
decision is based on microeconomic factors, such as their own access to 
adulterant-substances.
• Resource view: Hamel and Prahalad (1990) focused on how a company’s assets 
and capabilities provide gaps that competitors will attack (Hamel and Prahalad 
1990). For food fraud, a fraudster’s resources cannot be judged very accurately 
and are often not a global factor since their value is individually very low—the 
resources of one fraudster are very small in relation to the entire global market. 
Also, the fraudster’s resource value is judged by the very unique and individual 
fraud opportunity. The global price of cocoa is a factor but nowhere near “the” 
deciding factor for an individual fraudster.
• Positional view: Porter (1985) and Day (1997) take a more proactive approach 
to build upon the “resource view” to support changes that create a more solid 
position for the brand in the market (Porter 1985; Day 1997). For food fraud, this 
may be to create relationships and supply chain security to reduce the fraud 
opportunity. This may also include implementing business efficiency tools that 
increase the transparency of each transaction as well as the product itself and the 
supply chain partners.
• Game theory: Teck and Weigelt 1997 examine “moves and countermoves of 
competitors” (Ho and Weigelt 1997). The competitors are rational and calculat-
ing. The underlying focus is on two competitors competing for the same prize. 
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For food fraud, this is inefficient to apply since it is not clear what game the 
fraudster is playing (e.g., adulterant-substance or stolen goods or tax avoidance 
smuggling) or even if the fraudster is now playing! Unless there is other intelli-
gence, we don’t know if the fraudster is attacking now. Furthermore, when we 
put countermeasures or control plans in place, the fraudster will usually be tipped 
off and then logically modify their attack… essentially not just changing how 
they are playing but would completely change the game they are playing.
• Behavioral theory: Meyer and Banks 1997 shift focus to how and why “cogni-
tive and behavioral” factors, “including psychological biases and motivational 
forces,” impact decision-making (Hussey and Jenster 1999). For food fraud, this 
is challenging since there are so many variables for each fraudster. There is no 
one detailed specific type of fraudster. In criminology this would be focusing on 
the specific criminal (traditional criminology) and not the space of crime (crime 
prevention or Situational Crime Prevention).
• Public policy view: Areda 1986 focuses on “what is legal/illegal” to help corpo-
rate strategy avoid concerns such as anti-trust issues (Hussey and Jenster 1999). 
For food fraud, this provides macro-level considerations of the source economy 
(where the fraudulent product is produced) and the market factors. The most 
important point is beyond what is “illegal” but on what is actually enforced and 
prosecuted. There are many countries with very strong intellectual property 
rights laws, but they only apply resources to enforce imported product, not prod-
ucts being exported. For example, the customs agencies for most countries have 
a much more thorough focus on monitoring and inspecting imported products 
rather than exports. Also, many countries are going through civil wars or other 
types of crises where the legislature or society could not justify a shift in resources 
from public health to intellectual property rights. The point is that the laws 
should be considered in relation to the level and efficiently of enforcement and 
prosecution to reduce the fraud opportunity.
Porter’s work applies to food fraud prevention since the concepts are a balance 
of macro- and micro-factors with the managerial choice focus but also trying to 
change the underlying marketplace to influence natural selection. Porter’s works 
combine these business theories with criminology theories (e.g., Situational Crime 
Prevention, routine activities theory, and rational choice theory).
The underlying theories are broadly researched, published in journals, and fun-
damentally sound. The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC) and Food Fraud 
Prevention Strategy (FFPS) are an adaptation and application of many theories.
 Competitive Analysis: Responses
There are a range of food fraud prevention responses that include offense, defense, 
or collaborate (Porter 1980, 1985; Hussey and Jenster 1999). The full Food Fraud 
Prevention Cycle (FFPC) should be considered when selecting risk treatments 
which would include the cost and potential for success.
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• Responses from Competitor Analysis
• Offense would be attacking the competitor, such as by flooding the market with 
product. For food fraud, this could be investigating and prosecuting the fraud-
sters or otherwise disrupting their operations.
• Defense would be a deterrent to reduce the competitor benefit of attacking your 
product. For food fraud, this could be implementing countermeasures or control 
systems that increase the risk of getting caught or the cost of conducting the 
crime. For food fraud prevention, deterrence is combating a specific type of 
attacker and attack, e.g., actions that target the melamine adulterant-substance at 
bulk milk collection sites. Of course, detection is a crucial part of a deterrent but 
only if it is applied to a specific question. For example, testing for the melamine 
adulterant-substance across the market is helpful but is not a targeted approach.
• Collaborate would be to merge or form a partnership with the competitor. For 
food fraud, this may not seem like an option, but there are stories of brand own-
ers who sought new contract manufacturers who were suspected to be the pro-
vider of high-quality counterfeits.
While going on the “offense” may feel like the most rewarding and impactful 
response, the nature of the fraudsters and the fraud is that such that the actual reduc-
tion in the fraud opportunity is negligible compared to prevention efforts. While it 
is essential—critical—to pursue enforcement and prosecution, it plays only a mini-
mal role in prevention. Fraudsters don’t think they will get caught.
For example, suing and prosecuting a fraudster is important but could be 
extremely costly (e.g., international courts, a long case, complex discovery process, 
expensive and long-term evidence storage costs, etc.) and provide little financial 
return (e.g., the criminal may have spent all the money or already laundered it in a 
secure location as well as a traditionally low repayment), and another criminal could 
quickly replace the gap left by the fraudster (see US Guidance for US Attorneys for 
prosecuting IP cases).
The “collaboration” is often not a direct option when addressing product fraud 
since the partners are criminal organizations.
The response that is most efficient and effective is “defense” or prevention. 
While the competitive analysis will start with understanding the fraudsters as a 
competitor, the countermeasures and control systems should shift to leverage crimi-
nology and specifically Situational Crime Prevention. Crime prevention has been 
adequately developed, implemented, and studied. With an ongoing competitor anal-
ysis, the criminology theories can be instrumental in reducing the “fraud 
opportunity.”
The goal is to change the operations and market, so the fraudsters do not find an 
attractive “fraud opportunity.” The countermeasures and control systems do not 
need to be perfect and cannot be impenetrable, but they need to be just enough of a 
hassle or danger to “dissuade” the skittish fraudsters from acting. There are plenty 
of fraud opportunities in the world, and an effective Food Fraud Prevention Strategy 
can be light as long as it is very focused.
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 Competitor Analysis: More on Defensive Strategies
In Competitive Advantage Michael Porter reviewed “defensive strategies” that are 
adapted to combat the fraudsters (Porter 1985). He stated “Every firm is vulnerable 
to attack by competitors. Attacks come from two types of competitors – new entrants 
to the industry and established competitors seeking to reposition themselves” 
(Porter 1985).
An incredibly important point that applies to strategy but also to financial 
decision- making and return on investment (ROI) is that reducing a risk or vulnera-
bility is not seen as “strategic” or a main function of the business. “Instead of 
increasing competitive advantage per se, the defensive strategy makes a firm’s com-
petitive advantage more sustainable.” So to be realistic, presenting fraud reduction 
projects are essential but will be less understood and be less exciting than other 
options (Fig. 14.2). This is a significant reason why it is best to focus the justifica-
tion on the ERM problems that are above the risk tolerance rather than increased 
benefits such as reducing counterfeits to increase sales.
The fraudster’s goal is to make money, so the financial factors should be the 
prime focus of the defensive strategies. The defensive strategies apply to food fraud 
prevention when the goals are to:
• Lower the probability of attack: For food fraud, this could be increasing the 
fraudsters’ risk of getting caught or the cost of conducting the crime. This is clas-
sic crime “prevention” or “reduction.” Examples could be to increase the com-
plexity of the recipe, authentication technologies, or packaging that is required 
by the fraudster to deceive the buyer or consumer. Other options could be chan-
nel blocking by strengthening the connection with buyers such as direct ship-
ments, stronger distribution relationships, or more robust traceability systems. In 
addition, using formulations or manufacturing that requires massive “minimum 
economic scale” can both challenge the required capital expenditures and also 
increase the production volume needed for the fraudster to compete.
• Divert attackers to less threatening avenues: For food fraud, there is more of 
a goal “dissipate” or eliminate fraud opportunity of the crime rather than “dis-
placement” to another time, place, or target. That said, countermeasures and con-
trol systems could focus on the highest and most impactful fraud opportunity so 
fraudsters “don’t even try” to attack specific products or markets.
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• Lessen the intensity or impact of the attack: For food fraud, this could be 
increased rapid detection or to shift the criminals to lower volume or less risky 
products. This is classic risk mitigation—reducing the impact of an event when 
it does occur.
A key focus should be on increasing the fraudsters’ awareness that there are 
countermeasures and control systems in place and that there is an increased risk of 
getting caught and the increased cost of conducting the crime. Porter refers to this a 
“Signal Commitment to Defend” which is:
• “Announce intentions by management to defend marketshare in the indus-
try”: For food fraud, this could be subtle mentions of food fraud prevention in 
supplier agreements or contracts that announce or allow authenticity testing.
• “Corporate pronouncement of the importance of a business unit to a firm”: 
For food fraud, this could be statements of the commitment to food fraud preven-
tion including actions, countermeasures, prosecution, etc.
• “Announcement of intention to build adequate capacity ahead of demand”: 
For food fraud, this would be statements that demonstrate long-term, future, sus-
tained commitment to implementing and evolving the Food Fraud Prevention 
Strategy.
While it may seem that a lot of complex and resource-intensive proposals have 
been presented here, in reality, after the vulnerability assessment and strategy have 
been developed, the first and most impactful countermeasures and controls systems 
are usually minimal. Elsewhere it has been noted that probably 99% of the neces-
sary audits, information, inspections, programs, and processes are already in place 
but just not organized within the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (FFPS). A systems 
approach and perspective can lead to a straightforward yet effective reduction of the 
“fraud opportunity.”
If the competent detection programs are put in place with no consideration of 
communication to the bad guys, then you will catch bad product but not prevent it 
from getting into the supply chain. There is a saying:
“Remember, the goal is not to catch food fraud but to prevent it in the first place.”
Sidebar: ERM for Defensive Strategy Decisions—What Must Be Done 
and How Much Is Enough
The fraud vulnerability is framed in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
terms, where if a “lost sales” situation is above the “risk tolerance” of the 
enterprise, and then the ROI of other projects is irrelevant. If the new incident 
is above the “risk tolerance,” then the resource allocation decision-making is 
the “ROI” of only reducing the current situation back to within control.
Without first establishing the vulnerability on the corporate risk map, there 
is no tangible, measurable argument that this is a problem that needs to be 
addressed (e.g., no consequence for not acting) or “how much is enough” 
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 Competitor Analysis: Tests for Evaluating Defensive Tactics
Porter provides a series of tests for evaluating the effectiveness of defensive tactics 
(Porter 1985):
• “Value to Buyers”: While the main focus of food fraud prevention is reducing 
your own fraud opportunity, Porter makes a good point that “A tactic directed 
toward buyers will not be effective for defensive purposes unless the buyer val-
ues it.” For maximum value, the prevention strategy should be clear, and the 
buyers should be educated on why this is important. For maximum impact, buy-
ers should be made aware of and educated to value the countermeasures and 
control systems. Also, the new, expanded, or new resource requirements need to 
be included in the buyer key job responsibilities and success metrics (see 
Wal-mart Sustainability section).
• “Cost Asymmetry”: Countermeasures and control systems should be selected 
that create the “greatest relative cost disadvantage” for the competitor. For food 
fraud, this could be including a complex technology or process that is already 
implemented in other parts of the firm but are very different from usual fraudster 
manufacturer operations.
• “Sustainability of Effect”: To be most efficient, tactics should be selected that 
have a longer-term effect. For food fraud, the fraudster response should be con-
sidered. The fraudsters will respond and adapt. There is a saying: “The chess 
match of food fraud prevention should consider ‘how will the fraudsters circum-
vent this system and when will it occur.’” That said, in some cases, there can be 
so many efficient and costly countermeasures and control systems that increase 
the fraud opportunity so much that the fraudster shifts to another target 
company.
 – From criminology, while considering the first move to address the fraud, there 
should be an awareness that the food fraudsters may be operating within the 
legitimate supply chain so their temptation—or routine activities—may lead 
their fraud to adapt. Adaptation (criminology): “refers to a longer-term pro-
cess whereby the offender population as a whole discovers new crime vulner-
abilities after preventive measures have been in place for a while. Paul 
Ekblom, Ken Pease and other researchers often use the analogy of an ‘arms 
race’ between preventers and offenders when discussing this process. So, in 
time, we can expect many crimes that have been reduced by preventive mea-
sures to reappear as criminals discover new ways to commit them.” (For more 
see Ekblom (2013) and Clarke and Newman (2005).)
(e.g., a bottomless pit of “how little do you dare to do” or “what’s the mini-
mum to make it look good”). In some cases, the ERM system will allow more 
risk-taking, but the real result is that there is a logical and process-based 
method to determining “what must be done” and “how much is enough.”
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• “Clarity of Message”: “A firm should select defensive tactics it is confident that 
potential challengers will detect and will understand the implications.” The bad 
guys need to understand they have in an increased chance of getting caught. The 
bad guys need to be “dissuaded” from attacking you. If they don’t understand—
or don’t believe—your threat of action, they will keep attacking.
• “Credibility”: From Criminology, there is an “anticipatory benefit” where crimi-
nals will reduce their crime when there is an announcement of additional inves-
tigation or scrutiny (Smith et al. 2002; Clarke and Eck 2014). The benefit will 
last for a short while before the criminals will check the actions. For defensive 
strategies the tactics should be believable and actually increase the risk of getting 
caught, the implementation should be demonstrated, and the bad guys should 
view them to be permanent or long-lasting.
• “Impact on Competitors’ Goals”: The countermeasure and control systems 
should be as measurable as possible. This is very difficult for vulnerability reduc-
tion activities, but leverage quality management principles could be a founda-
tion. For example, a quality management system does measure the final output 
(e.g., number of fraud incidents) but really focuses on the precursor root causes 
of nonconformance (e.g., a wire connection is weak, so the link is redesigned and 
checked during manufacturing). For food safety and HACCP, this is identifying 
critical control points and monitoring compliance (e.g., a refrigerator is kept at a 
constant temperature). For food fraud, there could be other critical control points 
that are monitored (e.g., every spot buy, emergency raw material ingredient pur-
chase passes a full-spectrum, nontargeted, authenticity test).
• “Matching by Other Incumbents”: If more market participants include similar 
countermeasures and control systems, the entire supply chain should become 
more secure and reduce the “fraud opportunity.” If best practices are shared, and 
resources are combined, then innovations could further reduce the vulnerabili-
ties. A fraud incident hurts the entire market.
• “Other Structural Effects”: This is not just an “other” category but is a focus on 
leveraging—or at least supporting—other business operations and countermea-
sures. For example, a supply chain logistics program could include tamper- 
evident tags to secure truck trailers. The record of the feature being secured is 
valuable to reduce the fraud opportunity, and maybe an incremental action of 
tracking the time between close and open could provide benefit for both the secu-
rity and the fraud reduction.
After reviewing the interdisciplinary strategies from marketing, criminology, 
food science, and others, it becomes more clear that defensive tactics are the most 
efficient and effective countermeasures and control systems. Also, once the basic 
business factors are considered, there is an important insight that the “fraudster” is 
just another “competitor.”
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 Key Learning Objective 3: Scenario Development that Helps 
Evaluate Countermeasures and Control Systems
This section reviews the scenario development that will help to understand the 
interaction of the factors and dynamics to help identify the most efficient and effec-
tive countermeasures and control systems.
The Key Learning Objectives for this section are
• (1) Understand scenario development
• (2) Review food fraud prevention scenarios
• (3) Consider the development of unique scenarios.
 Industry Scenarios: Response
In Competitive Advantage, Michael Porter emphasizes the value of creating a series 
of “industry scenarios” to address uncertainty. The process identifies the concerns, 
assumptions, variables, and then to gauge the estimated financial impact. Porter 
provides guidance on the range of scenarios that provide a full insight on the prob-
lem which includes worst case, best case, then the most likely case, or, more appro-
priately, several most likely cases that are based on several fundamental assumptions 
or variables.
For food fraud, the scenario planning would consider a range of issues such as:
• Increased government scrutiny.
• Major incidents that create consumer concern for a specific product.
• Increased testing technology that identifies an unknown fraud act.
• Changes in the legal liability from lawsuits.
• Changing supply that creates new or emerging vulnerabilities.
• Changing consumer preference for a product with a higher fraud opportunity.
• And many others.
These industry scenarios are helpful when formulating the forward-looking “cor-
porate strategy.” To benefit from opportunities and avoid losses, there should be a 
dynamic link between the industry scenarios (e.g., the underlying shifting assump-
tions, variables, etc.) and the corporate strategy. The corporate strategy would direct 
actions that optimize the outcomes for each of the scenarios or as many as practical. 
There may be a scenario where the future is too risky, and a quick exit may be the 
best strategy.
Porter presents five basic scenario responses for dealing with the uncertainties 
(Porter 1985):
 1. Bet on the most probable scenario: This is predicted to be the most likely future 
state so the corporate strategy would focus on this scenario but with a balance 
and consideration of other futures. The level of confidence in this scenario will 
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dictate how much focus is allowed here. It is dangerous to focus only on this 
scenario.
 2. Bet on the “best” scenario: This scenario has the highest return so—if this does 
occur—the firm should be prepared to excel. Of course, in an ideal world, the 
“most probable” and “best” are the same. Longer-term corporate strategy can 
help the firm evolve their market position to this ideal spot.
 3. Hedge: A more significant focus here is on satisfactory results under all of the 
scenarios. This is an ideal option when there is considerable uncertainty in the 
marketplace, society, consumer preferences, or regulations. This is sometimes 
referred to as “minimax,” where “a player makes the move that minimizes his 
maximum loss” (Porter 1985).
 4. Preserve flexibility: Here final decisions are held off as long as possible to wait 
until uncertainties are more apparent or variables have revealed themselves. This 
is sometimes referred to as a “fast follower.” “A firm preserving flexibility often 
pays the price in their strategic position because of first-mover advantages gained 
by firms that commit early.” Sometimes the “fast follower” requires a very fast, 
costly, and haphazard response. Conversely, early movers can put processes in 
place that increase the barriers to entry for the fast follower.
 5. Influence: Here the firm uses the longer-term vision to try to encourage or 
change the future direction. This may include collaboration in industry associa-
tions, supporting technological changes, channel policies, government regula-
tion, and other influence of causal factors. “Since a casual factor in casual user 
demand for chainsaws is wood burning stove installations, a firm might try to 
influence stove demand. This might involve coalitions with wood burning stove 
manufacturers, or advertising that stressed the value of wood-burning stoves at 
the same time that it advertised chainsaws.” This strategy can be very costly and 
time-consuming and take focus from other more direct actions, and the final 
influence is hard to measure.
Two primary considerations in setting corporate strategy—or how much to focus 
on each scenario—are (1) degree of inconsistency of strategies for alternate sce-
narios and (2) relative probability of the scenarios. If there isn’t much difference 
between the worst and best scenarios, then there is less benefit to influencing fac-
tors. Also, if there is a scenario that has a high probability—or if they all exhibit 
great uncertainty—then there may also be less benefit to hedging or influencing.
 Methods of Competitor Analysis
The best model to use for competitor analysis is one that is fully implemented and 
already used at your company. It is recommended that you find the method and 
review the content. Use the method for your own assessments and analysis in devel-
oping the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. After refining the analysis and applying 
it in your company’s system, only then is it recommended to engage the marketing 
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team. Adding fraudsters or counterfeiters to the formal and official competitor 
analysis will sound absolutely crazy until they see an example, completed, and 
implemented.
The process for conducting and updating a competitor analysis is similar to the 
updates for the FFPC steps of Incident Review, Scanning, and Public Policy.
 1. Define the question, the process, and how the result will be used
 2. Consider if there is enough of the right information to address the specific 
question
 3. Assign an accountable party or person
 4. Identify the sources of information
 5. Assign a function to monitor sources of information
 (a) External
 (b) Internal
 (c) Market research
 6. Review the new information in relation to the fraud opportunity, to vulnerability 
assessment, and to plot on the corporate risk map.
Whether your company formally includes fraudsters as competitors or not, this 
is an effective resource for your Food Fraud Prevention Strategy (FFPS).
 Case Study: Market Share of Fraudsters in the Food Flavor 
Industry
The book Competitor Intelligence included a chapter on “The World Flavor 
Industry” (Hussey and Jenster 1999). One section reviewed the market shares 
(Hussey and Jenster 1999). The specific companies and names are not important, so 
only abbreviations are included. There is a common estimate that the general world-
wide counterfeiting is “5 to 7%.” If that estimate is applied to the market and then 
the total of counterfeits, then counterfeiters, as a whole, could be the sixth to the 
11th largest competitor (Table 14.1).
While this general estimate of “5 to 7%” is easy to apply to a table like this, the 
real fraud opportunity is harder to assess. First, the approximately $130 million 
sales at the 5% market share level are probably not from one company and actually 
could be from literally thousands. Second, the same type of fraud is probably not 
occurring at each company, so there is probably no single countermeasure or control 
system that will address all fraud. Finally, this global, general estimate does not 
consider the nuance of unique supply chains or specific supplier-buyer countermea-
sures and control systems.
So, it is efficient to compete against your total vulnerability rather than against 
each individual fraudster while realizing that each fraudster is not influenced in the 
same way by the macro- and micro-factors. The most efficient and effective activity 
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is to try to understand common influences or motivations. The fraud opportunity is 
the attractiveness of your company for an attack. The one area where you have the 
most clarity and control is your company as a target. “Target hardening” is under 
your control.
This case study is an example of why the individual fraud opportunity should be 
considered not only for selecting countermeasures but also for even making the first, 
high-level, “10,000 foot” estimates of the problem.
 Conclusion
The product and food fraud problem is very complex and based on a wide range of 
problems from across the legitimate and illegitimate supply chain, and thus the 
response is interdisciplinary. A subset of marketing is competitive strategy includ-
ing competitor analysis. The first conclusion is that for business people who study 
business activities—including product and food fraud—it is logical to conduct spe-
cific studies of the patterns and responses by the adversary. For criminologists 
studying crime, it is logical to understand routine activity theory and rational choice 
theory. The logical expansion is to consider the counterfeiter as a competitor. The 
second conclusion is that a critical aspect of competitive strategy is to understand 
inherent vulnerabilities. While attacking and growing in the market, it is also essen-
tial to consider vulnerabilities and defend current positions. The logical expansion 
is to not only protect the products and prosecute the criminals but also to consider 
actions that reduce the fraud opportunity—increase the risk of getting caught or the 
cost of conducting the crime. The final conclusion is that the theory is put into 
Table 14.1 Example of 
market share of product 
fraudsters in the food flavor 
industry—all fraudsters are 
combined into one estimate
Company
Sales  
($ millions) Percent
A 328 12%
B 298 11%
C 221 8%
D 206 8%
==fraudsters if 7% 188
E 163 6%
F 150 6%
G 145 5%
==fraudsters if 5% 130
H 125 5%
I 120 4%
J 119 4%
K 100 4%
Adapted from Hussey and Jenster (1999)
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action by first considering overall strategy scenarios and also of building model 
scenarios to review specific incidents. It is efficient to consider the counterfeiter as 
a marketing competitor.
There is a saying:
“Why not just consider the fraudster as another competitor? The logical and methodical 
step would be to include fraud business ‘barriers to entry’?”
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Marketing
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all Overall, this chapter provides an introduction and insight on the part of the 
food fraud prevention strategy that may not have been considered which is 
classifying the fraudster as a business competitor
Quality team This chapter provides a structure to review and evaluate the fraud opportunity 
as well in terms of market position and of the fraudster as a business 
competitor
Auditors This chapter mainly provides an overview of how companies must position 
and then create their food fraud prevention strategies to address fraudsters as 
business competitors
Management This provides an explanation of why and how marketing should consider the 
counterfeiters as a competitor
Corp. 
Decision-makers
Generally, this provides a Michael Porter-based—Competitive Strategy and 
Competitive Advantage—Overview of how competitors are assessed
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the key learning objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question.
 (a) Why does marketing science provide valuable insight for FF prevention?
 (b) How does FF prevention benefit from competitor strategy and competitive 
analysis?
 (c) Why is it efficient to consider the fraudster as just another business 
competitor?
Appendix: Study Questions
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 2. Key Learning Objective 1.
 (a) What is a “Five Forces Analysis”?
 (b) Why does a “Five Forces Analysis” apply to FF prevention?
 (c) How is the “Five Forces Analysis” a vital resource for selecting countermea-
sures and control systems?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2.
 (a) What is “Competitive Analysis”?
 (b) How do “Competitive Analysis” defensive strategies apply to FF 
prevention?
 (c) Why does “Certainty Of Benefit” hinder resource allocation for addressing 
FF prevention?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3.
 (a) What are “Industry Scenarios” in a business strategy?
 (b) How is a “Competitive Analysis” method approach applicable for FF 
prevention?
 (c) How do each of Porter’s “Five Basic Scenario Responses” apply to FF 
prevention?
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Chapter 15
Risk Analysis (Part 1 of 3): Basic 
Fundamentals
Summary
This chapter presents risk assessment and the broader concept of risk analysis. This 
chapter will introduce the foundational concepts as well as general applications, 
review key issues such as hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management, 
and risk communication. In addition this will include the information used to con-
duct the assessments such as data analytics (“Big Data”) as it relates to decision-
making and the role in food fraud prevention.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) Fundamentals: Understand the fundamentals of risk analysis that apply to 
food fraud.
• (2) Adaptation to Food Fraud: Understand how those fundamentals are adapted 
to the unique attributes of the variables.
• (3) Tools and Models: Finally, understand current tools or models.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the “(0) 
Fundamental Concepts” beyond what is risk analysis to the details of risk assess-
ment as applied to food fraud prevention (Fig. 15.1).
 Introduction
Risk assessment is a specific function within the concept of risk analysis. The entire 
process includes gathering information and processing it into a useful and reliable 
form. The fraud opportunity for food—and more generally to all product fraud—is 
unique and adds multiple layers of complexity. That is, there are multiple systems 
that interact to increase the complexity of the problem and sophistication needed to 
put efficient and effective countermeasures and control systems in place. For exam-
ple, food safety risk assessment deals with a specific set of hazards and variables. 
Traditional supply chain management looks within finite systems and deals with a 
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different set of variables. To consider the root cause—the human adversaries—this 
adds a new set of variables from criminology. Then, when decision sciences apply 
all the variables, the complexity expands again.
In general, the risk analysis and basic assessment concepts are essential for food 
fraud prevention because:
• Foundation: There needs to be an underlying foundation to understand and eval-
uate the vulnerability.
• Value of Information: Without a deeper understanding of the usefulness of the 
information, subsequent assessments could be misleading or false.
• Unique Considerations: There are unique considerations that must be defined 
before even considering modeling. These include risk versus vulnerability and 
mitigation versus prevention.
• Share Best Practices: Finally, rather than starting with a novel approach, it is best 
to adapt other currently implemented systems to food fraud prevention.
This chapter is a key component in the theoretical foundation of food fraud 
prevention.
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
(B) Fundamental Concepts
Traceability
Investigation
or Audit
Testing
Fig. 15.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
Fundamental Concepts” and “(5) Risk”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 
2019)
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 Key Learning Objective 1: Introduction to Risk
This section reviews the fundamentals of risk analysis, the concepts such as risk 
versus vulnerability, and then the founding discipline of decision sciences.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Risk analysis
• (2) Review of terminology
• (3) Review of the many types of risks
 Introduction to Risk Analysis
The overall risk analysis is not a quantitative analytical number or value—through 
a specific tool could present a ranking for a specific question—but judgement of 
“what could happen, how likely it is to happen, and what the consequences are if it 
does happen” (Kaplan 1997; CFSAN 2002, 2003; FDA 2003; CFSAN 2005; CBER 
2006; CFSAN/FDA 2007). Risk analysis consists of four concepts including 
hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication 
(Figs. 15.2 and 15.3). This is a cycle that is constantly in motion and continually 
adjusted.
A significant challenge for starting risk analysis for a new type of risk such as 
food fraud is breaking from a current paradigm and standard scope and method 
(e.g., a traditional food safety risk assessment or a traditional crime assessment). 
New risks are initially attempted to be addressed, logically, by currently  implemented 
Risk 
Analysis
Hazard Identification
Risk Assessment
Risk Management
Risk 
Communication
New 
Question
Unknown 
until actually 
assessed
Fig. 15.2 Risk analysis cycle including hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management, 
and risk communication
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systems. These previous systems address them until it is proven a new paradigm is 
needed.
As there is more awareness of novel or evolving risks, the old methods may 
become ill-fitting tools. When a new topic is addressed, there is often a lack of his-
torical data or even a lack of knowledge of how the information will be used (Cruz 
2002; Van Der Fels-Klerx et al. 2002). “A common challenge faced in risk assess-
ment is a lack of appropriate historical data, a basic lack of knowledge important in 
decision-making and data that is not yet available” (Spink 2009). Also, “One com-
mon method used for taking the first step is peer consultation or expert panels” 
(Spink 2009). Peer consultation has been standardized in the “Delphi Method” 
which was originally developed by the RAND Corporation after World War II 
(RAND 2018).
A danger when dealing with new or emerging risks is that the previous meth-
ods—and even the assumptions about the availability of the “right” data—no longer 
apply. Underlying issues include understanding the nature of risk, uncertainty, and 
vulnerability.
For food fraud prevention, the entire cycle should be understood as well as the 
challenge of including a new hazard as well as new needs for data collection.
 Introduction to Risk and Vulnerability: Foundational Terms
While it seems very simplistic to provide definitions for the most basic concepts, it 
has been determined by experience as a critical first step when addressing food 
fraud. Often there are different definitions—often unknowingly—applied. There is 
an expectation that “everyone” knows what that word means. While you may not 
agree with the exact definition provided, you at least can clearly see how the term is 
being used.
Suspicous Activity/ Question
Problem
Vulneraibility
Risk
Hazard
Fig. 15.3 Hierarchy of information and response: suspicious activity/question, problem, vulner-
ability, risk, and hazard
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A first consideration is how do we refer to new information or concerns. 
Criminology has a logical starting point with a consideration that it applies to all 
responses not just the actions or responsibilities of the police (Clarke and Eck 2005):
• Problem: “…the basic unit of police works rather than a crime, a case, calls, or 
incidents. A problem is something that concerns or causes harm to citizens, not 
just the police. […] Addressing problems means more than quick fixes: it means 
dealing with conditions that create problems” (Goldstein 1990).
These next definitions are from a previous research project was conducted on the 
definition and scope of several key terms (see that article for full citation details that 
are within the quoted sections) (Spink et al. 2017):
• Event: “An event is essentially something that occurs (summarizing: ISO31000; 
CNSSI 2010; Merriam-Webster 2004). There is no evaluation yet of the change 
in the consequence.”
• Incident: “A type of event is an incident that has occurred and evaluated, and 
that could have a negative consequence (DHS 2008; ANSI 2009; CNSSI 2010).”
• Vulnerability: “[A] weakness or flaw that creates opportunities for undesirable 
events related to the system (“system design”) (ISO 2007a; ISO 2002, 2012; 
DHS 2013; NIST 2011; CNSSI 2010; NRC 2009; COSO 2014; Merriam- 
Webster 2004). The result of a vulnerability assessment is usually a qualitative 
statement of the susceptibility of the system e this influence the likelihood (NRC 
2009).”
• Risk: “Risk is an uncertainty of an outcome that is assessed in terms of likeli-
hood and consequence (ISO 2007a; NIST 2002; CNSSI 2010; DHS 2013). Often 
the consequence is sub-divided to other factors such as onset, severity, or other. 
Risk is a based on factors of the probability of the threat and the susceptibility 
from vulnerability (NRC 2009). In other applications, it is an unwanted outcome 
(DHS 2008; Codex 2014, 21 CFR 50 (A) (.3)(k), Merriam-Webster 2004).”
• Hazard: “Also, a hazard is an event that has not occurred and could cause harm 
if not addressed (ISO 2007b; PAS 96 2014; NRC 1996; 21 CFR, Merriam- 
Webster 2004) -- this includes damaging potential (ISO 2007b). For food, this is 
often applied to unintentional events that have potential to harm. A new note to 
add is that the US FDA further defines an unacceptable level of protection as a 
“hazard that requires a preventive control” (FDA 2015) (for more on the appro-
priate level of protection see (WTO 1995; CODEX 2003)).
• Threat: “…is the cause of an unwanted event that includes generally known 
variables or attributes of the source of the negative consequence (“threat source”) 
(ISO 2012; ISO 2002; 21 CFR 121, ANSI 2009; PAS 96 2014; FSMA 2016; 
NIST 2002; CNSSI 2010; UNODC 2010; DHS 2013) – this includes incident, 
hazard, damaging potential, etc. In crime and security science, this is often a 
person(s) who have the intent and capability to cause harm. This is often applied 
to intentional acts with the intent to harm. The result of a threat assessment is 
usually a quantitative probability that the event to occur – but not an assessment 
of the consequence.”
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• Mitigation: “…is intended to reduce the consequence of the event (ISO 2007a, 
b; ISO 2007; DHS 2013; Merriam-Webster 2004). This assumes the hazard event 
will occur, so the goal is to mitigate or reduce the negative consequence. This 
focuses on reducing the risk that cannot be eliminated.”
• Prevention: “…is intended to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of the event 
occurring (ISO 2007; ISO 2007a, b; ISO 2008; Merriam-Webster 2004). This 
focuses on identifying and eliminating or reducing vulnerability.”
Building on these definitions and applying to food fraud (Spink et al. 2017):
• Food fraud vulnerability: “…is the susceptibility of a system to food fraud 
(e.g., milk is not tested for adulterants such as water).
• Food fraud threat: “…is the cause of a food fraud event; e.g., a criminal could 
dilute milk with water and then sell to a deceived customer.”
• Food fraud risk: “…is the combined likelihood and consequence e that consid-
ers the threat and vulnerability e of food fraud. This is a function of the vulner-
ability and threat; e.g., an estimate of the likelihood and vulnerability and threat; 
e.g., an estimate of the likelihood and consequence of milk diluted with water, 
sold to a deceived customer.”
From this review of definitions, there is more clarity on the current activities 
(focus on risk and mitigation) and the ideal future state (focus on vulnerability and 
prevention).
Other related terms defined in ISO 31000 include (ISO 2009):
• Control: “measure that is modifying.”
 – “Note 1 to entry: Controls include any process, policy, device, practice, or 
other actions which modify risk.”
 – “Note 2 to entry: Controls may not always exert the intended or assumed 
modifying effect.”
• Probability: “measure of the chance of occurrence expressed as a number 
between 0 and 1, where 0 is impossibility and 1 is absolute certainty.”
• Frequency: “number of events or outcomes per defined unit of time.”
 – “Note 1 to entry: Frequency can be applied to past events or to potential future 
events, where it can be used as a measure of likelihood/probability.”
When focusing on how to address risks and determine “how much is enough” for 
countermeasures and control systems, ISO 31000 Risk Management presents sev-
eral key concepts (ISO 2018):
Addressing risk perception (ISO 2018):
• Residual risk: risk (2.1) remaining after risk treatment (2.25) [SOURCE: ISO 
Guide 73:2009, definition 3.8.1.6]
• Risk acceptance: informed decision to take a particular risk (1.1) [ISO Guide 
73]; Note 1 to entry: Risk acceptance can occur without risk treatment (3.8.1) or 
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during the process of risk treatment; Note 2 to entry: Accepted risks are subject 
to monitoring (3.8.2.1) and review (3.8.2.2).
• Risk aggregation: a combination of a number of risks into one risk (1.1) to 
develop a more complete understanding of the overall risk [ISO Guide 73] [Note: 
also referred to as risk summing or risk overview.]
• Risk appetite: amount and type of risk (1.1) that an organization is willing to 
pursue or retain [ISO Guide 73]
• Risk attitude: organization’s approach to assess and eventually pursue, retain, 
take or turn away from risk (1.1) [ISO Guide 73]
• Risk aversion: attitude to turn away from risk (1.1) [ISO Guide 73]
• Risk perception: stakeholder’s (3.2.1.1) view on a risk (1.1) [ISO Guide 73]; 
Note 1 to entry: Risk perception reflects the stakeholder’s needs, issues, knowl-
edge, belief, and values.
• Risk review: activity undertaken to determine the suitability, adequacy, and 
effectiveness of the subject matter to achieve established objectives Note 
Review can be applied to a risk management framework (2.3), risk management 
process (2.8), risk (2.1) or control (2.26).” [ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 
3.8.2.2]
• Risk tolerance: organization’s or stakeholder’s (3.2.1.1) readiness to bear the 
risk (1.1) after risk treatment (3.8.1) in order to achieve its objectives [ISO Guide 
73]; Note 1 to entry: Risk tolerance can be influenced by legal or regulatory 
requirements.
While the definitions of many terms seem to be “common sense,” it is still rele-
vant to research terms and considers formal references.
 Types of Risks
Excerpts from “Analysis of Counterfeit Risks and Development of a 
Counterfeit Product Risk Model” (Spink 2009)
There are general risk analysis guides that are important to consider when 
developing food fraud prevention theories. One such resource is the types of 
risks identified by many authors. This type of general list provides insight into 
the challenge of classifying or categorizing product fraud or counterfeit prod-
ucts – they could fall into several or many categories.
• “Catastrophic risk (Nader): This affects industries and firms whose finan-
cial assets are exposed to catastrophic natural perils, such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, volcanic eruption, and so on…. Although catastrophic risk is 
usually considered as an outcome of natural perils, one nonnatural peril, 
terrorism, has emerged in recent years as a source of risk whose conse-
(continued)
 Key Learning Objective 1: Introduction to Risk
508
quences for the insurance industry appear increasingly capable of attaining 
the same dimensions as those of catastrophic risk.”
• “Foreseeable risk (Nader): This is primarily a legal definition derived 
from the concept of “foreseeability.” Accordingly, the foreseeable risk is 
any risk whose consequences can reasonably be expected to occur, by a 
person of ordinary prudence.”
• “Fraud risk (Nader) [also categorized by Nader as security risk]: This 
may be defined as the entity’s total exposure to the probable misconduct, 
dishonesty, and deceit by internal as well as external parties…. What is 
peculiar about fraud risk is that it can never generate any returns to the 
party at risk. Therefore, no business entity acting rationally should ever 
voluntarily bear or expose itself to any type or amount of fraud risk. 
However, we live in an imperfect world, and it is unrealistic to expect that 
total elimination of fraud risk can be achieved.”
• “Fundamental risks (Nader): This is impersonal in nature, and any per-
son affected by such risks is exposed to losses that do not arise from that 
person’s own individual choice or behavior, but from events beyond his or 
her control. Examples of such events include natural disasters, political 
and social developments, economy-wide phenomena, industry-wide phe-
nomena, and so on.”
• “Legal risk (Nader): This is one of the risks of doing international busi-
ness. It arises from the weaknesses, incompleteness, nonenforceability, 
and other similar problems with a foreign country’s laws and its legal- 
judiciary machinery…. Such problems increase the probability that the 
legal system will fail to provide adequate protection of physical and intel-
lectual property rights or remedies against breaches of contracts and other 
violations of contractual rights.”
• “Liability risk (Nader): This is applied to a very broad category of pure 
risks, many of which are insurable…. Liability risk arises whenever one 
party is exposed to possible loss of present or future assets or income as a 
result of causing one or more of the following events to another party or to 
assets owned by another party, whether those events (torts) are caused by 
the first party willfully or through negligence.”
• “Marketing risk (Nader): This is used to describe the uncertainty that sur-
rounds the future demand for a firm’s products as a result of numerous 
variables which affect this demand, but may be unpredictable or not 
entirely under the firm’s control. Marketing Risks arise from unanticipated 
or uncontrollable shift in any of the factors which affect the firm’s market-
ing mix (which are product, price, place, and promotion).”
• “Particular risks (Nadar): These are those types of risk whose conse-
quences affect individuals separately, and are not so pervasive (as in the 
case of fundamental risks) as to affect an entire group of individuals. 
Particular risks arise from personal actions or events that are under an 
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Sidebar: Meeting Dr. Kenneth Arrow—The Godfather of Uncertainty 
Assessment
In 2009 I was fortunate to meet with Dr. Kenneth J. Arrow at a Society for 
Risk Analysis meeting. We had a chance to discuss how he saw the uncer-
tainty principles applying to a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities. To step 
back, Dr. Kenneth Arrow is a Nobel Prize-winning economist—and five of his 
students were also a Nobel award winner—who is regarded as one of the 
greatest economists. He was the researcher who developed one of the funda-
mental concepts of business and economics of “moral hazard” as it relates to 
risk, uncertainty, and decision-making.
To review, a moral hazard is a situation where an actor may take greater 
risks if they receive rewards from the activity but do not personally suffer the 
consequence of a related loss—it is insinuated that it is immoral to take more 
risk with someone else’s money than you would with your own (Arrow 1951, 
1963, 1966, 1968). Applied to food fraud prevention, a buyer may receive a 
individual’s control, and are therefore considered to be the responsibility 
of the individual, rather than the responsibility of society as a whole.”
• “Property risks (Nadar): These encompass all events which carry a pos-
sibility of loss, to a property owner, of one or more of the following: the 
value of property (direct loss), the use of property (indirect loss), and the 
future income generated by property (indirect loss).”
• “Pure risk (Nadar): This is defined as any risk which can only result in a 
loss or no loss, but can never generate any gains to the party at risk. In other 
words, a pure risk consists entirely of downside risk and does not contain 
any upside risk component…. The designation of some risks as pure risks 
is useful for setting apart those risks that are normally insurable risks from 
speculative risks, which are normally uninsurable risks.”
• “Speculative risk (Nadar): As distinguished from pure risk, is a term 
applied to describe all risky situations that, in addition to carrying the pos-
sibility of loss, also carry the possibility of gain to the party at risk. In other 
words, speculative risks incorporate not only a downside risk component 
but an upside risk component.”
When the specific threat or response is hard to classify  – such as from 
product fraud or product counterfeiting – there could be a problem if there is 
a debate about who “owns” the problem. The application to food fraud pre-
vention is that it really doesn’t matter how the risk or vulnerability is catego-
rized. There is a process to review new or changing enterprise-wide risks or 
vulnerabilities. When connected to enterprise-risk management this enables 
in the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle.”
(continued)
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bonus for purchasing the inexpensive product but not be penalized for the cost 
of a product recall or other re-work expenses. It is argued that the term “moral” 
is ill-fitting since, unless the activity is illegal or there is some other fraudulent 
deception, the actor is maximizing the set parameters or specifications, so 
their activity is not “immoral.”
His most significant impact is the “general equilibrium theory.” Basically, 
the idea is that many other factors throughout the economy influence a single 
decision. The decision to purchase a product (or commit a fraud act) is not 
only based on if you have money in your wallet (or have other fraud opportu-
nities including do nothing). This was a core to the food fraud strategy goal to 
“connect everything to everything.” Of course, there are direct and indirect 
variables as well as a wide range of the impact of those variables. He not only 
developed the idea, but he proved the existence of the equilibrium in the form 
of a mathematical proof (a mathematical formula that demonstrates and con-
firms the theory).
An especially interesting and important idea that is applied to food fraud 
prevention—and defines how it is different from food safety or even food 
defense—is “social choice theory.” This concept is not to be confused with 
criminology theories such as “rational choice theory,” but they are similar. 
Arrow modeled individuals (a person) as “rational in a narrow sense.” The 
individual has a unique set of decision criteria (e.g., the person sells beef and 
horsemeat), but it is influenced by society-wide (the entire population) criteria 
(e.g., the beef commodity price increases). So, if “A” is preferred to “B” and 
“B” is preferred to “C,” then does everyone prefer “A” to C”? Maybe but not 
necessarily.
In later publications, Dr. Arrow expanded the social choice theory and gen-
eral equilibrium to “risk” and “uncertainty.” The same product in a different 
“state of the world” or changing market condition is really a different product. 
He saw that there were more variables involved or “contingent commodi-
ties”—commodities that are influenced by when and where they are in the 
world. Horsemeat within a national border—and not subject to customs 
inspections—is a different commodity than horsemeat outside the country 
which would be required to cross a border that would include different laws 
and face possible inspection. Horsemeat to a company that sells a wide range 
of meat is a different commodity that for someone who sells wrist watches.
To summarize Dr. Arrow’s theories, there is a consideration of several con-
cepts. To apply to food fraud prevention, then consider the “commodity” as a 
“fraud opportunity”:
• Commodity as it relates to the entire world.
• Commodity as it is a value to an individual.
• Commodity as it is a value to an individual in a specific situation.
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Fundamentals of Risk Analysis 
and Risk Communication
This section reviews the academic discipline of decision sciences as a structured 
way to review the basic risk analysis concepts used to conduct assessments and 
define the strength of the data and then the recommendations for presenting the 
findings.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Introduction to decision sciences
• (2) Fundamental risk analysis concepts such as likelihood, consequence, and risk 
tolerance
• (3) Fundamental dataset characteristics such as accuracy, precision, certainty, 
and robustness
• Moreover, information that influences that specific situation [“fraud oppor-
tunity”] including risk and uncertainty that could be a fraudster concern 
they might get caught. This is an especially critical contribution to the food 
fraud prevention theories.
The application to food fraud prevention is that while the fraud opportu-
nity is influenced by macroeconomic factors such as pricing, the real decision 
is by an individual who is in a specific situation.
That seems like “well, duh, of course,” but until that was mathematically 
proven, it was not considered a real theory. It is important to note that Dr. 
Arrow applied his theories to market and economic decisions and not to pub-
lic policy. “He laughed when we asked him how he applied sophisticated 
mathematical modeling to public policy. His answer was that he did not” 
(Greenberg and Lowrie 2010). In general, Dr. Arrow considered his theories 
as a foundation and starting point that could be applied to a wide range of new 
and emerging risks. Meeting with him encouraged our quest to continue to 
adapt current models or tools to the unique needs of food fraud prevention.
I am personally grateful for the patience and willingness of someone such 
as Dr. Arrow to spend a few minutes with a “grad student” talking about some 
crazy topic such as anti-counterfeiting. He said, “Well, my research would 
seem to apply.” Yes, Dr. Arrow, it does.
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 Introduction to Decision Sciences
As there is a closer review of food fraud prevention and the foundation, more core 
concepts are identified. One specific area is the decision sciences. The Decisions 
Sciences Institute publishes the peer-reviewed, refereed scholarly Decision Sciences 
Journal (Decision Sciences 2018). Beyond risk and vulnerability assessment or 
enterprise-wide management, decision-making is the underlying process of the sci-
ence of decision-making. INSEAD University states (INSEAD 2018):
• “The area of Decision Sciences includes:
• Risk management,
• Decision making under uncertainty,
• Statistics and forecasting,
• Operations research,
• Negotiation and
• Auction analysis, and
• Behavioral decision theory.”
Thus, beyond the behavioral science of how people make decisions, this focuses 
on the methods and processes to organize and assess information to support the 
exact question that is posed. A primary focus is on defining the specific and detailed 
question that is being addressed, so there can be an assessment of the right data to 
support the decision-making (Fig. 15.4).
Research is supported by agencies such as the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) within their Division of Social and Economic Sciences which has a section 
on Decision, Risk, and Management Sciences (DRMS). Their funding focuses “in 
the areas of judgment and decision making; decision analysis and decision aids; risk 
analysis, perception, and communication; societal and public policy decision mak-
ing; management science and organizational design” (NSF 2018).
There are four main goals for decision sciences study:
• (1) “Enrich the diverse disciplines of the decision sciences” meaning to connect 
and integrate multiple information exchange systems.
• (2) “Integrate these disciplines into bodies of knowledge that are effectively uti-
lized for decision making” which is interoperability and basically to “connect 
everything to everything.”
• (3) “Develop theoretical bases for such fundamental processes as implementa-
tion, planning, and design of decision systems” which is studying and refining 
the process or method to create harmonization and enable sharing of best 
practices.
• (4) “Improve educational programs and instruction in the decision sciences” 
which is sharing information through publications and also educating new 
scientists?
The application to food fraud prevention is that decision sciences emphasizes:
• (1) The need to be very specific in defining the question that is being asked
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• (2) To focus on the process or method of gathering information and supporting 
that final decision
The core focus is on what exact decision is being made, such as to put the prod-
uct on hold and conduct authenticity tests, implement a product recall, cancel a 
supplier contract, report a suspicious activity to a government agency, etc. Moreover, 
another consideration is what specific information would change a decision, such as 
“parmesan cheese has had incidents of this type of cheese fraud” versus “the US 
FDA just issued a warning letter to one of our suppliers regarding swapping types 
of cheese fraud.” These questions “Establishing the context” of the question to be 
asked to help identify what and how much data is needed.
 Risk, Risk Attitude, Likelihood, and Consequence: ISO 31000—
Clarity and Conflict
ISO 31000 Risk Management was published in 2009 after years of a consensus- 
driven process involving national standards organizations. Even though this was a 
comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach, it was not without critics. There was 
support with seemingly simultaneous criticism such as “The consequence of this is 
that certain ideas about risk and its management have got a boost in credibility and 
prominence while others have lost out” (Leitch 2010). The meaning is that while the 
field of risk management received credibility from an ISO standard and future 
research that was more harmonized, there were also some fields that would have to 
change their current terminology to be compliant. In some cases this is easy, but 
Enterprise 
Risk 
Management
Risk Analysis
Decision 
Sciences
Fig. 15.4 The hierarchy of 
decision-making: 
enterprise risk management 
to risk analysis to decision 
sciences
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often they are very formalized and in-depth research using one or another of the 
terms. An example may be the early research on food fraud and economically moti-
vated adulteration. Some research was published using economically motivated 
adulteration, but the later research shifted to food fraud—there could be confusion 
or a lack of prestige from those who changed their terminology. This was true for 
some of the risk assessments and use of terms such as probability versus likelihood, 
severity versus consequence, and prevention versus mitigation.
Other than the common terminology, the two major steps were to (1) identify that 
risk could lead to a benefit (consider a financial investment in a high-risk product 
that results in a higher rate of return) and (2) a standardized methodology for assess-
ing and managing risks.
From ISO 31000 there are some key definitions (including a few terms that have 
been presented and defined earlier in this book) (ISO 2009):
• “Risk: effect of uncertainty on objectives;
 – NOTE 1: An effect is a deviation from the expected  — positive and/or 
negative.
 – NOTE 2 Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and 
safety, and environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as 
strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process).
 – NOTE 3 Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events (2.17) 
and consequences (2.18), or a combination of these.
 – NOTE 4 Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the conse-
quences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the associated 
likelihood (2.19) of occurrence. ISO 31000:2009(E)”
• “Risk attitude (referred to in later ISO documents or COSO as ‘risk tolerance’ or 
‘risk appetite’): organization’s approach to assess and eventually pursue, retain, 
take or turn away from risk [ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.7.1.1]”
• “Consequence: outcome of an event affecting objectives
 – NOTE 1: An event can lead to a range of consequences.
 – NOTE 2: A consequence can be certain or uncertain and can have positive or 
negative effects on objectives.
 – NOTE 3: Consequences can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively.
 – NOTE 4: Initial consequences can escalate through knock-on effects. [ISO 
Guide 73:2009, definition 3.6.1.3]”
• “Likelihood: chance of something happening
 – NOTE 1: In risk management terminology, the word ‘likelihood’ is used to 
refer to the chance of something happening, whether defined, measured or 
determined objectively or subjectively, qualitatively or quantitatively and 
described using general terms or mathematically (such as a probability or a 
frequency over a given time period).
 – NOTE 2: The English term ‘likelihood’ does not have a direct equivalent in 
some languages; instead, the equivalent of the term ‘probability’ is often used. 
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However, in English, ‘probability’ is often narrowly interpreted as a mathe-
matical term. Therefore, in risk management terminology, ‘likelihood’ is used 
with the intent that it should have the same broad interpretation as the term 
‘probability’ has in many languages other than English. [ISO Guide 73:2009, 
definition 3.6.1.1]”
This is published in coordination with other ISO standards including:
• ISO Guide 73:2009, Risk management—Vocabulary: A thorough glossary of 
terms with detailed definitions.
• ISO/IEC 31010:2009, Risk management—Risk assessment techniques: A fur-
ther review of the process of analyzing and managing risks.
ISO 31000 has a focus on the sources of risks or broadly how they are generated, 
root cause analysis and then an integrated focus on how best to implement and man-
age a risk treatment.
• “Risk source: element which alone or in combination has the intrinsic potential 
to give rise to risk, NOTE: A risk source can be tangible or intangible. [ISO 
Guide 73:2009, definition 3.5.1.2]”
For food fraud prevention, the focus on root cause analysis supports the focus 
on social science and criminology. While these are new disciplines for a food 
safety group to consider, this is the most efficient method to reduce or address the 
root cause—the human adversary. Also, some risks such as stolen goods may seem 
to have countermeasures and control systems far outside the normal scope of a 
Food Safety Management System, but the simplest way to reduce the food safety 
risk is to focus on the risk source which is that the product is stolen. Again, the 
concept of “accountable” versus “responsible” is important where a Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment would naturally include stolen goods and the actual 
controls of securing the inventory would be the “responsibility” of corporate secu-
rity or plant management.
When the Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment guidances were being com-
pleted, one company estimated it would take 5 years to complete the process. That 
is interesting, but the GFSI compliance requirements were due in 12  months. 
“[There are often] disconnects between the available scientific data and the informa-
tion needs of decision makers also hinder the use of risk assessment as a decision- 
making tool” (NRC 2009).
Also, “The depth, extent, and detail of the uncertainty and variability analyses 
should be commensurate with the importance and nature of the decision to be 
informed by the risk assessment and with what is valued in a decision. This may 
best be achieved by early engagement of assessors, managers, and stakeholders in 
the nature and objectives of the risk assessment and terms of reference (which must 
be clearly defined)” (NRC 2009).
ISO 31000 includes a consideration for the preliminary or general assessments 
that may not require data that is very detailed, accurate, precise, certain, or robust 
decisions. What is often important is that “a” risk assessment is conducted as long 
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as the specification of the low certainty and low robustness is clearly defined. For 
food fraud prevention decisions, there may not be a lot of detail needed for a deci-
sion, or there may not be details provided (at least not yet).
It is very important and a great value that ISO 31000 Risk Management provides 
a common set of terms and methods so risk assessors across many industries can 
share insight and expertise. The bottom line is that ISO 31000 is an implemented 
and standardized system, so it is inefficient and illogical not to follow the guidance 
or definitions.
 Quantitative or Qualitative Analysis: Both Are Supported in ISO 
31000
ISO 31000 repeatedly emphasizes to conduct the assessment that is most logical 
and efficient for the question being asked. This can be very formal and quantitative 
of more informal and qualitative (Purdy 2010). “Analysis can be qualitative, semi- 
quantitative or quantitative, or a combination of these, depending on the circum-
stances” (ISO 2009).
This is reiterated in the ISO 31000 standard:
• “The way in which consequences and likelihood are expressed and the way in 
which they are combined to determine a level of risk should reflect the type of 
risk, the information available, and the purpose for which the risk assessment 
output is to be used. These should all be consistent with the risk criteria.”
• “The confidence in determination of the level of risk and its sensitivity to precon-
ditions and assumptions should be considered in the analysis, and communicated 
effectively to decision makers and, as appropriate, other stakeholders.”
• “Risk analysis can be undertaken with varying degrees of detail, depending on 
the risk, the purpose of the analysis, and the information, data, and resources 
available. Analysis can be qualitative, semi-quantitative, quantitative, or a com-
bination of these, depending on the circumstances.”
The bottom-line summary is to select a system and specification that meets 
your needs. Occasionally levels of detail or methods are defined in standards; how-
ever, often they are not. For food fraud prevention, the FSMA, GFSI, COSO, or 
other standards are not very specific.
The general “risk treatments” are presented with flexibility for the risk assessor 
(ISO 2009):
“Risk treatment options are not necessarily mutually exclusive or appropriate in all circum-
stances. The options can include the following:
 a) Avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives rise to the risk;
 b) Taking or increasing the risk in order to pursue an opportunity;
 c) Removing the risk source;
 d) Changing the likelihood;
 e) Changing the consequences;
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 f) Sharing the risk with another party or parties (including contracts and risk financing); and
 g) Retaining the risk by informed decision.”
For risk assessors in the security or food safety area, the thought of “retaining the 
risk” seems terrible, irresponsible, and absolutely illogical. In reality, there is no 
“zero risk” or “zero tolerance” situation, and actually approaching “zero risk” 
would be inefficient.
ISO 31000 also provides a basic framework that is a logical starting point 
(Fig. 15.5):
“Establishing the context” is one of the most important steps and is so basic that 
it is often overlooked by traditional food science risk assessors. Often an incident 
such as melamine is identified, and the risk assessors quickly use currently available 
and understood control measures to select and implement risk treatments. The inci-
dent is melamine in the product (risk identification), this is a product recall, so it is 
a problem (risk analysis and risk evaluation), and so applying traditional food safety 
controls would be to implement a melamine detection test (risk treatment). “Experts” 
who believe they are already familiar with the incident almost automatically jump 
to conclusions.
The key concepts for food fraud prevention include these adapted ISO 31000 
steps including:
 1. “Establishing the context.” defining the external and internal parameters [con-
text] to be taken into account when managing risk, and setting the scope and risk 
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Fig. 15.5 Relationships between the risk management principles, framework, and process, Clause 
5 Process. (Copyright Permission Granted) (ISO 2009)
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criteria (2.22) for the risk management policy (2.4) [SOURCE: ISO Guide 
73:2009, definition 3.3.1].
 a. For food fraud prevention: this would be defining the scope. For example, 
FSMA would focus only on health hazards. Also, GFSI would focus on vul-
nerabilities for all types of fraud and for all products.
 2. “Risk Identification”: in HACCP terms this would be hazard identification.
 a. For food fraud prevention: this would be an incident review and suspicious 
activity report.
 3. “Risk Analysis”: in HACCP terms this would be a combined step of hazard 
identification and hazard assessment.
 a. For food fraud prevention: Vulnerability assessment—review the hazards 
that were identified and conduct an assessment to define what requires further 
review.
 4. “Risk Evaluation”:
 a. For food fraud prevention: Risk assessment—conduct a more detailed 
review that includes likelihood and consequence.
 5. “Risk Treatment”: managing the system to reduce to within the risk tolerance.
 a. For food fraud prevention: this would be documented and managed within 
the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy and by using the Food Fraud Prevention 
Cycle.
This section provided insight into ISO 31000 Risk Management, presented the 
terms and concepts, and then presented the application to food fraud prevention. 
This is a valuable exercise to present the underlying consensus-based standards base 
and also to explain the logic of the process.
The ERM/COSO system is most efficient and effective for a company to utilize 
when calibrating the enterprise-wide risks and assessing the vulnerability in relation 
to the risk tolerance.
Those conclusions are logical if they consider past incidents and a food safety, 
public health risk-based approach. However, the “Establishing the context” may not 
be “detect melamine in the product that is being received.” The best overall goal 
could be to “reduce the fraud opportunity of a range of adulterant-substances to be 
sent to the company.”
Several related ISO risk terms include:
• “Risk assessment: overall process of risk identification (2.15), risk analysis 
(2.21) and risk evaluation (2.24) [ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.4.1].”
• “Risk criteria: terms of reference against which the significance of a risk (2.1) 
is evaluated [SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.3.1.3]
 – Note 1 to entry: Risk criteria are based on organizational objectives, and 
external (2.10) and internal context (2.11).
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 – Note 2 to entry: Risk criteria can be derived from standards, laws, policies and 
other requirements.”
• “Risk management policy: statement of the overall intentions and direction of 
an organization related to risk management (2.2) [SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, 
definition 2.1.2].”
• “External context: external environment in which the organization seeks to 
achieve its objectives [SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.3.1.1]
 – Note 1 to entry: External context can include:
 – — the cultural, social, political, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, 
economic, natural and competitive environment, whether international, 
national, regional or local;
 – — key drivers and trends having impact on the objectives of the organization; 
and
 – — relationships with, and perceptions and values of external stakeholders 
(2.13).”
• “Internal context: internal environment in which the organization seeks to 
achieve its objectives [SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.3.1.2]
 – Note 1 to entry: Internal context can include:
 – — governance, organizational structure, roles, and accountabilities;
 – — policies, objectives, and the strategies that are in place to achieve them;
 – — the capabilities, understood in terms of resources and knowledge (e.g., 
capital, time, people, processes, systems, and technologies);
 – — information systems, information flows and decision-making processes 
(both formal and informal);
 – — relationships with, and perceptions and values of, internal stakeholders;
 – — the organization’s culture;
 – — standards, guidelines, and models adopted by the organization; and
 – — form and extent of contractual relationships.”
 Foundational Definitions: Accuracy, Precision, Certainty, 
and Robustness
Regarding this section, there is an applicable anecdote: “To be wrong with infinite 
precision”—Taleb. There is a tendency to very thoroughly analyze the information 
on-hand… often beyond what is appropriate. A very complex and intricate statisti-
cal assessment will insinuate that the underlying information is accurate, precise, 
and certain.
Several foundational definitions should be reviewed before going into more 
detail. While there are many possible references for these definitions, since the 
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research question here is focused on “food,” then when possible the US FDA 
definitions are presented:
• Accuracy: “how close the measured result is to the actual result” (Capra and 
Canale 1998). In addition: “The accuracy of an analytical procedure expresses 
the closeness of agreement between the value which, is accepted either as a con-
ventional true value or an accepted reference value and the value found. This is 
sometimes termed trueness” (Teasdale et al. 2017).
• Precision: “how two measurements agree with each other regardless of the 
‘accuracy’” (Capra and Canale 1998). The quote is: “The precision of an analyti-
cal procedure expresses the closeness of agreement (degree of scatter) between a 
series of measurements obtained from multiple sampling of the same homoge-
neous sample under the prescribed conditions. Precision may be considered at 
three levels: repeatability, intermediate precision, and reproducibility. Precision 
should be investigated using homogeneous, authentic samples. However, if it is 
not possible to obtain a homogeneous sample, it may be investigated using arti-
ficially prepared samples or a sample solution. The precision of an analytical 
procedure is usually expressed as the variance, standard deviation or coefficient 
of variation of a series of measurements” (ICH 2005).
• Bias (also referred to as Inaccuracy): “is defined as systematic deviation from 
the truth” (Capra and Canale 1998). In this context, it is very different from a 
more general dictionary definition such as “an attitude that always favors one 
way of feeling or acting especially without considering any other possibilities” 
(Merriam-Webster 2004). This term creates confusion due to the difference in 
scientific and popular definition.
• Uncertainty (Imprecision): “on the other hand, refers to the magnitude of the 
scatter” (see Certainty) (Capra and Canale 1998).
• Certainty: “[A] parameter, associated with the result of a measurement that char-
acterizes the dispersion of the values that could reasonably be attributed to the 
[thing being measured]” (JCGM/WG1 2008). Is generally a statement of the 
confidence in a measurement. Further from that definition “The parameter may 
be, for example, a standard deviation (or a given multiple of it), or the half-width 
of an interval having a stated level of confidence” (NIST 2018). A general dic-
tionary definition is “1. fixed, settled, 2. of a specific but unspecified character, 
quantity, or degree, 3. dependable, reliable, indisputable, etc.” (Merriam-Webster 
2004).
 – Robustness: “The robustness of an analytical procedure is a measure of its 
capacity to remain unaffected by small, but deliberate variations in method 
parameters and provides an indication of its reliability during normal usage” 
(ICH 2005).
It is usually helpful to provide a case study to explain concepts, definitions, and 
most importantly how the terms relate to each other. Of course, without a methodi-
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cal and thorough review, the accuracy and precision cannot be judged. What can be 
judged is the method and process to gather data (Re., seeking many, varied sources 
and considering insight and patterns) in relation to what is known about the overall 
data set (Re., all types of food fraud).
First, consider measuring the speed of a person jumping out of an airplane 
(emphasis added) (Capra and Canale 1998):
Errors sometimes enter into an analysis because of uncertainty in the physical data upon 
which a model is based. For instance, suppose we wanted to test the falling parachutist 
model by having an individual make repeated jumps and then measuring his or her velocity 
after a specified time interval. Uncertainty would undoubtedly be associated with these 
measurements since the parachutist would fall faster during some jumps than during others. 
These errors can exhibit both inaccuracy and imprecision. If our instruments consistently 
underestimate or overestimate the velocity, we are dealing with an inaccurate, or biased, 
device. On the other hand, if the measurements are randomly high and low, we are dealing 
with a question of precision. (Capra and Canale 1998)
The accuracy and precision concepts are applied to a food fraud example in 
Table 15.1.
A visualization of the accuracy/inaccuracy and precision/imprecision is provided 
(Fig. 15.6):
For food fraud prevention, it is important that you know what accuracy and 
precision you need before you can judge the value of a data set. If the provider of a 
data set cannot define their accuracy and precision—as well as the 7 Vs of data 
analytics—then they may be “Just gathering whatever data you can find” (example 
“a” above).
A B
C D
Fig. 15.6 Visual example. 
(Adapted from Capra and 
Canale (1998))
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 Key Learning Objective 3: Review Who Is of “Accountable” 
and “Responsible”
This section reviews the most important question of “who is accountable” which is 
quickly followed by “who is responsible.” Once those questions are clear, then there 
can be more direct agreement what are the exact tasks that define competent 
“accountability” and “responsibility.”
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Who is accountable and who is responsible?
• (2) What are the exact tasks for those who are accountable and who is 
responsible?
• (3) What are the metrics to define competence?
Table 15.1 Explanation and examples of accurate, inaccurate, precise, and imprecise with results 
and a food fraud example
Accuracy Precision Result Food fraud example
Inaccurate Imprecise A random 
pattern that does 
not cluster 
around the 
center
Example (see figure position “a”): “Just gathering 
whatever data you can find.” This could be a 5-minute 
internet search of the phrase “food fraud incident.” 
Possibly one type of incident—or multiple mentions 
of the same incident—skews the focus away from the 
actual target
Accurate Imprecise A random 
pattern that is 
clustered around 
the center
Example (see figure position “b”): This could be 
gathering information from a source that covers a 
broader range of issues than the topic of concern. This 
could be using a database that records many incidents 
that are outside the specific scope of food fraud such 
as including fraud acts that are intentional and 
unintentional
Inaccurate Precise A tight pattern 
not around the 
center
Example (see figure position “c”): This could be 
analysis from only one type of test or only from one 
market. This could be referred to as being “uncertain 
with great precision.” This could be a detailed 
assessment of one type of fraud and possibly one 
incident. This could be many tests of meat but from 
one grocery store or city
Accurate Precise A tight pattern 
that is around 
the center
Example (see figure position “d”): A thorough 
method to consider all types of incidents and then 
extensive development of the data set to provide 
insight from many incidents. This could be testing 
many products from many types of retail locations 
from a wide region and with a sampling plan that is 
designed to be holistic and all-encompassing
(Adapted from Capra and Canale (1998)
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 Who Is “Accountable” Versus Who Is “Responsible”
The concept of “accountable” and “responsible”—including explicit or de facto 
assignment—was fundamental to the concepts behind the Food Risk Matrix. The 
four cells represent the food risks that a company is “accountable” to manage 
regardless of their knowledge of the risk. Following ISO 31000, each new problem 
or incident must be put into one of the cells. Some must be identified as “account-
able” for that cell and cannot give up their role until someone else acknowledges 
and agrees to take over the problem or incident. This also identifies that someone is 
“accountable” but delegates a task to someone “responsible” for implementation 
(emphasis added).
• Risk Owner: “person or entity with the accountability and authority to manage a 
risk [ISO Guide 73:2009]”
• Accountability: “The organization should ensure that there is accountability, 
authority and appropriate competence for managing risk, including implement-
ing and maintaining the risk management process and ensuring the adequacy, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of any controls. This can be facilitated by:
 – Identifying risk owners that have the accountability and authority to manage 
risks;
 – Identifying who is accountable for the development, implementation, and 
maintenance of the framework for managing risk;
 – Identifying other responsibilities of people at all levels in the organization for 
the risk management process;
 – Establishing performance measurement and external and/or internal reporting 
and escalation processes; and
 – Ensuring appropriate levels of recognition.”
• Stakeholder: “person or organization that can affect be affected by, or perceive 
themselves to be affected by a decision or activity; note a decision maker can be 
a stakeholder [ISO Guide 73:2009, definition 3.2.1.1]”
• Interested party: “person or organization (3.32) that can affect, be affected by, 
or perceive itself to be affected by a decision or activity” (ISO 2005).
Also from “Establishing Risk Management Policy” clearly identifies different 
individuals who are “accountable” and “responsible”:
• “Commitment to make the necessary resources available to assist those account-
able and responsible for managing risk;”
Moreover, “Preparing and Implementing Risk Treatment Plans” stated:
• “The information provided in treatment plans should include: … those who are 
accountable for approving the plan and those responsible for implementing the 
plan;”
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At the end of the day, after an incident, you do not want to find out that you were 
the “accountable” person! If you know about food fraud, then you are now aware 
and may be legally liable for being “accountable” until you transfer this to another 
“risk owner.”
 Conclusion
The foundational risk analysis and risk assessment concepts in this chapter are very 
general and broad so as to add value during food fraud prevention. Building on the 
foundation and fundamentals identified in the previous chapters, there are specific 
methods—and adaptations of even more broad theories—that are effective and effi-
cient. The first conclusion is that there are some basic, standardized, and codified 
terms and methods that are efficient and effective to utilize. There are also some 
commonly used risk analysis and risk assessment concepts and theories that abso-
lutely do not apply. The use of a common definition and scope helps both the risk 
communication of food fraud as well as enables the application of expertise and 
insight from other fields. The second conclusion is that it is most efficient to build 
upon other currently implemented risk analysis systems but to adapt the methods 
based on the unique food fraud prevention needs and nature of the dataset. For the 
new topic of assessing and managing food fraud, it is most efficient to build upon 
previously understood and trusted systems to provide a mental anchor. For example, 
a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment can be described as “like HACCP but for 
food fraud vulnerabilities in VACCP.” Another example is to state that “food fraud 
prevention strategy is just a specific application of the total quality management Six 
Sigma concepts of root-cause-analysis and plan-do-check-act.” HACCP and Six 
Sigma are well known and trusted by a wide range of interested parties including the 
C-suite of companies and internal auditors who might be accountants by education 
and to financial analysts at investment firms. The final conclusion is that the risk 
assessment methods and analysis that applies to other food problems do not neces-
sarily apply to food fraud. When food scientists or food safety professionals first 
address the food fraud problem, there is an assumption that there is “enough” of 
similar food safety data. The nature of the data generator is very different since it is 
a human, not a microbe. The human is an intelligent adversary that rapidly evolves 
to shifting fraud opportunities. Also, compared to food safety, there are many fewer 
incidents and few incidents that occur in the same way. This chapter provided a risk 
assessment foundation specific to food fraud prevention. There is a saying:
VACCP is like HACCP but for food fraud prevention.
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Risk Basics
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all This is an introduction to the basic risk analysis and risk assessment 
concepts to provide a thorough understanding of the basics as well as a 
common terminology and approach
Quality team This provides insight on how auditees conduct an FFIS and ongoing RAs
auditors This provides a basic definition and terms that should be used—e.g., 
utilizing common ISO 31000 Risk Management and ISO 9000 Quality 
Management terminology
Management Same
Corp. 
decision-makers
The risk analysis terms may be new to you, but they are universally used and 
will reduce confusion
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the key learning objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) Is “risk” tolerable when addressing a food safety?
 (b) Discuss the relationship between vulnerability, threat, and risk.
 (c) What are the challenges of data collection and assessment for food fraud?
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is “moral hazard”?
 (b) Why is it more efficient to focus on “vulnerability” rather than “risk”?
 (c) Is “suspicious activity” a “risk”?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is “decision sciences”?
 (b) Why is ISO 31000 considered the definitive source for risk management?
 (c) What is the “impression of excessive precision”?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) What is “accountable” and “responsible”?
Appendix: Study Questions
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 (b) Why is it important to define and assign “accountable” and “responsible” 
parties?
 (c) What job function and position should be “accountable” for FF prevention?
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Chapter 16
Risk Analysis (Part 2 of 3): Application 
to Food Fraud
Summary This chapter presents the risk analysis application to food fraud pre-
vention. The risk analysis concepts and theories are well known and widely 
researched but not often adapted to the unique fraud opportunity and resource- 
allocation decision-making needs for food fraud prevention.
The Key Learning Objectives of this chapter are
• (1) Risk Analysis: Application of risk analysis to food fraud prevention
• (2) Data Analytics and Big Data: Introduction to data analytics and Big Data
• (3) Extreme Events: A review of extreme events, the highly improbable, and 
Black Swan events
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the “(0) 
fundamental concepts” beyond what is risk analysis to the details of risk assessment 
as applied to food fraud prevention (Fig. 16.1).
 Introduction
This chapter continues the risk analysis topic on the application to food fraud. While 
the basic concept (risk is bad and something that should be controlled) and a method 
to judge the seriousness of a problem (likelihood and consequence) is clear, there is 
often little direction on actually applying the findings to a resource-allocation deci-
sion. To define a need to do “more,” without a calibration with all other risks or 
resource- allocation options, is not usually helpful. There is value in considering the 
application to a specific problem which here is food fraud. When the project moves 
toward an actual decision, there are often questions about the data and data set. 
While risk theories are often not fully applied to a specific problem, the specifica-
tion of the data and data sets is often not defined until questioned near the end of the 
process. It is helpful to understand the attributes of the data you have for your 
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review. When the analysis of a risk moves through an assessment and consideration 
of countermeasures and control systems, there is sometimes an awareness that all of 
this formality is based on some very extreme and improbable events…and can they 
even be predicted or prevented? These are sometimes referred to as Black Swan 
events. Fortunately, as with other parts of food fraud prevention, there is already a 
well thought through and thoroughly researched body of scholarship to draw upon.
 Key Learning Objective 1: Application to Food Fraud 
Prevention
This section reviews the application of food fraud prevention in terms of how the 
assessment is presented. The presentation focus here is on the format of the 
finding.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Review the insinuations made from an assessment including accuracy, preci-
sion, and certainty.
(2) Fraud
Opportunity
(3)
Assessment
(4)
Enterprise
Risk Rank
(5) Rank
(6) Counter-
measures
(1)
Informaon
Initial
Screening
Detailed
Incidents
Scanning
Public Policy
(A) Academic Disciplines
(C) Applicaon:
“The Guardian”
Guardian &
Hurdle Gaps
VictimThe
Fraud
Opportunity
Fraudster
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Fig. 16.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
fundamental concepts” and “(5) risk” (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 
2019)
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• (2) An overview of the definitions of the types of risks from across many 
disciplines to make sure to be clear in risk communication.
• (3) Then consider the nature of the data set and risk management needs to under-
stand the most efficient format for presentation of the data and recommendation. 
The presentation format questions include qualitative or quantitative, also words 
or numbers, the amount of analysis required for the decision at hand, and 
others.
 Appropriate Precision, Accuracy, Certainty, and Presentation 
of Findings
Albert Einstein is reported to have said: “everything can be counted, but not every-
thing counts.” This applies to food fraud prevention both in the evaluation of the 
underlying data sets and the subsequent assessments. Judgments of the source and 
type of information (e.g., raw data, information, and then more advanced and for-
mally defined intelligence) are covered in more detail in the Criminology chapter. A 
series of incidents are provided that contribute to very important insights into the 
fraud opportunity, and the final reports should take into consideration the nature of 
the underlying data. For example, a wide range of statements of the economic 
impact of counterfeiting and piracy are presented with high-level statistical analysis 
but based on an underlying assumption of all counterfeiting and piracy in the range 
of “5 to 7 percent of world trade” (Spink and Levente Fejes 2012). The high-level 
statistics were conducted on a data set with a very informal and qualitative founda-
tion. This could be considered “excessive precision.”
“Analysis of Counterfeit Risks and Development of a Counterfeit 
Product Risk Model” (Spink 2009)
“Basics of Risk Assessment – Appropriate Precision”
An expert or group of experts can provide quick insights, as well as iden-
tify potential influences that may not show up until much later using data- 
intensive statistical methods. A limitation of using an expert’s judgment is the 
role assumptions play in the judgment. Techniques that simplify an analysis 
can compound into greater uncertainty in the final output of the model 
(Claycamp 2006; CODEX 2014). Usually, these heuristically-derived 
assumptions (e.g., using expert judgment rather than hard, unchanging data) 
are not clearly defined in the statistical review, and yet reports presenting the 
results as very precise.
In the report “Understanding Risk,” the National Research Center (NRC) 
at the National Academies of Science discussed related analysis that is 
conducted to reduce the complexity of the model, and the danger that is 
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Sidebar: Perceived Risk, Trust and Confidence, Source Credibility, and 
Dread and Outrage
Several key definitions and concepts from “What Role Can We Count on 
Consumer to Pay in Product Authentication” (MSU-FFI 2018):
Perceived Risks. The types of consumers and ways consumers respond are 
important base concepts, especially when dealing with perceived risk. 
Perceived risk is a specific consumer behavior concern which is “expected 
negative consequences of performing an activity such as purchasing a 
product”(Peter and Olsen 2005). There is a large body of research on per-
ceived risk from a consumer behavior and a risk assessment perspective 
(Green et  al. 1972; Gorn 1982; Haley 1995; Green et  al. 2000; Haimes 
2009; Lewis and Tyshenko 2009; Lindell et al. 2009; Terpstra et al. 2009; 
Venables et al. 2009). The intensity of the risk is influenced by the severity 
and the probability of the negative event (Kearny 2009; Cox 2009; 
Meijnders et al. 2009). “Risk depends on more than frequency and severity 
of consequences”(Cox 2009).
Trust and Confidence. There is research on the trust or confidence in a prod-
uct or provider of products (Gotlieb and Sarel 1991; Tyler and Degoey 
1996; Andrew et al. 1999; Kramer 1999; Cvetkovich et al. 2002; White 
et al. 2003; Chen 2008; Eitzinger and Wiedemann 2008; Sanquist et al. 
2008; Earle 2009; Malka et  al. 2009; Meijnders et  al. 2009). Trust is 
oversimplifying complex, multidimensional problems can lead to results that 
are “highly contentious” to the decision-making process (NRC 1996).
Additional insight includes (Hassenzahl 2006):
Risk analysts are often asked to generate precise numerical calculations. 
The expectation serves an essential role in risk evaluations by forcing disci-
pline on the analysts. At the same time, however, the act of generating such 
precise numerical calculations permits the unfortunate possibility that the 
resulting estimates will be interpreted as sufficient and accurate depictions of 
the risk. Alternatively, analysts may feel compelled to present estimates that 
are more precise than they feel is warranted. Stripped of quantitative and qual-
itative information about uncertainty, these precise estimates may become 
repeatedly mentioned and thereafter be interpreted as the “true” or “actual” 
value of the risk.
The concern is that the analysis may reach a point of “excessive precision” 
or a “false sense of precision and it is an important point to remember in mak-
ing preliminary risk assessments or in reviewing emerging risks (Pittinger 
et al. 2003; Jablonowski 2005; Hassenzahl 2006).
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usually associated with companies or agencies whereas confidence 
associated with an evaluation or technical assessment (Earle 2009). Trust 
and confidence are heavily correlated to a consumer’s world view or per-
sonal experiences (Schoell and Binder 2009). In high-counterfeit markets 
or products, increased communication of the risks can increase consumer 
confidence. Consumers have a higher confidence in science confirming a 
risk rather than science confirming the absence of a risk (Siegrist and 
Cvetkovich 2001; Schoell and Binder 2009). It is easier to confirm a risk 
than confirm a lack of a risk (Keller et al. 2009).
Source Credibility. Source credibility, or source dynamism, is an important 
concept when communicating to consumers (Berlo et al. 1969; Chaiken 
and Maheswaran 1994; Van Kleef et al. 2007; Malka et al. 2009; Meijnders 
et  al. 2009). Here, again, a consumer’s perception could be swayed by 
world view or personal experiences (Burgoon et  al. 1990; Gotlieb and 
Sarel 1991; Gotlieb et  al. 1992; Stern 1994; Magee and Kalyanaraman 
2007). There has been specific research on how corporations are, or are 
not, trusted (Kopalle and Assuncao 2000; Lafferty et al. 2002). A Harris 
poll identified low trust of the message of some agencies and of messages 
from companies (Harris Interactive 2008). In the high counterfeit markets 
or products, government messages about counterfeits or authentication are 
perceived as trusted public health promotion. “Prevention campaigns 
should systematically incorporate and respond to at-risk population’s 
existing beliefs, emotions, and perceived barriers in the message design 
process to effectively promote behavior change”(Cho and Witte 2005).
Dread and Outrage. There is a specific study of hazard and outrage, which is 
also referred to as dread. Specifically, Sandman (2004a, b) developed the 
formula that for consumer “risk = hazard + outrage” (Sandman 1988; 
Sandman et al. 1993; Sandman 2004a, b; Cho and Witte 2005). The emo-
tional concept of “dread” leads consumers to underreact to a high hazard/
low outrage, such as snowboarding (Sandman 2004a, b). Consumers over-
react to a low hazard/high outrage, such as terrorism (Sandman 2004a, b). 
Risks out of the control of the consumer, involuntary, are more of an out-
rage (Levitt and Dubner 2005). Generally, counterfeits in low probability 
markets appear to be in the low hazard/high outrage category, which would 
lead to a consumer overreaction.
Fear Appeals. There is a wide range of research on fear appeals, also called 
fear arousal, which use fear as a marketing tool (Tanner Jr. et al. 1991; 
Witte 1992; Hale and Lemieux 1995; Witte and Morrison 2000; Cho and 
Witte 2005; Levitt and Dubner 2005; Green and Witte 2006; Nielsen and 
Shapiro 2007; Lapinski and Nwulu 2008; Backer-Grøndahl et  al. 2009; 
Furukawa et al. 2009). Examples are to either stop a dangerous behavior 
such as smoking or to reinforce avoiding danger such as using sunscreen. 
Fear appeals engage two processes: danger control and fear control (Ray 
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 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Assessments and Words 
Versus Numbers
and Wilkie 1970; Witte 1992). Different consumers could respond to the 
same message with either the danger or fear response. The danger is more 
cognition and fear is more effect. For counterfeits in markets with a low 
probability and severity, a quantitative thinking consumer may not per-
ceive danger. Remember that the WHO report on counterfeit medicines 
reported that worldwide, ~70% of counterfeits are a placebo at worst 
(WHO 2007) and <0.2% of the US drug market is estimated to be counter-
feit (Kearny 2009).
These wide ranges of perceived risk details demonstrate the importance of 
engaging the discipline of consumer behavior before implementing any new 
warning messages.
“Analysis of Counterfeit Risks and Development of a Counterfeit 
Product Risk Model,” a 2009 Ph.D. Dissertation by John Spink (Spink 
2009):
Risk assessments do not need to strive for quantitative output (numerical 
data). In fact, there is a body of literature which supports qualitative (high/
medium/low) output, when there is qualitative (high/medium/low) input, 
including agencies such as the FDA, US Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), US Department of Defense (DOD), international standards organiza-
tions, and industry associations (Broder 2000; Jablonowski 1994). For exam-
ple, in a CFSAN/FDA presentation, “Tools for Prioritizing Food Safety 
Concerns: An FDA Perspective” (Note: author Dr. Robert Buchanan was the 
FDA/CFSAN Senior Science adviser and Director of Science) either qualita-
tive and quantitative tools or models for risk ranking or assessment were vali-
dated, noting that each can have their strengths and drawbacks F(Buchanan 
2007). This is supported by other authors, as well (Claycamp and Hooberman 
2004; Shepherd et al. 2006; Etherton et al. 2008).
In a Risk Management Journal study by Jablonowski (1994), a survey of 
risk managers found that “words” communicated the risks better than “num-
bers” (Jablonowski 1994). For example, it was more descriptive and helpful 
to call something “rare” than to refer to a “0.05” percent chance of 
occurrence.
The security industry also echoes the lack of detailed history. For 
example, the book “Risk Analysis and the Security Survey,” which is 
recommended reading for the American Society for Industrial Security 
ASIS Certified Protection Professional certification, specifically addresses 
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This focus on the presentation of the data should consider the final use of the 
results. Presenting the data on a broad scale or bell-shaped curve can be helpful 
except where the results are plotted in relation to the overall risk tolerance. When 
plotting versus the risk tolerance then it is possible that all food fraud vulnerabilities 
could cluster all above or all below that threshold.
Sidebar: Risk Assessment Numerical Methods
“Analysis of Counterfeit Risks and Development of a Counterfeit Product 
Risk Model” (Spink 2009):
Basics of Risk Assessment – Numerical Methods
Traditional numerical models, formulated to be solved with arithmetic 
operations, are the focus of engineering textbooks (Capra and Canale 1998). 
Unlike engineering problems (e.g., will a bridge withstand a certain load?), 
the counterfeit risk has human factors, and there may be no physical laws in 
the root cause. Due to the nature of the data, even traditional “fundamental 
laws” (e.g., energy cannot be created or destroyed) cannot be derived from 
empirical tests (e.g., observation or experiment) (Capra and Canale 1998). 
The Counterfeit Product Risk Model [CPRM] is not a physical system or 
process that is easily defined for future threats [Note: the CPRM is a general 
model presented in the Ph.D. Dissertation and is similar to a food fraud initial 
screen or pre-filter assessment].
Since engineering problem-solving concepts are familiar to many of the 
risk assessors assigned with counterfeit risk prediction, these concepts will be 
reviewed for their relevance to the model:
• Flowcharting: While flowcharting of the processes can work in a very 
general sense for counterfeit risk, the lack of large, historical data sets 
reduces the effectiveness of developing numerical models.
security-related risks that apply directly to the anti-counterfeit strategy 
situation (Broder 2000):
“Threat occurrence rates and probabilities are best developed from reports of occur-
rences or incident reports, whenever this historical data exist. Where information 
does not exist, it may be necessary to reconstruct it. This can be accomplished by 
conducting interviews with knowledgeable persons or by projecting data based upon 
educated guesses, supported by studies in like industries and locations.”
The review of the literature and other reports did reveal a way to specify how 
to separate the categories (e.g., high/medium/low) beyond stating that the cat-
egories should be spaced far enough apart to be meaningful. The categories 
should not be set to parts-per-trillion if the test equipment can only measure 
to parts-per-million (the data would be impractical to measure). Likewise, the 
categories should not be set, so all the responses fall into the same rank (if all 
are “medium” there is no differentiation).
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• Analytical versus numerical methods: Analytical methods are consid-
ered exact, approximated by linear functions, and are of limited value since 
most “real” problems are more complex (Capra and Canale 1998). 
Numerical methods are based on “equations, non-linearity, and compli-
cated geometries” and are very common in engineering problem-solving 
(Capra and Canale 1998). Even though the numerical solutions can be 
quite complex, they are still an approximation. “Although perfection is a 
laudable goal, it is rarely, if ever, attained” (Capra and Canale 1998). 
Neither applies to the Counterfeit Product Risk Model due to the underly-
ing lack of historical data and the ever-changing nature of the risk.
• Truncation versus round-off errors: Truncation error is a different con-
cept that measures the variation in the approximation of a number and the 
actual number (e.g., a measured number 4.859 but truncated to 4.9) (Capra 
and Canale 1998). Round-off error is due to method or computers simpli-
fying the data to a finite number (e.g., Pi is 3.141592653589… but rounded 
off to 3.14) (Capra and Canale 1998). These concepts both assume there 
are a large historical data sets and some accurate measure of the system. 
The only historical data about counterfeiting is whether the product is 
known to be counterfeited and how many occurrences of the fake product 
were identified. Thus, neither concept applies to the Counterfeit Product 
Risk Model [or current food fraud risk assessments].
• Significant figures, accuracy, and precision: Significant figures refer to 
the number of digits that can be used to represent the data point (Capra and 
Canale 1998). Since the actual number for a counterfeit risk calculation 
cannot be known, these concepts do not apply to the Counterfeit Product 
Risk Model.
• Blunders,” formulation errors, and data uncertainty: Engineering 
problem-solving assumes that the model and assumptions are sound, but in 
the real world that should not be assumed.
 – Blunders (in risk modeling): are considered to be gross errors in the 
data gathered or models that are not fundamentally sound relative to the 
data collection or measurement methods (Capra and Canale 1998).
 – Formulation errors, or model errors: are from “incomplete mathemat-
ical models” (Capra and Canale 1998). If a counterfeit risk model is 
based on the analysis of past data, then a mathematically representative 
model can be developed, but in trying to predict future risks the model 
developed would be fundamentally incomplete. With these fundamen-
tally incomplete models, uncertainty (bias) would be associated with 
the results. When the counterfeit risk is to consider future risk, the 
uncertainty could magnify, detracting from the value of the prediction.
 – Data uncertainty is the error from the physical data that was used to 
build the model (Capra and Canale 1998). The physical data used to 
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 Key Learning Objective 2: Introduction to Data Analytics 
and Big Data
This section reviews the concept of data analytics and Big Data. The terms are often 
used casually referring to “gathering a bunch of information.” Data analytics is a 
specific scientific field of study that includes universities that offer master’s degrees 
and Ph.D.s on the topic. The study of data analytics includes very specific defini-
tions and evaluations that will be presented in this section. Data analytics is a spe-
cific discipline with unique terminology and methods. The science is not to “just 
gather a bunch of data” and run some spreadsheet averages. The science of data 
analytics is critical to understand before making any decisions regarding food fraud 
prevention.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) A review of the types of assessments or, more precisely, analytics.
• (2) Then an understanding of the ways to classify the nature of the data in the “7 
Vs of Big Data.”
• (3) Finally, building upon the types of analytics and nature of the data an evalu-
ation survey is presented.
 Types of Analytics
It is critical not to overstate utility of the results of an assessment such as an “impres-
sion of excessive precision” (an overview summary is provided in (Spink et  al. 
2019)). Descriptive analytics are very valuable but not if a customer is expecting a 
prediction. There are three types of analysis or analytics (Schniederjans et al. 2015):
build an analytical counterfeit or product fraud assessment could be 
both inherently uncertain and imprecise.
Quantitative methods are not always the most efficient or most appropriate 
prediction models. Also, classical statistical methods are based on the funda-
mental concepts outlined above and are not practical to apply to the Counterfeit 
Product Risk Model. The use of classical statistical tools such as mean, stan-
dard deviation, or variance could give an impression of excessive precision.
If the Counterfeit Product Risk Model used a traditional analytical or 
numerical model, the associated error would lead the output to be impractical 
in practice. This review supports using a more general, qualitative model for 
counterfeit risk assessment [and also, later, for product fraud including food 
fraud].
 Key Learning Objective 2: Introduction to Data Analytics and Big Data
538
• Descriptive Analytics: This is beyond a list of events or historical past probabili-
ties. This is defined as: “A simple statistical technique that describes what is 
contained in a data set or database.” “To identify possible trends in large data sets 
or databases” (Schniederjans et al. 2015), e.g., descriptive statistics such as aver-
ages or standard of deviation, charts, graphs, sorting methods, or lists.
• Predictive Analytics: Apply statistical modeling to not only interpolate the his-
tory from the past but consider dependent and independent variables to predict 
future occurrences. This is defined as: “Advanced statistical, information soft-
ware, or operations research methods to identify predictive variables and build 
predictive models to identify trends and relationships not readily observed in a 
descriptive analysis” (Schniederjans et  al. 2015). “To build predictive models 
designed to identify and predict future trends” [e.g., ANOVA and multiple regres-
sion analysis].
• Prescriptive Analytics: Build upon predictive analytics assessment of future 
events to decide and apply resources that mitigate consequences, e.g., linear pro-
gramming and decision theory (Schniederjans et al. 2015).
These are the types of conclusions and recommendations that can be drawn from 
large data sets. The more data—and the more accurate, precise, and certain the 
data—the higher-level analytics can be conducted.
 Describing the Nature of the Data
Further, to describe the data and analytics in more detail, there are the “5 Vs of Big 
Data”—or sometimes these range from 4 to 7 and are summarized here (McAfee 
and Brynjolfsson 2012; Schniederjans et al. 2015; Haan et al. 2015; Meehan 2016; 
Sivarajah et al. 2017):
The 5 Vs of Big Data
 1. Volume: the amount of data. “Big Data” is judged in terabytes or above.
• For example, how much information is in the data set such as the number of 
food fraud incidents?
 2. Velocity: the speed of data collection with Big Data defined in real-time or near 
real-time.
• For example, how recently is information collected and how they would 
include recent incidents? For example, is the entire data set reviewed and 
updated at least monthly, weekly, daily, hourly, etc.)?
 3. Variety: a range of forms including pictures, text messages, GPS signals, sensor 
readings, etc.
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• For example, how many different data sources are used including in how 
many languages?
 4. Veracity: the trust in the accuracy, precision, and certainty as well as if the data 
set is representative of the entire event.
• For example, how complete is the data set in covering all problems in the real 
world and not just “everything we could find”?
 5. Value: this is a rough judgment of the actual usefulness of the data set to address 
the specific question or the thoroughness recommendation based on this data set.
• For example, how much more or other information would need to be collected 
to make a final decision such as recalling a product, putting a product on hold 
to conduct authenticity tests, canceling a supply contract, or contacting a gov-
ernment agency to report suspicious activity?
For another perspective on “data analytics” and the “Vs of Big Data,” consider 
the US National Institute for Standards and Testing (NIST) report on “Big Data 
Interoperability Framework”(NIST 2015). The NIST reference is especially impor-
tant due to the formal and authoritative role of the influence on US laws and integra-
tion to international standards such as ISO.
The NIST report expands the “Vs” list and provides more detail on the veracity 
term:
 1. Value refers to the inherent wealth, economic and social, embedded in any data 
set (i.e., the value of the analytics to the organization, also sometimes referred to 
as validity [i.e., appropriateness of the data for its intended use]).
 2. Variability refers to the change in other data characteristics.
 3. Variety refers to data from multiple repositories, domains, or types.
 4. Velocity refers to the rate of data flow.
 5. Veracity refers to the accuracy of the data.
 6. Volatility refers to the tendency for data structures to change over time (i.e., the 
tendency for data structures to change over time).
 7. Volume refers to the size of the data set.
One of the most important concepts for the food fraud prevention application is 
veracity, so more detail is provided here:
“Veracity refers to the completeness and accuracy of the data and relates to the vernacular 
‘garbage-in, garbage-out’ description for data quality issues in existence for a long time. If 
the analytics are causal, then the quality of every data element is extremely important. If the 
analytics are correlations or trending over massive volume datasets, then individual bad 
elements could be lost in the overall counts, and the trend will still be accurate. As men-
tioned in Section 2.2, many people debate whether “more data is superior to better algo-
rithms,” but that is a topic better discussed elsewhere.” (NIST 2015)
The “Vs of Big Data” provides a framework for explaining the nature of a data 
set.
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 Assessing the Value or Utility of a Data Set
If you are going for a walk outside then, you might check the weather to examine 
what you might expect. First, you may look outside your window. Is it raining, 
snowing, windy, or calm? Should you bring an umbrella with you? How long will 
you be away? Will you be near a shelter? Will the consequence of getting wet be 
bad? Would the consequence of getting wet be catastrophic? You only can assess 
what you can see out your window; it would be so much wiser to look at the clouds 
in all directions and then check a weather report.
The application to food fraud prevention is that once the specific decision is 
identified, then the available data can be evaluated and assess the “fit for purpose” 
(Table 16.1). A data set could be judged by the type of analytics possible and then a 
Likert scale for the Vs of Big Data.
This table is an example of how to possibly explain and present the nature of a 
data set regarding the appropriate application of Big Data and data analytics.
Table 16.1 Evaluation of the value of data regarding data analytics: types of analytics and Vs of 
Big Data
Product and suspicious activity: assessment of the data and “fit for purpose”
Research question:
Current data set (source, information, etc.):
Type of analytics possible (descriptive, predictive, or prescriptive):
Details of Data—5 Vs: Concept and then judge confidence in the current 
data set meeting the immediate need without further processing
Confidence:  
1 (low) to 5 (high)
1. Value: this is a rough judgment of the actual usefulness of the data set to 
address the specific question or the thoroughness recommendation based on 
this data set
2. Variability: this is the change in other data characteristics
3. Volume: the amount of data. “Big Data” is judged in terabytes or above
4. Velocity: the speed of data collection with Big Data defined in real-time 
or near real-time
5. Variety: a range of forms including pictures, text messages, GPS signals, 
sensor readings, etc.
6. Veracity: the trust in the accuracy, precision, and certainty as well as if 
the data set is representative of the entire event
7. Volatility: refers to the tendency for data structures to change over time
Total =
Sidebar: Review of FMEA Application to Food Fraud
There are many risk assessment models or tools that are very successfully 
implemented. Some provide more value in addressing food fraud prevention 
than others.
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Excerpt from Ph.D. (Spink 2009):
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a quality control and risk 
analysis system with underlying risk assessment and management concepts 
that are very sound and insightful, although not necessarily suited to the all- 
encompassing counterfeit threat [and for food fraud prevention]. FMEA is a 
widely used, pro-active quality tool that focuses on design improvements and 
physical failures (Kmenta and Ishii 2000). The FMEA failure mode is defined 
here:
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA): the manner in which a component, 
sub-system, or system could potentially fail to meet the design intent. The potential 
failure mode could also be the cause of a potential failure mode in a higher level 
subsystem, or system, or the effect of a lower level effect (Kmenta and Ishii 2000).
FMEA focuses on system performance by analyzing reliability, maintainabil-
ity, and safety (Onodera 1997). FMEAs are most frequently used in early 
product development and then again in manufacturing (Onodera 1997). The 
FMEA system is based on data gained from known recorded failures—in the 
lab and in the field— which leads to the efficient use of a probabilistic 
approach (probabilities based on historical data) (Kara-Zaitri et  al. 1991). 
Other reports specifically identified FMEA in manufacturing operations, 
focusing on “the ways equipment can fail or be improperly operated,” with an 
emphasis on identifying the specific single component that failed (Graver 
2001). FMEA is used to analyze “risk by identifying hazards and suggesting 
process design modifications” (Zambrano et al. 2007). The FMEA emphasis 
on monitoring recurring actions within a specific system is demonstrated in 
the abstract of the FMEA Reference manual, published by the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE). Its focus is on “potential failure of a product/
process” and identifying actions that could reduce or eliminate the failure 
(Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 2002).
The key component of FMEA is the Risk Priority Number (RPN), which 
is used to assess the risk using the three criteria of occurrence, severity, and 
detection. Detection focuses on identifying the failure before the customer 
receives the product.
Detection considers the physical product’s development, manufacturing, 
and operations. FMEA is a widely used quality and risk assessment process 
that is event and data intense. It focuses on specific products and systems, so 
it does not directly apply to the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
To consider the challenges of the direct application of FMEA for food 
fraud prevention:
• While there are known “failures” (known food fraud incidents) there are 
actually relatively few known “recorded failures” (100’s in the world not 
100’s per manufacturing plant)
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• There are not enough incidents to conduct a statistically significant proba-
bilistic risk assessment
• Food fraud incident cannot be created “in the lab.”
• There can be an assessment of “the ways systems fail” based on the inci-
dent reviews
• There can be monitoring on controlling the “potential failure of a product 
or process.”
• An adaptation of the RPN can be used in terms of assessing vulnerability 
assessments, but there is a key concern that a numerical assessment may 
“imply excessive precision” – on a scale of 1 to 5 (versus very low, low, 
medium, high, and very high) is a 3.5 actually significantly different from 
3.7? Also, by presenting an assessment of “3.7” implies the assessment is 
accurate to two significant digits. Even “3” – not “3.0” since “3.0 insinu-
ates that there is confidence in stating it is not “2.9” or “3.1″ – implies 
accuracy to one significant digit. If the assessment is qualitative, it is clear 
to state that two assessments are both “Medium” rather than “3.5 and 3.7.”
Thus, the general FMEA principles can generally be applied to food fraud 
prevention. That said there should be great care of unintentionally presenting 
more accuracy, precision, or certainty than intended by the risk assessor.
 Key Learning Objective 3: Extreme Events, the Highly 
Improbable, and Black Swans
This section reviews the study of extreme events and the highly improbable that are 
sometimes referred to as Black Swan events.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are
• (1) Review of extreme events and the highly improbable results
• (2) Black Swan events
• (3) The GermanWings suicidal pilot airplane crash as a Black Swan event?
Black Swan Events: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Fig. 16.2) 
(MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: The Black Swans of Food Fraud
By John Spink, May 15, 2013, Blog
No, Black Swans are not the next food fraud incident. Black Swan events 
are extreme events that are not foreseen, but if they occur could have cata-
strophic results, and in hindsight could have been seen coming (see “The 
Black Swan” book by Nassim Taleb). Black Swan events are the types of 
threats that led to the creation of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM).
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Using ERM concepts to conduct Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessments 
are not only efficient but has been recognized as progressive by higher-level 
managers. Stepping back to consider this broader corporate strategy can seem 
foreign since we are scientists and want to jump into taking action and con-
ducting tests of the environment. However, to be competent corporate leaders 
with an enterprise-wide risk such as food fraud we need to speak the language 
of finance and of the Board of Directors.
ERM is a concept and system that monitors all risks across an entire enter-
prise. ERM is filtering down from the Board Rooms through the organizations 
and will soon be an everyday practice in Business Units and also further down 
in Operations. Specifically, these enterprise-wide risks – as opposed to the 
more traditional operational risks – are more “vulnerabilities” than “recurring 
events.” Their impact is more strategic than operational. An extreme event 
may be very unlikely but, if it occurs, could be catastrophic to the entity. For 
example, consider the impact on your business of the sub-prime lending crisis 
(economic collapse), the Japanese Tsunami and nuclear meltdown (radioac-
tive migrating tuna), another avian influenza scare (shut down of some trade 
routes), or food fraud (the horsemeat scandal and the global suspicion of a 
food staple). The growing awareness of these types of complex risks that are 
distributed across an enterprise led to the creation of the ERM system and of 
Fig. 16.2 Image of the blog post on the subject (Copyright Permission Granted)
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a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) position. The CRO is responsible for all risks 
across the entire enterprise regardless of the frequency, impact, or if they have 
actually occurred.
It is important to emphasize that each business function is usually compe-
tently addressing risks that are clearly defined as within its roles and respon-
sibilities. In each of the ERM examples above the food safety or Food Defense 
group would be competently focusing on the objective of reducing foodborne 
illnesses or attacks that can create public health threats  – but within their 
boundaries what could they do about mitigating the risk of the sub-prime 
lending crisis?
What is unique about enterprise-wide risks is that they are often distributed 
across many business functions. In addition, the specific incidents are so 
improbable or uncontrollable that it would be inefficient for any single busi-
ness function to address that vulnerability alone. That being said, the com-
bined risk to the enterprise could be catastrophic.
What is also different about these types of strategic risks is that they are 
governed at the Board of Directors level (where the risk appetite and defining 
accountability are determined), at the Company level (where CEO and CFO 
evaluate the risks across the entire enterprise), and at the business unit level 
(where they are responsible for implementing and managing countermeasures 
and control systems in line with the Board of Directors and Company 
requirements).
Food safety professionals will find that ERM principles are similar to the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) standards such as ISO 31000 Risk 
Management and ISO 22000 Food Safety. We can also rely on best practices 
from ISO 27000 Information Technology Security, ISO 28000 Supply Chain 
Security, and the work of Technical Committee 247 on Fraud Countermeasures 
and Controls. All these standards also provide a framework to address the 
“written risk assessment” mandate in the Food Safety Modernization Act.
This is not just another version of HACCP or CARVER+Shock. Are you 
ready for a Black Swan event? Are you speaking the language of Enterprise 
Risk Management?
Sidebar: The Black Swan—“To Be Wrong with Infinite Precision”
This is a review of an idea presented by Nassim Taleb in his book The Black 
Swan—The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Taleb 2007). The analogy of a 
“Black Swan” is that until a swan that was black in color—rather than white—
was found by explorers in Australia, the Western belief was that all swans 
were white. In one incident, everything changed.
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One of the concepts Taleb presents is “The narrative fallacy addresses our 
limited ability to look at sequences of facts without weaving an explanation 
into them, or, equivalently, forcing a logical link, an arrow of relationship, 
upon them. … Where this propensity can go wrong is when it increases our 
impression of understanding” (Taleb 2007). This review starts with reviewing 
what insight is outside and inside our information set.
Insight from outside Our Information Set
A key point—and incredibly important challenge for food fraud prevention 
incident databases—is “what could be inferred from outside our information 
set.” Often there is a lack of awareness of what is not included. Now, these 
next few thoughts seem like gibberish but follow the logic closely:
• We know what we know (also, “known-knowns).
• We don’t know what we don’t know (also, “unknown-knowns” or 
“known-unknowns”).
• Wisdom comes from knowing—and to the point of assuming—we do not 
know everything.
• Further wisdom is knowing how much we do not know (also, 
“unknown-unknowns”).
In that order, this seems entirely logical. That said think about some deci-
sions made about food fraud prevention for countermeasures and control sys-
tems. There is often an unsupported assumption or stated confidence and 
presentation that the information set is complete. This creates Black Swan 
event opportunities.
Insight from Inside Our Information Set
A first concept is a “post hoc rationalization” where humans have a need 
for “sense-making” and seek logic or patterns even where there are none. An 
example from Taleb is first to read this statement:
A BIRD IN THE
THE HAND IS WORTH
TWO IN THE BUSH
Did you catch something wrong? In a busy world, the human brain tries to 
make sense of and focus on the important things. Brain scientists have found 
that some people have a lower rate of error in assessments based on if they are 
more “right brained” or “left brained.” There are other interpretations and 
decision-making mechanisms and habits that add to the complexity. Applied 
to food fraud prevention, this presents interpretation bias – you might miss 
something obvious.
Overcausation
The world is busy, and massive amounts of information are presented. 
Humans need to make a lot of assumptions just to be able to walk down a 
hallway. Taleb stated “We [humans] harbor a crippling dislike for the abstract. 
(continued)
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 The Black Swan: Experience Versus Expertise
When a new food fraud article or interview is published, there often many people 
who say “oh, I’ve been studying this topic for years.” Do they have “experience” or 
“expertise”? If they’re such experts and been working on this for so many years, 
then why is food fraud still a problem?
If you were leading a project to protect a bank, would you rather hire a bank 
manager who has “experience” being robbed or someone with “expertise” not being 
robbed? From “The Black Swan,” author Taleb would define this as two terms that 
which will be defined below which are the “empty-suit problem” and “epistemic 
arrogance” (Taleb 2007). Some key definitions help provide insight on this question 
(the food fraud prevention application is added for several of the key terms) (Taleb 
2007):
Black Swan blindness: The underestimation of the role of the Black Swan and 
occasional overestimation of a specific one.
• For food fraud prevention, this would be focusing on preventing a recent inci-
dent such as melamine or horsemeat and basically ignoring trends that may 
identify a new “fraud opportunity.”
Black Swan ethical problem: Owing to the nonrepeatable aspect of the Black Swan, 
there is an asymmetry between the rewards of those who prevent and those who 
cure.
• For food fraud prevention, this would be the post-incident focus on detection 
of the specific incident rather than focusing on the root cause and general 
vulnerability reducing control systems.
Humans have a need to identify a root-cause to explain an event. Scientists, 
the public, media, and others go to great lengths to process the problem and 
root-cause. This is a “confirmatory bias,” “overcausation,” or “It is as if they 
wanted to be wrong with infinite precisions [this is sarcasm by Taleb or a 
statement that some risk assessors intend to deceive the reviewer].”
When there are many unknowns and uncertainty, rigorous assessments or 
probabilities become less and less precise and thus less valuable when select-
ing countermeasures and control systems. Applied to food fraud prevention, 
this would be trying to predict “the next melamine incident” or “which 
imported shipping container should we inspect.” One way to address this is to 
accept the uncertainty and lack of precise data. When considering what infor-
mation is available there is an ability to create models that identify vulnerabil-
ities but not necessarily probabilities. Countermeasures and control plans can 
be implemented that reduce all vulnerabilities regardless of the market 
dynamics or stakeholders.
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Confirmation error (or platonic confirmation or confirmatory bias): You look for 
instances that confirm your beliefs, your construction (or model)—and find 
them.
• For food fraud prevention, this could be relying heavily on a published data 
set to be representative of all vulnerabilities.
Empty-suit problem (or “expert problem”): Some professionals have no differential 
abilities from the rest of the populations but for some reason, and against their 
empirical records, are believe to be experts.
• For food fraud prevention, some professionals rely on their previous experi-
ence as an expert and have not reviewed new insight or methods. (It is amaz-
ing to hear absolutely positively incorrect statements made by industry 
experts—but the statements are made with high confidence.)
Epistemic arrogance: Measure the difference between what someone actually 
knows and how much they think they know. An excess will imply arrogance and 
a deficit of humility. An epistrocrat is someone of epistemic humility, who holds 
their own knowledge in greatest suspicion.
• For food fraud prevention, this could be a professional who has worked in 
food adulterant detection, and there is a belief that the food fraud prevention, 
opportunity reducing countermeasures, and control systems are from within 
their area of expertise (e.g., a food scientist who applies food safety microbio-
logical prevention techniques to the human criminal adversary).
Gray Swan (Mandelbrotian): Black Swans that we can somewhat take into 
account—earthquakes, blockbuster books, and stock market crashes—but for 
which it is not possible to completely figure out the properties and produce pre-
cise calculations or probabilities.
• For food fraud prevention, the reality is that almost every single incident is a 
“Gray Swans” with an inevitability or warning signs. The incidents may even 
be “White Swans” if we assume they will eventually occur. Earthquakes do 
occur. Depending on the geographic location of your building, you will take 
more or fewer precautions.
Ludic fallacy (or uncertainty of the nerd): The manifestation of the Platonic fallacy 
in the study of uncertainty, basing studies of chance on the narrow world of 
games and dice. A-Platonic randomness has an additional layer of uncertainty 
concerning the rules of the game in real life. The bell curve (Gaussian), or GIF 
(Great Intellectual Fraud), is the application of the ludic fallacy to randomness.
• For food fraud prevention, this could be when a food safety or risk scientist 
applies statistical methods to a data set that is not appropriate or that is incom-
plete. For example, the most complex statistical analysis is usually based on 
the underlying assumptions of “5 to 7 percent of world trade” (Spink and 
Levente Fejes 2012).
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Narrative fallacy: Our need to fit a story or pattern to a series of connected or 
disconnected facts. The statistical application is data mining.
• For food fraud prevention, this could be addressing the food fraud problem 
with current data sets or within current countermeasures systems. This could 
include food fraud being addressed in food safety early warning systems.
Reverse-engineering problem: It is easier to predict how an ice cube would melt 
into a puddle than, looking at a puddle, to guess the shape of the ice cube that 
may have caused it (“the melting ice cube”). The “inverse problem” makes nar-
rative disciplines and accounts (such as histories) suspicious.
• For food fraud prevention, there are sometimes data sets that use themselves 
to validate the model (in sometimes unintentional or ignorance of circular 
references). For example, predicting the type of food fraud once fraud has 
been identified—the primary challenge is not really what type of fraud is 
occurring but to figure, first, if fraud is occurring. Another example is to use a 
known data set to create a model and then demonstrate the accuracy and pre-
cision by running examples from that data set.
Others include:
Frequency vs. probability: “Overconfidence is less significant when the problem is 
expressed in frequencies as opposed to probabilities.” This also applies to vulner-
abilities rather than risks or a probabilistic risk assessment.
Lack of awareness of ignorance: “In short, the same knowledge that underlies the 
ability to produce correct judgment is also the knowledge that underlies the abil-
ity to recognize correct judgment. To lack the former is to be deficient in the 
latter”.
Overconfidence: “Overconfidence can be influenced by item difficulty; it typically 
diminishes and turns into under-confidence in easy items.”
Randomness as incomplete information: Simply, what I cannot guess is random 
because my knowledge about the causes is incomplete, not necessarily because 
the process has truly predictable properties.
Retrospective distortion: Examining past events without adjusting for the forward 
passage of time. It leads to the illusion of posterior predictability.
Uncertainty of the deluded: People who tunnel on sources of uncertainty by pro-
ducing precise sources like the great uncertainty principle, or similar, less conse-
quential matters, to real life; worrying about subatomic particles while forgetting 
that we can’t predict tomorrow’s crises.
The Problem of Induction: “Things cannot be known with perfect certainty because 
their causes are infinite.”
A new appreciation for our assumptions or bias is helped when stepping back 
and reviewing broader risk assessment concept such as the Black Swan definitions.
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Sidebar: The Black Swan—“The Melting Ice Cube”
This is a review of the concept presented by Taleb in “The Black Swan” (Taleb 
2007). This is one of the most effective and simple explanations to reinforce 
the focus on vulnerability reduction rather than specific event detection. The 
analogy explains a “forward process” and “backward process.” He states “The 
backward process is much more complicated. The forward process is gener-
ally used in physics and engineering; the backward process in nonrepeatable, 
nonexperimental historical approaches. In a way, the limitations that prevent 
us from un-laying an egg also prevents us from reverse engineering history” 
(Taleb 2007).
Option 1 “The Melting Ice Cube”: place an ice cube on a table and imagine 
the puddle that will result.
• For food fraud prevention we know there will—or could—be a puddle 
in the future. A focus could be keeping the ice cube in the freezer or to 
contain the puddle once it is formed. The melting ice cube and the dam-
age from the puddle are vulnerabilities. Crime prevention theory would 
identify characteristics of the situation or environment that lead to the 
ice cube being removed and left to melt. The focus can be on reducing 
those root causes for a range of problems related to the access to the 
freezer.
Option 2 “Where did the water come from”: try to reconstruct the shape of 
the ice cube be analyzing the puddle. This assumes the puddle is from the 
ice cube.
• For food fraud prevention, if there was an ice cube, there are infinite 
possibilities for the shape if there was, in fact, an ice cube, to begin 
with. Authentication would tell us that there is a puddle and that the 
liquid is water that is similar to what was used to make ice cubes. 
Control systems could tell us that an ice cube was removed from a 
freezer. The focus would be on alerting us when an ice cube has been 
attacked.
To be proactive and focus on prevention is to take the “forward process.” 
To detect and to deter is, of course, important, but the real focus is on 
prevention.
A Black Swan Event?: Review of the Germanwings Airplane Crash 
(MSU-FFI 2018)
Title: Germanwings Airplane Crash: Was it a Black Swan Event? Was it a 
“Reasonably Foreseeable Hazard” or “Reasonably Likely to Occur”?
By John Spink • March 31, 2015 • Blog
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Was last week’s Germanwings intentional airplane crash by a rogue pilot a 
“reasonably foreseeable hazard”? Was it “reasonably likely to occur”? What 
is the regulatory or jury-determined legal liability expectation of what is “rea-
sonably” and “likely”? For food fraud prevention: To-be-determined.
The Germanwings plane crash from last week is a horrible tragedy on 
many fronts. The cause points to an intentional act by the co-pilot. The result 
was the crash and death of all 150 people on board. The co-pilot had a medical 
condition (still undefined but there is speculation) that he did not reveal to the 
employer. Investigators stated they found a torn-up doctor’s note stating the 
co-pilot was “… too ill to work, including on the day of the crash.”
It was reported that “Some international airlines responded to the crash by 
introducing new rules requiring that two crew members always be present in 
the cockpit. The airlines that said they were instituting a two-person rule in 
the cockpit included Air Canada, EasyJet, and Norwegian Air Shuttle.” “The 
European Aviation Safety Agency [EASA], based in Cologne, Germany, also 
advised airlines across the region to adopt a two-person rule. The agency said 
the recommendation was temporary, pending the outcome of the French 
investigation into the Germanwings crash.”
This article reviewed seemingly related suspicious airplane crashes which 
were:
• 2013: Mozambique Airlines, Dead: 33, “When the flight’s co-pilot left to 
use the lavatory, the captain locked him out of the cockpit and manually 
steered the plan downward.”
• 1999: EgyptAir, Dead: 217, “Investigators conclude that the most likely 
explanation was that that co-pilot, … deliberately brought down the 
plane… The flight data recorder showed that he waited for the captain to 
leave the cockpit and then disengaged the autopilot.”
• 1997: Dead: 104, “[The plane] was cruising at 35,000 feet when it sud-
denly dove… [The pilot] had recently been demoted and disciplined by the 
airline and had large gambling debts.”
• 1994: Air Morocco, Dead: 44, “The pilot… intentionally disconnected the 
plane’s automatic navigation system… and crashed the plane… shortly 
after takeoff…”
• 1992: Japan Air Lines, Dead: 24 of 166 passengers, “…the pilot… sent the 
plane into Tokyo Bay moments before it was to land… He had a history of 
‘psychosomatic disorders’ in the late 1980s, but airline doctors said he was 
fit for duty.”
So, after considering this new information, is the suicidal pilot risk a 
Reasonably Foreseeable Hazard or Reasonably Likely to Occur?
This incident raises some interesting questions about the definition of what 
is a “reasonably foreseeable hazard” and what is “reasonably likely to occur.” 
This incident also provides an example of the difference between: (1) the need 
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or expectation to address a hazard and (2) knowledge that an incident could 
occur. The data is that there were five (5) related suspicious airplane crashes 
in the last 23  years. Though it could be argued that a Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment would be an inappropriate assessment for this type of “vulnera-
bility” there would have been an infinitesimal probability of this incident 
occurring. That said, the intentional airplane crashes are not unheard of.
FDA Food Protection Plan: Intervention, Response, and to Prevention
For food fraud prevention we have discussed the process of prevention to 
intervention to response. We note that after a new incident the process starts 
at Intervention, then to Response, and finally back up to Prevention. By defi-
nition, the new incident either defines a previously unheard-of risk (e.g., a 
“Black Swan” event) or provides new information on a previously known risk 
(e.g., a “Gray Swan” event). (Note: see the previous blog post on “Beware the 
Black Swans of Food Fraud.”)
Intervention
• This Incident: The plane has already crashed. The incident has passed. 
There is no “Intervention” for this incident.
• Future Incidents: This would focus on how to intervene in future situations 
where a pilot may try to take over the cockpit. Actually, expand this to 
anyone with access to the cockpit including other staff or a passenger. 
There are times during a flight when the cockpit door does open. The 
health of the pilot would also be a consideration, but that is more “tradi-
tional criminology” focusing on the perpetrator, not “environmental crimi-
nology” focusing on managing the “space” of the crime  – Situational 
Crime Prevention. The company has more control over the physical space 
of the crime rather than of the perpetrators.
Response
• This Incident: This incident has passed so no “Response.”
• Future Incidents – Immediate: Airlines and the EASA have implemented a 
temporary mandatory requirement that two pilots be in the cockpit at all 
times even if this means a third pilot is required on a flight. (This will be 
interesting on flights where there are only two seats in the cockpit.)
• Future Incidents – Future: This would technically be addressed under the 
Prevention category.
• In General: It appears that the Response for this and other incidents is 
related to the catastrophic nature of the risk and the clarity of the immedi-
ate effect of a countermeasure. Requiring two pilots to be in an airplane 
cockpit can be implemented immediately, and there is logic to how this 
reduces the “crime opportunity.”
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 Conclusion
This second risk analysis chapter expanded on the basic fundamentals to an applica-
tion to food fraud prevention. Through a series of basic concepts, and application 
examples, consistent and revealing practical and pragmatic insights can be found. 
The first conclusion is that food fraud is a new and different type of food risk so the 
“it” in “do it right the first time” is to only conduct a PRELIMINARY review…at 
least for now. There is an expectation that the insights will probably reveal very dif-
ferent types of best practices. This leads to an insight that at different stages in the 
implementation there are very different needs from the data (e.g., accuracy, preci-
sion, certainty, and robustness). Also, due to the nature of the data sets and the 
assessments, seemingly simplistic qualitative assessments and presentations may be 
optimal. The second conclusion is that all data analysis should include basic data 
analytics/Big Data review. Often, due to the nature of food fraud and the fraud act 
compared to other problems, there is a massively smaller data set with exponentially 
less thorough information. It is critical to characterize the nature of the data to 
explain the level of output that can be expected. Often for food fraud, there is so 
little data that there is almost never enough for a “prescriptive analytics” or “predic-
tive analytics” and often not even enough to state a statistical significance meaning-
ful “descriptive analytics.” There is absolutely enough information and data to 
conduct incident reviews that explain the system weaknesses such as in the Product 
Counterfeiting Incident Clustering Tool (PCICT) or Hot Product and Hot Spot anal-
ysis. The final conclusion is that there are great insights to be gained from the study 
of extreme events and the research on the highly improbable. Many food fraud 
incidents fall into the realm of Black Swan events. Once there is a realization of 
being in “Extremistan,” there is a new perspective, theories, and models to apply. 
With the right perspective and vulnerability assessment, there is shift from being 
surprised by Black Swan events to seeking Gray Swans—a shift from mitigation (a 
quick response to minimize the negative consequences of an event after it has 
Prevention
• Future Incidents: It appears longer-term research into Prevention is already 
underway. The “two-pilot” rule may become – or may just have become – 
a standard industry practice.
The Germanwings airplane crash provides a case study to define the nuance 
of “reasonably foreseeable hazard” and “reasonably likely to occur.” For food 
fraud prevention this incident emphasizes the importance of taking the time 
and effort to thoroughly and precisely define the fundamental concepts. While 
this will require a lot more consideration and research, this incident seems to 
emphasize a focus on prevention and reducing vulnerabilities. For food fraud 
prevention these are already core, fundamental concepts. MSU-FFI
16 Risk Analysis (Part 2 of 3): Application to Food Fraud
553
occurred) to prevention (reducing system weaknesses to try to prevent the event 
from even being able to occur). There is a saying:
Avoid presenting the “impression of excessive precision” and the temptation “to be 
wrong with infinite precision.”
 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Risk Application
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all There are very different work processes, but they are key to addressing these 
highly improbable but often catastrophic Black Swan-type events
Quality team There are very specific risk analysis and risk assessment methods that apply 
and do not get overly complex until you conduct high-level, prefilter 
information gathering projects
Auditors Due to the nature of the risk—and the current GFSI requirements—the 
assessments will seem extremely simple and light compared to other 
HACCP-type assessments
Management Support the continuous review of the process with a series of lighter activities 
and deliverables—“do it right the first time” is to conduct enterprise-wide 
assessment that is not very certain or robust, yet
Corp. 
decision-makers
The first assessments will be light but effective, for now
 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the key learning objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion Question
 (a) When considering data needs, what is the relationship between accuracy, 
precision, and certainty?
 (b) When presenting FF vulnerabilities, what are the strengths and weaknesses 
of “qualitative versus quantitate” and “words versus number”?
 (c) How do the concepts of Black Swans, Gray Swans, and White Swans apply 
to FF prevention?
Appendix: Study Questions
554
 2. Key Learning Objective 1
 (a) What is “data uncertainty”?
 (b) How does “dread and outrage” impact the reponses to a FF incident?
 (c) How do “blunders” impact the effectiveness of addressing FF prevention?
 3. Key Learning Objective 2
 (a) What is “data veracity”?
 (b) What are the “7 Vs of data analytics”?
 (c) Are most FF vulnerability assessments “descriptive,” “predictive,” or “pre-
scriptive” analytics or none of the above?
 4. Key Learning Objective 3
 (a) How did the “Black Swan event” get its name?
 (b) What is “experience vs. expertise”?
 (c) What does mean to be “wrong with infinite precision”?
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Chapter 17
Risk Analysis (Part 3 of 3):  
Implementation
Summary
This chapter presents a shift from the general risk analysis theory to the application 
and implementation of the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. The following chapter 
on Risk Assessment Application provides more detailed examples and case studies. 
This chapter will focus more specifically on the vulnerability assessments including 
preparing to address the problem, conducting a quick initial screening, expanding to 
a more detailed assessment where and when warranted, and finally connecting the 
assessment to all other enterprise-wide problems.
The Three Key Learning objectives are:
• (1) Framing the Problem and Scope: Define what question you are asking and 
exactly what information is needed to change a specific decision.
• (2) Conducting a Prefilter or Initial Screening to Start: At minimum, review 
the entire fraud opportunity to document an assessment. This will demonstrate a 
method to identify the most important problems.
• (3) Conducting a Detailed Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) 
Including Presentation in an Enterprise-Wide Assessment: This final step 
will allow a detailed—and often spirited—debate of the conclusions and very 
specific discussions about countermeasure and control systems.
On the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC), this chapter addresses the “(0) 
fundamental concepts” beyond what is risk analysis to the details of risk assessment 
as applied to food fraud prevention (Fig. 17.1).
 Introduction
This chapter will expand on risk analysis to specific vulnerability assessment con-
cepts. It is important to build upon a theoretically sound foundation to establish the 
overall principles and finally to make sure the concepts are coordinated and 
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Fig. 17.1 Food Fraud Prevention Cycle—where this chapter applies to the overall concept: “(B) 
fundamental concepts” and “(5) risk”. (Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink 2014; Spink et al. 
2019)
calibrated all the way to actual implementation (Fig. 17.2). Too many times aca-
demics study one part of a process—ad infinitum to way beyond the point of dimin-
ishing return—but leave the integration to some anonymous “others.” There is often 
an empty and unsupported claim that “can be used by decision-makers” or “is valu-
able to support decision-making.” The “decision” is never clearly defined, and the 
“decision-makers” are often generic “risk assessors.” General recommendations 
generally help while specific recommendations specifically help. This general 
approach to answering non-correlated research questions is similar to creating sepa-
rate links in a chain but never checking that the entire chain actually connects and 
can support the weight of the lift. Without framing the problem and scope of the 
application or value of the new research cannot be judged… at all.
To consider more details of the Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment and 
decision- making, there is a flow from the beginning with a consideration of the 
issue through decision-making (Fig.  17.3). There are specific steps required to 
advance from an assessment through processing to supporting an actual resource- 
allocation decision.
As is presented in the Business Decision-Making chapter, the COSO managerial 
accounting practice of Enterprise Risk Management is based on an assessment in a 
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two-stage process. The first is a qualitative, prefilter, or quick “initial screening” 
following more detailed assessments only as required for the specific question and 
resource-allocation decision. In many cases, more assessment is not needed. The 
third step is to include the assessment in some sort of enterprise-wide calibration 
system. This new problem must be compared to other enterprise-wide problems. 
Finally, the assessments and analysis have a definitive role in supporting resource- 
allocation decision-making. The entire system is refined to both increase the effi-
ciency of the assessments and also support the final decision-making.
 Key Learning Objective 1: Framing the Problem and Scope
This section reviews framing the problem and scope which is referred to in ISO 
31000 as “Establishing the context” (ISO 2009). Specifically, the preparation is 
critical to consider what really needs to be completed and how the resource- 
allocation decision-making can best be conducted.
• Academic 
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• Core 
Fundamentals
Theoretical 
Foundation
• Risk Managment
• Decision 
Sciences
• Data Analytics
Risk Analysis 
Methodology • Resource 
allocation 
decision maker
• compare 
everything to 
everything
Actually Make 
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Fig. 17.2 Process from theoretical foundation through risk analysis methodology to actual 
decision-making
Food Fraud
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[ERM Stage 1]
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Corporate Risk 
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[COSO Result]
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Fig. 17.3 The role of the Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) in the Food Fraud Risk Continuum. 
(Copyright Permission Granted) (Spink et al. 2016)
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The Key Learning Objectives are:
• (1) Prepare and review scope which is not just to authenticate but to prevent.
• (2) Internal and external resources such as to spend 10-minutes on Google 
Scholar can save 2 weeks of laboratory research or project work.
• (3) Needs of the boss and many decisions are based on very little data.
 Prepare and Review
If you do not identify the specific question in detail, then there is really no way to 
judge the efficiency of countermeasures and control systems. Aspirin is good, taking 
an aspirin must be good, then taking ten aspirins would seem to be better, right? If 
A = B and B=C, then A = C? However, for a broken leg or acne, that is not a very 
efficient risk treatment. If you clearly identify the problem (broken leg or facial 
acne), then the urgency of response can be defined and defended. Also, the most 
efficient and effective risk treatment can be identified and explained. For the broken 
leg, immediately call an ambulance to go to an emergency room to set the broken leg. 
For acne, maybe begin to try using acne soap and face cream for a month. Aspirin is 
good but never considered as a recommended treatment for either problem.
An example of defining the problem in detail is presented here (Spink 2017):
• Problem: Counterfeit or substandard vodka poisoning consumers, undermining 
consumer confidence, and possibly reducing the demand and price for local 
vodkas.
• Market: An entire country.
• Goal: There is a hierarchy of needs that get synthesized for specific agencies or 
countermeasures and control systems.
 – What is the problem?
• Stop e-commerce? No.
• Detect fraud? Yes.
• Deter fraudsters? Yes.
• Stop consumers getting cheated? Yes, and now getting more specific.
• Stop consumers getting hurt? Yes, and now getting even more specific.
• Reduce public health harm from fraudsters? Yes, getting yet even more 
specific.
• Reduce consumer victimization? Yes, a final key focus.
• “Prevent it all violations?”—Ok, this is more of an aspiration and is good 
as a vision, but what is “it” again?
 – Prevent all health harms from all e-commerce? No.
 – Address illegal e-commerce alcohol and specifically vodka? Yes.
• Review the updated project scope: The problem statement is to address counter-
feit or substandard vodka poisoning dangers which undermine consumer confi-
dence and possibly reducing the demand and price for locally produced vodkas. 
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Thus, a first step is to conduct a risk assessment to identify the root causes of the 
vulnerabilities so that a prioritized focus can be concluded.
After following this detailed process, the research question is clearly and pre-
cisely defined. If this is written, then it can be shared, edited, discussed, debated, 
and refined. Now that there is a very specific research question, a response can be 
identified and evaluated. This type of detail is helpful to identify success metrics 
and then also support a resource-allocation decision.
Sidebar: Detail on Starting to Address the Problem (Starting from a 
Blank Page)
Of course, if there is an actual, live incident, then addressing that problem is 
the priority. If there is a known or suspected public health threat that gets the 
immediate focus. If there is no specific incident or suspected public health 
threat, the first step is not to “respond to risks” or to select countermeasures 
and control systems. Before selecting countermeasures and control systems, 
there is a methodical approach to frame the question.
Overall, there will appear to be similar theoretical concepts that keep pre-
senting themselves between the ISO (e.g., ISO 9000, ISO 22380, and ISO 
22000), criminology (e.g., SARA method and Situational Crime Prevention), 
and the business management (e.g., COSO, Total Quality Management 
(TQM), and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)).
Risk assessment process based on the COSO managerial accounting prac-
tices state that “The ERM risk assessment process is outlined here” (COSO 
2011):
“1. Identify risks. These might impact the enterprise (external or internal).”
“2. Develop assessment criteria. Assessment criteria are often difficult to 
develop as it is very difficult to compare and aggregate risk across the 
enterprise. Such criteria often focus on the relative likelihood of an enter-
prise experiencing a specific risk as well as the impacted financials and all 
other negative consequences that might occur. Since risks might have neg-
ative consequences across functions/business units/etc., it is important 
these different constituencies within the enterprise have an understanding 
of the breadth of risks and their impact and such that consistent interpreta-
tions of risk/consequences can be developed.”
“3. Assess risk. This is accomplished in two stages that include:
• ‘(1) A qualitative initial screening is driven by categories of likelihood/
impact (e.g., this risk as a high likelihood and a moderate impact).
• ‘(2) A more detailed quantitative assessment of those risks that were 
deemed most consequential in the initial screening.”
“4. Assess risk interactions. This step focuses on understanding the enter-
prise risk portfolio in an integrated or holistic way by examining how iden-
(continued)
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 Risks of Conducting Risk Assessments
To continue to review “how to start,” there is a need to define the end goal but also 
other ways that the process could start, such as testing for the fraudulent product 
(Spink et al. 2013; Spink 2019). There is a saying “If you are a hammer everything 
looks like a nail.” That means that if a “hammer” is trying to complete a task, it will 
start by treating the problem like it is a “nail” and start banging. For food fraud 
tified risks positively or negatively are influenced by specific changes/
processes that might occur within the enterprise. For example, efforts to 
reduce the potential for supply chain disruption might involve bringing in 
new raw material suppliers. Such a change might increase the risk of food 
fraud within the firm (e.g., unadulterated product, more difficult to audit 
each supplier, etc.).”
“5. Prioritize risks. This step includes evaluating risks against “predeter-
mined target risk levels and tolerance thresholds [later referred to as risk 
appetite].” It is important in this step that the potential holistic impact of a 
given risk is included when prioritizing the importance of a given risk. For 
example, beyond the financial loss, other important criteria such as the 
health and safety, brand reputation, etc. should be carefully considered.”
“6. Respond to risks. In this step, risk responses (accept, reduce, share, and 
avoid) are determined and implemented. These steps create the foundation 
for the assessment. The next step is creating the vulnerability scales.”
An example of the continuum from an initial screen to the detailed assess-
ment is provided (Fig. 17.4).
This is a detailed list that helps define the start of the risk assessment pro-
cess which helps with the following step of “how to start.” It is important to 
emphasize that framing the question and identifying “how to start” creating a 
strategy are important before selecting or implementing countermeasures.
One Assessment
Enterprise Wide
All Variations in-
between 
One Assessment
for each Supplier-
Product-Location
Fig. 17.4 Continuum of the ERM two-stage process of risk assessments from “initial screen” to 
“detailed assessment”
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prevention, this could be a packaging manager recommending a packaging anti- 
counterfeiting component, a corporate security officer recommending investigating 
for suspicious activity, a law enforcement agency recommending investigation and 
prosecution, a customs officer recommending border inspections, a corporate law-
yer recommending a lawsuit, or a food scientist recommending food authenticity 
tests. While each manager is trying to do the right thing and to make real progress 
on the problem, the most efficient way to start is with a risk assessor conducting an 
enterprise-wide assessment.
Next, it is important to understand the possible ramifications of any first action. 
While it may seem logical to “just start testing,” there may be no consideration of 
what you might find. It would be illogical not to find any suspicious activity 
regardless of their actual vulnerability, risk, or hazard. Early in the process, there 
may be no assessment calibration or decision-making criteria; any and all suspi-
cious activity or innuendo may require a response. A response could be a global 
product recall of all products related to the suspicious activity. A more scientifically 
or methodologically based decision-making process could consider all the suspi-
cious activities—or vulnerabilities—but include a filter that reduces the situations 
that require the most urgent and comprehensive responses.
If you find something suspicious, you may need to act—if you suspect a health 
hazard or illegal act, then not acting may be literally criminal—and criminal for 
you, individually, not just for your corporation. Most times, the issue is just peculiar 
or odd but not dangerous. If you “just start testing” or “just start investigating,” you 
may be inadvertently taking on new risks.
Another consideration is that there is even a risk of conducting risk assessments. 
At an early FFVA session that included senior food safety managers for food 
 companies, there was a lack of awareness of the general liability in even just doing 
a prefilter assessment. The operations-focused personnel felt they were taking a 
science- based approach to more data gathering. They ignored and laughed off men-
tions of potential general legal liability. When the food scientists were asked “have 
you actually run this by your General Counsel,” they responded “yes, yes”—it 
seemed apparent that they hadn’t. In later sidebar discussion with a Deputy General 
Counsel, it was clear that the liability was a concern that was not fully understood 
by the food safety managers. The Deputy General Counsel was extremely con-
cerned with the “risk of conducting risk assessments” and the liability of “just start 
testing product.” To be clear, if there were any incident or suspected health hazard, 
there would be immediate action.
For example,
• Action: Consider a packaging summer intern employee at your company uses a 
published Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment without full information, and 
the automated system concludes your company has “high” food fraud 
vulnerability.
• Response: So, “yes or no” does your “company” have knowledge of a “high” 
food fraud vulnerability? “Yes, but…” The fact is “yes.”
• Consequence: This may be found during discovery during a lawsuit.
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If you conduct an investigation and find any—each and every—suspicious 
activity, that concern must be further investigated. Each and every suspicious 
activity could be a public health threat or fraudulent product that would be illegal 
and unfit for commerce. Without a full system to assess the vulnerability, you may 
find a lot of “suspicious activity” that really is not a risk and actually within the risk 
tolerance. The suspicious activity may be just peculiar or odd but not dangerous or 
illegal.
 Research Internal and External Resources
It is amazing how the little background research is often conducted before imple-
menting big food fraud projects such as a lack of awareness of the value of criminol-
ogy before addressing the human criminal adversary. Also, the general lack of risk 
analysis focuses on defining the problem and understanding the decision-making 
method. There is a mantra to “just get started.” There is an ignorance or lack of 
perspective that just because you have not heard of a problem before that, the vul-
nerability does not exist. Some companies and industries continuously create a 
completely new system from scratch or “reinvent the wheel.” Usually, they reinvent 
a poorer version of “the wheel.” The first inclination should be that:
• ‘(1) Someone else has been studying this.
• ‘(2) The available systems probably do not exactly apply to food fraud 
prevention.
The action to “just get started” could lead you down a long and winding path to 
a dead end. While “analysis paralysis” is the other end of the spectrum, for food 
fraud prevention there are guides and recommended paths forward.
In many (most) situations, there is new technology development that “is a solu-
tion looking for a problem.” This is backward. If you clearly understand your prob-
lem, then you can seek out or develop an optimal solution. If you don’t know your 
problem, then it is “dumb luck” if the technology or solution you select actually 
meets your needs (see section on Diagnosis, Treatment, Prognosis, and Decision).
There is a joke in academia that “two weeks in the laboratory can save you one 
day in the library”—yes, it is intended in that illogical order. With the Internet, the 
“1 day in the library” is probably about “10 minutes online.” A little background 
research could help you find previous work and both learn from the past and also 
start your work in an optimal direction.
After clearly defining and documenting the definition and scope of the research 
question, it is important to review currently available internal and external insight, 
methods, or resources. While fraud may be new to the food industry, product fraud 
prevention is not new to all of industry. There are 30+ years of experience address-
ing some aspects of fraud prevention-related work in many industries such as phar-
maceuticals, personal care products, luxury goods, apparel, or even currency. 
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Because the question is new to you or your industry does not mean it is new for 
the world.
There are several examples of technology moving faster than the understanding 
of the root cause and the resource-allocation decision-making mechanism. For 
example, around 2006, radio-frequency identification (RFID) technologies were the 
hot technology that was perceived to be the magic bullet solution for traceability. As 
food safety traceability is a regulatory push in 2017 (re FSMA and previously the 
“one step forward and one step back” in the Bioterrorism Act of 2002), the US 
Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 was that push due to mandated serial 
number-based traceability systems (as of 2018, the PDMA is still in limited stages 
of implementation not because of the package level capabilities but more straight-
forward challenges such as a single coding system, interoperability, data sharing 
concerns, and database security). Later in 2006, Wal-mart made a big push stating 
their “early adopter” intent to apply machine-readable automatic identification 
(Auto-ID) and RFID technologies. The number of Auto-ID or RFID vendors at the 
PackExpo packaging exposition boomed over about 2 years to the point there was 
an entire floor of the massive Chicago McCormick Place conference center dedi-
cated to just the technology. While the frenzy has passed with little of the projected 
benefits, there is a wealth of experience and expertise in selecting, implementing, 
and managing new technology or solutions. The food industry can learn from the 
previous projects implementation successes and failures.
For food fraud prevention, systems and services are being developed to support 
a wide range of prevention needs. Some products or services provide insight on 
incidents while others help with assessments and then others support enhanced 
traceability.
To find case studies or successful implementation examples, an extensive litera-
ture and marketplace search is very efficient if you have your needs and scope 
clearly defined. You may find that the most efficient and effective resource is from 
outside your industry.
Product fraud is new to the food industry, but it is not new to all industry. Since 
at least the early 2000s, the pharmaceutical industry—including the drug side of the 
US Food and Drug Administration—has been conducting coordinated internal and 
external security activities. The drug industry has a long history of traceability, seri-
alization of products, and end-to-end digital traceability. The US Prescription Drug 
Marketing Act of 1987 was the first effort to create this program. Additional US 
laws and regulations have further refined the focus and activities such as the Drug 
Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) of 2013 (Public Law 113-54 2011). The food 
industry—including the “food” side of agencies such as the EU DG-SANCO and 
US Food and Drug Administration—can learn a lot from their counterparts. By 
reviewing the past—the good and the less efficient—hopefully the food industry 
can both avoid pot-holes but also leapfrog to the next generation of prevention- 
focused activities.
Any proposal or project that does not begin with a thorough literature or research 
review is beginning as a guess and hoping for “dumb luck” to succeed.
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 Key Learning Objective 2: A Prefilter or Food Fraud Initial 
Screening (FFIS)
This section reviews the prefilter or Food Fraud Initial Screening tool (FFIS) which 
was created and published in response to an unmet research need (Spink et al. 2016). 
While there are many ways an assessment can be started, the FFIS began with 
understanding the need (e.g., compliance for GFSI, ISO 31000, FSMA, Sarbanes- 
Oxley, and others), acceptance of the very limited human and financial resource 
allocation (e.g., often a new assignment piled on top of other food quality or food 
safety job responsibilities), the limited and uncertain base incident data available or 
collected, and the other Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment products, services, 
tools, and methods.
The Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Review the foundational concepts of the FFIS.
• (2) Conduct a brief overview of the FFIS tool and method.
• (3) Consider the final presentation of the assessment and address the resource- 
allocation decision-making process.
The next sections will present the methods including the initial screening and 
detailed vulnerability assessment.
 Introduction to the COSO Initial Screening: Food Fraud Initial 
Screening Tool (FFIS)
For vulnerability assessments, there is a range of actions from very casual and quali-
tative to the other extreme of very formal and quantitative. The COSO Enterprise 
Risk Management system describes a two-stage process of an initial screening and 
then a detailed assessment (COSO 2011). From COSO:
• “This [risk assessment following the event identification] may be accomplished 
in two stages where an initial screening of the risks is performed using qualita-
tive techniques followed by a more quantitative analysis of the most important 
risks.”
• “Risk assessment is often performed as a two-stage process. An initial screening 
of the risks and opportunities is performed using qualitative techniques followed 
by a more quantitative treatment of the most important risks and opportunities 
lending themselves to quantification (not all risks are meaningfully 
quantifiable).”
This theory and terminology were used to create the Food Fraud Initial Screening 
Tool (FFIS) (Spink et al. 2016). The initial screen has also been referred to as a 
prefilter or first-step assessment. While the desired outcome for risk mitigation 
planning includes detailed vulnerability assessments, broader initial screening can 
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make the process much more manageable. Often a detailed, by-individual-product 
assessment is not practical due to the nature of the risk, the time allotted, or the 
detail needed for resource allocation and decision-making (Spink et al. 2016).
The FFIS is an efficient way to start with a review of the entire company. The 
important step is to complete the first assessment to identify where the more detailed 
investigation is necessary. Also, many compliance requirements already require 
“an” assessment but have no specification for the depth or breadth. For example, the 
basic GFSI requirements published in 2017 only require that an assessment is con-
ducted and documented. A conversation was overheard at a conference where a 
company said: “our detailed vulnerability assessment will take five years”… the 
response was “that’s nice, but it was due two months ago.”
 Introduction to the COSO Detailed Assessment: Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment
The initial screening addresses the assessment from an overarching view of the 
entire operation, while the FFVA builds up from reviews of specific assessments by 
product/supplier/manufacturing location (Table 17.1).
Table 17.1 Attributes of the FFIS and FFVA
Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA)
Initial screen/prefilter Detailed assessment
Company level perspective downward Supplier/product level perspective upward
Minimum acceptable activity as small as a 
group of subject matter experts
Maximum activity as detailed as an assessment 
for every supplier, product, package style, 
manufacturing location, and supply route
Qualitative Quantitative (if each data point is generated from 
a test of some kind) though some are 
semiquantitative, but actually most would be still 
considered qualitative (since the individual 
questions may also be qualitative (Note 1))
Number of assessments: minimum one 
assessment matrix for raw materials and one 
for finished goods. The FFIS typically has a 
minimum of 25 cells per matrix. With a 
two-matrix process, this would be 50 
assessments with a likelihood and 
consequence that equates to the overall, 
enterprise-wide risk assessment
Number of assessments: maximum could be for 
every supplier/product/manufacturing locations/
supply logistics item. A medium-sized food 
company with 100 ingredients from 3 suppliers 
and 3 logistics methods could reach 900 
assessments. If the FFVA has 30 questions each, 
then there could be 27,000 data points
Note 1: See Fejes and Spink, 2011, presented in the sidebar section “So, How Big Is the Food 
Fraud Problem? Unknowable!” That publication found that each of the quantitative estimates of 
the economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy was either without a citation or based on a core 
estimate of “5–7% of world trade.” Thus, the high-level statistical analysis conducted was based on 
a guess where a 1% error for the 2017 World Trade Organization estimate of world trade exports 
at $15 trillion would be plus or minus $150 billion
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Once a holistic and all-encompassing FFIS assessment is conducted that covers 
the entire enterprise, then the specific additional data collection needs can be 
determined.
Sidebar: “Enterprise-Wide Assessment” or “COSO Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM)”
Be careful when using new terms or phrases. The COSO/ERM concepts are 
new to many food safety risk assessors. COSO/ERM is a formal, regulatory, 
certification based concepts that often have legal ramifications. It is very 
important to be very careful with risk terminology.
A frequent conversation goes like this:
• Generalist: “Oh, I know all about enterprise-wide assessments.”
• Expert: “Wow, I’m impressed you’re experienced with managerial account-
ing regulations.”
• Generalist: “Oh, not that.”
• Expert: “(Silent but thinking) Ok, so you really do not know what you’re 
talking about.”
Yes, the idea of considering how risks are related to all the risks of an 
enterprise is a general concept, but it is not “Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM).”
Another more dangerous conversation demonstrates an unintentional shift 
from general concepts to inadvertently offering legal, regulatory compliance 
advice is related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A common statement could be 
“Now we will consider how the food fraud risk compares to other risks across 
the company. These impact the enterprise. Food fraud is an enterprise-wide 
risk. So we will now present Enterprise Risk Management.” This seems like a 
natural flow, but the word “Enterprise Risk Management” shifts this casual 
statement to a formal term that possibly has legal ramifications. Using the 
term incorrectly might be like telling an FDA inspector that you have a plan 
to analyze and manage risks, so you cook your product to 160F. “It’s a HACCP 
plan.” Wait, is it a formal official auditable “HACCP” plan or just something 
you decided to do? In reality, it is not a HACCP plan. Stating it as a HACCP 
plan could create legal or regulatory liability. Thus, it is important to state 
whether the assessment is really ERM or just a general broad assessment.
Before moving on, and continuing here to review ERM/COSO, a question 
is “Does your job require expertise?” Is there a critical aspect that comes from 
years of experience? ERM/COSO is a formal regulatory requirement. Don’t 
just assume your current expertise will suffice.
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Sidebar: Developing Assessment Scales and Outputs
This section will build upon previous ISO and criminology discussion on 
qualitative and quantitative assessment to now review several basic aspects of 
model development.
Regarding the assessment scales, a quote from the FFIS research article is 
provided including “meaningful differentiation” and the recommended “five- 
point scales” (Spink et al. 2016):
“Applied to the research question in this paper, an important aspect of developing 
assessment criteria is defining the ranking scales. ‘Scales should allow meaningful 
differentiation for ranking and prioritization purposes. Five-point scales yield better 
dispersion than three-point scales. Ten point scale imply precision typically unwar-
ranted in qualitative analysis, and assessors may waste time trying to differentiate 
between a rating of six or seven when the difference is inconsequential and indefen-
sible’ (COSO 2011). This statement presents several key concepts. First, meaningful 
differentiation refers to fidelity in the data meaning that the result provides a clear 
and appropriate presentation of the risks. Unless all the risks are the same or very 
similar, which could be the case, the risks should be presented on a scale that can 
quickly and visually present the differences.” (Spink et al. 2016)
Regarding numbers versus words, a quote from the FFIS research article is 
provided (Spink et al. 2016):
“Another important COSO concept for developing assessment scales is implied pre-
cision. This is the rationale for defining scale attributes with words (e.g., “Low”) and 
not as number values (e.g., “3”) (also see [REF Cox, 2009; Hassenzahl, 2006; 
Jablonowski, 1994]). Often the core data input for assessing food fraud vulnerabili-
ties is qualitative incident data. This enables the FFVA to apply the qualitative judg-
ment of what constitutes “very high” or “very low” risk. Numbers could be used to 
aggregate and sort the risk ranks, but the final presentation should shift back to quali-
tative or word results. Presenting numerical results could “imply precision” that is 
unjustified.” (Spink et al. 2016)
Regarding “implied excessive precision,” a quote is provided (Spink 2009):
“Another key concept that is related to implied precision is indefensible values or 
positions. Managing enterprise risk can appropriately generate rigorous debate sur-
rounding competing risks or countermeasures that often involve significant resource 
allocations. The decisions and the data must be defensible. As long as the foundation 
is clearly stated it is acceptable if such assessments are qualitative and have limited 
accuracy or precision. Data uncertainty is common in early stage assessments of 
risk, and thus evaluations should be considered qualitative, not quantitative.”
Regarding quantitative and qualitative assessments addressed in government 
documents, a quote from a research article is provided (Spink 2009):
“An example of this comes from the US Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
They reviewed the methods used to assess the economic impact of counterfeiting 
and piracy (GAO, 2010). The GAO report concluded that there were no quantitative, 
statistically supported methods to conduct such an assessment. The GAO report 
missed the opportunity to support qualitative assessments such as those espoused in 
COSO. The challenge for anti-counterfeiting research and assessment is that it con-
(continued)
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tinues to be presented as analytical, quantitative data. The assessments have been 
indefensible in some situations such as testimony by the Director of the US Office of 
the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) to a US Senate subcom-
mittee (see discussion and transcript highlights below and in (Spink and Levente 
Fejes 2012)). The estimates would probably be defensible if they were presented as 
qualitative.” (Spink 2009)
Regarding an example of an actual challenge during an open Senate testimony 
(Spink and Levente Fejes 2012):
“This need was reiterated in U.S.  Senate Testimony by Victoria Espinel, the 
Director of the U.S. Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 
(IPEC), Office of Management and Budget (Espinel, 2011). When pressed by the 
Senators for quantification or even an order of magnitude [of the economic impact], 
her response aligned with that GAO report: “So I would say it is very difficult to 
quantify precisely the impact of infringement on our economy because infringe-
ment… is illicit activity and it is difficult to quantify”. (Senate Hearing 111-847, 
2011)”
“When further pressed for even ‘Orders of magnitude, tens of millions of dollars, 
tens of billions of dollars, trillions of dollars?’ She responded in ‘It is not my nature 
or inclination to speculate without precise data.’ Ms. Espinel did refer to upcoming 
U.S.  International Trade Administration analysis (though both reports eventually 
only reviewed China) (USITC 2011, USITC 2011). The string of questions con-
cluded with ‘Well, let me jump in and ask that you conclude your answer on that in 
the form of a written response to a question for the record, to get back with whatever 
data you have.’ IPEC and the Senate Subcommittee have not published a public 
response. Neither IPEC nor others have published or referred any new initiatives on 
assessing the economic impact of counterfeiting.”
These examples consider the risk of presenting estimates as quantitative, ana-
lytical, or statistical where, when pressed, the underlying data set is often built 
on qualitative assessments or wild guesses. The application to food fraud pre-
vention is that starting with a qualitative assessment—as long as the method 
and challenge of the underlying data set is explained—is an efficient and 
effective starting point. Once this starting point is achieved, the resource- 
allocation decision-makers can ask for more information if needed. Academics 
and scientists are more comfortable with precise analytical data sets, but often 
there is not enough time, the effort to gather “enough” data is too costly and 
requires a deep understanding of the underlying root cause. The FFIS com-
bined with the resource-allocation decision-making method in ERM and pre-
sented in the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle provides a holistic and 
all-encompassing system.
It often seems that a prefilter or initial screening, a qualitative assessment, 
is way too simple, but it is a legitimate process and at least creates a manage-
able starting point.
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Sidebar: Review of USITC 1988 Report on IPR Crime Impact on the 
US Economy (1541)
Title: Review of USITC’s Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Effect on US Industry Trade Report of February 1988, by John Spink, 
Internal MSU Report, January 17, 2011
It appears that the earliest reference to quantifying the economic impact of 
counterfeiting and piracy is the US International Trade Commission (USITC) 
Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on US 
Industry Trade Report of February 1998 (covering surveys for 1986). This 
does refer to previous Commission’s study on The Effects of Foreign Product 
Counterfeiting on US Industry (USITC Pub. 1479, January 1984, “out of 
print” but hardcopy received through Freedom of Information Act request); 
however limitations were noting “the primary focus of that study was on for-
eign product counterfeiting; licensing revenues and service industries were 
not included in the study.” The other early report is the Counterfeiting 
Intelligence Bureau report in 1997, which does not include mentions of other 
methods. As a reference for the time frame, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) defined counterfeiting in 1996 (CIB 1997). The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) first Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Agreement (TRIPs) definition was developed in 1993–1994. The 
CIB 1997 notes the earliest criminalization of counterfeiting in “the early 
1980s,” including the US Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, and they 
refer to the future TRIPs agreement.
“The [USITC] was asked to develop, to the extent possible, quantitative estimates of 
the distortions in the US trade associated with deficiencies in the protection provided 
by foreign countries to US intellectual property rights, including trademarks, copy-
rights, patents, trade secrets, semiconductor chip designs [also defined as mask 
work, or the design of the chip architecture], proprietary technical data [e.g. included 
in regulatory paperwork or patent requests] and other types of intellectual property 
rights.”
The report and estimates were developed from questionnaires sent to 736 
US companies including all the largest 500 publically traded companies. It is 
very interesting and important that the USITC stated:
• “The data, therefore, represent estimates from a percentage of an unknown 
universe; the losses suffered by the US industry as a whole may well be 
much larger.”
• A third of the respondents stated IP was not important to their business.
• “Infringing product sales” were in $9.5 billion, including copyright viola-
tions. The trademark violations were $5 billion in lost sales and $754.9 
million in lost profit—it is a key point that they made the distinction of 
revenue versus profit. Later they state “counterfeit sales imply some loss of 
revenues.”
(continued)
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• The USITC continually emphasizes that the “discouragement of invest-
ment represents a social loss in that fewer new or improved products will 
be available in the future.” The damages were very broad and beyond the 
usual sales numbers included:
 – Fees or royalties not paid.
 – Reduced profit margins.
 – Damage to reputation or trade name.
 – Research costs not recovered.
 – Research or business foregone (opportunity cost).
 – Weakening of sales of other product lines.
 – Enforced reduction in plant efficiency.
Interesting for future reference, the annual 1986 loss for pharmaceuticals 
was $1.9 billion, and loss for food and beverages was $86 million.
The surveys identified a loss of 5374 US jobs, with half in the software 
industry, 478 in electronics, and 22 in the pharmaceutical industry.
Regarding the methodologies, “The Commission could identify no better 
means of developing estimates than asking a broad range of firms in the indus-
try’s most probably affected for the core evidence on US losses from inade-
quate intellectual property protection  – estimates that could admittedly be 
biased and self-serving.”
Appendix F was titled “Calculating the Effects of Counterfeiting Sales on 
Output, Total Revenue, and Profits of Legitimate Producers.” This Appendix 
included methodologies which focus on deceptive counterfeits (perfect sub-
stitutes of the genuine article) and that assumed the amount of counterfeits are 
known.
For a company to estimate their loss in revenue they would require the data 
inputs of:
• Sales in a defined market (usually known, includes diversion).
• Value of counterfeit sales in a market (usually not very well known, if at all 
able to quantify in any meaningful or statistically significant level).
• Profit per unit of sales (known).
Counterfeiting is described as to reduce demand by competing with the 
legitimate product. Further model development by other researchers (not the 
USITC researchers) often assumes counterfeits are a perfect substitute for 
the legitimate product, or what would be defined as deceptive versus non- 
deceptive counterfeits. This USITC model does not consider non-deceptive 
counterfeits since they are assumed not to reduce the sale of a genuine 
product.
“For example, if counterfeit blue jeans are sold from the back of a truck on a street 
corner, they are actually different goods from blue jeans of the identical material and 
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styling sold in a fashionable retail outlet.” The model appears to adapt supply and 
demand economics using the counterfeiter as the perfect substitute competitor.”
Both methodologies are only presented, for example, and no assessments 
are included or used.
Appendix H (Protection of Losses from Inadequate Intellectual Property 
Protection for all US Industries) clearly states that this assessment is only for 
US companies impacted from international counterfeiting:
• “Because the [survey] sample did not provide a statistically verifiable basis 
on which to project this loss estimate (based on a sizeable but still frac-
tional sample of the US firms) to the total of susceptible transactions, we 
did not attempt to make such a projection has not [sic] been included in the 
body of this report.”[…]
• “The data collected by the Commission’s questionnaire cannot be pro-
jected to US industry as a whole with any statistical validity. This is due to 
two characteristics of the samples and universe involved:
 – (1) The universe of all US businesses is unknown;
 – (2) The sample of questionnaire recipients was not randomly-drawn; 
and
 – (3) Those companies responding to not represent a random sample (of 
either all companies or all those sent questionnaires).”[…]
• “However, one can illustrate a likely range of aggregate losses from inad-
equate foreign intellectual property protection by making a number of 
assumptions concerning properties of both responding and non-responding 
companies. […] The range of possible estimates is wide. At the bottom 
end, to assume that companies not surveyed had no losses gives a $24 bil-
lion loss estimate. […] At the high end, to assume that firms not surveyed 
experienced the same ratio of losses to sales as those surveyed would give 
an estimate of $102 billion. Neither is this a reasonable assumption because 
our sample concentrated on industries and firms known to have the greatest 
problems with intellectual property losses.”
From the extensive analysis, it was estimated that “For all [US company] 
respondents then, estimated losses would be 1.9% of worldwide sales.” And 
“Thus, it is estimated worldwide losses to US industry would range from 
inadequate foreign protection of intellectual property rights would range from 
$43 billion to $61 billion. It should be stressed that this figure may be ‘reason-
able,’ but its limitations and lack of statistical validity should be kept in mind.” 
The Appendices and the report end on that statement.
The conclusion is that:
• There was a small response to the survey with 431 of 736 companies 
responding (58%).
(continued)
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• Less than half of those who did report reported losses with 198 of the 431 
companies (46%) reported the $23.8 billion in losses, whereas 233 compa-
nies did not report or did not report losses (54%).
• Although companies reported under oath, and a meta-analysis was con-
ducted to review the estimates, there was no methodology outlined or 
defined for providing responses.
For reference, here is the full USITC 1988 text regarding the counterfeit 
product as a substitute (emphasis added):
• “At first face, the above analysis does not appear well suited to many coun-
terfeit cases, because counterfeit goods often sell at a price that is much 
lower than that of the genuine article. However, on closer examination, this 
objection does not appear to seriously detract from the analysis. The coun-
terfeit units used in the analysis are perfect-substitute equivalents of the 
more expensive genuine article. For example, if counterfeit blue jeans are 
sold from the back of a truck on a street corner, they are actually different 
goods from blue jeans of the identical material and styling sold in a fash-
ionable retail outlet. Jeans bought from the retail outlet can usually be tried 
on for fit, and the consumer may be able to return the jeans if he finds later 
that they are flawed or if he simply changes his mind. Also, the retail outlet 
is likely to have a more pleasant ambiance, regular hours, and a well-
advertised location. Locating the counterfeit supply may impose some 
information costs on the consumer because a well-advertised, stable loca-
tion for the counterfeiter would increase the likelihood that he would be 
detected and punished. If the consumer knows the product is counterfeit, 
he may also feel moral qualms about engaging in an illicit transaction. 
These are all attributes of a good that makeup part of its price. If counter-
feiters are able to supply an entire market with goods that are perfect-sub-
stitute equivalents and lower priced than the genuine article, we should 
expect to see the legitimate producer forced out of that market entirely.”
Sidebar: Application of Qualitative, Quantitative, or Semiquantitative 
Assessments
At the start of research on food fraud, the assessments seemed to mirror quan-
titative, data-intense food safety risk assessments. As the food fraud assess-
ments were first being considered, there seemed to be a belief or assumption 
that there was “enough” of the “right” data to conduct the detailed quantita-
tive assessments (Spink et al. 2019). The food fraud assessments built upon 
food science methodologies that are not from the probably more appropriate 
crime assessments or business enterprise risk assessments.
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 Application of the Assessment and Supporting Resource- 
Allocation Decision-Making
The basic FFIS steps are to develop assessment criteria (e.g., details of likelihood 
and consequence), identify risks, assessment of risk components, combine the risk 
assessment, and then risk aggregation and evaluation in relation to all other 
enterprise- wide risks.
Prework is conducted before starting the assessment. Reviewing these concepts 
before considering any likelihood or consequence of judgment is important. If the 
vulnerability or risk assessment is presented early in the process, the risk assessors 
usually cannot help leaping ahead to consider risk treatments. It is recommended to 
separately and specifically “develop assessment criteria” before reviewing 
incidents.
For food fraud prevention there has been a focus on quantitative and by- 
individual- product assessments. These are valuable and are placed in the con-
text of the stages of assessment. Some advantages and disadvantages of both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses are further described by COSO (COSO 
2012):
• “Qualitative
 – Is relatively quick and easy to implement
 – Is easily understood by a large number of employees who may not be 
trained in sophisticated financial modeling techniques
 – Results in limited differentiation amongst levels of risk (e.g., a macro 
assessment)
 – Is imprecise—risk events that plot within the same risk level can repre-
sent substantially different amounts of risk.
• Quantitative
 – Allows for financial aggregation taking into account risk interactions 
when using an at-risk measure such as Cash Flow at Risk.
 – Can be time-consuming and costly especially at first during model 
development.
 – Other qualitative impacts or factors may be overlooked when they can-
not be meaningfully quantified.
 – Quantification (e.g., rankings of “7” vs. “8” compared to “medium” vs. 
“low”) may imply greater precision than the uncertainty of inputs 
justify.”
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Develop Assessment Criteria: Several factors are critical to the FFIS process.
• Likelihood details for very high to very low: This includes details such as the 
number of lost sales, the public health hazard level, amount of market share lost, 
regulatory penalty level, legal liability lawsuit level, etc.
 – For incoming goods:
• Products: identify five types of products with one category including 
“other.”
• Markets or channels: identify five types of markets or channels with one 
category including “other.” The market could be raw materials from a 
country or region (e.g., Canada, etc.) or a specific type of supplier (e.g., 
major food manufacturer, broker, etc.)
 – For outgoing goods:
• Products: identify five types of products with one category including 
“other.”
• Markets or channels: identify five types of markets or channels with one 
category including “other.” The market could be in the end markets for a 
country or region (e.g., Canada, etc.) or a specific type of supplier (e.g., 
major food retailer, broker, etc.)
Identify Risks: Next would be to conduct a review of risks. The level of certainty 
and robustness does not—repeat not—need to be high at the start. Consistent with 
COSO guidance, many successful programs started with nothing more than experts 
in a single meeting. It is important to note that the report should clearly identify an 
estimated level of “certainty,” “robustness,” and the risk assessment team.
Beyond expert insight, the events could include:
• Known food fraud incidents at this entity.
• Known food fraud incidents in a similar company, same industry, or related 
product.
• Product fraud incidents in other industries but for the somehow related product 
(e.g., liquid chemicals and liquid food products).
• Then vulnerabilities identified through scanning which could include market 
price fluctuations, supply irregularities, etc.
• Another factor is public policy changes where a new focus could lead to more 
oversight or testing that could increase detection.
Assessment of Vulnerability or Risk: The assessment is conducted for incoming 
goods and a separate assessment for outgoing goods. One matrix is created for each 
of the two types of goods (Fig. 17.5). Of course, more than five categories can be 
used, but more categories increase the complexity. Also, more detailed matrixes can 
be created. For example, consider that cell “A2” in the final incoming goods matrix 
one cell could be “meat” from “Europe.” That could be expanded into another 5x5 
matrix listing European countries versus different types of meat (e.g., beef/pork, 
poultry, seafood, ground meats, and processed meats/meal/powder/other).
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Risk Assessment: Once the factors and categories are plotted on the matrix, then 
the risk assessment can occur. To start, a quick assessment of the entire matrix is 
efficient. Identifying the assessment certainty and robustness is important. For exam-
ple, “Certainty: 1/10” and “Robustness: 1/10.” It is important to document how each 
cell rank was determined and also if/what additional information is needed. For 
example, maybe none of the experts has experience selling a product in the country 
of India. For each cell, the “likelihood” and “consequence” would be estimated.
Risk Aggregation and Evaluation: A specific risk assessment is a static estimate 
that is not compared to any other problem in the enterprise. While the risk ranks 
were identified, the overall conclusions had not been calibrated or tested. To “con-
nect everything to everything,” it is recommended by COSO/ERM to plot the risks 
on an enterprise-wide assessment usually in a corporate risk map (or risk heat map) 
(Fig. 17.6) (COSO 2012). (Note: The corporate risk map originally included the 
Fig. 17.5 Example of the FFIS matrices for incoming and outgoing goods. (Copyright Permission 
Granted) (Spink et al. 2016)
Likelihood
Very High High Medium Low
Very 
Low
ecneuqesnoC
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Low D2
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Low
Fig. 17.6 Corporate risk map plotting Food Fraud Initial Screening risk assessments. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) (Spink et al. 2016)
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colors red/orange/green/blue but changed to red/orange/green/light green since a 
more complex COSO investment matrix uses the blue color for all positive return 
opportunities.)
The FFIS process is completed when the vulnerabilities or risks are plotted on 
the corporate risk map. The process is documented and the meeting attendees 
recorded (when considering an audit, it didn’t occur if it wasn’t documented”). For 
the full enterprise supply chain, this is a complete Food Fraud Vulnerability assess-
ment, it is documented, it covers all types of products, and it addresses all types of 
fraud. Technically that meets the GFSI food fraud requirement.
Sidebar: ERM/COSO Examples and Definitions of the Likelihood and 
Consequence Details
An example of the likelihood details is provided from a COSO report 
(Table 17.2) (COSO 2012).
An example of the consequence details is provided from a COSO report 
(Table 17.3) (COSO 2012).
These are general examples of the likelihood and consequence provided by 
COSO and can be helpful in creating a starting point.
Table 17.2 Illustrative 
likelihood scale with 
definition from COSO (2012)
Likelihood Detail
Very high Up to once in 2 years or more
High Once in 2 years up to once in 25 years
Medium Once in 25 years up to once in 50 years
Low Once in 50 years up to once in 100 years
Very low Once in 100 years or more
Table 17.3 Illustrative impact scale with definition from COSO (2012)
Consequence Detail
Very high Financial loss of $X million or more
  International long-term negative media coverage; game-changing loss of 
market share
  Significant prosecution and fines, litigation including class actions, 
incarceration of leadership
  Significant injuries or fatalities to employees or third parties, such as 
customers or vendors
  Multiple senior leaders leave
High Financial loss of $X million up to $X million
  National long-term negative media coverage; significant loss of market share
  Report to regulator requiring a major project for corrective action
  Limited in-patient care required for employees or third parties, such as 
customers or vendors
  Some senior managers leave, high turnover of experienced staff, not perceived 
as an employer of choice
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Table 17.3 (continued)
Consequence Detail
Medium Financial loss of $X million up to $X million
  National short-term negative media coverage
  Report of breach to the regulator with an immediate correction to be 
implemented
  Outpatient medical treatment required for employees or third parties, such as 
customers or vendors
  Widespread staff morale problems and high turnover
Low Financial loss of $X million up to $X million
  Local reputational damage
  Reportable incident to the regulator, no follow-up
  No or minor injuries to employees or third parties, such as customers or 
vendors
  General staff morale problems and increase in turnover
Very low Financial loss up to $X million
  Local media attention quickly remedied
  Not reportable to the regulator
  No injuries to employees or third parties, such as customers or vendors
  Isolated staff dissatisfaction
 Key Learning Objective 3: FFVA and Presentation of Results 
(5265)
This section reviews the preparation, management, and communication of the 
results of an assessment. This section is not intended to be a review or judgment of 
Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) tools, methods, or systems since it 
would be inefficient to cover that detail here since the science and application are 
changing so quickly that the insight or recommendations would quickly be out-
dated. That said, there are some basic concepts or principles that will always apply.
Key Learning Objectives of this section are:
• (1) Review the Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment and detailed assessment.
• (2) Consider sources of data and “how much is enough” for the current 
decision.
• (3) Corporate risk map summary and presentation.
 Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) Which Is 
a Detailed Assessment
Based on the ERM/COSO principles, there is a continuum for the two stages of 
vulnerability assessments from the first stage which is an “initial screen” and then 
a “detailed assessment” that is presented here as a Food Fraud Vulnerability 
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Assessment (FFVA). The full continuum spans from one vulnerability assessment 
for an entire enterprise to the other extreme which could be one assessment for each 
product/supplier/manufacturing location. A top 100 multinational food manufac-
turer could have 1000 suppliers and purchase an average of 10 products from each 
supplier. In turn, each supplier could have an average of three manufacturing facili-
ties for each product. To address the detailed end of the spectrum, a food company 
would be required to conduct 30,000 individual and separate vulnerability assess-
ments. It is estimated that just saying the name of each of those manufacturing 
facilities could take 25 hours (e.g., based on 30,000 names that take 3 seconds each 
to pronounce). This would be a realistically impossible task; alternatively, the 
human and financial resource justification would need to be very well defined and 
supported. There may be unique vulnerabilities, but there is probably a logical bal-
ance of specificity and reality. That said, there is a documented method to define 
why the level of detail decided was practical and logical.
 Databases and Sources of Information
To review databases and sources of information, this section will focus on the over-
all specifications and utility rather than individual available databases. These food 
fraud products and services are not reviewed in detail since they are changing so fast 
that as soon as a book is published, the insight will be obsolete (actually, during the 
writing of this book, several of the commercially available food fraud incident data-
bases underwent significant changes, reductions, expansions, or consolidations). 
The underlying needs and specifications of the user will be consistent.
As has been emphasized throughout this chapter and this book, the “right” data 
set is defined by assessment needs. The scope of the research question defines the 
assessment needs (e.g., adulterant substances or all types of food fraud), the deci-
sions (e.g., presenting trends for discussion or initiative for a recall of products from 
around the world), or the needs of the resource-allocation decision-maker (e.g., 
some managers, or for some decisions, require more or less information).
In general, there are many sources of information that are logical even if they 
seem very casual or informal: subject matter insight, known incidents with the com-
pany, databases, and Internet searches (Table 17.4) (Spink et al. 2016).
While analysis of the specific databases is outside the scope of this work, it is 
essential to review the sources of information and types of data gathering methods 
(Table 17.5).
It is efficient to identify the research question and then start assessing the avail-
able data sources. There may be no single data set that includes all products or that 
is updated on a frequent enough basis (for more, see the section on Introduction to 
Data Analytics).
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Table 17.4 Sources of data for the Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) and Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) (Spink et al. 2016)
Information source and detail
Subject matter expert insight
Known incidents within the company (i.e., internal sources)
List incidents
List details and costs if known
Databases (i.e., static external sources)
Review product recall information (i.e., company, product group, industry, etc.)
Review food fraud or related databases
Internet searches (i.e., dynamic external sources)
General Internet searches (i.e., by individual products, etc.)
Set up automated Internet keyword alerts (e.g., ongoing Google Alerts, etc.)
Note: This content would usually be described by regulators such as FDA as “science-based” since 
it is published in a peer-reviewed, refereed, scholarly journal. “Science-based” is not just “a group 
of scientists” who made a decision
Table 17.5 Review of FFIS information gathering details such as databases and sources of 
information
Databases and sources of information
Recall and incident information: These are public government statements, or their summaries 
consolidated by-product supplies.
Incident databases: These are reviews of information summarized and presented. The incidents 
could be from many sources and also include a wide range of detail. A key is to understand 
whether the database includes:
  1. Your specific supplier/product/country item
  2. The robustness of the data search
  3. Frequency of assessment. For an urgent incident review, this could be a starting point that is 
supported by a review of current product recall information or an immediate internet search
Market monitoring: These are reviews of changes in the marketplace such as price changes, 
product shortages, or consumer concern on social media. These provide insight that possibly 
influences the macro-level “fraud opportunity.”
Internet searches: An internet specific keyword search can evaluate a wide range of sources 
and identify if “anything” is publically known. This can be an excellent resource during an 
urgent incident review or research on suspicious activity.
Internet keyword alerts: An automated process can be to set up keyword alerts to be passively 
made aware of possible concerns.
Sidebar: Estimates of Product Counterfeiting—Same Challenges for 
Food Fraud
There is an Aesop’s Fable “Belling the Cat” that proposes impossible solu-
tions. In the fable, a group of mice proposes to put a bell on the pestering cat. 
The problem is that no one offered a solution as to how to get the bell around 
the cat’s neck. The idea is excellent and effective, but there was no consider-
ation of the implementation. Estimating the economic impact of counterfeit-
ing and piracy sometimes seems like belling the cat.
(continued)
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Before developing an assessment model, it is wise to consider the available 
data. A proposed utopian model may require a mythological data set that does 
not exist. A frequent misperception—regardless of what may be stated publi-
cally—is that most companies do not have the ability to quantify their product 
fraud risks or costs accurately. They know what has been reported to them, but 
they face the same challenges as their predecessors of gathering useful data. 
Over time, and based on identifying unmet needs, they can refine their process 
to understand their vulnerabilities better.
In many situations, this type of assessment is trying to quantify the 
“unquantifiable” or to try to “know” the “unknowable.” Ok, it may be techni-
cally possible to gather enough data, but in reality, it would be cost prohibi-
tive. A key consideration is “cost prohibitive” in comparison to “how much is 
enough” for the current resource-allocation decision-making.
Compared to other risk or threat assessments—such as food safety, food 
defense, or also terrorism—the fraudster does not “need” to act, so there is an 
undefined threat of the incident; there are a wide range of types of attacks, so 
the consequence is also usually undefined; and finally this combines to make 
the consequence very uncertain. However, this has not been an insurmount-
able hurdle because the shift from economic impact to vulnerability is a com-
mon factor already in place in a company under a CSO/ERM system.
Finally, the most important fallacy is that there is an assessment that 
already integrates into the resource-allocation decision-making system 
(“There must be? Right?”). There is a belief that “someone else” does that 
integration. Well, I would challenge to ask “who?” Do you “know or think” 
that someone does that integration? What is their name? Have you have con-
firmation that their key job responsibilities include meeting your exact ques-
tion or the specific compliance requirement? Also, does your current risk 
assessment actually help them?
Any proposed model that does not include an application case study—
including the final and actual resource-allocation decision-making—is not 
really that helpful. Hypothetical examples are often incomplete and cause 
either dangerous assumptions that it is already being conducted or frustration 
when the risk assessor cannot figure out how to answer the question.
Sidebar: Inconsistent Sources of Data
When researching the methods to assess the economic impact of counterfeit-
ing and piracy, details of the inconsistent sources of data were determined 
(Spink and Levente Fejes 2012). Several examples are presented:
“Seizure data and interdiction rate: ‘Seizure data reports are not considered as 
core documents because they only represent what has been caught and not an estimate 
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of the entire counterfeit product marketplace.’ A quote is from the US GAO ‘We 
wouldn’t consider the seizure rate to be a random sample of the extent of counterfeit 
goods coming in [to a country].’ Moreover, then, the USITC stated ‘The data, there-
fore, represent estimates from a percentage of an unknown universe.’ ”
Challenges of Using Seizure Data: Regarding seizure data and published 
reports, there are often even challenges of getting any data. While the most 
basic customs data such as seizure amounts and rates may seem like “just a 
fact,” even sharing what seems like the most basic and sterile information or 
data is a challenge. For example, the customs survey used in the OECD coun-
terfeiting and piracy survey was sent to 169 World Customs Organization 
members with 70 responses (OECD 2007). For the general country survey 
sent to the 30 OECD member countries, there were 20 responses. From the 
OECD report (OECD 2007):
• “Caution must, of course, be exercised in interpreting the results of sur-
veys, as participants may not necessarily report fully or truthfully on their 
activities, particularly if these activities involve unlawful deeds. While 
these limitations need to be kept in mind, the value of surveys in suggest-
ing patterns and changes over time should not be underestimated” (OECD 
2007).
• “The general lack of data with respect to counterfeiting and piracy activi-
ties necessitates that more information on the phenomenon be developed. 
One of the most promising sources of information in this regard currently 
concerns seizure statistics as registered by customs authorities around the 
globe. Apart from being collected on a systematic basis, in most cases, 
these data also constitute the only official data that exist on infringement 
activities. Hence, despite their apparent shortcomings, they currently con-
stitute the best foundation for measurement analyses as far as counterfeit-
ing and piracy issues in a global context are concerned” (OECD 2007).
• “Answers to the survey ranged from being limited in their usefulness for 
developing information on infringement activities to being very detailed 
and thus of great value with respect to the analysis. Of the 70 responses 
received, only 45 economies [countries], provided information detailed 
enough to allow a more elaborate assessment of the counterfeiting and 
piracy activity. The number of data records submitted varied largely across 
economies” (OECD 2007).
The report noted analysis based on 19 reporting countries including 
“Andorra, Angola, Australia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Japan, Latvia, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Korea, 
Romania, Spain, the UK, and the USA.” Notably missing some of the biggest 
economies in the world including China, Hong Kong, Brazil, Russia, India, as 
well as EU-15 countries of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden.
(continued)
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Data Representative of the Marketplace: Another consideration is if the 
data received is representative of the marketplace. From the World Customs 
Organization repoint on capacity building (2007) “An increase in seizures of 
counterfeit goods might mean that it has become more of a problem; or, more 
likely, it could mean that IPR enforcement has become more aggressive and 
thus successful”(WCO 2007). Essentially, more counterfeits are found after 
there is more effort to find counterfeits. Conversely, an increase in one type of 
counterfeit product does not necessarily mean that a specific problem is 
increasing. Often law enforcement or regulatory inspectors shift focus from 
one product to the next. If counterfeit electric cords were a priority in 1 year 
and then counterfeit watches in the next, it would be expected that the number 
of seized counterfeit electric cords would decrease and counterfeit watches 
would increase. This data of the change in seizures does not necessarily indi-
cate a change in the rate of counterfeiting.
From a 2012 article that “A Review of the Economic Impact of 
Counterfeiting and Piracy Methodologies and Assessment of Currently 
Utilized Estimates” (Spink and Levente Fejes 2012):
• “Lack of historical data: ‘The first challenge is that, compared to many 
other crimes or quality control defect assessments, there are a very few 
identified incidents.’ Moreover, ‘If there are limited or incomplete histori-
cal data, any model development would include formulation- or model- 
errors.’ And then ‘Furthermore, the counterfeiters evolve their operations 
quickly, and so there is a question of time-sensitive data perishability 
where an assessment at one time is not applicable or useful at a future 
time.’”
• “Data uncertainty: ‘The second challenge is that for product counterfeit-
ing, uncertainty refers to estimates that are not necessarily agreed upon as 
being accurate.’ Also, ‘These errors are caused by the physical data used to 
build the models or conduct the assessments that do not represent what is 
actually occurring.’ And finally ‘What is seized is not technically a statisti-
cally representative random sample of what was actually counterfeited, so 
there is probably no test of the marketplace that could provide a represen-
tative sample of the prevalence of actually counterfeit product.’”
• “Data input and uncertainty: ‘The third challenge is that although some 
products or brands are counterfeited repeatedly, the details of how the 
infringement occurs can be nearly infinite.’”
• “Model uncertainty: ‘A fourth challenge is that due to the evolving nature 
of the marketplace and the fraudsters, a model constructed from known 
types of infringements cannot possibly predict every risk.’ Then 
‘Counterterrorism addresses this challenge by focusing on vulnerabilities 
in addition to assessment and mitigation of known risks.’ However, 
then ‘Although the data are uncertain and inaccurate, this is often not a 
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hindrance to governments and companies taking action in situations where 
the data are framed as uncertain.’”
In combination, these inconsistent sources of data undermine the ability to 
conduct advanced statistical analysis or analytics. The nature of the data sup-
ports a less formal review method such as a vulnerability assessment rather 
than something more advanced such as a probabilistic risk assessment.
Sidebar: A Review of the Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and 
Piracy Methodologies and Assessment (MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: So, How Big Is the Food Fraud Problem? Unknowable!
By John Spink • April 3, 2013 • Blog
Quantitative estimates of product fraud are elusive if not impossible to 
determine. The bad guys don’t submit annual reports and don’t share esti-
mates of their activities – at least not outside their criminal organizations. We 
know what we caught, but we have no idea what we didn’t catch. Did we only 
catch the sloppy or the unlucky? There are even legal and cultural debates on 
“what is fraud?”
This interest in the research question about the estimate of the economic 
impact of counterfeiting and piracy was sparked during an interview with the 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) when they were developing its 
2010 report on “Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of 
Counterfeit and Pirated Goods.” That report found that no quantitative meth-
odology is in use and that the government agencies relied upon industry esti-
mates of counterfeiting. It stated, “it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify 
the economy-wide impacts.” This report is an important starting point for esti-
mating food fraud and demonstrates the need for additional research, which 
we have begun through the MSU Food Fraud Initiative.
There is definitely a perception implied by many authors that the product 
fraud or counterfeiting estimates are quantitative and based on precise, accu-
rate, and certain data. To review this, we conducted a research project on the 
estimates. The assessments all kept coming back to just three core sources 
[see Spink and Fejes (2011) A Review of the Economic Impact of 
Counterfeiting and Piracy Methodologies and Assessment of Currently 
Utilized Estimates, International Journal of Comparative and Applied 
Criminology]. In most cases these estimates are often considered quantitative 
their authors were very clear that their findings were “educated guesses” and 
one even stated that there were “no methods known to develop an overall 
estimate.” While this research was for intellectual property rights violations of 
trademark, patent, or copyright, the findings also apply to food fraud.
(continued)
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 Incident Reviews
To consider the incident reviews, insight from a research article is provided (Spink 
et al. 2016):
“In [the data gathering], incidents or suspicious activity is reviewed. There are many accept-
able sources for the information including subject matter expert insight. This is a very 
efficient starting point that can quickly identify whether there is a lack of information or 
It cannot be emphasized enough that any seizure data is based only on what 
we caught and that there is probably no way to correlate this with the actual 
incidents in the marketplace. That is a bold and important statement. In our 
article, we stated: “The models being used to estimate the impact are being 
generated from extremely low-frequency events, or if the exact process and 
method of the counterfeiters is considered, events that have never occurred 
before.” We went on to point out that the data uncertainty was based on:
“(1) The lack of historical data;
(2) The incomplete and often inaccurate nature of available data;
(3) The seemingly arbitrary infringements by the counterfeiters (data uncer-
tainty created by the data generator which in this case is a human); and
(4) The model uncertainty which is also referenced as formulation errors.”
Thus, a survey of the marketplace can be valuable as a snapshot of activity 
in a known, infiltrated, high-counterfeit activity setting… however, a random 
sampling of the globe would require millions of samples to even approach 
being considered anywhere near statistically significant.
Even though the quantitative, statistically significant estimates are 
unknown or unknowable… we do know the vulnerabilities. We can assess 
how counterfeit or diverted product did get into a marketplace. Although that 
exact type of fraud incident may not occur again, we can assess whether the 
system is still vulnerable.
Although the estimates of product counterfeiting and product fraud lack 
accuracy and precision, this should not be an impossible hindrance to govern-
ments or companies taking action. It is important to note that governments do 
require more quantitative rigor when deciding which projects to fund, but this 
lack of data hasn’t hindered resource commitment in areas such as homeland 
security or human trafficking.
It is critical that the estimates be framed as based on “uncertain” data and 
be viewed more as an evaluation of the vulnerability rather than an exact esti-
mate of the threat. Once we evaluate the vulnerabilities, we can begin protect-
ing the supply chain gaps. A first step in determining the appropriate, strategic, 
and efficient food fraud prevention program  – beyond what is technically 
required by law – is to evaluate the vulnerabilities that allowed past incidents 
to occur.
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where the enterprise decision-makers will need more data. For example, an enterprise 
considering the start of a food fraud strategy needs fewer details than a situation where 
competing and costly risk tactics are being evaluated. This is the process to gather and 
assess historical or emerging threats. Currently, there are no explicit or detailed process 
steps for gathering and sorting data. Government regulation and industry standards refer to 
experts, or a qualified person, to assess hazards and assign risk ranks. Also, many key terms 
are not defined such as the FSMA concept of a ‘known or reasonably foreseeable hazard’.” 
(Spink et al. 2016).
There are many ways to sort or organize known incidents. Encoding data, estab-
lishing a typology, or using a data cluster tool are all acceptable methods to organize 
and analyze incident data. One method developed for product fraud is the “Product- 
Counterfeiting Incident Clustering Tool” (PCICT) that is codified in an ISO stan-
dard (see the section on “Product-Counterfeiting Incident Clustering Tool”) (Spink 
et al. 2014; ISO 2018).
“After conducting the incident review step, there can be information relating to a 
realization of an inherent risk requiring an immediate redefinition of the overall 
project (i.e., not simply performing an FFIS). This is a natural opportunity to review 
the overall Food Fraud Prevention Plan and development process.”
 Presentation: Corporate Risk Map
COSO/ERM recommends the presentation of the assessment results on a corporate 
risk map or also referred to as a risk map or heat map. The single figure is well rec-
ognized by a Board of Directors, Risk Audit Team, or Internal Audit Team. It is 
efficient and important to present the assessment in the terminology and format of 
those enterprise leaders. The subject is introduced previously in this chapter and in 
the chapter on Business Decision-Making. Several case studies are provided includ-
ing a hypothetical county level FFIS and a product-specific FFIS.
Sidebar: Case Study—FFIS for an Entire Country Including All 
Products and All Fraud (Yes, It Can Be Done)
This exercise was to refine the process and to demonstrate the utility of a final 
assessment. This assessment covered the entire market for all products and all 
types of fraud (Fig. 17.7). The creation of the countrywide completed assess-
ment enables a review of specific issues rather than the more conceptually 
difficult first step in conducting the broad assessment. Also, once issues are 
identified as “high” or “very high,” there is often an intense engagement and 
questioning of the assessment. Presenting the assessment usually creates 
motivation from other stakeholders or interested parties to engage in the pro-
cess. (Note: refer to ISO definitions of key terms such as interested parties, 
organization, management, management system, and other.)
(continued)
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• Since this is a prefilter, preliminary assessment with low pre-research, the 
matrix was identified to be very low on “certainty” and very low on 
“robustness.”
• The assessment found 14 items that were a “very high” or “high” food 
fraud vulnerability based on an estimate of the country-level risk 
tolerance.
• Of the 14 issues, 11 were in 2 products which were “spirits, alcohol, etc.” 
and “meat, seafood, dairy.”
• Also seven of nine “incoming goods/raw materials” were imports from 
developing countries (Eastern Europe, China, and others).
• The imported product was both at a port and smuggled into the 
marketplace.
• For “outgoing goods/finished goods,” four of six were for “private/kiosk/
bazaar/trolley” and “e-commerce/online shipping.”
This country-level assessment provided a review of all vulnerabilities. The 
next step is to conduct further edits to the conclusions. After final agreement 
Likelihood
Consequence VH H M L VL
A B C D E
VH 1 E
H 2 B,F
3,4,5,6,7,9
D
8
M 3 A 1,2
L 4
VL 5
Certainty Robustness
1 3 5 8 10 1 3 5 8 10
Fig. 17.7 FFIS summary matrix that for this assessment includes only outgoing goods
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on the rankings, there is now a clear method to identify the focus topic which 
would be the item highest risk that is item “E.” Also, the presentation of the 
conclusions raises a question about the urgency of addressing the other risks 
that are above the risk tolerance (in the red and orange zones).
Sidebar: Case Study—European Country, Food, Alcohol, Spirits, Vodka
Included here is an example of a quick but complete FFIS that includes plot-
ting the vulnerabilities on the corporate risk map and then a quick review of 
possible countermeasures and control systems. Each of the “very high” risks 
seems to have risk treatments that could be implemented almost immedi-
ately—and for all three problems, the equipment or process may already be in 
place so they could be implemented with only a slight adjustment in the 
screening target or message. In all three problems, the countermeasures and 
control systems were not the usual food authenticity tests or anti- counterfeiting 
components.
From the report:
Title: Prefilter Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) Using Open- 
Source Information
For: Country/Vodka
Date: October 6, 2017
Summary: An open-source search was conducted to review the food fraud 
vulnerability for Country/Vodka. The goal was to provide an example of the 
FFIS tool for a specific problem. The review assessment is ranked as certainty 
1/10 and robustness 1/10, and the team was the MSU Food Fraud Initiative 
members. The assessment identified three specific “very high” and four spe-
cific “high” vulnerabilities. The likelihood was an estimate based on base 
awareness and local discussions. The consequence was a combination of the 
health hazard incidents, the loss of economic contribution from lost sales, and 
then a social factor of concern raised by an incident/illness/death by the spe-
cific retail location. For example, it is more concerning for consumers if there 
is a slight problem at a trusted supplier rather than an incident at an informal 
or illicit market. The “market” main concerns appeared to be (1) online mar-
ketplaces and (2) “white van” deliveries (e.g., an unofficial seller of product 
“out of the back of a ‘white van.’” The “product” for an online sale is the 
delivery, and the main concerns were (1) local courier or person-to-person 
delivery and (2) private or contract couriers. Together, three “very high” prob-
lems were identified. Possible countermeasures and control systems were 
suggested for each:
 1. For high incident geographic areas (such as a specific postal code), possi-
bly utilize an X-ray/computer system to identify >0.5 L glass or plastic 
bottles.
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 2. Add or adapt current mail X-ray/computer scanner for >0.5 L liquid in 
glass or plastic.
 3. Review warning communication to this target group of consumers (e.g., 
social media of Snapchat, Instagram, specific information brokers).
 4. Note: All three countermeasures and control systems may already be 
implemented by other agencies.
The next step would be to review if the resource-allocation decision-maker 
requires an increase in the certainty and robustness to a level necessary to 
decide on countermeasures and control systems.
Method: The prefilter Food Fraud Initial Screening Tool (FFIS) is the first 
of the two-stage process for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). The initial 
screening is conducted both as a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment starting 
point and to understand public information that could lead to litigation. The 
limits for likelihood, consequence, and corporate risk appetite were estimated.
Assessment Detail: This conclusion was based on an assessment. The 
nature of the product and specific research question enabled one matrix to be 
used (Fig. 17.8).
Next, although it was very easy to see the cluster of “very high” concerns, 
the results were plotted on a risk map (Fig. 17.9).
Process Check—These “very high” food fraud problems versus all coun-
trywide “very high” problems: Plotting the problems on this corporate risk 
map is helpful for the resource-allocation decision-maker since these findings 
can be calibrated against all of the enterprise-wide risks. For example, while 
it may be clear, these are by far the most concerning three problems; they may 
actually be lower compared to enterprise-wide problems. For example, a 
countrywide Salmonella outbreak would seem to be higher than all three of 
these food fraud problems. This brings up a question of whether the likeli-
hood and consequence were properly calibrated.
Process Check—Recalibration: The corporate risk map and enterprise- 
wide ranking include a built-in recalibration feature. The original likelihood 
Markets/ 
Products
Major retailer/ 
Specialty
Minor retailer/ 
Independent
Bazaar/ Kiosk/ 
Flea Market Online
“White Van” – 
individual & Other
A B C D E
Pick-up 1 VL VL M NA NA
Local Inventory – 
Direct Delivery 2 VL VL M H H
Domestic Ship – 
Mail 3 L L NA VH NA
International Ship – 
Mail 4 NA NA NA VH NA
Local Inventory – 
“Courier” Delivery, 
P2P Handoff & 
Other
5 VL M H VH H
Fig. 17.8 FFIS assessment detail of the specific fraud opportunity problems. (Copyright 
Permission Granted) (Spink 2017)
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for the next evolutionary pilot project. The final conclusion is that a top-down, 
prefilter, or initial screening—which can be quick, uncertain, and unrobust—can be 
very useful. By clearly reviewing a prefilter or initial assessment method, in combi-
nation with understanding this is often the very first assessment of this specific 
problem, a very light, uncertain, and unrobust assessment may be optimal. There is 
a saying:
A general assessment will generally help, and a specific assessment will specifically help.
and consequence estimates can be recalibrated. Each of the 25 cells can be 
reassessed b sed on the ne ly defi ed likelihood and consequence factors.
The recalibration is not bad—it is ac ually good or ven great. If there is a 
need for a recalibratio , then it indicates that the re ourc -allocati n decision- 
maker has ev ewed th  process in detail and provided ore refine ent. The 
next FFIS/FFVA will be more finely tuned.
A legend for the risk map was created (Fig. 17.10). This allows a quick 
presentation of the findings.
VH H M L VL
VH C F
H A,B G
M D E
L
VL
ec
ne
u
qes
n
o
C
Likelihood
Fig. 17.9 FFIS heat map summary of the fraud opportunity problems. (Copyright Permission 
Granted) (Spink 2017)
#
Total 
(Likelihood * 
Consequence) Group/ Product
1 <<NOT REVIEWED
2
3
A VH = VH * H Online company, domestic mail delivery
B VH = VH* H Online company, international mail delivery
C VH = VH * VHOnline company, courier or P2P handoff delivery
D H = VH * M Online company, local inventory direct delivery
E H = H * M Online company, courier or P2P handoff delivery
F H = L * VH White Van, direct delivery
G H = H * H White Van, courier or P2P handoff
Incoming Goods-TOTAL (Econoimc + Hazard + Social)
Outgoing Goods-TOTAL (Econoimc + Hazard + Social)
Fig. 17.10 FFIS detail of the heat map fraud opportunity problems including the total, likelihood, 
consequence as well as the details of each problem. (Note: the incoming and outgoing goods detail 
is included to clarify that only the local impacts were assessed) (Copyright Permission Granted) 
(Spink 2017)
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Next, since there was such a tight cluster of “very high” incidents in terms 
of the markets and products, there could be a simple consideration of counter-
measures and control systems (Table 17.6).
While this is a quick assessment that is low in certainty and low in robust-
ness, it does add value to provide a case study but also for the country to begin 
to address this specific research question.
Table 17.6 FFIS detail of each cell with reference number, rank, problem, and countermeasures 
(Spink 2017)
Ref 
# Rank Problem Countermeasure
D3 VH Vodka bottles shipped 
through the domestic 
mail
For high incident, areas utilize X-ray/computer scanner to 
identify >0.5 L glass or plastic bottles (Q: are these already 
in use?)
D4 VH Vodka bottles shipped 
through the 
international mail
Add or adapt current mail X-ray/computer scanner for 
>0.5 L liquid in glass or plastic (Q: are they already in 
place?)
D5 VH Late night young 
people buying vodka 
from pedestrians
Review warning communication to this target group 
(social media of snapchat, Instagram, specific information 
brokers) (Q: what other public health information 
distribution or programs exist?)
 Conclusion
Before conducting assessments, it is important to thoroughly review the theoretical 
foundation and then adapt the use case to the specific application. The previous 
chapter covered risk analysis and basic assessment which provide a foundation that 
was built upon here to provide an expanded review of the application and assess-
ment. This chapter provided a series of examples and reviews that led to key conclu-
sions. The first conclusion is to clearly define the research question and the 
specification of the resource-allocation decision-making. The research question is 
exactly what problem you are addressing such as reducing the fraud opportunity and 
not a tactical middle step such as which test to choose. This effort to not just review 
the incidents but consider the decisions that will be made will help refine the speci-
fication of “how much is enough” for an assessment. The second conclusion is to 
conduct a case study or a use case (description of the method of how a goal is 
achieved) to be able to refine the assessment to meet the specific need. Since this is 
often the first time a food fraud assessment is conducted, a quick exercise will help 
both to provide insight but also to refine the process. This preliminary step seems 
contrary to the “do it right the first time” mantra. In this situation, it is probably 
impossible or at least impractical to try to decide on the method that would be used 
forever. For the first time addressing food fraud prevention the “do it right the first 
time,” the “it” is a pilot or preliminary study. The key outcome is the lessons learned 
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Sidebar: Bell-Shaped Distribution of Your Risks Versus an ERM Heat 
Map
The presentation of an assessment has several forms. There is no right or 
wrong method.
That said, be very clear about your goal before plotting the data or even 
before gathering any data. If the goal is to review food fraud in relation to all 
other enterprise-wide risks (the most applicable goal), then the method 
would not be to create a bell-shaped, even distribution of all food fraud 
incidents.
• First, there may be a need for an even distribution of the findings.
 – This spreads the results evenly across a spectrum such as very low to 
very high.
 – The calibration is the specific data set against itself.
 – This spreads the results evenly across the scale. This is similar to grad-
ing students on a bell-shaped curve. Even if all the students were bril-
liant, the bell-shaped curve would require the top 10% of students to be 
categorized as “excellent” and the bottom 10% to be categorized as 
“failing.”
 – As risk treatments are applied, and as individual vulnerabilities are 
reduced, the plot is recalibrated to spread the data over that span.
• Second, there may be the use of a standardized heat map that plots the 
assessment on a matrix such as bound by likelihood and consequence pre-
defined in a method or standard.
 – This spreads the results as determined by the definition of very low to 
very high.
 – The calibration is the assessment of the general definition of very low to 
very high.
 – This spreads the results as determined by the general definition of likeli-
hood and consequence.
 – As risk treatments are applied, and the individual vulnerabilities are 
applied, the entire data set could shift below the risk tolerance—actu-
ally, that is the goal. The risk threshold is set by the method.
• Finally, a variation of the standardized heat map is a corporate risk map 
that plots the likelihood and consequence determined by the entity’s unique 
and specific risk tolerance.
 – This spreads the results as determined by the definition of very low to 
very high.
 – The calibration is the assessment of the entity’s unique and specific 
definition of very low to very high.
(continued)
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 Appendix: WIIFM Chapter on Risk Implementation
This “What’s In It For Me” (WIFFM) section explains why this chapter is important 
to you.
Business 
functional group Application of this chapter
WIIFM all This provided insight and methods for the overall starting point of 
vulnerability assessments which is the Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) 
within the Food Fraud Prevention Cycle (FFPC)
Quality team This chapter presented the prefilter and Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) 
method—with case studies
Auditors This chapter will provide insight on the type of assessments you might 
recognize that are effective risk communication and that it is based on sound 
methods
Management The output should be a very simple one-page summary that presents all 
enterprise-wide risks under your control—with as much background detail as 
you need
Corp. 
decision-makers
The process will provide you with a high-level, one-page summary which the 
Food Fraud Prevention Strategy will seamlessly integrate into your COSO/
ERM type system with just with as much detail as you need
 – This spreads the results as determined by the entity’s definition of likeli-
hood and consequence.
 – The risk threshold is set by your own company’s risk managers based 
on a formal system such as ERM/COSO (which is actually set by your 
owners through their proxies, the Board of Directors).
As discussed elsewhere, the likelihood and consequence are presented in 
qualitative terms (e.g., words: very high, high, medium, low, very low) or 
quantitative terms (e.g., numbers: 5, 4, 3, 2, 1). The plot can include only the 
points or include a statement of the standard of deviation or confidence inter-
vals. Presenting two dimension figures with the point estimate and confidence 
intervals is very complex, and the charts are often confusing. Thus, just the 
point plot is usually used.
It is important to note here that the use of numbers may imply precision 
where a “3” is presented as defined by an analytical method to be significantly 
different than “2”. Further, a “3.7” versus a “3.8” implies accuracy and preci-
sion to two significant digits. For initial screening, prefilter, or early stage 
assessments, it is strongly recommended to use words not numbers.
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 Appendix: Study Questions
This section includes study questions based on the Key Learning Objectives in this 
chapter:
 1. Discussion question
 (a) What is the COSO/ERM source of credibility or authority?
 (b) Why is it so difficult to obtain even a simple estimate of the economic impact 
of food fraud or product counterfeiting?
 (c) What are the biggest hindrances of conducting a countrywide or company- 
wide assessment?
 2. Key learning objective 1
 (a) What is a COSO defined “initial screen”?
 (b) What is the first step in a COSO assessment?
 (c) What is the “risk of conducting a risk assessment”?
 3. Key learning objective 2
 (a) What is an FFIS?
 (b) What is an enterprise-wide assessment per COSO/ERM?
 (c) What are the COSO defined strengths and weaknesses of a qualitative vs. 
quantitative assessment?
 4. Key learning objective 3
 (a) What is “seizure data”?
 (b) What are the “challenges of using seizure data” in a FF assessment?
 (c) Why does FF prevention—and many types of crime such as IPR counterfeit-
ing—inherently include “inconsistent sources of data”?
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Chapter 18
Conclusion
Summary
This book addresses the food fraud prevention concepts cover a wide range of aca-
demic disciplines and include a breadth of applications. This chapter addresses the 
conclusions of the other chapters in a structured approach that presents the specific 
insights and then a summary of how they fit into the overall concept. This Conclusion 
Chapter will review each of the chapter conclusions and then provide an overall 
perspective. This is intended as a review of all the chapters but also a holistic and 
all- encompassing consideration of their application to the overall food fraud preven-
tion goal. There are so many specific concepts or processes that it is easy to be dis-
tracted from the focus on the fraud opportunity to completing the individual tasks.
The Key Learning Objectives of this book are
 1. Clearly understand and define the fraud opportunity by focusing on criminol-
ogy—understand why there are system weaknesses or vulnerabilities and how 
and why criminals perceive an opportunity.
 2. Conduct a pre-filter or initial screen for all types of fraud, for all products, and 
for the entire organization—if you can’t identify the most important problems, 
then you’re just guessing at the most urgent problems.
 3. Create an overall strategy that is broad enough to address compliance and busi-
ness management requirements—build upon the Enterprise Risk Management 
COSO concepts.
 Conclusion
There is a broad and deep body of work to draw upon for food fraud prevention. 
There is no shortage of insight from other disciplines, and the difficult part is to both 
narrow the content to consider and the application in a logical way. Considering the 
food fraud prevention concept and this book, The first conclusion is that addressing 
600
food fraud is fundamentally different from management of the other food risks of 
food quality, food safety, and food defense. The second conclusion is that the only 
real way to implement a holistic and all-encompassing system is to focus on vulner-
abilities and prevention. The final conclusion is that a systems approach is necessary 
that starts at a very light level and gets deeper as defined by the unique fraud oppor-
tunity and the company-specific, fluctuating risk tolerance. Finally, through all the 
work, continue to focus on the fraud opportunity. The Food Fraud Prevention Cycle 
is an efficient way to “connect everything to everything” and manage the process. 
Remember, “It’s all about the fraud opportunity.”
18 Conclusion
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 Afterword
If this book is successful, then at this point, the path forward is completely logical… 
common sense… and so obvious that it is ridiculous that a book was even published 
on the topic.
A note to other professors and instructors: We are very happy to collaborate on 
projects or course development. Please contact us through social media.
Afterword: Food Fraud Compliance—A Roadmap Summary (Fig. 1) 
(MSU-FFI 2018):
Title: Review—Trade Journal Articles on Food Fraud Compliance 
Requirements for GFSI, FSMA, and Sarbanes-Oxley
By John Spink • February 23, 2017 • Blog
Are you compliant with the current and pending regulatory and standards 
requirements to address “all” types of food fraud and “all” products? Probably 
not… but there are fairly simple steps to get started. Our MSU FFI team just 
published two trade journal articles that summarize numerous peer-reviewed, 
refereed scholarly journal articles. MSU’s Dr. Doug Moyer is a co-author on 
both articles.
Overview
Food Fraud is beginning to be understood as a unique food risk. Industry is 
shifting focus to Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessments requirements and cre-
ating a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. Full compliance requires addressing 
all types of Food Fraud (e.g., stolen goods and counterfeits) as well as all 
products, (e.g., incoming goods and outgoing or finished goods.) Also, the 
vulnerability assessment must cover all of your products, but not necessarily 
an individual assessment for “each” product.
It is important to realize that implementing separate plans for food safety, 
Food Fraud, and Food Defense plan does not triple the work—splitting up the 
tasks into three steps reduces the overall complexity.
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Combining the key points from the series of articles:
• 7 Questions: “Food Fraud Compliance Requirements — The general com-
pliance requirements for Food Fraud prevention are:
 1. Conduct a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment
 2. Confirm it is written
 3. Implement a written Food Fraud Prevention Strategy
 4. Confirm it is written
 5. Minimally conduct an annual Food Fraud Incident Review
 6. Address all types of Food Fraud
 7. Address all products from both incoming goods (e.g., ingredients) and 
outgoing goods (e.g., finished goods) through to the consumer.”
 8. Plus: Who is “accountable” for Food Fraud compliance (or blamed if 
there is a fail)? Do they know they are accountable?
 9. Plus: Who is “responsible” for managing the Food Fraud strategy? Do 
they know they are responsible?”
• 2 Concepts: “The first steps include:
 1. Convene a Food Fraud Task Force—this is the group to start the review 
and others may take over the ongoing management
Fig. 1 Blog post image. (Copyright Permission Granted)
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 2. Create an Enterprise-wide Food Fraud Policy/Mission Statement—also 
begin drafting a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy—the key is to “start,” 
not necessarily finish or wait for the final approval of the corporate level 
policy/mission”
• 7 Steps: “for a Food Fraud Task Force project—developing the proposal 
for a strategy
 1. Convene a Food Fraud Task Force
 2. Create an Enterprise-wide Food Fraud Policy/Mission Statement and 
begin drafting a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy/ Plan
 3. Conduct the pre-filter Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS)
 4. Review additional needs including additional information or a more 
detailed Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA)
 5. Review specific Food Fraud vulnerabilities in an enterprise risk map 
(Enterprise Risk Management)
 6. Consider countermeasures and control systems to address the ‘very 
high’ and ‘high’ vulnerabilities
 7. Propose a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy including the calibration of 
the Food Fraud risks on the enterprise risk map”
• 1 Decision: Decision, Approval, and Implementation: The Food Fraud 
Task Force project proposal is intended to be a full and formal recommen-
dation of the optimal Food Fraud Prevention Strategy for your enterprise:
 1. Formal Project request from an Executive sponsor
 2. Review by the Executive sponsor
 3. Decision by the Executive sponsor
At the end of this process, if there is either (1) no request for a formal proposal 
or (2) no approval of a new project or strategy, then the decision is to maintain 
the status quo. No decision is a decision.
Upon deeper review, the requirements are clear for the scope and timing of 
a Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment and a Food Fraud Prevention Strategy. 
That said, there is a steep adoption curve that most companies are just now 
approaching. This may seem like a daunting and complex task, but fortu-
nately, there are guidelines, summaries, research, and best practices to help 
the industry to navigate the various requirements and expectations in order to 
fully realize an effective Food Fraud Prevention Strategy.
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 Glossary
• A detailed glossary of terms is constantly changing. It is recommended to see the 
lasted Food Fraud Terminology Glossary on the Michigan State University Food 
Fraud Initiative Website at (MSU-FFI 2018): www.FoodFraudPrevention.com
 Further Reading
This section provides recommendations for further reading that are not by the author 
of this book. These are also not focused on specifically food fraud or food 
authenticity.
 Ten Recommended Readings: Reports by Government or Association
There are several key reports by governments or associations that provide founda-
tional insight or shaped the early FF research:
 1. OECD, organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Estimating 
the magnitude of counterfeiting and piracy, in OECD, The Economic Impact of 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, OECD Publishing, Paris, URL (full text): http://
dx.doi.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/10.1787/9789264045521-5-en. 2007: OECD 
Publishing. (OECD 2007)
 2. Clarke, Ronald, V and John E Eck, Crime analysis for problem solvers in 60 
Small Steps. Washington, DC: Center for Problem Oriented Policing, 2005. 
(Clarke and Eck 2005)
 3. FDA, Food and Drug Administration, Combating Counterfeit Drugs, U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, Editor. 2004. (FDA 2004)
 4. CRS, Congressional Research Service, Food Fraud and Economically 
Motivated Adulteration. 2014. (CRS 2014)
 5. DEFRA, United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 
Elliott review into the integrity and assurance of food supply networks, 
Independent report, Ref: PB14089, PDF, 539 KB, 84 pages, https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/350726/elliot- 
review- final-report-july2014.pdf. 2014. (DEFRA 2014)
 6. EC, European Commission, On the food crisis, fraud in the food chain and the 
control thereof. 2014. (EC 2014)
 7. GFSI, Global Food Safety Initiative, Food Fraud Technical Document, Tackling 
Food Fraud through Food Safety Management Systems, May 9, 2018, URL: 
http://www.mygfsi.com/files/Technical_Documents/201805-food-fraud- 
technical-document-final.pdf. 2018. & GFSI, Global Food Safety Initiative., 
GFSI Position on Mitigating the Public Health Risk of Food Fraud. 2014, 
Global Food Safety Initiative, Consumer Goods Forum. (GFSI 2014, 2018)
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 8. COSO, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 
Risk Assessment in Practice - Enterprise Risk Management. 2012, Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, COSO. (COSO 
2012)
 9. Dietrich, Ed, Erik Puskar, Andy Grace, Mary Ann Allen, and George Schmitt, 
Considering RFID for Use in the Fight Against Counterfeiting, in Emerging 
Technology Overview, Presented by the CACP’s Technology Task Force. 2006, 
Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP), U.S.  Chamber of 
Commerce. (Dietrich et al. 2006)
 10. DOJ, United States Department of Justice Prosecuting Intellectual Property 
Crime. CCIPS, Criminal Division, 2006. 2007. & 12. DOJ, Department of 
Justice, DOJ, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual 2013, Fourth 
Edition, Published by the Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys, URL: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/03/26/prosecuting_ip_crimes_manual_2013.pdf. (DOJ 
2006, 2013)
 Ten Recommended Readings: Books Related to Product Fraud
There are several books that were key to shaping the thinking and direction in this 
book. The key books are listed here:
 1. Naim, Moises, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking 
the Global Economy. 2005, NY, NY: Doubleday. (Naim 2005)
 2. Felson, M, Crime and Everyday Life (3rd Edition). 2002: Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. (Felson 2002)
 3. deKieffer, Donald, Underground Economies and Illegal Imports: Business and 
Legal Strategies to Address Illegitimate Commerce. 2010: Oxford University 
Press. (deKieffer 2010)
 4. Hopkins, David M., Lewis T. Kontnik, and Mark T. Turnage, Counterfeiting 
Exposed: How to Protect Your Brand and Market Share 2003, Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 304. (Hopkins et al. 2003)
 5. Phillips, Tim, Knockoff: the deadly trade in counterfeit goods: the true story of 
the world’s fastest growing crime wave. 2005, London: Kogan Page. (Phillips 
2005)
 6. Fortin, Neal D., Food regulation: law, science, policy, and practice. 2009, 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. (Fortin 2009)
 7. Wu, Yongning, Hong Miao, Bing Shao, Jing Zhang, J. Spink, and DC Moyer, 
Food Fraud [Chinese Version], in Food Safety in China  - Past, Present, and 
Future:, Science, Technology, Management and Regulation, Joseph Jwu-shan 
Jen and Junshi Chen, Editors. 2016: Beijing. p. E. & Wu, Yongning, Miao 
Hong, Bing Shao, Jing Zhang, John Spink, and DC Moyer, Chapter 15: Food 
Fraud [English Language], in Food Safety in China - Past, Present, and Future:, 
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Science, Technology, Management and Regulation, Joseph J Jen and Junshi 
Chen, Editors. 2017, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. (Wu et al. 2016, 2017)
 8. Eban, Katherine, Dangerous Doses: How Counterfeiters are Contaminating 
America’s Drug Supply. 1st ed. 2005, NY, NY: Harcourt, Inc. (Eban 2005)
 9. Wilson, Bee, Swindled: the dark history of food fraud, from poisoned candy to 
counterfeit coffee. 2008: Princeton University Press. (Wilson 2008)
 10. Accum, Friedrich Christian A, A treatise on adulterations of food, and culinary 
poisons. 1820, London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown. (Accum 
1820)
 Ten Recommended Readings: Books Related to Business and Management
 1. Porter, Michael E, Competitive strategy: Techniques of industry and competitor 
analysis. 1980, Free Press. (Porter 1980)
 2. Porter, Michael E, Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining superior 
performance. 1985. 1985, New York: Free Press. (Porter 1985)
 3. Kotler, Philip, Kotler on marketing. 2012: Simon and Schuster. (Kotler 2012)
 4. Bowersox, Donald J, David J Closs, and Cooper MB, Supply chain logistics 
management. Vol. 2. 2002: McGraw-Hill New  York, NY. (Bowersox et  al. 
2002)
 5. Dye, Thomas R, Understanding public policy (14th Edition). 2012: Prentice 
Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ. (Dye 2012)
 6. Stout, Martha, The sociopath next door: the ruthless versus the rest of us. 2005, 
New York: Broadway Books. (Stout 2005)
 7. van Schendel, Willem and Itty Abraham, Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: 
States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization. 2005, Bloomington, IN.: 
Indiana University. (van Schendel and Abraham 2005)
 8. Saviano, Roberto, Gomorrah: A Personal Journey into the Violent International 
Empire of Naples’ Organized Crime System, trans. Virginia Jewiss, New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. (Saviano 2007)
 9. Freidman, Thomas, The world is flat. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2005. 488. (Freidman 2005)
 10. Peters, Tom, Thriving on chaos. Vol. 7. 1987: Alfred A.  Knopf New  York. 
(Peters 1987).
 Recommended Readings: Key Journals Articles
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 Appendix: Public Policy History and Status
Excerpt from food fraud public policy development article (Spink et al. 2019):
This appendix is an expanded review of the key agenda setting activities or 
events that advanced the public policy-making. This is an expansion of the 
topics noted in the text above (for detailed citations of the quoted text, see the 
original publication (Spink et al. 2019)).
2009—USA—Defining Economically Motivated Adulteration: As mentioned 
earlier, in May 2009, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) conducted 
a Public Meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) that 
applied to all products they regulate including medicines, food, food ingredi-
ents, dietary supplements, medical devices, and others. Due to this broad 
scope, the FDA defined EMA addresses more than just food. At the same 
time, FDA’s EMA scope was narrowed to only a “substance” for “economic 
gain” and not the broader “Adulterated Foods” concept in the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act (21 USC §331 2008; FDA, 2009). The FDA meeting empha-
sized that beyond an adulterant-substance, the FD&C defines “Adulterated 
Foods” to include goods that are stolen, smuggled, genuine but expired, genu-
ine but spoiled, or others. To note, the FDCA defines “Misbranded Foods” as 
a separate concept (21 U.S.C. 362 2011). Thus, there is confusion where an 
“Adulterated Food” may not include an adulterant-substance or may not be 
food fraud in the case of genuine spoiled goods. Other FDA groups, such as 
medicines, have had a more precise focus on product counterfeiting or stolen 
goods. The formal regulatory “Adulterated Products” definition is not com-
mon across all FDA products, so the concept could not be implemented uni-
formly across FDA.  There were also other confusing points such as EMA 
being a common abbreviation in medicines regulation referring to the EU 
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European Medicines Agency. Using EMA for all products would be as con-
fusing as the food industry using “FDA” as an abbreviation for an entity other 
than a food and drug administration. Regardless of the debates, EMA of food 
was explicitly defined by the GAO and CRS to be on the FDA public policy 
agenda.
2009—ISO—ISO Technical Committee 247 Fraud Countermeasures and 
Controls: Expanding from US standards that focused on anti-counterfeiting, 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) proposed and led the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) Technical Committee 247 Fraud 
Countermeasures and Controls (TC247). This focused on a range of counter-
feiting for fraud including currency, tax stamps, identify documents, and 
product fraud including product counterfeiting. In 2015 TC247 was moved 
into the Technical Committee 292 Security Management and Resilience. The 
standards that have been adopted—or are in final approval stages—include 
interoperability of authentication features, analysis of product fraud incidents, 
and definitions.
2011—USA—Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) Law: This new stat-
ute has over 70 mentions of “prevent” or “prevention” and 11 mentions of 
“intentional adulteration” (FDA 2011). EMA was shifted from the FSMA 
Intentional Adulteration rule to the FSMA Preventive Controls rule 
(FSMA-PC, or PC). The Intentional Adulteration section (FSMA-IA or IA) 
was later defined to be only essentially “catastrophic events” such as terrorist 
attacks. This shift of the rule is consistent with the text of the original law 
published in the US Code. Regardless of the EMA or food fraud terms not 
specifically mentioned in FSMA, the law clearly states that FDA is expected 
to lead a prevention effort for all types of hazards even those that are “eco-
nomically motivated.”
2012—USA—Food Safety Modernization Act, Intentional Adulteration Rule 
(IA): During rulemaking, the FDA interpreted the Congressional lawmakers’ 
intent of the IA section scope to only be “catastrophic events” such as terror-
ism. The text of “intentional adulteration, including acts of terrorism” (note 
the comma) to really mean “intentional adulteration acts of terrorism” (no 
comma). Considering a related concept, the IA section was also refined to not 
cover “disgruntled employees” or “malicious tampering.” Those two actions 
are illegal under FSMA but not addressed in a rule. The final IA rule stated 
that EMA would be addressed in the Preventive Controls section of 
FSMA. This rule was finalized in 2016.
2012—GFSI—Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) Addressing Food Fraud: 
The GFSI created a Food Fraud Think Tank to provide insight and guidance 
to the GFSI Board of Directors. The original title was Economic Adulteration 
Think Tank but shifted to food fraud. The goal was to review the food fraud 
issue, how it might be addressed under the GFSI type Food Safety Management 
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System principles, and if it was within the scope and mission of GFSI. GFSI 
solicited feedback from their broad membership, including in many public 
workshops and presentations. Thus, this activity raised the awareness that 
food fraud was going to be addressed. This became a requirement in February 
2017 to be required in January 2018.
2013—UK—DEFRA Elliott Review of Food Crime: The UK Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and Department of Health 
co-funded the Elliott Review (led by Professor Christopher Elliott of Queen’s 
University, Belfast) on food fraud which reviewed the issue and proposed 
countrywide countermeasures and programs. The very clear directives are 
being broadly implemented in what can be considered as world-leading 
efforts.
2012—Scotland—Food Standards Agency, Arrangements to secure food 
standards and safety in Scotland (The Scudamore Report): Scotland created a 
report that reviewed the options for managing all food standards and food 
safety (FSAS 2012). Scotland clearly defines food fraud (“Food fraud is com-
mitted when food is deliberately placed on the market, for financial gain, with 
the intention of deceiving the consumer.”). They also clearly define food fraud 
as a food agency issue (“The Food Standards Agency takes the issue of food 
fraud very seriously and… the Agency has a responsibility to protect the con-
sumer.”). They also clearly assign responsibility for enforcement but not 
explicitly a countrywide prevention strategy (“In Scotland, the Incidents 
Team within the Enforcement Branch manages and co-ordinates the response 
to food fraud”).
2013—EC—European Commission Resolution on Food Fraud: The European 
Commission (EC)—the administrative branch of the European Union—pub-
lished a draft resolution that defined food fraud and the focus on prevention in 
2013 that was passed in 2014. The EC has proposed and is supporting that the 
European Member States also adopt this broad definition of food fraud and 
the focus on prevention.
2013—Ireland—Review of Food Standards Agency response to the incident 
of contamination of beef products with horse and pork meat and DNA, An 
Independent Report: Ireland conducted a review of the horsemeat incident 
that included recommendations for managing future related incidents (Food 
Safety Authority of Ireland 2013). The report stated, “The FSA should take 
the lead in building capability, but a collaborative approach will be essential.” 
It also recommended that “The arrangements for authenticity and in particular 
the management of incidents need to be clarified and placed on the FSA 
website.”
2014—EP—European Parliament Prioritizing Food Fraud: The European 
Parliament—the legislative branch of the European Union—food fraud was 
identified as a top-5 policy issue, not just a top-5 food issue but at top-5 for all 
issues.
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2014—GFSI—GFSI Food Fraud Position on Food Fraud Published: GFSI 
published their Position Paper on Food Fraud that defined food fraud would 
be included—and required—for companies to achieve future GFSI 
Certification. In 2014, GFSI even identified implementing food fraud to be a 
top-5 priority for 2015.This certification is often a prerequisite to conduct 
business.
2014—UK—National Food Crime Unit (NFCU): In response to the recom-
mendations in The Elliott Review, the UK government created the National 
Food Crime Unit (NFCU). Housed within in the UK Food Standards Agency, 
the NFCU is headed by a law enforcement director and operates across all 
agencies. The NFCU has been established as a coordinating body similar to 
INTERPOL but has more direct intelligence gathering powers. The initial 
funding was “minimal as the Unit initially evolved from a small but similar 
capability within the FSA.” The annual running cost was £580,000 
(US$725,000), and the final allocation is agreed to £1.2 million (US$1,500,000) 
(Parliament 2016).
2015—USA—Food Safety Modernization Act, Preventive Controls, EMA: 
While not too many details are provided in the FSMA-PC Final Rule, it 
appears it covers an “agent” that causes a “hazard” that must be mitigated 
from an “economically motivated” act (MSU FFI 2018). FSMA-IA specifi-
cally mentions “stolen” goods to FSMA do cover all types of fraud or the 
traditional definition of “food fraud.” The prevention focus shifts the burden 
to the manufacturer. As with other FDA regulations such as for medicines and 
tampering, the responsibility shifts from a prescriptive approach (what you 
need to do) to performance (demonstrate a control measure is effective). A 
question becomes “why did you decide this was NOT a ‘hazard that required 
a preventive control’.” Many of the seven FSMA Final Rules reiterate that the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act is still in effect. For food fraud, the sections 
that are most applicable are “Adulterated Foods” and “Misbranded Foods.” 
This rule was finalized in 2015 and is a legal requirement starting in September 
2016.
2015—BRC—Food Safety Management System Food Fraud Requirements 
Being Audited: In April 2015, the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Issue 7, a 
GFSI compliance standard, required a food fraud vulnerability assessment 
and mitigation plan. It was announced that BRC would be auditing against the 
food fraud concepts meaning that addressing food fraud would be a require-
ment to receive the certification. While the depth and breadth of implementa-
tion are currently undefined, there is a current, industry-wide, food fraud 
strategy in place.
2015—China—Chinese Food Law Addressing Nontraditional Food Threats: 
Public presentations by Chinese government food officials have revealed a 
root in criminal law and not just a regulation. Also, while the laws build upon 
adulteration and counterfeiting, the concepts are presented in a hierarchy or 
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continuum that emphasizes addressing all the risk together. The food fraud 
term has been explicitly defined as holistic, all-encompassing, and harmo-
nized with the global government and industry scope.
2016—CODEX—Codex Alimentarius Draft Discussion Document on Food 
Authenticity and Food Integrity: CODEX included a food fraud agenda item 
in 2015 and 2016 until the draft documents were created.
2017—GFSI—GFSI Guidance Document Version 7: In February 2017, the 
new GFSI Guidance Document was published which defined the requirement 
for a (1) food fraud vulnerability assessment and (2) food fraud prevention 
strategy (GFSI 2017). The definition and scope of food fraud is “A collective 
term encompassing the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tam-
pering or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients or food packaging, 
labeling, product information or false or misleading statements made about a 
product for economic gain that could impact consumer health.” To be compli-
ant with GFSI, a company, standard, or auditor company must address all 
types of fraud (including stolen goods, tampering, and mislabeling) and all 
products (including raw materials through packaged goods in the market-
place). It is important to note that not every vulnerability is a hazard that 
would be identified as a risk—every vulnerability must be assessed, but a 
countermeasure is not always required. The formal compliance requirement is 
1 year after publication.
2017—China—China FDA Request for Comments on “Fraud in Food 
Safety”: In March 2017, the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) 
published a public request for comments on addressing “Fraud in Food 
Safety.” This is in support of the Chinese Food Safety Law that was enacted 
in 2014 and is being updated (Wu et al. 2017a, b). The questions included a 
focus on investigation and prosecution with an emphasis on efficiency and 
prevention.
2017—CODEX—CCFICS EWG: Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food 
Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems (CCFICS) reviewed 
a food fraud discussion draft paper at the May 2017 meeting. An Electronic 
Working Group (EWG) was formed to review the definitions of food fraud, 
food integrity, and food adulteration, as well as gaps in the current CODEX 
standards, with a focus on broad food fraud incidents and on prevention (MSU 
FFI 2017). While there are no final conclusions, the EWG is a first formal step 
in the development of a standard.
2017—ISO—ISO 22000 Update: In June 2017, the ISO 22000 standard is 
being reviewed for an update. There are specific sections that are proposed to 
deal separately with food fraud and also with food defense (ISO 2017b).
2019—Canada—Food Fraud Work Group (FFWG): Creating in December 
2018, the Canadian government has undertaken a project to review the Food 
Fraud problem, the current state, and then to consider gaps and best practices 
for an optimal public-private partnership approach (Cadieux et al. 2019).
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 Appendix: Scholarly Works by the Author
Review of scholarly works by the author per Google Scholar as of January 10, 
COFS2:
Title
Cited 
by Year
1 Development and application of a database of food ingredient fraud and 
economically motivated adulteration from 1980 to 2010
376 2012
JC Moore, J Spink, M Lipp
Journal of Food Science 77 (4), R118-R126
2 Defining the public health threat of food fraud 315 2011
J Spink, DC Moyer
Journal of Food Science 76 (9), R157-R163
3 Economically motivated adulteration (EMA) of food: Common 
characteristics of EMA incidents
150 2013
K Everstine, J Spink, S Kennedy
Journal of Food Protection 76 (4), 723–735
4 Understanding and combating food fraud 45 2013
J Spink, DC Moyer
Food technology 67 (1)
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41 2017
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Food Control 71, 358–364
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35 2013
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27 2011
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…
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11 Introducing the food fraud initial screening model (FFIS) 34 2016
J Spink, DC Moyer, C Speier-Pero
Food Control 69, 306–314
12 Introducing Food Fraud including translation and interpretation to Russian, 
Korean, and Chinese languages
21 2015
J Spink, DC Moyer, H Park, Y Wu, V Fersht, B Shao, M Hong, SY Paek, …
Food chemistry 189, 102–107
13 A review of the economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy methodologies 
and assessment of currently utilized estimates
20 2012
J Spink, Z Levente Fejes
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 36 (4 …
14 Defining food fraud and the chemistry of the crime 16 2012
J Spink
Improving Import Food Safety, 195–216
15 Food fraud prevention shifts the food risk focus to vulnerability 15 2017
J Spink, DL Ortega, C Chen, F Wu
Trends in Food Science & Technology 62, 215–220
16 Combating the impact of product counterfeiting 14 2010
J Spink, OK Helferich, JE Griggs
Distribution Business Management journal 10 (6)
17 Food fraud prevention: Policy, strategy, and decision-making–implementation 
steps for a government agency or industry
12 2016
J Spink, ND Fortin, DC Moyer, H Miao, Y Wu
CHIMIA International Journal for Chemistry 70 (5), 320–328
18 Overview of the selection of strategic authentication and tracing programmes 11 2012
J Spink
Counterfeit Medicines: Policy, Economics and Countermeasures 1, 111
19 When crime events defy classification: The case of product counterfeiting as 
white-collar crime
9 2017
JA Heinonen, J Spink, JM Wilson
Security Journal 30 (2), 621–639
20 Development of a product-counterfeiting incident cluster tool 9 2014
J Spink, DC Moyer, H Park, JA Heinonen
Crime Science 3 (1), 3
21 The role of the public-private partnership in Food Fraud prevention—
Includes implementing the strategy
8 2016
J Spink, DC Moyer, P Whelan
Current Opinion in Food Science 10, 68–75
22 Addressing the risk of product fraud: a case study of the Nigerian combating 
counterfeiting and sub-standard medicines initiatives
5 2016
J Spink, DC Moyer, MR Rip
Journal of Forensic Science & Criminology 4 (2), 1–13
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Y Wu, H Miao, B Shao, J Zhang, JW Spink, DC Moyer
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0 2019
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